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1 Introduction: Crossroad Civilisations and
Bricolage Identities
Erich Kolig, Sam Wong, Vivienne SM. Angeles
Globalisation seems to be taking an unexpected turn: the hegemon that
has driven it so far appears to be weakening, succumbing to the com-
petition emanating from elsewhere. The process of decentring of Eur-
ope and North America is rapidly advancing, shifting the focus of eco-
nomic and socio-political dynamic perceptibly ‘eastwards’. As the
pathos of Western hegemonic reproduction withers, a new hegemon
appears to be descending the cultural and technological birth canal.
Combined with its traditional diligence and sheer force of numbers, if
‘Asia’ had the energy resources of the Middle East and the technologies
and missionary zeal of the West, humankind would be speaking Man-
darin by now instead of English,1 and Beijing would have the status of
Washington DC or New York. It does not require excessive imagination
to foresee that Asia would be the vortex of global civilisation drawing,
in ever increasing circles, the rest of the world into its orbit. Somewhat
belatedly, this is beginning to take shape now. It is unclear whether
this is the consequence of the catastrophic decline of the Western hege-
mon – as, for instance, Friedman (1994, 2006)2 has argued – or
whether this is simply a phase in the cyclical development in which
the cosmopolitical epicentre shifts from time to time with law-like in-
evitability.
However, as the West is gradually sliding into global eccentricity, it
is important to realise that ‘Asia’ is far from being a coherent and
homomorphous civilisation in any way comparable to ‘the West’; nor is
it a series of internally integrated major civilisations such as Sino-Con-
fucian, Malay, Japanese and Hindu-Indian, and their respective satellite
civilisations. Cutting across this, there are the deep, traditional, cultural
cleavages of religion, language and custom of a multitude of ethnici-
ties. And then there are globally relevant fault lines, cleavages that Asia
shares with the rest of the world and which are important in the for-
mation of identity, and divide it internally. These dissect Asia in many
ways, producing a richness, multi-chromatism and complexity that riv-
als the dazzling best the world can offer elsewhere. This intricate and
often baffling complexity questions Samuel Huntington’s concept of ‘ci-
vilisation’3 which, though alluring in its splendid simplicity, reveals it-
self to be largely fictitious, ignoring as it does the finer detail that is so
very important for the formation of people’s identity. The ‘Clash of Ci-
vilizations and the Remaking of World Order’ turns out on closer in-
spection to be rather less than macro-cosmic as the socio-political rea-
lity falls into a confusing pastiche of cross-cutting, competing and con-
flicting identities, political interests and social and cultural units,
giving the lie to the vision of a profoundly and clearly segmented world
order. Syncretisms and antagonisms, cultural repulsion and attraction
sit side by side in a bewildering global kaleidoscope – and nowhere in
greater and more colourful complexity than ‘Asia’.
Despite its popularity and admiration in political circles, Hunting-
ton’s thesis has rightly been under attack for offering a monolithic un-
derstanding of civilisations and paying little attention to the multiple
layers of personal and collective sense of Selfness and identity (Philips
2002: 598). It has also been criticised for being overly simplistic in un-
derstanding the complex process of identity building and the negotia-
tion of different actors between civilisations. Among others, Amartya
Sen (2006) questions Huntington’s concept of an inevitable clash
along civilisation lines. He proposes that the root cause of violence is
the failure to see the multiple affiliations of individuals. For example, a
working-class woman from a low caste is not just ‘Indian’, a caste
member placing her in largely pre-determined, pervasive relationships
with other Indians and belonging to a particular economic class and
consumer group; at the same time she also fulfils a multitude of other
social roles and identities: as a daughter of her parents, a mother of
her children, a doting wife, possibly a member of a religious organisa-
tion or a political party and a union organiser. The multiplicity of iden-
tities requires individuals to negotiate and juggle their competing
needs, roles and fragmented self-awarenesses. Edward Said (2001)
rather scathingly critiqued Huntington’s thesis, satirising it as ‘the
Clash of Ignorance’ and as a ‘gimmick’. He suggests that the way Hun-
tington – whom he calls a ‘clumsy writer and inelegant thinker’ – di-
vides the world into a few basic civilisations and closed ‘civilisation
identities’ is a falsification of reality. Civilisations are not ‘sealed off
identities purged of the myriad current and countercurrents’ that pro-
duce exchange, cross-fertilisation and sharing. Although dynamic and
competitive interactions of cultures can lead to conflict, they can also
offer solutions, fertile syncretisms and seminalities.
Samuel Huntington presents identity in a broad scope, in terms of a
‘civilisation identity’ defined by common objective elements, like lan-
guage, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective
self-identification of people (Huntington 1993: 24). This view tends to
present a picture of rigid structures – coming to us unchanged from
the ‘mythical’ past – as underlying the world. Especially in an age of
globalisation, this hardly seems adequate any more.
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Globalisation4 and its effects on culture and identity formation have
been a major subject of contemporary studies (Appadurai 1996, 2003;
Tomlinson 1999). While largely visible in the economic sphere as de-
monstrated by the exchange of goods and services and by the prolifera-
tion of multinational business all over the world, globalisation has af-
fected self-consciousness and given rise to new connectivities, pro-
moted innovative ways of looking at the world and of viewing the Self.
As people, for instance, become transnational migrants and as ideas
travel in cyberspace, old notions of identity and nationalism that have
been rooted to particular geographic places and parochial interests are
challenged and redefined to reflect new realities. Globalisation requires
fundamental reorientation of traditional identities to take note of one’s
embeddedness in a world-wide context. In a sense everyone becomes
‘diasporic’.
This view of identity and belongingness as fluid and constructed at
the same time also raises questions about the idea of nationalism in a
continuously changing world, where one in every 35 persons is an in-
ternational migrant.5 Huntington coined the expression ‘Davos Man’
for the global elite for whose transnational if not supra-national activ-
ities national boundaries were obsolete, a vanishing nuisance. Today’s
transnationalism goes well beyond the financial and business elite as-
sembling in Davos every year. An increasing number of people become
transnationals with multiple loyalties. In fact, one might say Islam has
bred Davos men for centuries.
How individual actions and motivations align with collective goals
has become a topic of great interest in the politics of identity building
(Cerulo 1997). Identity can be explained as ‘the way individuals and
people understand themselves along with the way they see themselves
as relating to other people, the natural world and the spiritual world’
(Richter et al. 2005: 21). It is also a very complex notion in another re-
spect, as explained by Croucher (2004: 40), who uses the term ‘belong-
ing’ as a way of recognising both the ‘affective dimensions of attach-
ment and identity while preserving an awareness of their fluidity and
constructedness’. Croucher further recognises the multiplicity of iden-
tity with its varying levels of centrality for the individual and the group.
Always formed in reference to an ‘Other’, identity is then redefined
and reconceptualised in response to an increasingly globalised and
complex society.
It seems more appropriate under present circumstances to speak of
‘identity bricolage’6 so as to link the micro- and macro-process of iden-
tity building. The idea is built on Anthony Giddens’s structuration the-
ory (1984) and Benedict Anderson’s idea of ‘imagined communities’
(1991). The notion of ‘identity bricolage’ highlights human agency in
shaping, and adopting, individual identity and the complex and often
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less-than-conscious motivations in drawing on identity to weave webs
of interaction and obtain access to resources, both material and imma-
terial. It acknowledges the fluidity and permeability of identity building
through a process of negotiation and contestation. That said, one needs
to be aware of the influence of structural constraints and institutional
settings in shaping identity. The agency-structure duality is, therefore,
useful in providing a sociological lens to examine the complexity of
identity building by underlining the structure and different sources of
social identity over time. It also helps break down the unnecessary bin-
ary divisions of identity.
Benedict Anderson, in his classical work Imagined Communities
(1999), defines a nation as ‘an imagined political community’. His con-
cept of ‘imagined community’ examines the complex process through
which individuals become attached to their communities and nations.
He is particularly interested in finding out how identity emerges from
sociability, how community members feel connected by developing
shared identities, although many of them do not engage in direct inter-
personal relationships with other community members. He suggests
that myth-making and its promulgation by the print media are central
components to developing ‘imagined communities’, and the psycholo-
gical aspect of identity politics is as important as social and political
forces.
The idea of ‘identity bricolage’ provides a useful metaphor for build-
ing on Anderson’s imagined communities and exploring how the inter-
actions between subjectivity, institutions and structures facilitate and
constrain the imaginative process of building not only nation but also
identity (see Haesley 2005). ‘Identity bricolage’ also helps to under-
stand the process of construction and dismantling of ‘imagined com-
munities’ and the changing meaning of individual identification over
time. We acknowledge that the imagining process is not without limits.
Neither do all individuals share the same capacity and resources to
draw on ‘myths’ to make claims (Wong 2007). We are also aware of
the paradoxes of shared identity: while it helps anchor people, the pro-
cess can also exert strong coercive pressures towards conformity (see,
for instance, Calhoun 1991).
Anderson (1999: 4) asserts that ‘nationality or nation-ness as well as
nationalism are cultural artefacts: that once created, they become mod-
ular, capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-con-
sciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged
with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constel-
lations’. Thus, it is subject to change over time, and such change de-
pends to some extent on how people ‘imagine’ themselves in a chan-
ging world. Some 25 years after Anderson’s book first came out, the
electronic media has outpaced the print media in terms of speed and
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quantity. The proliferation of electronic devices like the internet, cable
television and cell phones, to name a few, has opened up new ways
and new vehicles for imagining nations and now beyond that: imagin-
ing global connectivities. Anderson’s views on ‘nation-ness’ or national-
ity continue to resonate in this age of electronics. Thus, it becomes all
the more necessary to see the linkages among identity, nationalism
and globalisation.
The Papers:7 a dialogue with Huntington and Anderson
The ruling identity-forming factors in today’s world – if it hasn’t always
been like that – are not stable cultural macro-entities, but volatile pro-
cesses and dynamics that can produce ephemeral, fast-changing, un-
stable results: socio-cultural quarks in an unpredictable quantum me-
chanics. The socio-political and ideological world discourses today can
be seen to be ruled by three major centrifugal forces which compete in
trying to pull humanity in quite different identity directions: globalisa-
tion, nationalism and ethnicity.
It is tempting to place these forces in an evolutionary framework to
establish a satisfactory classification relationship between them: mod-
ern-day ethnicisation being a throw back to the pre-state condition of
socio-political grouping; state formation and nationalism as the next
developmental step; and globalisation and socio-political internationali-
sation as the world-spanning last phase of identity development, the in-
evitable step towards bringing humankind under one all-encompassing
awareness. In this perspective, globalisation can be linked with mod-
ernism, the global hegemon of the West mobilising forces of political
economy to move the world in a certain direction, which supposedly of-
fers a glimpse of the future. Some would argue this process has stalled
now as the agens movens, the hegemon, is declining, and the mission
of global modernisation has remained incomplete. But Asia resists
such easy categorisation.
Globalisation works mainly as a process of global intertwining in the
form of internationalisation in all areas of human activity and thought,
seemingly drawing the world along a homogenising trajectory at the
end of which there will be putatively a single world culture. Largely still
perceived as an offshoot of Westernisation, if not Western imperialism,
it is seen by some as a spent force. Others see it as still strengthening
and thus becoming an impulse for cultural resistance, a reactionary
force that in turn sparks off an array of small, culturally based identi-
ties (see, for instance, Harrison 1999; Grillo 2003). The ethnicisation
process we observe, and its cultural politics, are either the result of a
decline of the modernist hegemonic mission, allowing opposition phe-
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nomena to come to the fore, or in a mechanistic sense, its unrelenting
course provoking ever stronger and more obvious counter-forces for
fear of eventual universal homogenisation.
In this process of ethnicisation, ethnic cultures are vying for survival,
sometimes aspiring to separatism and possibly more: dominance over
competing others.
Cutting across these three forces and arraigned against globalisation
– but often provoked by it, especially when it is perceived as clandes-
tine Westernisation – there are the forces of regionalisation. Elena As-
ciutti’s essay describes (East) ‘Asian’ ideological regionalism with its at-
tempts to create a specific identity that is designed to resist globalising
– perceived to be Westernising – processes, from its point of view em-
bodied especially by the human rights agenda. Asian regionalism offers
an interesting paradox: it goes beyond both ethnicisation and national-
ism, yet offers no acceptance of a globalised identity, in fact negates all
of that. It offers an identity that has been inspired by globalisation, yet
resists it. A parallel exists in the united Europe arising from the eco-
nomic-political construct of the European Union, which struggles with
a new identity that transcends narrow and very entrenched national-
isms yet formulates itself in sharp contrast to the rest of the world.
The contributions enter into a dialogue not only with globalisation
and with Huntington’s civilisational concept, but also and especially
with Benedict Anderson’s notion of national identity. Nationalism is an-
other major ideological and political force. It emphasises the sover-
eignty and exclusive powers of the State and especially the cultural
messianic properties of the nation-state. Nationalism, one might say, is
a European invention that exerted an especially strong effect in the
19th century. After it had served to divide up Europe into nation-states,
the idea was forcibly extended onto the rest of the world through the
efforts of colonialism. The enforced creation of territorially defined na-
tion-states brought along its own political difficulties, many of which
had to do with the ideal of such a state to be mono-ethnic and mono-
cultural. If conditions were not in conformity – for instance, by not
forming a culturally monochrome polity – they had to be pressed into
a straitjacket of cultural and ideological uniformity, if necessary by
force. Romantic visions of a culturally homogenous fatherland or
motherland, whatever the terminology may have been, helped to en-
trench this political reality emotionally. In Europe, J.G. Herder, J.G.
Fichte and other philosophers propagated and romantically embroi-
dered this cultural monochrome to make it a desirable ideal. The Third
World found its own propagandists of this notion, peddling the high
value of an ‘organic’ communitarianism in preference to liberal indivi-
dualism. It sets aside the liberal political theory of Locke and Smith
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that envisaged the individualist, freely choosing persona opposed to the
communal, societal and national constraints.
Achieving an ‘imagined community’ may come at a price. Creating
community with a national identity may be closely aligned with cultur-
al imperialism and intolerance towards minority and client cultures. It
is often combined with monoculturalism and the hegemony of a domi-
nant identity over minority interests. Malaysia, as analysed by Toru
Ueda, sets an example of a government-induced, relatively gentle form
of creating and instilling a national identity and culture that still seeks
to embrace cultural diversity. Other countries are more ruthless in the
pursuit of cultural nationalism. Rup Kumar Barman describes Bhutan’s
monocultural nationalism – state regulated and legislated and para-
doxically combined with a process of democratisation. It alienates and
excludes significant minorities and drives them literally into exile. In a
still stronger sense, trying to impose a national culture in an effectively
pluralist, multicultural situation can also produce exceptionally viru-
lent, aggressive forms, as Sali Augustine’s paper argues with regard to
fanatical Hindu nationalism.
Asia has taken its own course, obscuring what may elsewhere seem
like a clear-cut evolutionary development. In Asia the force of national-
ism and the insistence of the sovereign powers of the state – defending
it against the claims of ideological globalism – are probably the stron-
gest, with China setting the glaring example. While engaging forcefully
in the economic side of globalisation and doing so on the level of na-
tion, in other respects it has retained a much more diversified picture.
Sam Wong, drawing on his experiences with Chinese migrants from
mainland China to Hong Kong, shows the absence of a pan-Chinese
identity and instead a fluidity of subnational choices. He examines
how Chinese migrants’ identities change almost chameleon-like in dif-
ferent contexts. Critically viewing Huntington’s thesis, he argues that
migrants develop different identities in order to cope with their every-
day lives in the host society.
Arraigned against the other major identity-producing forces, there is
ethnicisation, i.e. the emergence or maintenance of culturally or reli-
giously based subnational identities, insistence on minority rights, as-
sertions of cultural, ethnic or religious autonomy and political separate-
ness. In its sub-national expression it often comes into conflict with na-
tionalism. Sometimes there is freedom to assert ethnic – or tribal –
identity, but it comes at the price of being left behind by the main-
stream, either ignored and forgotten, or struggling to hold its own
against being swamped by national interests. As India’s traditional
caste system sits side by side with newly emergent socio-economic
groups such as working class, middle class and modern entrepreneur-
ship, tribally or ethnically based, small-scale economies co-exist with
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powerful, internationally intertwined national economies. So-called
‘primitive tribal communities’ in India seem to belong to a different
era and are now struggling against the forces of a nation powerfully
striving to take a leading position in the 21st century – as Samar Kumar
Biswas’s paper describes.
These forces define and redefine the Us-versus-Them divide by
drawing a circle of inclusiveness around the in-group identity and di-
viding it sharply from the out-group. The distinguishing criteria are of
a cultural kind: just as on a larger scale Huntington’s model of civilisa-
tions relies on an exaggerated boundary-emphasising delineation.
Sen’s, Sa¨a¨va¨la¨’s and Chang’s essays demonstrate the opposite: the fluid-
ity and permeability of such cultural boundaries, and how syncretisms
and composite self-definitions are created through cultural ‘osmosis’,
vitally contributing to and enriching identity formation.
In this process of taking India into a new era, syncretisms emerge, if
reluctantly recognised (especially when they bring up shades of the co-
lonial past), which are a by-product of globalisation unwittingly bring-
ing change and excoriating national identities. Krishna Sen examines
how the English language and English studies in India interact with
class consciousness today in a way quite different from colonial times.
Using an historical approach that critically appraises the British colo-
nial rule through to the post-colonial administration, she suggests that
independent post-colonial India does not offer a simple binary of ‘nati-
vism’ versus ‘globalism’. Instead, the foreign import enhances and un-
derpins an Indian middle-class identity. Very much the same may be
said about birthday cakes. Minna Sa¨a¨va¨la¨ uses birthday cakes in India
as an example to illustrate how they, being seen as archetypically ‘Wes-
tern’, can yet strengthen the new middle-class Indian’s national cultural
Self and how they negotiate apparently contradictory cultural mean-
ings. In a similar vein, Eddy Chang investigates the ‘Germanic’ music
import of Beethoven’s Ode to Joy to Japan, to become an expression of
Japanese groupism, creating an identity that blends traditional Oriental
features with Occidentalism.
Multicultural coexistence does not always offer a happy solution of
mutual permeation. Not unusually, there are problems with identities
in a multicultural situation. Charlene Rajendran draws on her thespian
background and her experience with a theatre director’s attempt to
overcome ethnic barriers in Malaysia’s pluralist, multicultural society.
Ethnic identities may be recognised and officially tolerated in Malaysia,
but in the daily social discourse they easily evoke xenophobic feelings
towards the cultural ‘stranger’.
The final two essays by Vivienne Angeles and Erich Kolig deal with
the special case of Muslims as national minorities – a fateful combina-
tion that is easily bent to a suspicion of ‘strangeness’. Muslim identities
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tend to sit poorly in a culturally or religiously different majority society.
A strong Muslim sense of religious and cultural exceptionalism makes
it difficult for a majority society to enfranchise a minority of such dis-
tinctive identity. Where Muslims form a minority – be it in a diasporic
sense as in New Zealand or where they are indigenous as in the Philip-
pines – they show an unfortunate tendency in today’s world to pose a
prominent challenge to nationalism’s imagined community. Muslim-
ness not only generates a strongly binding force that unites a global
umma (including the Muslim minority now resident in the Western
world) but can assume outright political overtones when it is combined
with aspirations of creating a global khilafa. Even a harmless cultural
element like adopting a Middle Eastern sartorial code may raise suspi-
cions about the loyalties of such a conspicuously transnational identity.
At best, the relationship between nationalism and Islam becomes the
subject of a close scrutiny as to their compatibility (see, for example,
Zubaida 2004).
Religion, too, may be welcomed as a cement of social solidarity use-
fully underpinning the nationalist notion and forming a salient ingre-
dient in the national characteristic. However, the emphatic elevation of
religion as a collective identity could also achieve the exact opposite: it
may become an exclusionary factor for other religionists, as the Philip-
pines demonstrate.
The New Zealand example reminds us of the ambiguous position of
nationalism in the West. The kind of romantically conceived national-
ism that relied on the characteristic predominance of one culture to de-
fine the national character and inform the national identity appears to
be retreating in the face of globalisation and its homogenising forces.
Globalisation undermines nationalism and the cultural monochrome
on which it is founded in several ways: juridically, emotionally, eco-
nomically, culturally and socially. Juridically, national boundaries be-
come softened through international – often UN sponsored – agree-
ments, conventions and legislation, which intervene ever more strongly
in national political and legal processes. National economies lose their
parochial encapsulation and internal self-sufficiency. Migration on a
global scale breaks open cultural and social isolation, creating distinct
cultural pluralities. Ethnic identities, long thought lost and submerged,
perhaps eradicated, come to the fore and clamour for recognition. They
challenge a nation-state’s right to enforce homogeneity on a cultural le-
vel as much as diasporic enclaves. Constrained by the force of interna-
tional legislation as well as the impersonal forces of global cultural ni-
vellation, concessions have to be made, albeit grudgingly. Emotionally,
the solidarity with and loyalty to one nation called patriotism becomes
mellowed and replaced by new networks of loyalty, of which double
and triple citizenship are obvious examples. Identity politics based on a
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liberal political theory pose one of the greatest challenges to national-
ism. Previously marginalised and culturally suppressed groups assert
themselves and their identity. Thus, a liberal democracy produces weak
national identities, often fragmented.
Identity politics redefine the concept and shape of citizenship and
pose their own challenge to monochromatic nationalism. Policies of as-
similation have been abandoned in favour of the right to maintain and
choose one’s ethnic and cultural identity, to adhere to various forms of
lifestyles regarded as intolerable or outlawed only a few years or dec-
ades ago. No longer enforceable is the classical imperative: ‘si vivis Ro-
mae Romano vivito more’ (when you live in Rome you live according to
Roman custom – often abbreviated to: when in Rome do as the Ro-
mans do).
Celebrating pluralism and multiculturalism is stridently bemoaned
by some as a slippery slope towards loss of identity and a dangerous
cultural alienation (see Fukuyama 2005, 2006; Huntington 2004).8 It
leads to the proliferation of political parties with anti-immigration,
anti-minority platforms and culturally intolerant agendas (tolerant New
Zealand produces phenomena faintly similar to those described from
Bhutan and India). The attempt to preserve a national identity – and
sometimes to create a new one – inclines towards engendering xeno-
phobism to an alarming degree. Even the mindless and violently ag-
gressive extreme right-wing often tries to give itself political legitimacy
with an invidious culture-preservationist agenda in which violence and
patriotism perform the most fantastic logical pirouettes.
One may wonder how New Zealand fits into a volume on Asian
identity? Asia’s boundaries are not fixed and are not of geographic fact,
as is the case for instance with America or Africa; more like Europe’s
case, they are a matter of perception than anything else (see for in-
stance Turkey seeking incorporation in Europe in a political, economic
and cultural sense; or the question of whether Russia is part of Europe
proper). Asia as a mental construct can assume many different forms.
In geopolitical and economic terms, the notion of ‘Asia’ is often much
narrower in a peculiar sense than geographically. Politically and espe-
cially in an economic respect, there is a linguistic tendency in the Eng-
lish-speaking world to subsume under the term ‘Asia’ primarily the
eastern and southern portion of the continent – the Far East (from a
Eurocentric viewpoint) – and tacitly exclude issues relevant to the Rus-
sian northern parts, the Middle East and the Caucasus area. This kind
of Asia also forms a category of contested attributes but in a diffuse
sense conjures up visions of vibrant and dynamic economies, huge fu-
ture prospects and resilience, but also dangerous population explosions
and disproportionate masses of humanity.
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Nevertheless, the concept of ‘Australasia’ has been coined in recogni-
tion of an economic and political regionalism that at least terminologi-
cally embraces Australia and New Zealand (as well as PNG) as part of
Asia.9 This denies the West Asia fault line while important Asian lea-
ders such as Dr. Mahathir Mohamad vociferously agitated against the
larger definition of Asia. Mahathir’s more parochial regionalism with
regard to APEC was eventually overruled by other Asian nations. De-
spite the resistance of conservative views on both sides – Asia’s as well
as Australia-New Zealand’s – which perceive Australia and New Zeal-
and as essentially Western and therefore not Asian, the interlinking of
the two sides is becoming more and more a modern-day reality. APEC
(Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) as well as ASEAN (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations in which New Zealand is a ‘dialogue partner’)
as well as a host of other linkages draw the two Western nations in-
creasingly into an Asian regionalism. Orbiting around Asia makes
much economic and strategic sense and is based on more than just re-
cognition of geographic proximity. A substantial Asian immigration
and multifarious diasporic linkages also begin to underscore this link-
age with Asia and the absence of rigid civilisational delineations.
Notes
1 Already, Mandarin is the language spoken by most people (native speakers) with 873
million, followed at some distance by Hindi with 450 million, and English in third
place with 341 million.
2 Huntington (1996: 81) calls it ‘the fading of the West’.
3 Samuel Huntington, (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Or-
der. New York: Simon & Schuster.
4 David Held, in his ‘Democracy and Globalization’ (1998: 13), views globalisation as ‘a
multidimensional phenomenon involving diverse domains of activity and interaction,
including the economic, political, technological, military, legal, cultural and environ-
mental’. Kent Richter (2005: 10), in Understanding religion in a global society, adds reli-
gion as one of the forces that promote the globalisation process.
5 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/world/04/migration/html/migration_boom.
stm (Accessed 10 October 2008)
6 With an appropriate bow to Claude Le´vi-Strauss. Applying the image of bricolage as
a complex artifice and assemblage made of ‘bits and pieces’ to identity formation is
of course not new (see for instance Chandler 1998; Bouma 2003; Laurent 2007).
The image, however, is loaded with considerable ambiguities: in myth-making brico-
lage refers to the creation of new integrated entities, while in the field of self-aware-
ness it accentuates a dynamic aspect of interchangeability and fluidity.
7 The papers were presented at the 4th and 5th ICAS, 2005 in Shanghai and 2007 in
Kuala Lumpur, respectively. Most papers were revised in 2008 at the invitation of the
editors. Even though the papers had to be coordinated to relate at least vaguely to a
common theme, they do not cohere in the sense that they expressed one kind of ar-
gument. On the contrary, they represent quite a wide diversity of viewpoints on ‘iden-
tity and nationalism’ and pursue quite different lines of enquiry.
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8 A particularly strong example – in relation to the Muslim diaspora in the UK – is
provided by Phillips 2006.
9 There is also an ecological understanding of the concept of Australasia that links
Australia and PNG to Indonesia, but excludes New Zealand.
20 ERICH KOLIG, SAM WONG, VIVIENNE SM. ANGELES
2 Asia and the Global World:
Identities, Values, Rights
Elena Asciutti1
Introduction
Asia has rejected the universality of human rights on the grounds that
human rights, as they are conceived in the West, do not fit the Asian
condition. The concept of Asian values has been launched instead, pla-
cing the universality of human rights under critical attack because they
do not take into account Asia’s history and culture. This view was pre-
sented and supported during the Regional Meeting for Asia of the
World Conference on Human Rights and translated into the Bangkok
Declaration (1993). Since then, a highly politicised debate on the an-
tithesis between the universality of human rights and Asian values has
been going on. When proposing Asian values, the supporters of this
concept announced the existence of a ‘common identity’, shared by the
inhabitants of Asian countries. A fundamental concept of ‘Asia’ is then
needed – a new political geography of Asia that differs from the con-
ventional one, in order to contrast it with the concept of ‘the West’.
This in turn refers to the debate on ‘Orientalism’ and ‘Occidentalism’,
which can be traced back to the late 1970s and to Edward Said’s Orient-
alism. Through the analysis of the concept of the ‘Self’ and ‘the Other’,
the debate will be reviewed, trying to get beyond the dichotomies of
East vs. West and the universalist view vs. relativist view of human
rights.
As is generally known, globalisation is a protracted evolutionary pro-
cess, which encompasses every nation and every part of the world in a
global political system (Attina` 1999). In other words, globalisation is a
process that creates a far-reaching system in which no event and no ac-
tion, whether significant or not, is confined to the geographical area
where it was generated. Technological innovations have stimulated and
amplified this process, making states much more permeable and inter-
dependent than in the past. The traditional concept of political geogra-
phy (in terms of time and space) has been altered: space has ‘shrunk’
(McLuhan 1960), consequently giving the perception of the world as a
compact entity, a unicum. However, the originality of globalisation con-
sists in being able to involve not only states in this process of interde-
pendence, but also individuals, creating an arena for cultural inter-
change which goes beyond the mere interdependence of the states
themselves. The complexity and multidimensionality of globalisation
can be summarised through the pattern proposed by Andrew Hurrell
(1995: 346; emphasis in the original): ‘First of all, we have witnessed
an increase in “density” and “depth” of economic interdependence. Sec-
ondly, technology and the revolution in information have played a fun-
damental role in the diffusion of knowledge and ideas. Thirdly, these
developments have created material infrastructures that consolidate the
interdependence between individuals […]. Finally, all this causes an ex-
ceptional and growing awareness of global problems […], and develop[s]
the feeling of belonging to one human community’.
The reference to the individual as part of the global interdependence
raises two pivotal issues for the international community: freedoms
and rights. They represent a peculiar normative system, whose legiti-
macy is based on the opinio iuris of the majority of the subjects who act
within the global system.
However, globalisation does not imply uniformity. States and indivi-
duals do not have the same reaction in the face of global phenomena:
there are differences between the geographical areas and regions, as
well as between the fields where the phenomena take place. Globalisa-
tion carries its contrary: fragmentation. This process could be described
as a swinging movement undertaken by states under international (glo-
balising) pressure, which aims at building up a mechanism of interna-
tional rules and domestic pressures on the one hand, and at safeguard-
ing internal interests on the other (Clark 1997). In this context, frag-
mentation does not have to be interpreted as a state’s hostile reaction
to globalisation, but as a particular/local interpretation of it. In other
words, fragmentation can be considered as the transformation of the
world into an ‘omnipresent patchwork’ (Geertz 1996). Within the inter-
active process of globalisation, the dialectic ‘convergence/divergence’
takes place (Robertson 1992). This dialectic determines the crumbling
of big contexts, as the emergence of diversities seem to promise some
possibilities of orientation in the global phenomena.
Given all this, it is possible to state that Asia could be seen as one of
the fragments of globalisation. Nowadays, the importance of the Asian
continent for the globalisation process cannot be underestimated.
Firstly, Asia has become the privileged point of reference for the West.
The interaction between East and West has achieved the status of a dia-
logue between equals, owing to the ability of the Asian continent to
carry out an autonomous development. Secondly, Asian development
cannot be considered as a mere outcome of the acceptance of the ‘Wes-
tern model’. It is better explained as the effect of a local approach to
the global context. Therefore, in the exploration of this ‘new geogra-
phy’,2 it is useful to set aside the methodological instruments com-
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monly used in Western countries, such as the concept of ‘modernisa-
tion’, and exploit some instruments elaborated in a local context, such
as the concept of ‘Asian values’.
This paper is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the
creation and the evolution of the ‘Asian values’ concept. The second
part analyses the way in which ‘Asian values’ have been used as a kind
of resistance against human rights. My contribution will try to avoid
falling into the trap of Orientalism,3 even though this might be diffi-
cult to achieve, due to the limits imposed by the use of an established
terminology.
Some definitions
Here Asia is not considered as ‘an inert fact of nature. It is not merely
there, just as the Occident itself is not just a there either. […] as both
geographical and cultural entities […] such locales, regions, geographi-
cal sectors as “Orient” and “Occident” are man-made. Therefore as
much as the West itself, the Orient is an idea that has a history and a
tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that has given it reality
and presence in and for the West’ (Said 1978: 4-5). The concept of
‘Asia’, therefore, entailed a complex work of cultural translation includ-
ing an effort to reduce the Other to the Self. Hence, the concept of ‘Asia’
represents a construction created by the West in order to provide a
comprehensive description of the ‘Other’, thus giving origin to the
West/East dichotomy.
Through a semantic analysis of the concept of Asia, some scholars,
such as Koselleck (1986) and Kristeva (1980), have concluded that the
term ‘Asia’ traces its origins to the classical Greco-Roman times, when
it was used to define the East, namely the Eastern areas outside the
boundaries of the Greco-Roman territories. In doing so, the relation be-
tween the Self and the Other was established. When the term ‘Asia’ re-
ceived the implicit connotation of ‘barbarians’, the relation between the
Self and the Other became asymmetric: we – representing the Greco-
Roman-European civilisation – and the Others – all those non-civilised
populations. This tradition of thought and imagines was inherited by
the philosophy of history during the 19th century. On this issue, G.W.F.
Hegel (1837: 103) wrote: ‘Here [in the East] the external Sun rises, and
in the West it sets: but for this reason here [in the West] the interior
Sun of the self-consciousness rises, diffusing its major brilliance.’ For
the German philosopher, therefore, East and West would be placed at
the two ends of a continuum that represents universal history. This vi-
sion is the renewal of the dichotomised relation construed during the
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Greco-Roman times: the self-consciousness of the West is created
through the reflected image of the East (Shimada 2000).
In the 19th century, with the diffusion of the Western geographical
maps, the concept of ‘Asia’ arrived in the East, where it was translated
from various European languages into Asian languages. ‘The definition
given by another culture was accepted. Asian countries placed them-
selves within this classification. In this process of adaptation, the rela-
tion with the West was already implicit. Indeed, the starting point of
the perception of the self was not the self itself but the vision provided
by the other. At this point, the semantics of asymmetry became the
foundation for the self-definition. […] the self obtained its own meaning
in virtue of the other’s look’ (Shimada 2000: 148).
If defined as the distinction between the Self and the Other, the con-
cept of ‘Asia’ appears as a unified space which, however, does not exist
mainly because of the ambiguous extension of its territory. It is, in-
deed, very difficult to find a homogeneous unity within the Asian con-
tinent from cultural, ideological, economic, political and religious
points of view. This is also confirmed by the need to create more de-
tailed geographical indications: Central Asia, South Asia, Northeast
Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia, where the starting point of percep-
tion is still the Western Self. In this analysis, the concept of ‘Asia-Paci-
fic Region’ (henceforth Asia-Pacific) will be used to show a neutral posi-
tion in relation to the two points of perception, the Self and the Other.
From a geo-cultural point of view, it could be said that Asia-Pacific in-
cludes all the countries that have been deeply influenced by Chinese
culture. This is the case of a ‘Confucian pole’ made up of China, Tai-
wan, Vietnam, Singapore, the Korean Peninsula and the Japanese ar-
chipelago. If we take into account the geo-economic point of view, this
space becomes even bigger, going beyond the borders of the Sino civili-
sation and including the Indo-Chinese Peninsula, the Malaysian Penin-
sula, Indonesia and the Philippines. The enlargement of the Confucian
pole can be attributed to two main factors. Above all, Japan first and
China later – the Confucian powers in a strict sense – have represented
the driving economic forces that have provided the neighbouring coun-
tries with the economic model of reference for their development.
Therefore, the fast economic growth represents an element of homoge-
neity among the countries in this area. Secondly, 35 million expatriate
Chinese living in this area have contributed to the diffusion of some
elements of Confucian thought. From a political point of view, the
countries of the Asia-Pacific region belong to ‘ASEAN plus Three’,4 a
regional cooperative framework whose aim is economic cooperation
through regular intergovernmental summits and international agree-
ments. Finally, from a methodological point of view, Asia-Pacific coun-
tries have opposed the concept of ‘modernisation’, as it creates another
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dichotomy: the modern West and the pre-modern non-West. ‘Histori-
cally, modernity has been opposed to its own historical precedents;
geo-politically, modernity has been opposed to what is not modern, or
more specifically, to what it is not Western’ (Sakai 1997: 154).
In this way, the concept of ‘modernisation’ is the outcome of the uni-
versalism of the philosophy of history, as it assumes a time conception
corresponding to the one shared by Western culture. This does not
mean that the non-West is unable to develop, but that the two spaces
are not able to develop simultaneously: a pre-modern West and a mod-
ern East cannot coexist. Besides, the logic of the philosophy of history
cannot accept models of development that are different from the one
established in the West. Therefore, the development of the non-West
has to follow the development of the West: by emulating the West,
non-Western countries are doomed to become similar to Western so-
ciety – an implicit assumption for example made in the ‘theory of the
end of history’ by Francis Fukuyama (1992).
Nowadays, the importance of the Asian continent within the process
of globalisation is undergoing a new phase in the interpretation of the
West/East dichotomy. The East is indeed the privileged point of refer-
ence for the West, and their interaction has resulted in an egalitarian
dialogue, thanks to Asia’s autonomous ability of development. Indeed,
Asian development cannot be considered a mere product of the ‘Wes-
tern model’, but the result of a local approach to a global trend. In this
context, the universalistic logic shows the inadequacy of the use of
Western methodological instruments when applied to a global context.
Therefore, it has been necessary to find new exploration tools in order
to interpret the economic and social development of Asia-Pacific, while
focusing the analysis on its endogenous factors. The consequence of
this reasoning is the creation of an ‘Asian values’ concept that inter-
prets the need for an intercultural dialogue based on universal con-
cepts to make the West understand the East. The concept of ‘Asian va-
lues’ has placed emphasis on the existence of different forms of moder-
nity, which require mutual recognition among cultures. ‘Asian values’
have become a relevant tool for scientific social research, and this is
confirmed by the widespread use of the concept both by the scientific
literature and the mass media.
Asian values
The concept of ‘value’ can be considered as a nucleus where specific
groups of subjects – it does not matter whether individuals or states –
define their identities and/or their interests. Values measure inclusion
and exclusion, as they distinguish the boundary between the Self and
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the Other. In the same way, the concept of ‘Asian values’ has become
relevant for the definition of the identity and the collective interests of
Asia-Pacific states, as they underline their diversity in relation to Wes-
tern states. Many scholars concluded that the debate on Asian values
came to an end after the financial crisis of 1997 that affected some
countries belonging to Asia-Pacific.5 The sudden arrest of economic
growth had in fact removed the raison d’eˆtre of Asian values.6 My analy-
sis, instead, maintains that the debate on ‘Asian values’ is not over, be-
cause the philosophical and juridical aspects of ‘fragments’ contrasting
globalising pressures are still to be grasped.
The ‘Asian values’ concept was introduced in Singapore in the
1970s. In the late 1980s, the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee
Kuan Yew,7 spread the ‘Asian values’ concept among Western scholars.
In the 1990s, other Asian politicians adopted the concept, among them
Kishore Mahbubani,8 the former Minister of Foreign Affairs in Singa-
pore, and Mahathir Mohamad,9 the then Malaysian Prime Minister.
First of all, the concept of ‘Asian values’ was created ad hoc. On the
one hand, ‘Asian values’ embodied the political representation of the
economic success achieved through the integration of some Asian
economies in the international system in the last decades of the 20th
century. ‘In seeking to understand the economic success of certain
Asian societies, due credit must be given to the role of these “Asian va-
lues”. It is not enough to analyse such economic success in culture-free
economic terms, or as a result of the adoption of specifically Western
values. In the process of developing modern political systems in Asian
societies due recognition must be given to the need to ground these
systems in the specific Asian cultures in which they are to be situated.
It is not acceptable to reform or criticise such societies solely on the ba-
sis of liberal-democratic forms developed in Western societies’ (Milner
1999: 2).
On the other hand, they represent the reaction to the increasing in-
ternational relevance given to human rights after the Second World
War: a kind of relativism versus the universality of human rights. The
basic political feature of the ‘Asian values’ concept makes it inevitable
to turn from a philosophical perspective to a political one. The political
feature has been used to create a local identity10 able to constitute a
homogeneous political, economic and cultural space among the coun-
tries in the Asia-Pacific region. In this space, it has been possible to
combine Asian successful economic performance with a new social de-
sign, as well as to reconcile the citizens’ rights with the state’s integrity.
So defined, the ‘Asian values’ represent a normative framework
through which states justify and exercise their power, thus creating a
legitimate economic and social project, which can be carried out only
through the exertion of the state power itself.
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What exactly are ‘Asian values’? Their semantic definition is hardly
explicit. Hence, in this context it is important to analyse the positions
taken by the above-mentioned Asian politicians in order to provide a
clear definition.
In Lee Kuan Yew’s opinion,11 the concept of ‘Asian values’ is based
on the critical judgement against the foreign policy of the USA, which
has imposed its own system on other societies. According to Lee’s
point of view, the main purpose of the East is to have an ordered so-
ciety in which everyone enjoys the benefit of liberty, while Westerners
have abandoned the idea of an ethic foundation for their society. Ac-
cording to Lee, this difference between East and West is based on the
fact that in the East the individual exists within his/her own family,
which increases the possibility for survival. Hence, from a political
point of view, the peculiarity of Asia-Pacific originates from the rele-
vance of the family alongside the capacity of establishing a synthesis
between the institutions that originated in the West and the social rela-
tionships established in the East. As a consequence, the Western mod-
el, though considered universal, cannot fit all the components of globa-
lisation. The Western model needs to go through a process of localisa-
tion, which causes it to change. Finally, taking into account the
capitalist economic model, Lee states that economic and technological
development changes the individual’s mental habits, although the time
during which the change occurs is not as short as it is in the cultural
systems of values. In other words, for Lee there is no structural corre-
spondence between economic development and liberal democracy.
Another relevant position within the debate on ‘Asian values’ is the
one proposed by Mahathir Mohamad. ‘It is possible to consider the
economic emergence of Asia as historically inevitable, and it is even
possible to presume that Asia will become the new centre of world
economy in the next century, but Asian people should not follow the
historical change in a passive way’ (Ishihara and Mahathir 1995: 24).
Against the stream of the philosophy of history, Mahathir opposes
Asian values, meant as hard work, respect for authority, discipline,
priority assigned to the interest and well-being of the majority, and fil-
ial piety. According to Mahathir, these values are culturally embedded,
as much as Western values are. They can summarise the Asia-Pacific
cultures and support the action of resistance against the West. ‘The
Western cultural hegemony is no longer acceptable. The Western cul-
tural arrogance is no longer acceptable. The Western myopia and stu-
pidity are no longer acceptable. The attempt to impose something on
someone else is immoral and counterproductive, and cannot be toler-
ated by 21st century Asia’ (Mahathir 1997: 5).
In the position advanced by Kishore Mahbubani, there is no contra-
position between West and East. The concept of ‘Asian values’ does not
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contrast with the Western model, but it attempts to describe a ‘Pacific
Way’ (Mahbubani 1995). According to Mahbubani, Asia-Pacific will be-
come one of the centres of global power, together with Europe and the
USA. ‘Western thinkers have strong difficulties in finding the right
paradigm that describes a world non-Western powers are emerging
into. Their natural impulse is to presume that these powers, when they
reach success, will become more similar to Western societies; or they
presume that there will be a “clash of civilizations”. None of the two so-
lutions is probable. The difficulties of Western thinkers in understand-
ing East Asia come from the fact that we are witnessing a historical
phenomenon without precedents: the fusion between the Western cul-
ture and the Far-eastern one in the Asian region in the Pacific. Only
through this fusion, it is possible to explain the explosive growth of the
Pacific and to offer the possibility of peace and prosperity in the Re-
gion’ (Mahbubani 2004: 159). This will lead to the creation of a com-
munity of the Pacific, which could give birth to an explosive creativity
never experienced before. This is a new regional model, founded on
the interpolation of elements with different cultural backgrounds,
which nevertheless do not destroy the existing cultural layer. In other
words, the model proposed by Mahbubani consists in the combination
of a local culture and a Western method, where Asia-Pacific values of
reference (‘Asian values’) remain unchanged, despite the relevant so-
cio-economic and political changes. The ‘Asian values’ would then pro-
vide the guidance, suitable for the interpretation of global inputs on a
local basis. The position of Mahbubani seems to present a biunique line
of development, where the West and the East could learn a lot from each
other.
All three positions identify the concept of ‘Asian values’ with the ‘pri-
macy of collective interests in respect of community and social har-
mony, respect for older people, the care for order and stability along-
side the care for family and parents, the interest for the nation and the
community; the value of frugality and parsimony and hard work; the
willingness to sacrifice oneself for the family, the deferment of present
gratification for a long-term benefit; the value of commitment to educa-
tion’ (Ehr-Soon Tay 2002: 695).
This interpretation of the concept of ‘Asian values’ confirms the poli-
tical representation of the economic success of Asia-Pacific. Asian va-
lues would then represent a normative frame, which would contribute
to the definition of an Asian form of modernity that aims at backing
up economic growth through the preservation of political stability and
control by the state power. The point here is that the global diffusion
of modernity has generated a series of multiple modernities ‘realizable
through autonomous human agency’ as ‘the premises on which the so-
cial, ontological, and political order were based, and the legitimation of
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that order were no longer taken for granted. An intensive reflexivity de-
veloped around the basic ontological premises of structures of social
and political authority […]. The degree of reflexivity characteristic of
modernity […] gave rise to an awareness of the possibility of multiple
visions’ (Eisenstadt 2000: 3-4).
‘Asian values’ have also built a bridge between politics and culture,
as they derive from the scheme of cultural relativism, the uniqueness
of cultures and the need for an inside analysis of cultures. ‘Asian va-
lues’ have indeed shown that it is not always possible to use a universa-
listic method of interpretation in order to understand the events linked
to globalisation. They have also destabilised the following considera-
tion: modernisation can be initiated only on social-cultural Western-
style structures. Therefore, it is possible to affirm that ‘modernization
started with individualism in the West, it was then continued in the
centralized economy of the North [ex Soviet Union], and has been re-
cently enhanced by the Eastern man, who is oriented to organization.
[...]. Every region changes its own approach (not always successfully)
when different problems linked to modernization occur, even if a fun-
damental regional orientation continues to exist’ (Rozman 1991: 3).
In the attempt to emancipate Asia-Pacific from Western cultural
domination, often understood as American and sometimes as Eur-
opean domination, the concept of ‘Asian values’ presents some limits.
One limit is to make use of a universalistic tool. This is not negative
per se, but it becomes a limit when ‘Asian values’ try to develop univer-
salistic assumptions in order to oppose the Western universalistic vi-
sion. The second limit consists of picturing Asia-Pacific as a whole sys-
tem bereft of any cultural changes. The third limit is represented by
the possibility of reproducing the dichotomy between West and East,
therefore running the risk of assuming the superiority of one kind of
development over another: Orientalism might then become Occidental-
ism.
On this point, it may be useful to reconsider the relation between
Asian values and Confucianism. Even if the reference to Confucian
doctrine may sound unrealistic and naive, Confucianism is to be con-
sidered as the hegemonic political ideology12 responsible for the emer-
gence of the discourse of ‘Asian values’.13 Indeed, the above-mentioned
visions of Asian values are an expression of Confucianism, in particu-
lar of its moral philosophical aspect, according to which society is in-
clined to order and harmony. The reference to Confucian tradition
shows that the traditional Asian society has neither disappeared nor
been replaced by the Western model. On the contrary, Asia-Pacific has
pursued its own economic and social development, strengthened by its
cultural traditions. The supporters of Asian values have used Confu-
cianism in an instrumental way, reducing the significance of the Con-
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fucian doctrine itself, and repeating the West/East dichotomy. For the
‘Asian values’ theorists, in order to attain social order and harmony, in-
dividuals have to respect the social duties of the group they belong to,
through the recognition of their specific social position. Therefore, the
West/East dichotomy can be expressed as follows: individual/rights
(West) versus group/duties (East). At this point, it is worth remarking
that the Confucian doctrine was not originally conceived as a mere con-
trast to the West. Therefore, the opposition between the East and the
West (implicit in the ‘Asian values’) is likely to be transformed into
some logic of convergence. In other words, it is not possible to exclude
the creation of a development model through cultural interaction with-
in the global context. This pattern might prevent one culturally specific
value from prevailing over the other (Monceri 2002).
Finally, the central issue has turned out to be the development of an
Asian social and intellectual path different from the Western one, as
the supporters of Asian values tend to believe. The functionalist-type
explanations should help Asian societies to interpret their own moder-
nity without falling into anti-imperialistic and nationalistic rhetoric. In
other words, although groups of states create cultural and religious
self-images, an identity would only work if these groups of states (shar-
ing a common understanding) try not to extend their common identity
beyond their social and geographical boundaries and thus impose their
own culture on other groups of states.
‘Asian values’ and human rights
The process of emancipation of Asia-Pacific from Western cultural
domination has also involved resisting the concept of ‘human rights’.
In this way, the Asia-Pacific states have used the concept of ‘Asian va-
lues’ as a common denominator in order to claim that the universalism
and indivisibility of human rights, as understood in the West, do not
fit Asian conditions. The transposition of ‘Asian values’ in the field of
human rights has put forward Asia-Pacific’s criticism of the Western
approach to human rights, mainly based on four arguments. According
to the first argument, cultural features can affect the ‘prioritising of
rights’, which matters when rights conflict, and it must be decided
which one to sacrifice.14 The second argument concerns the recogni-
tion of the pluralism of values15 for the ‘justification of rights’, as cul-
tural traditions can provide the resources for local justification of hu-
man rights. The third is an argument for moral pluralism. Cultural pe-
culiarities call for different moral viewpoints in relation to the Western
ones. The fourth argument embodies the need for modifying the cur-
rent ‘West-centric’ human rights regime.
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The corollary of this critique is the inviolability of the principle of
state sovereignty.16 In other words, if human rights are the historical
result of a particular political and legal culture, their universalism,17 as
proposed by the West (and presented in Article 2 of the Universal De-
claration of Human Rights18), would result in cultural domination and
homogenisation. The imposition of human rights would also represent
a new ethnocentric and imperialist attitude of the West. Further, the in-
divisibility of human rights would not take into account the peculiari-
ties of the Asian societies, which are struggling to attain socio-econom-
ic development. According to the supporters of Asian values, the Asian
specificity is based on two elements: economy and culture. According
to the former, economic growth is considered crucial for the survival of
nations. Therefore, more attention is given to economic, social and cul-
tural rights, while the protection of political and civil liberties is not
considered indispensable for economic development. Growth and poli-
tical stability are connected in a complex and delicate way: individual
rights are balanced by a community’s requirements, and the govern-
ment concretely governs taking care of the development needs of the
society (Kausikan 1996). Hence, the transposition of ‘Asian values’ in
the field of human rights imposes a precise hierarchy of rights: imple-
mentation of social and economic rights first and then civil and politi-
cal rights.
From the cultural point of view, the most important element is the
value placed on community and social harmony as well as societal con-
sensus and respect for authority. ‘Asia has never considered the indivi-
dual above the society’ (Lee in Minchin 1993: 210). Individuals do not
act in an isolated way, they try to balance their own interests with those
of the community they belong to: family, clan, neighbourhood, nation.
The result of this communitarian attitude is the acceptance of ‘a wider
sphere of responsibility and of intervention by the government’ (Kausi-
kan 1996: 267). Hence, within Asia-Pacific societies, there will be a
balance between individual rights, which guarantee personal freedoms,
and social duties determined by the need for discipline and political
stability within the society (Kausikan 1997). These elements will there-
fore define the Asian version of the social contract: governments will
keep law and order and will satisfy the needs of citizens in relation to
employment, accommodation, education and health. Moreover, govern-
ments have the duty to treat their citizens with loyalty and humanity.
In exchange, citizens have to respect the law and governmental author-
ity, to work, to save money and to motivate children to be educated.
If these are the cultural and social assumptions of ‘Asian values’ as
interpretative instruments of human rights, it is then possible to detect
a core of human rights as accepted and respected by the Asia-Pacific
states: the binding rights of the International Covenant on Civil and
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Political Rights (ICCPR)19 and the Right to Development.20 The point
here is not to reject humanity as the normative idea of the interna-
tional community (Arendt 1958), but rather to allow for the possibility
of putting together the normative idea of humanity with cultural plur-
alism, so that the human rights regime reflects the outcome of an in-
ternational dialogue between peoples of different cultures.
This critical position was officially formulated by 34 countries in the
Regional Meeting for Asia at the World Conference on Human Rights
and translated into the Bangkok Declaration (1993). This declaration
represents the main document containing the Asian vision of human
rights. It consists of a preamble and 30 articles. A double interpretation
can be applied to it: on the one hand, it reaffirms the adherence of
Asian countries to the principles of the Universal Declaration on Hu-
man Rights (1948), recognising the universality, interdependence, ob-
jectivity, indivisibility of human rights and sustaining the relevance of
avoiding double standards in the implementation of human rights; on
the other hand, the Bangkok Declaration affirms that the promotion of
human rights is based on cooperation and consensus, and not on the
imposition of incompatible values. Moreover, the Bangkok Declaration
stresses the need to democratise the United Nations, to maintain re-
spect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the duty of Asian
states to promote and protect human rights, and discourage Western
countries from using the respect of human rights as a necessary condi-
tion for offering economic support and aid. Finally, the document fo-
cuses on the regional and national peculiarities as well as the religious
and cultural substrates in the implementation of human rights.21
Hence, the Bangkok Declaration presents a strong contradiction be-
tween the formal acceptance of the human rights doctrine and its prin-
ciples by the Asian states and their claim for the respect of the princi-
ple of state sovereignty.
Following the logic of the cultural appraisal of the Bangkok Declara-
tion, the differences between the universalistic approach and the Asian
one towards human rights could be summarised in the following way:
‘duties versus rights’; ‘cultural relativism versus universality of human
rights’; ‘interests of collectives versus individual rights’; ‘economic and
social rights versus civil and political rights’; and ‘state sovereignty ver-
sus conditionality of human rights’. Bearing in mind that human
rights are commonly designed to protect and enhance the individuals’
ability to lead the lives they wish (Ignatieff 2001), a further reflection
on the above-mentioned dichotomies might help to demonstrate how
the ‘Asian values’ discourse on human rights can go beyond the contra-
position between the Self and the Other as well as overcome the di-
chotomy between the universalism of the Universal Declaration on Hu-
man Rights and the relativism of the Bangkok Declaration.
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As for the dichotomy ‘duties versus rights’, in some cases, concepts
of rights and duties have merged, at least where internationally recog-
nised rights have been transposed to a national level. For example, the
right to elementary education has become an obligation to submit to
such schooling. Moreover, some initiatives, such as the African Charter
of Human and Peoples Rights (1981)22 and the Universal Declaration
on Human Responsibilities (1997), seem to suggest that the concept of
duties as such is not incompatible with international human rights
law. The main obstacle that international lawyers have encountered in
sustaining the idea of creating duties for individuals by international
instruments is that the state, and not the individuals, has been con-
ceived as the subject of public international law. This divide is increas-
ingly redundant in a world where individuals are recognised both as
limited subjects and as objects of rights and duties under international
law. The problem might arise when the exercise of rights is made con-
ditional on the performance of duties, or where performing duties im-
plies the exclusion of some meaningful rights.
The dichotomy relativism/universalism is primarily an issue of the
philosophical and historical foundation of human rights. The Universal
Declaration was written in circumstances where the instruments of hu-
man rights promotion ‘were not a triumphant expression of European
imperial self-confidence but a war-weary generation’s reflection on Eur-
opean nihilism and its consequences’ (Ignatieff 2001: 4). In other
words, the Declaration is part of a broad re-organisation of laws and in-
ternational relations after the war, aiming at avoiding new outbursts of
barbarity from ‘civilised’ Europe. Therefore, human rights incarnate a
new age of rights, where ‘natural rights are historical rights […] having
their origins in a specific situation, characterized by struggles for freedom
against old powers’ (Bobbio 1990: 135-136; emphasis in the original). It
is necessary, then, to distinguish analytically between the genesis of
rights and the status and legitimisation of rights (Hoffe 1997) because
‘the struggle for freedom against old powers’ (a mere set of ideas) has
become an issue cutting across regional, social and cultural bound-
aries. The struggle can begin again with various modalities and in dif-
ferent places. This does not threaten local cultures, but affirms the uni-
versality of the goal: the attainment of freedom against old powers.
Hence, the universality of human rights supports the key interests of
human beings in their autonomy and well-being, such as freedom,
which should not be sacrificed for the sake of greater efficiency or pros-
perity or for any aggregate of lesser interests under the heading of the
public good (Waldron 1993).
The third dichotomy concerns the interests of communities and in-
dividual rights. In this respect, it could be said that universalism con-
ceptualises both the individual-society relationship and the individual-
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individual relationship in terms of competing or potentially competing
interests. While it is undoubtedly true that this dualism is maintained,
it is not true to suggest that the international human rights corpus has
been incapable of transcending it in certain instances. The pre-eminent
example is the right to self-determination, which is granted to peoples
in the ICCPR and the ICESCR (International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights). As for the concept of ‘people’, it is not a
question of amalgamating numbers of individual rights. Individuals
cannot invoke their rights. On the other hand, the concept of ‘people’
is meaningless without the individuals who make it up. The formula-
tion is perhaps closer to some Asian concepts of the relationship be-
tween individuals and the community. According to the states signing
the Bangkok Declaration, there is an inevitable conflict between civil
and political rights on the one hand, and effective development and
growth (economic and social rights) on the other. ‘When poverty and
lack of adequate food are commonplace and people’s basic needs are
not guaranteed, priority should be given to economic development’.23
Amartya Sen (1999) has conducted relevant research on this issue in
order to show how human rights guarantees can often play an instru-
mental role in the promotion of capability expansion and the fulfilment
of basic needs. Indeed, his work in this field has contributed to the
growing body of literature on economics and institutional conditions
by establishing that democratic forms of government and civil and poli-
tical rights protections can be critical in determining incentives for gov-
ernments and for public policy responses to social and economic
shocks. For example, Sen (1999) has argued that the patterns of risk
and investments that predispose countries to financial and economic
crisis can be partly explained by lack of transparency, disclosure and ac-
countability in business, strong family links between the government
and the private sector, and lack of public participation in and scrutiny
of financial and business arrangements; and that governmental re-
sponses to economic and financial crises, and the chances of effective
restructuring and reform, are critically affected by the absence or pre-
sence of democracy and human rights protection (Sen 1999). Accord-
ing to the ‘Asian values’ vision, even though human rights have an in-
ternational aspect, they are still primarily an issue under the jurisdic-
tion of domestic law. It might be said that this is true for all the
countries in the world: the State has to be the first to promote, protect,
respect and fulfil human rights in favour of its citizens. Consequently,
the conflict between domestic law and international law, as emphasised
by the Bangkok Declaration, should not exist. Moreover, in the context
of a growing interdependence among states, the Westphalia concept of
state sovereignty needs to be revised, as the State is no longer enough.
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Therefore, there is a need to take into account other actors, such as in-
ternational organisations and NGOs, even in the field of human rights.
This analysis shows some possibilities of reconciliation between the
universalistic position and the ‘Asian values’ relativist approach on hu-
man rights.24 However, if ‘a human rights regime is supposed to pro-
tect our basic humanity – the fundamental goods (or needs or inter-
ests) that underpin any “reasonable” conception of human flourishing’
(Bell 2006: 72), it is then possible that Asia-Pacific political actors en-
dorse a somewhat different set of fundamental human goods than
their counterparts in Western societies now and for the foreseeable fu-
ture. Hence, beside prohibitions against slavery, genocide, murder, tor-
ture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimina-
tion, which human goods are fundamental?
To this purpose, Culture can provide some possibilities of orienta-
tion. In fact, if cultures interpret human experience, and experiences
can be shared by peoples in different societies and different cultures,
cultural systems – such as that of the human rights doctrine – can
make sense and have an ethical force across national borders and tradi-
tional cultural boundaries. Cultures refer to the beliefs, values, norms,
sentiments, and practices that support and give meaning and value to
human lives. This definition is neutral between Asian and Western cul-
tures. It is also neutral between individualist and collectivist cultures.
The essence of beliefs, values, norms, sentiments and practices repre-
sents the universal features of Culture. So, who is the most competent,
morally and epistemologically, to interpret the beliefs, values, norms,
sentiments and practices of a particular culture? The most competent
interpreters of a culture are those whose culture it actually is. We can-
not respect cultures unless we have reliable knowledge of what type of
Culture those cultures represent, and we cannot have reliable knowl-
edge of cultures unless the voice of the people is clearly heard (Free-
man 2000). Cultures would not then oppose the promotion and the
protection of human rights; on the other hand, they would determine
the thicker meaning of rights, by defining their content, foundation
and aim as well as by establishing the juridical instruments and the
mechanisms of execution at the local level. The definition of ‘thicker
meaning’ of human rights would follow the international standards in
matters of human rights, which are defined in a ‘thin’ way, highly inde-
terminate and unclear.25 Universal validity proposes a common set of
minimum conditions, not for a world of cultural uniformity, but rather
for all world peoples to achieve a life of dignity. As a whole of mini-
mum moral conditions, compulsory for political institutions and fun-
damental for individuals, human rights should not be compromised in
their interpretation and implementation by cultures.26 Hence, reconci-
liation between the universality of human rights and the affirmation of
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the Asian cultural peculiarities might be found in the fact that human
rights norms are quite general, and must be interpreted and applied in
specific human rights practice (Chan 1995), taking into account circum-
stances and individuals.
Governments have often spoken for the people by interpreting the
culture of their people. From a theoretical point of view, elites might be
able to understand the people’s culture, but they might also lack the in-
centive to understand it. Empirically, elites have often disregarded peo-
ple’s culture, and misused it for exploitation and oppression. At the
same time, ‘human rights diplomacy’ has tried to persuade others of
the value of human rights challenging local cultural traditions.
Listening to many voices is a useful tool in refuting or accepting
common proclamations about human rights, and building on local cul-
tural traditions can help win the struggle to promote human rights. A
real thrust in this approach is the ability to develop a schematic meth-
od to identify relevant actors and evaluate their standpoints in the hu-
man rights and cultural values debate in any country involved. In this
sense, there is also a need to go beyond the vision of social relation-
ships as always occurring among autonomous and equal individuals,
where every individual is considered as the owner of his own person,
even in a position of inferiority or inequality. People have to be listened
to inside their own reality, which is always changing and different from
what we think it might be, in a concrete context of interrelations, and
in a fusion of contexts and different viewpoints.
The foundation for human rights might still be difficult to demon-
strate in a rational and largely shared way because of cultural specifi-
city.27 Nevertheless, it is still possible to believe in the protection of hu-
man rights at a global level. People who contribute the most to their
culture agree that human rights are needed, and the awareness of
‘Asian values’ allows human rights activists to draw on the most com-
pelling justification for human rights practices. In this way, many
rights battles will be fought within societies according to local norms
and justifications. The very purpose of human rights is then the protec-
tion and enhancement of people’s agency, meant as the ability to
achieve intentions that do not involve obvious harm to other human
beings. People’s agency deserves also the higher level of protection that
can be found in internationally agreed standards, by giving individuals
the civic courage to stand up when states implement unjust laws and
order them to do wrong (Ignatieff 2001).
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Some concluding remarks
The elaboration of the concept of ‘Asian values’ has created an original
image of Asia-Pacific, independent from the West, at least on three dif-
ferent levels.
On the global level, ‘Asian values’ have represented a reply to both
the globalisation and internationalisation of law and human rights.
‘Asian values’ have focused on the role played by local cultures within
the globalisation process, rediscovering the importance of ‘fragments’.
At the macro level, the concept of ‘Asian values’ incarnates the criti-
cism of the philosophy of history and liberalism.28 Hence, Asian values
represent the attempt to give consistency to Asia-Pacific uniqueness, as
an autonomous Self that is independent from the Western Other. Asian
values have helped to rehabilitate Asia-Pacific to its own peculiarities,
to recover its active role in the context of globalisation, which was ear-
lier put in doubt. In other words, Asia-Pacific has shown that it is able
to react to the inputs from other places: ‘Modernisation without Wes-
ternisation’. By taking into account the Confucian heritage, ‘Asian va-
lues’ lose the conflict-laden feature in relation with the West, and in-
stead propose a model of modernisation free from Western cultural de-
termination. Therefore, the main characteristics of the Asia-Pacific
model of modernisation do not rule out a political elite governing with-
out the democratic participation of ordinary citizens so long as the
state has an obligation to secure the conditions for people’s basic mate-
rial welfare, an obligation that has priority over competing political
goods (Bell 2006). Conceived in this way, ‘Asian values’ would not re-
present the reiteration of a dualist vision of the world, but rather an al-
ternative vision. In the long term, therefore, the intercultural confron-
tation might reduce the influence of one dominant culture, leading to
a more balanced interaction between the Self and the Other.
At the micro level, the concept of ‘Asian values’ has opposed the no-
tion of the universality and indivisibility of human rights, in order to
support a relativistic approach based on economic and cultural reasons.
The ‘Asian values’ discourse has shown the existence of conceptual
pluralism (where human rights come from) and normative pluralism
(which goods or interests are to be protected) based on local cultures
and traditions. The dualism between universalism and cultural relati-
vism can be overcome if Asia-Pacific cultural peculiarities are used to
define the ‘thicker’ social meaning of human rights in local context,
which otherwise would remain general and abstract principles.
Nevertheless, the debate on ‘Asian values’ goes beyond manipulative
politics and old polarities: universalism versus relativism, individual-
ism versus communitarianism, economic and social rights versus civil
and political rights. It has raised an important question about the uni-
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versality of ethical values as phrased in international human rights
documents and challenged the argument of Western liberalism as the
only moral foundation of human rights. For this reason, the discourse
of ‘Asian values’ is likely to continue to influence international rela-
tions and the domestic and social politics of Asia-Pacific. The need for
a reconceptualisation of the universality of human rights has emerged,
the awareness notwithstanding that human rights belong to the wider
normative system of post-war international relations, designed to create
firewalls against barbarism and abolish hierarchy in civilisations and
cultures. The task of reconceptualisation stems from the plurality of
different approaches to questions of the good and of the right, as the
discourse of ‘Asian values’ has confirmed. Hence, human rights could
represent minimum moral standards, an international political-legal
tool, which protect people’s agency vis-a`-vis their states.
What has just been mentioned can be defined as a ‘human rights
dialogue’. This kind of dialogue has to be started by governments, but
it should not be monopolised by them. All human beings are inter-
ested in participating in dialogues about human rights, as they repre-
sent a set of necessary minimum standards for leading a respectable
life. The dialogue runs from international organisations, which provide
for international tools, to governments implementing policies, and to
individuals, who interpret culture, evaluate values, endorse norms, en-
gage in the practice, and live the consequences of their interpretation.
This process can also start from the opposite direction, from the bot-
tom up, as the request for human rights can also come from the indivi-
duals directly. These processes make cultures complex, contested and
constantly changing.
Hence, the problem of human rights universalism is the problem of
cross-cultural communication, consisting in the modalities and limits
within which it is possible to get to know values and concepts belong-
ing to different cultural systems. International law and human rights
law have a global reach and have become an instrument of inter-
change, as well as economy, politics and goods of consumption. Never-
theless, the language of human rights fractures – one of the fragments
is the concept of ‘Asian values’– when it encounters different ways of
reasoning as well as philosophical and political orders. There is, then,
the need for constructing a theoretical understanding of human rights
that might act as a common framework within which competing non-
relativist systems of thought and being can agree on a modus vivendi. It
should not be a completely theorised agreement, but rather an incom-
pletely theorised agreement (Sunstein 1995), which ‘involves the develop-
ment of a theory which provides space for various groups to have their
own independently justified morality, the overlaps between which com-
prise the support structure of international political and legal instru-
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mentalities and human rights declarations’ (Langlois 2002: 102). The
result of this reconceptualisation would allow autonomous selves to sup-
port human rights without competing on the universal foundation of
human rights.
This point brings us back to the context of globalisation, which was
the starting point of this investigation. Understood as large-scale eco-
nomic integration, worldwide environmental issues, rising prominence
of international organisations, the originality of globalisation lies in its
ability to involve individuals, creating an arena for cultural interchange,
which goes beyond the mere interdependence between states, and de-
veloping ‘the feeling of belonging to one human community’ (Hurrell
1995: 346). This human community needs an essential common code,
so that all individuals can flourish in their own diverse ways. Human
rights are but a rational response to the demands for an efficient gov-
ernance faced by every single nation in a world of rising complexity. At
the same time, human rights empower individuals against this com-
plexity and improve their agency for the attainment of freedom that has
now become a global challenge within the ‘omnipresent patchwork’.
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law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life’ (Article 6.I); ‘No one shall be sub-
jected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In par-
ticular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific ex-
perimentation’ (Article 7); ‘No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade
in all their forms shall be prohibited’ (Article 8.I); ‘No one shall be imprisoned
merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation’ (Articolo 11); Prin-
ciple ‘nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege’ (Article 15); ‘Everyone shall have the
right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law (Article 16); e il diritto alla
liberta` di pensiero, di coscienza e di religione’ (Article 18). ‘It makes a great deal of
difference if the West insists on humane standards of behaviour by vigorously pro-
testing genocide, murder, torture, or slavery. Here there is a clear consensus on a
core of international law that does not admit of any derogation on any grounds’ (Kau-
sikan 1993: 39).
20 ‘The right to subsistence is the right of every individual to enjoy free and equal condi-
tions of life, which include both political conditions of non-violence, security of their
lives and social conditions of maintaining a minimum living standard. All indivi-
duals and all of humanity are entitled to these rights. The right to development is an
effective instrument used by developing countries to safeguard their own interests
and opportunities’ (Li Zhenghui and Wang Zhenmin, 2002).
21 Article 5 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (A/CONF.157/23, 12
July 1993): ‘All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and inter-
related. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and
equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the signifi-
cance of national and regional peculiarities and various historical, cultural and reli-
gious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their
political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights
and fundamental freedoms’.
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22 Preamble of the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights: ‘The enjoyment of
rights and freedoms also implies the performance of duties on the part of everyone’.
23 Liu Hiaqiu, Chinese Delegate at the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna
1993.
24 At this point, it should be also noted that criticism of the universality of human
rights has also come from non-Asian theorists: Communitarianism and the clashing
civilisations put forward by Samuel Huntington (1993) are another example of cultur-
al relativism. The criticism of the universality of human rights has been also pre-
sented by scholars who do not belong to the culture of ‘Asian values’, whereas an-
other version of cultural relativism can be found in the theory of the ‘cultural clash’
of Samuel Huntington. The relativist approach to human rights can be summarised
in the following way. First of all, human rights cannot be rationally justified. Sec-
ondly, if human rights are a product of Western culture, they could incarnate the tra-
ditional civilising mission (imperialistic) of the West. Finally, through the deconstruc-
tion of the rational individual, the limits of the atomistic vision of human beings
have emerged, putting in doubt the universalistic language of human rights. For ex-
ample, gender studies criticise the fact that the language of human rights identifies
the beneficiary of rights only with the adult male.
25 The concepts of ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ have been borrowed from Michael Walzer (1994).
26 From a practical point of view, this kind of interpretation corresponds to the doctrine
of ‘margin of appreciation’ already adopted by the European Court of Human Rights
in order to combine the cultural differences and to avoid that member states limit
their support for this Court.
27 Asia-Pacific governments have shown that the argument on Western liberalism as
the only moral foundation for human rights is no more valid.
28 In particular of the political features of liberal democracy.
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3 Creating ‘Malaysians’:
A Case Study of an Urban kampung in Kota
Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia
Toru Ueda1
This chapter analyses how a government-generated national culture is
practised in an actual social context in Malaysia. It is based on anthro-
pological research, which focused on identity formation in a newly
built kampung, an urban community in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah. By look-
ing at the way a cultural event, Tadao Kaamatan, is narrated, it seeks to
clarify the impact of the project of creating ‘Malaysians’ in the daily life
of the kampung residents as they appropriate and redefine the national
culture. The analysis of these dynamics reveals the national enterprise
of creating ‘Malaysians’.
Nation-making and culture in Malaysia
Nationalism, especially the state-sponsored variety, is a modern project
designed to create a culturally and socially homogenous people in a gi-
ven territory. Thus, a nation is shaped through governmental interven-
tion such as by census taking or classification, with the aim of making
it appear as a community. Here I want to look at government-led na-
tionalism in Malaysia and analyse the process of creating a homoge-
nous people and how this is manifested in daily life. Ian Hacking
(2002, 2004) points out that we should pay attention not only to offi-
cial discourses aimed at shaping one kind of people, but also to the
face-to-face interactions in a daily context. He asserts that the dialectical
process of these two important aspects, which he terms ‘looping effect’,
should be analysed. Over the past few decades, a considerable number
of studies on nationalism that included both specific area studies and
general theoretical enquiries has been undertaken in various disci-
plines. However, only a few studies focus in detail on the daily perspec-
tive and on the acceptance or rejection of government-induced nation-
alism.2 For example, governments may make use of various kinds of
local cultural elements for the purpose of creating a nation, but this
project is interpreted and appropriated by the people in their daily lives
in various ways. It is important to consider the resulting dialectical
looping processes. Using a case study of an urban community in Kota
Kinabalu, Sabah, I will show how the government-led project of mak-
ing ‘Malaysians’ with reference to ‘national culture’ is practised in the
daily social context.
Malaysia’s characteristic as a multi-ethnic state is a legacy of colonial-
ism. In such a situation the ethnic groups are part of what Shamsul
(1998: 24) calls a ‘nation of intent’, i.e. they have their own notion of
their identity and of ‘the nation’. That is to say, each of them have their
discrete image of this communion, or as Anderson (1991: 6) says: ‘the
members of even a small nation will never know most of their fellow
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each
lives the image of their communion’. But after Dr. Mahathir, the for-
mer Prime Minister of Malaysia, had announced ‘Wawasan 2020 (Vi-
sion 2020)’, a national programme aimed at making Malaysia a fully
industrialised and developed country by the year 2020, creating a cohe-
sive Malaysian people became a new national political agenda. Dr. Ma-
hathir emphasised nation-building as one of the most important chal-
lenges of the vision. Various kinds of programmes were launched in
the attempt to make this vision a reality; among them social self-net-
working organisations, Rukun Tetangga, which aim at making ‘Malay-
sians’ at the grass roots level, and launching the National Service Pro-
gramme (Program Khidmat Negara, PKN), started in 2003 by the Min-
istry of Defence. Rukun Tetangga was expected to foster friendship at
the grass roots thus leading to the creation of a national community.
PKN was intended not only to address social problems among the
youth, but also to promote national integration through the reconfi-
guration of national culture.
More than 30 years have passed since Clifford Geertz (1973: 237) ad-
dressed nationalism in this region as follows: ‘Nationalism – amor-
phous, uncertainly focused, half-articulated, but for all that highly in-
flammable – is still the major collective passion in most new states,
and in some it is virtually the only one.’ In recent years, the borders of
nation-states seem to have weakened due to advancing globalisation. It
appears that the era of nationalism has already passed. Nevertheless,
we can still see in the contemporary world many examples of the en-
deavour to create a national spirit bearing a common identity, and
where nationalism is still the major collective passion.
Culture and nation
Ideally, a nation is expected to have one national culture. However, the
official discourse involving the Malaysian government clearly shows
that the Malaysian nation does not have one single national culture.
The images circulated in the course of national cultural events in the
form of pamphlets reflect the existence of five main ethnic groups: Ma-
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lay, Chinese, Indian, Iban and Kadazan – or so it appears (see Plate 3.1).
The national culture in Malaysia was supposed to be Malay-based or
Bumiputera-based, as Shamsul (1998) pointed out, because of this
group’s hegemony. Aspects of Bumiputera or Malay culture were re-
garded as the core of Malaysia’s national identity, although cultural
symbols of other ethnic groups were also recognised to be important
components.
Plate 3.1 Pamphlet for promoting tourism distributed by the Ministry of Culture, Arts
and Tourism. Five women from the main ethnic groups are represented
As some cultural events show, each of the five main ethnic groups is
obviously acknowledged as a vital component of national culture. For
example, since 2002, the Malaysian government has been holding offi-
cial cultural events called ‘Open House’ to observe ‘national celebration
day’. It was held six times in 2003 in the name of ‘harmony in diver-
sity’, namely to celebrate Hari Raya (celebration after the fasting
month of Ramadan) for Malays, Chinese New Year for Chinese, Depa-
vali for Indians, Gawai for Iban in Sarawak, Kaamatan for Kadazandu-
sun in Sabah, and Christmas for Christians.3 The purpose of these cul-
tural events is to provide the people with an opportunity to celebrate
each other’s festivals and to show integration of the nation not only to
outsiders, but also to the nation itself. The celebrations are relayed
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through live broadcast by the state-operated television station. Accord-
ing to local newspapers, there are usually at least 50,000 participants
in these events (see Table 3.1 and Plate 3.2).
Table 3.1 Open House in 2003 (compiled by author from local newspaper)
Name City Date Estimated
participants
Chinese New Year Petaling Jaya, Selangor 8 February 200,000
Kaamatan Kota Kinabalu, Sabah 18 May 100,000
Gawai Sibu, Sarawak 14 June n.d.
Deepavali Penang 24 October 50,000
Hari Raya Aidilfitri Kuching, Sarawak 13 December 100,000
Hari Christmas Kota Kinabalu 27 December 100,000
As the ‘Open House’ implies, the core of the national Malaysian cul-
ture has been reconfigured. That is to say, the cultures of the five eth-
nic groups have been upgraded to be part of the national culture and
juxtaposed as equals in the official discourse. This upgrading of ethnic
cultures to the national culture is worth considering. In the section that
follows, we will consider the way one of the national cultures in the of-
ficial discourse is practised within the actual social context, with special
attention to Kaamatan representing the Kadazandusun of Sabah.
Plate 3.2 Notice board about Kaamatan organised at the national level
46 TORU UEDA
Kadazandusun
Kaamatan is the festival for the Kadazandusun people of Sarawak on
Borneo. Kadazandusun is an amalgamated word that was created
through political negotiation in Sabah. In the official discourse, ‘Kada-
zandusun’ refers to the ethnic groups in Sabah, in eastern Malaysia,
who are regarded as one of the main indigenous ethnic groups. Ac-
cording to the census taken in 2000, the population of Kadazandusun
is estimated at around 470,000 of the 2,600,000 or 20% of the total
Sabah population.
Kadazandusun is a combination of ‘Kadazan’ and ‘Dusun’, the names
of two ethnic groups that were counted separately in the former cen-
sus.4 Kadazan originally means the people living in the Penampang
area, which is close to the state capital. Dusun, which means orchard
in Malay, was the name used by outsiders, such as the British coloni-
sers or Brunei Malays, to denote the people living in the interior area
and speaking several mutually intelligible dialects. When Sabah be-
came a state of the Federation of Malaysia, some leaders from Penam-
pang attempted, around 1960, to make Kadazan a term for all native
people of the interior of Sabah (Roff 1969). This attempt, however, was
met with opposition, and people living in places other than Penam-
pang chose to use Dusun to identify themselves as they had previously
done.
A few years after Sabah joined Malaysia, as Muslim leaders came to
power, non-Muslim Kadazan and Dusun sought to unite as a group in
opposition to the government. In order to underline the mood of unity,
Kadazan and Dusun were combined to terminologically create a new
category. It began to be used especially in the political discourse, when
the confrontation between the central government and Sabah came to
the surface. It also underscored the cleavage between Muslims who
supported the federal government – where Muslims exercised hege-
mony – and non-Muslims in Sabah. Nowadays, Kadazandusun is often
used in the political discourse to refer to the non-Muslims indigenous
to Sabah and sometimes incorporates another ethnic group, the Murut,
who are also non-Muslims.5
Kaamatan
Kaamatan (Harvest Festival) is a cultural event in Sabah, which cele-
brates Kadazandusun belief in the spirit of rice (Bambaazon or Bam-
barayon). Although most, if not all, Kadazandusun are now Christian,
they have an earlier belief in a spirit world which looked after the har-
vest. Appreciation after harvesting the crops was shown in a thanksgiv-
ing ritual called magavau or maga’au, led by a female religious priest
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bobolian or bobohizan. Its purpose was also to secure a good harvest for
the following year.
As traditional beliefs changed, this cultural event was exploited
around 1960 by some political elites to symbolise integration of the lo-
cal people in Sabah. According to Yamamoto (2002, 2006: 147-148),
Tamu Besar was one of the models for the Kaamatan festival. It became
an annual event after 1955, organised by the colonial administration to
allow it to survey activities of ‘the natives’. To attract them, events such
as beauty contests, costume contests, football games, theatrical perfor-
mances and others were incorporated. Yamamoto (2006: 146) identi-
fied yet another event as one of the models for the Kaamatan festival.
This was a harvest festival held in the interior areas like Keningau,
Tambunan, Bingkor in April 1957, upon the suggestion of native
chiefs. For example, OKK Sedomon bin OKK Gunsanad, a native chief
of Keningau, called on the colonial government to launch a festival for
‘native people’, such as the Dusun and Murut, in his area. The colonial
government accepted this request and decided to inaugurate the three-
day long festival especially for the interior area.
Using traditional precedents such as spirit beliefs and the festive
events mentioned above, Kaamatan was later created as a statewide cul-
tural festival. Since 1961, 30 and 31 May have been designated public
holidays to celebrate this festival. After Sabah joined Malaysia, Kaama-
tan was practiced statewide as a political symbol of the integration of
the Kadazan and Dusun people rather than as a harvest celebration. At
the same time, in the 1990s, it gained a position as one of the national
cultures, representing Sabah culture after Dr. Mahathir had put for-
ward Wawasan 2020. In this capacity it represented national integra-
tion. We need to have a closer look at this kind of cultural appropria-
tion and redefinition of the Kaamatan to be able to contextualise it
within the larger project of nation-making.
Case studies from Kota Kinabalu
Let me begin by presenting some general information about the re-
search site (kampung K in Malay or K village) where I have carried out
anthropological research since 2003.
K village is located on the slope of a forest-covered hill adjacent to
the centre of Kota Kinabalu, the state capital of Sabah. According to
the 2002 census, K village has a population of about 1,500 and about
300 households. It started in the 1970s, when a few people squatted
there on government-owned land, and it was appropriately labeled ‘se-
tinggan (squatter)’ area. Initial demands that they leave were not
heeded. Even after the land was gazetted as a legal kampung in the late
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1990s, the impermanent nature of K village has not changed. The peo-
ple in K village even today often say ‘this kampung is just for temporary
living’. Most of them have come to Kota Kinabalu just to look for jobs
and maintain that they would like to return to their village of origin
after they have retired from work. The following story illustrates the
transitory character of this village. When I visited K village in August
2006, an old woman died. Her body was taken away to a gravesite in
another kampung, which has existed longer than K village. A friend of
mine explained to me: ‘because we have no place here to bury, all of us
will leave this kampong … at the latest when we die’.
Most of the people in the kampung are classified by officials under
the label of Kadazandusun, which is also the ethnic identity accepted
by them. Some of my friends who live outside of K village, also charac-
terised K village as a Kadazandusun’s kampung. The people, although
accepting the label Kadazandusun as an ethnic entity in the official dis-
course of the government, prefer to use Dusun with particular locality
for self-identification. In certain contexts they emphasise the differ-
ences among the various sub-ethnic groups of Kadazandusun people
and explain how different their customs, cultures and languages were.
Kaamatan represented
In 2004, Kaamatan was held twice in K village and once in the resi-
dential zone next to it. In my description I will focus on the largest
event.6
Kaamatan was publicised through official channels such as notices
on the message board in the village, posters and a flag-like white cloth
with the meeting’s date displayed inside the kampung. Before the day
of the event, application forms for the beauty contest (unduk ngadau)
were distributed by the organising body through the village headman
(ketua kampung). The place of the event was prepared on the day before
by some residents working as organisers.
The main guest of the day was an elected member of the local as-
sembly, Yang Berhagia (YB). Three speeches were read on the day –by
YB, the village headman and the chairperson of the organising com-
mittee, each conveying the meaning of Kaamatan to the village. (These
speeches shall be analysed below.) Following the speeches, a gong was
beaten seven times to launch the event. Next the ‘traditional’ dance
show, named ‘special show’ (persembahan khas) was held on stage. The
dance group consisted of nine young girls dressed in local ethnic
costumes, namely of the Kadazandusun from Papar, Penampang and
Bajau.7
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Plate 3.3 Special show (Persembahan khas)
Plate 3.4 Playing gongs during unduk ngadau
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The climax of the event was a very popular beauty contest. The beauty
contest has always been at the core of Kaamatan since it started as a
statewide festival. Its origin lies in the myth of a traditional godhead
who sacrificed his daughter and made her body into essential crops for
the benefit of the people in Sabah. This mythical motif was exploited
to become a popular component of Kaamatan festival. Now, the beauty
contest is described in the official discourse as a commemoration of
the great mercy of the godhead’s daughter and is clearly used to attract
people’s attention to the celebration. This cultural device is also very
popular in this village. Five finalists were chosen from seven partici-
pants. After the winner was chosen as a ‘queen’, the guests left and the
event was closed, although some of the people remained, with beer in
hand, until night came.
As mentioned above, three speeches (ucapan rasmi) were read in this
event. One was directed against the official characterisation of Kaama-
tan, while another one sought to mediate.
Official speeches are an interesting object of anthropological inquiry.
For example, Parkin (1975) pointed to the inherent performative power
of political speech. Official speeches are not necessarily just full of
flowery rhetoric and empty words, but are interpretations of some par-
ticular issue and are intended to influence the audience. In short, the
official speech is performance oriented. The chairman started his
speech in the official manner with respectful words of thanks for some
guests, but also for the people, especially those who had donated for
this gathering. He characterised Kaamatan in K village as follows: ‘Cel-
ebration of Kaamatan, as we know, is a festival celebrated by the ethnic
group, namely Kadazandusun and also Murut. After working so hard
on the rice-field, it is the time for them to be delighted by opening the
festival as their token of gratitude for the spirit of rice.’
This is similar to what YB said in the first part of his speech. Juxta-
posing Kaamatan with the important Muslim festival of Aidilfitri and
the Chinese New Year, he said: ‘Celebrating and welcoming any festival
such as Aidilfitri, Chinese New Year and so forth, is a good and noble
practice’, thus making a direct comparison between the ethnic groups
of Malays and Chinese, but also drawing the Kadazandusun Murut into
it. In doing so, all three cultures are placed on a par in multi-ethnic
Malaysia. In other words, YB recognised the Kaamatan owned by Kada-
zandusun and Murut living in Sabah as one of the national cultures in
Malaysia. This narrative expresses the view of the Malaysian govern-
ment in general.
But Kaamatan in this village was not entirely consistent with the
government-made narratives. A few days after Kaamatan, I met with
one of my friends (J) who had been working with the organising com-
mittee of the festival. As we talked about Kaamatan over some pictures
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I had taken, he said: ‘Did you go to Kaamatan? Certainly it is impor-
tant. But it had some strange points … Look, this is a costume usually
worn by Dusun in Papar and this is Penampang’s one. We do not have
so many friends from Papar and Penampang here. It was strange …
for example the design of these clothes is different from the one in my
natal kampung [Tambunan] … We, in Tambunan, use red as a color of
the stitch, not yellow.’ It was clear that J was not totally satisfied with
the cultural event, although he was committed to it as a member of the
organising body. The Kaamatan reminded him of the communal tradi-
tions of local Kadazandusuns, but it was not the same in K village. Cul-
tural factors, such as the stitching, were different, and he was disap-
pointed with the festival, which had lost authenticity for him. J often
questioned the classifying of the Kadazandusun people as one group.
He criticised the way of narrating Kadazandusun as a whole, though
he sometimes started his conversations with remarks that this kampung
is Kadazandusun’s. But then he would go on to say how different the
Kadazandusun subgroups were. For instance, he explained to me that
he had been afraid of his neighbours when he came to K village for the
first time because they were really cultural strangers to him, although
they were placed in the same ethnic group by the government census.
‘I was afraid of them [referring to a family living next to his house] be-
cause I really did not know who they were and what customs (adat)
they have.’
From these examples it emerges that the ethnic categorisation used
by the government and that employed by the Kadazandusun differ con-
siderably. While the former emphasises inclusiveness to create larger
categories as components of national culture, the latter is more ‘frag-
mented’ and has considerable variations. Thus, the manner of repre-
senting Kaamatan in K village is ambivalent. When it was narrated in
the government discourse, participants, like J for example, could not
see its relevance and were disappointed. At the same time, Kaamatan
in this village cannot follow a particular subethnic way in its search for
authenticity since the origins of the people differ so much. In order to
resolve this dilemma, another way of narrating was used. It is a state-
ment that raises a moderate objection about the way of representing
Kaamatan as Kadazandusun inclusively. For example, the village head-
man pointed out in his opening speech that Kaamatan was missing an
important factor. He said: ‘Although this kampung of ours does not
have land where we can plant rice, we also celebrate Kaamatan every
year to remind us of our tradition’. As he described it, there was no har-
vesting aspect in the Harvest Festival. The chairman also mentioned
this in the interview after Kaamatan:
52 TORU UEDA
‘The story [about Kaamatan in their original village] I told is an
old one. But what we brought here, to the very centre of the city,
differs slightly. We brought here [another kind of Kaamatan ],
that’s the point as I emphasised in the speech at the event. We
do not cultivate rice … no. No rice cultivation here. Everybody
works in a government office, private company, and so on. It
varies so much.’
This ‘contradiction’, however, was resolved in the following remarks in
his speech: ‘In the individual context we have to come together and in-
teract with one another in order to mature and strengthen friendship
(Silatul-rahim), which was established among us without distinguish-
ing between ethnic group and religion’. Kaamatan was thus imbued
with a new meaning: in K village it was not necessarily concerned with
a certain ethnicity, custom (adat) or tradition (tradisi), nor does it have
the government-sponsored interpretation of the official discourse. Kaa-
matan is meant to deepen friendship and relationship within a local
community. In this third narrative, Kaamatan does not represent Kada-
zandusun culture. It is an opportunity to have commensality and to
meet friends, neighbours, and family members.
Conclusion
In the urban village, Kaamatan is located between two narrative poles:
the government-oriented one as YB represented it and the one contex-
tualised within a particular local and ethnic setting as J described it.
Kaamatan in K village officially imitates the government-oriented ver-
sion and appropriates its vagueness and inauthenticity into the set-
tings. It treats the Kadazandusun as one community or group and does
not incline towards recognising specific cultural factors among them.
Therefore, it was criticised for its inauthenticity by some. On the other
hand, Kaamatan in K village cannot be done in the way of a particular
locality as some would have wanted, because of differences in lan-
guage, tradition, and religion. It also lends itself to a new meaning as
an event that is useful in deepening friendship and strengthening rela-
tionships in the newly built and temporary kampung.
The national culture ‘created’ by the government is appropriated, re-
defined to fit the actual social situation, and endowed with new mean-
ing. The people deploy the government-made cultural device intended
to create a national identity and accept the framework of ‘nation’ intro-
duced by the government, but perform the event to fit into their lives.
The process of nation-making must be understood in terms of this am-
bivalence. Thus, we have to pay attention not only to the official dis-
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course sponsored by the government, but also to what emerges from
the official discourse in the context of daily life.
Notes
1 This research was conducted while I studied at the Institut Alam dan Tamadu Mel-
ayu (ATMA), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia with a grant from the Heiwa-Nakajima
Foundation. The Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of the Prime Minister’s Department
of Malaysia generously issued permission for the research. I also wish to express my
gratitude to Prof. Dr. Shamsul Amri Baharuddin, the former director of ATMA, and
Prof. Dr. James T. Collins for providing useful advice while I was in Malaysia. My
thanks also to kind friends and colleagues: Kiun and his family, Chong Shin, Karim
Harun, Sarjit Singh Gill and Lee Yok Fee.
2 See for example Abu Lughod (2005) and Herzfeld (1997).
3 Christians are not combined with particular ethnicities like Muslims. They include
Chinese, Indian, Iban, Kadazandusun and other minorities.
4 See for instance Sullivan and Regis (1981), Uesugi (2000) and Ueda (2006).
5 Murut is linguistically and culturally different from Kadazandusun, but sometimes
categorised within the same group in the political discourse by using the abbreviated
label KDM (Kadazandusun-Murut).
6 According to the pamphlet distributed by the organising body on the day, this festival
has been held only three times before; the first being in 1999.
7 Bajau is one of the ethnic groups in Sabah, usually not categorised as a variant of Ka-
dazandusun, but as different because of their language, religion and other cultural
factors.
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4 Ethnic Mosaic and the Cultural Nationalism
of Bhutan
Rup Kumar Barman
Bhutan, a landlocked multi-ethnic country, situated in the lap of the
Himalayas, has drawn the attention of social scientists around the
world mainly because of its ongoing developmental activities, cultural
nationalism and the process of democratisation. Democratisation in
Bhutan was initiated by the monarchy itself in the second half of the
twentieth century when its neighbours initiated the policies for socio-
economic and political modernisation. India’s independence in 1947
and its planned development strategy plus the emergence of the com-
munist People’s Republic of China in 1949 and its move towards a
new identity induced King Dorji Wangchuk (1952-1972) to initiate a
policy of political and economic modernisation in Bhutan.
However, the process of democratisation in Bhutan is confronted by
several internal socio-cultural, political and economic forces. While de-
mocracy ensures freedom and liberty for all citizens and provides am-
ple opportunities for political participation, the Citizenship Act as well
as the policy of cultural nationalism have created a situation where a
large number of genuine Bhutanese, particularly the Bhutanese-Nepa-
lese (called Bhupali), effectively lost their citizenship. Many of these
Bhutanese-Nepalese took shelter as refugees in the United Nations’
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) camps and as immigrants
both in Nepal and the Indo-Bhutan borderland. Thus, the process of
democratisation in Bhutan has led to a parallel development of greater
political freedom and deprivation of citizenship rights for some. In this
situation, cultural nationalism, multi-ethnicity and the discourse on de-
mocracy in Bhutan vitally intersect.
Ethnicity is a state of consciousness in which people who maintain
their own customary ways or culture set themselves apart from others.
In a broad sense, ethnicity takes shape on the basis of certain charac-
teristics such as language, religion, beliefs, race, caste and other com-
mon cultural traditions, which differentiate a particular group from
others. A sense of ‘Otherness’ and a positive desire for a distinguishing
identification are the distinct features of a self-aware ethnicity. How-
ever, ethnicity is multidimensional as well as ‘situational’ and ‘contex-
tual’ and can be used to inspire collective action as ‘reactive awareness’.
It mobilises ethnic groups to form a politically active social identity
and to assert their share in economic resources and ‘power’, which
they may believe they have been denied by discriminatory policies fol-
lowed by the state and other agencies. Thus ethnicity as a socio-cultural
identity may motivate the members to attain practical goals. Imposition
of a national identity by the dominant group on the subordinate ethnic
group may push the latter to mobilise its people towards the formation
of a separatist identity, even a fictitious one in some cases. Formation
of an ethnic group identity thus has two aspects: first, denunciation of
the imposed identity and, second, annunciation of their own. In a
changing context, however, an ethnic group may change its objectives
and characteristics of awareness (Barman 2006: 99-100).
Nationalism, a Eurocentric concept, is very difficult to define within
a rigid framework. According to Hans Kohn (1944: 10), nationalism is
‘a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt
to be due to the nation state’. Characteristics of nationalism differ
everywhere according to the location of the country and its historical
and social background. Generally, it is accepted that ‘nationalism, a
product of political, economic, social, and cultural factors at a certain
stage in history, is a condition of mind, feeling or sentiment of a group
of people living in a well-defined geographical area, speaking a com-
mon language, possessing a literature in which the aspirations of the
nation has been expressed, attached to common customs, venerating
its own heroes, and in some cases, having a common religion’ (Snyder
1954: 196-97).
Nationalism has also been defined as a ‘political, social conscious-
ness centered upon a common national identity rooted in a shared tra-
dition, and the ideological belief in the structure of the modern nation-
state as the most efficient instrument of national unity, national inde-
pendence and national interest’ (Norbu 1992: 22).
Traditions, customs and behaviour patterns motivated by common
beliefs and values collectively constitute the culture of a particular com-
munity. The traditional culture of any community is basically formed
through its social institutions, festivals, art, music and other features.
The signifiers of culture, however, are not static and may change as
new socio-religious ideas, techniques and technologies arise and grow.
In addition, the adoption of culture from the outside world and its loca-
lisation may stimulate the process of culture change. Among the differ-
ent constitutive elements of nationalism, ‘culture’ rooted in language
and religion, arts and other achievements may also play an important
role.
The relationship between ethnic aspirations and nationalism based
on culture is most often antagonistic, particularly when the distinct cul-
ture of the dominant group is considered the ‘national culture’ and is
imposed upon the subordinate ethnic culture. Subnational ethnic
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groups then assert their self-identity, which may be contradictory to na-
tionalism. Thus, the process of nation-building in a spirit of cultural
nationalism can lead to strong contestation.
This paper seeks to conceptualise the contemporary nation-building
process in Bhutan, which has recently attracted the attention of social
scientists. Bhutan’s developmental activities, internal politics and espe-
cially the move towards democracy, underpinned by a policy of cultural
nationalism, have created such a complex situation as to challenge cri-
tical analysis.
Feeling threatened by the rapid growth of the Bhutanese-Nepalese
minority (Nepali-speaking and -descended Bhutanese called Lhotshm-
pas), the Royal Government of Bhutan has come to believe that it has a
duty to protect the ‘national cultural identity’ of this multi-ethnic coun-
try. In order to protect the indigenous culture of the Drukpas (the poli-
tically dominant ethnic group), Bhutan declared a national cultural pol-
icy called Driglam Namza (one language, one culture and one nation)
in the 1980s. Its ultimate – perhaps intended – result is the emigra-
tion, statelessness and refugee status of the Bhutanese-Nepalese. Citi-
zenship is a key issue for a meaningful democracy, but in this situation
the violation of rights of citizenship in the question of cultural nation-
alism and move towards democracy run parallel to each other. These is-
sues together with the impact of the internal policies of Bhutan are
highlighted in this paper.
Surface and socio-cultural format
Bhutan, popularly called Druk-Yul or land of the Drukpas, is a multi-
ethnic country though culturally and politically dominated by the Druk-
pas. It is the smallest and most mountainous country of South Asia, si-
tuated between the two giants India and China; with a land area of
46,500 square km and divided into twenty administrative districts
(dzogkhas). Geographically, this country comprises four major zones:
Great Himalayas, Inner Himalayas, the Southern Foot Hills and the
Duars Plains. The northern side of Bhutan lies within the Great Hima-
layas, with snow-capped ranges rising to 3,700 and 5,400 m above sea
level. The Inner Himalayas lie on the southern side of the Great Hima-
layas. This region forms Central Bhutan with several fertile valleys.
The Southern Foot Hills area varies between 600 to 1,500 m above sea
level and is densely forested. The Duars region is situated in the Indo-
Bhutan border zone connecting West Bengal and Assam of India.
Like its surface morphology, the temperature, rainfall and climate of
Bhutan as a whole vary widely. Climate has influenced the flora and
fauna of Bhutan and its population distribution as well. The Greater
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Himalayas and the ranges of the Inner Himalayas are not suitable for
human habitation. The high-altitude zones ranging from 3,000 to
3,500 m are sparsely populated. People of this region are dependent on
the cultivation of sheep and yaks and production of crops that grow in
cold weather. The fertile plain tracts of the Inner Himalayas have a tol-
erable climate and are moderately populated. The urban centres of
Bhutan, however, are densely populated with about 15% of the total po-
pulation of the country.
There is no standard parameter to estimate the population of Bhu-
tan. However, there are some estimates based on official reports, which
place the figure around 582,000 in 1995 and 672,425 in 2000. The po-
pulation growth rate is 2.19%. There are four major ethnic groups in
Bhutan: the Ngalongs (Tibeto-Mongoloids), Sharchops (Indo-Mongo-
loids), Khengs (earliest inhabitants) and the Lhotshmpas (of Nepalese
origin). The Ngalongs are in the majority, forming around 50% of the
total population. The Lhotshmpas are the second largest ethnic group
comprising 35% of the total population, and the Khengs, Sharchops
and other minor ethnic groups make up 15%. From the religious point
of view, Bhutanese Buddhists (Lamaistic Buddhist) are in the majority
(75%), while 25% of Bhutanese are followers of Nepalese-influenced
Buddhism.
Among the Ngalongs (Tibeto-Mongoloids), the Drukpas form the
majority, and are largely concentrated in western Bhutan. They mi-
grated to Bhutan from Tibet in the ninth and tenth centuries CE. Most
of the ruling elites of Bhutan are of this ethnicity. The Drukpas are fol-
lowers of the Drukpa Kagyuppa sect of Buddhism (Bhutanese Bud-
dhism). With their own social institutions and a language called Dzon-
kha, the Drukpas constitute the ‘mainstream culture’ of Bhutan. Like
the Drukpas, the Brokpas are also from Tibetan stock but have their
own dialect that is of Tibetan origin. One of the earliest communities
(Indo-Mongoloids) of Bhutan is the Monpas (Mons) who live mainly in
eastern and southeastern Bhutan. They speak a dialect called Sharchok-
kha. Khengs, another ancient community of Bhutan, are speakers of
the Khen-kha language. This community has a distinct Indo-Mongoloid
affinity and is the intermediary between Tibet and the Sub-Himalayan
Bengal and Lower Assam of India. The Birmis and the Dayas are min-
or communities of Bhutan. The Birmis are nomadic and are concen-
trated in the high altitude region of eastern Bhutan. The Dayas on the
other hand live mainly in south Bhutan. Their lifestyle is a mix of
semi-sedentarism and semi-nomadism. They are closely related to a
smaller neighbouring tribe in India: the Totos. The Lepchas are an-
other small ethnic group who have affinities with the Sikkimese.
Nowadays, the Lepchas of Bhutan have been more or less assimilated
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by the Drukpas owing to the fact that both groups are followers of Bhu-
tanese Buddhism.
There are a few more ethnic groups in Bhutan, which are the off-
shoot of the Greater Bodo family of north Bengal and northeast India.
Such communities like the Koches, Meches and the Tephoos entered
Bhutan between the 15th and 19th century, particularly during the
course of the encounter between Bhutan and the Koch kingdom
(Cooch Behar) of Sub-Himalayan Bengal and Lower Assam. The
Koches are expert agriculturists and followers of Hinduism with their
own traditions. They are mostly concentrated in south Bhutan
although the Tephoos, another branch of the Koches, are scattered in
Spu-na-Kha of north Bhutan. The offshoots of the Greater Bodo family
are less influential in the pluralist Bhutanese society.
The Bhutanese-Nepalese are a strong minority community in Bhu-
tan. The Nepalese began to settle in Bhutan in the early 20th century
and are now concentrated in the southeastern and southwestern re-
gions of the country. The agricultural knowledge of the Nepalese was
encouraged in Bhutan and they were allowed to clear the forestland of
southern and central Bhutan to start their agricultural activities. Gradu-
ally, the Nepalese population of Bhutan increased. This influx of Nepa-
lese changed the demographic composition of Bhutan, and they now
form the majority of the population in five districts of south Bhutan:
Sachi, Chhukha, Chirang, Geylegphug and Samdrup Jongkhar. Nowa-
days at least 35% of the total population of Bhutan is Nepalese.
The Nepalese themselves, however, are not a homogenous group.
They migrated from different regions of Nepal and India, with their
traditional caste, social and linguistic differences. They belong to the
Bahun, Chhetri, Magar, Gurung, Rai, Libu, Tamang and Newar castes
(Barman 2007: 16). Besides the Nepalese, a few more Indian commu-
nities have also migrated to Bhutan in recent years, especially with the
beginning of developmental activities including the construction of
roads and the spread of education.
The existence of a pluralist society in Bhutan is the result of its long
history of inflow of various communities who impacted on the socio-
economic life of the country. The development of a pluralist society in
a nation-state of the Third World often creates social unrest and pro-
blems in its social structure. This is certainly true for Bhutan.
Nation-building process and cultural nationalism
The traditional structure of Bhutanese polity is based on monarchical
traditions. Although the present monarchy of Bhutan was established
in 1907 by the British,1 its history can be traced back to the 17th cen-
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tury. In 1616, Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal, a monk from Tibet, es-
tablished his rule in Bhutan. He unified the Bhutanese territory with a
dual system of governance (spiritual and administrative). The religious
and state affairs were divided between the Dhrama Raja and the Devar-
aja. However, after the death of Shabdrung in 1652, this system un-
leashed a civil war between various sects that was to last for two centu-
ries. In 1907, Ugyen Wangchuck, the provincial governor of the Druk-
pa Kargyupa school of Tibetan Buddhism, consolidated his power over
the country and established the hereditary monarchy. It was not an ab-
solutist monarchy, and neither Ugyen Wangchuk (1907-1926), nor his
son Jigme Wangchuk (1926-1952), nor his grandson Dorji Wangchuk
(1952-1972) enjoyed absolute power. In fact, to appease a decentralised
and increasingly restless spiritual order, Dorji Wangchuk decreed in
1968 that the king would abdicate in favour of his oldest son if the
tshogdu (national assembly) gave him a vote of no confidence by a two-
thirds majority. It was Dorji Wangchuk who started the process of poli-
tical modernisation, and in 1953, he initiated one of the most impor-
tant constitutional reforms in Bhutanese history with the establish-
ment of the National Assembly of 150 members.
King Singhe Wangchuk, son of Dorji Wangchuk, ascended the
throne in 1972. He initiated several new policies for the development
of the state and began the process of decentralisation of power. This
process culminated in 1998 when he delegated full executive powers to
an elected Council of Ministers. The National Assembly was also em-
powered by the monarch by establishing a mechanism whereby it can
move a vote of confidence – or no confidence – in the king.
In the process of nation-building, Bhutan also initiated an economic
policy with the adoption of the First Five-Year Plan (1961-66), assisted
by financial aid from India. Bhutan received both financial and techno-
logical help from India consecutively in the first three Five-Year Plans.
However, Bhutan became suspicious of India’s assistance after the
merger of Sikkim with India in 1974. In spite of their suspicions, Bhu-
tan continued to implement the policy of rapid development and mod-
ernisation with the help from India.
The development strategy of Bhutan is based on six well-known
principles: self-reliance, sustainability, development and improved effi-
ciency of the private sector, peoples’ participation in the development
programmes through decentralisation of power, human resource devel-
opment, and removal of regional imbalances through social and eco-
nomic development. In addition to these, Bhutan also adopted a few
more development objectives in its Seventh Five-Year Plan (1992-97).
This plan stressed mature international relations including aid and
trade, basic economic and social infrastructure, macro-economic man-
agement, stable law and order, and preservation of the cultural heritage
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of Bhutan. The development activities of Bhutan have drawn their la-
bour force from different countries of South Asia including India, Ne-
pal and Bangladesh.
Since the beginning of planned development, Bhutan stressed the
idea of ‘gross national happiness’.2 The late King Jigme Dorji Wang-
chuck expressed his view on the goal of development as making the
people prosperous and happy, which he also emphasised when Bhutan
became a member of the United Nations in 1971. King Jigme Singye
Wangchuck followed the same policy of ‘national happiness’.
The concept of preservation of cultural heritage as an important
point of the development strategy was somewhat ambiguous as it
stressed the renunciation of negative outside influence. However, in
the 1980s Bhutan reinterpreted cultural preservation as ‘a positive and
essential means to safeguard national security’. Bhutan also founded a
commission called National Council for Social Cultural Promotion in
1980. Its main objectives were the (a) organisation and promotion of
social, cultural and educational activities to foster and strengthen a feel-
ing of national community transcending regional loyalties; (b) adoption
of schemes to develop the sense of national identity among the youth
and make them dedicate their service to the king and the country; (c)
initiations of plans and programmes calculated to emphasise the social,
cultural, and spiritual aspects of life and to make the youth participate
in activities conducive to national development at the rural level. In
1986, Bhutan established the Special Commission for Cultural Affairs
with the purpose of the preservation and promotion of the cultural
heritage. It should be noted that one of the main points of the Sixth
Five-Year Plan (1987-92) was the question of national identity. During
this plan period, Bhutan adopted a policy of renovation of old dzongs
(fort), monasteries and chhortens. Dzongkha, the language of the
Drukpas, was adopted and developed as the national language. The
Dzongkha Advisory Board was entrusted to produce Dzongkha text-
books from pre-primary to degree levels (Ghosh et al. 2002: 67-68).
Thus, Bhutan launched a series of cultural policies and, in 1989,
adopted a code of conduct called Driglam Namza (one nation, one peo-
ple, one language). Traditional dress of the Drukpas called gho (for
men) and kira (for women) was made compulsory for the Bhutanese.
Dzongkha became compulsory for elementary education, and the edu-
cational curriculum emphasised traditional learning. These aspects
provided the basic structure of a national identity, which became sy-
nonymous with Drukpa culture.
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National identity and statelessness
This policy on national identity and the nation-building process had a
negative impact on the nation’s multi-ethnic and polyphonic composi-
tion. The Bhutanese-Nepalese in particular realised that the policies re-
lated to the cultural nationalism of Bhutan were violating their human
rights. They were even facing the fundamentally important question of
citizenship in a democratic sense. In particular, the New Citizenship Act
of 1985 had denied citizenship to a large number of Bhutanese-Nepa-
lese. This act categorically stated that people who entered Bhutan after
1958 were not citizens of Bhutan. Moreover, knowledge of the national
culture, language (Dzongkha) and customs were made compulsory in
order to acquire citizenship of Bhutan. Under this act a large number
of Nepali speakers failed to prove their Bhutanese citizenship. After
1988 Bhutan strictly implemented the New Citizenship Act, and as a
consequence a large number of people of Nepalese origin were de-
clared illegal immigrants. Implementation of the Driglam Namza
further increased the number of stateless people. The ‘illegal immi-
grants’ were compelled to leave Bhutan and to take shelter in the fron-
tier districts of Nepal, particularly at Jhapa. Some Nepali speakers also
left Bhutan voluntarily. The inflow of refugees from Bhutan to Nepal
began to increase after 1990. By the end of March 1992, the Bhutanese
‘asylum seeker’ population had increased to 27,000. The United Na-
tions High Commission on Refugees and the Government of Nepal es-
timated the Bhutanese refugees of Nepalese background (called Bhupa-
li)3 in 1996 at around 90,700 (who are given shelter in the camp) (Up-
reti 2004: 92). Bhutanese refuges are still stateless and continue to be
so in spite of several bilateral talks between Bhutan and Nepal.
Against this background of refugee problems, a constitution was
drafted in Bhutan without representation from the dissident groups,
and which remains vague about the monarch’s prerogative powers. It
also lacks a provision for an independent judiciary and fails to properly
acknowledge religious, linguistic and cultural freedoms. At best, it en-
visages a two-party oligarchy based on the Drukpa vision of a homoge-
nous nationhood. However, by the beginning of 2008 Bhutan success-
fully conducted elections as part of the transition process of the coun-
try from monarchy to democracy. But the concept of cultural
nationalism remains unchanged.
Conclusion
National identity based on culture is no doubt a complex problem for
any multi-ethnic, pluralist society. This problem originates mainly from
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the question of subordination of minority communities by the majority.
The ‘national identity’ in the case of Bhutan reflects the cultural iden-
tity of the Drukpas, in which the smaller communities have little place.
Imposition of the national identity over minorities has led to dissatis-
faction and ethnic unrest.
Political experiments in Bhutan, particularly its move towards de-
mocracy, have created much interest among minorities. The general
elections for the National Council of Bhutan, the upper house of the
new bicameral Parliament of Bhutan, were held for the first time on 31
December 2007. On 24 March 2008 members were elected to the Na-
tional Assembly, the lower house of the parliament. The Bhutan Peace
and Prosperity Party, conservative and royalist in outlook, enjoyed a
landslide victory, securing 44 seats while the People’s Democratic
Party, which stands for democracy and human rights, got only 3 seats.
Unfortunately, a large number of Bhutanese-Nepalese expelled from
Bhutan have been excluded from the election process. This deprivation
has created further tension among the new generation of Bhutanese-
Nepalese who are now trying to draw the attention of the whole world
to their problem.
Notes
1 After the establishment of British colonial power in India, the British Indian govern-
ment sent several political missions to Bhutan and Tibet. Several conflicts broke out
between Bhutan and British-ruled India, but Bhutan never became part of the British
empire.
2 The ‘Gross National Happiness’ (GNH) is a concept associated with the development
strategy of Bhutan. It was coined by Jigme Singye Wangchuk in 1972, in order to de-
fine quality of life in more holistic and spiritual terms than Gross National Product
(GNP). It stands for promotion of equitable and sustainable socio-economic develop-
ment, preservation and promotion of cultural values, conservation of the natural en-
vironment, and establishment of good government.
3 The term Bhupali has been derived from Bhu of Bhutan and pali of Nepali. Bhupali
means the people of Bhutan of Nepali origin.
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5 Religion and Cultural Nationalism:
Socio-Political Dynamism of Communal Violence
in India
Sali Augustine
Communal violence (especially between Hindus and Muslims, and
Hindus and Christians) has shocked India, particularly in the last two
decades – despite its post-independence efforts towards democratisa-
tion and development. The emerging cultural nationalistic hegemony
in India plays an important role in this. The element of identity politics
that is emerging in the developing economy, combined with religious
sentiments, brings new issues and conflicts in a democratic situation.
India’s democratic institutions have encouraged mixing religion with
politics so as to utilise minority votes to gain political power. This mix-
ing, pursued by politicians as a means of deriving advantages in elec-
tions, has caused Hindu-Muslim cleavages to widen. However, these
phenomena cannot be understood without placing the social analysis
in the context of global change. Thus, understanding the climate of re-
ligious extremism in India has to be linked with the situation that can
be found on a global level.
Conflict between Hindu and Muslim communities in India has been
identified as a major stumbling block to the development of the coun-
try and its democratic principles. The term ‘communalism’ is widely
used across South Asia to describe the systematic misuse of religion
for political purposes. It refers to the processes of political construction
of community identities along religious lines. Communal politics re-
presents one’s own religious community in an antagonistic relation-
ship with ‘the other religious community’. Thus, socially engineered
prejudice, tension and conflict between religious communities consti-
tute ‘communalism’ (Kapoor 1995). However, by analysing three socio-
political and economic factors in modern society, this paper suggests
that communal conflict in India has more than one cause and is be-
coming more complex through the emerging socio-economic and poli-
tico-cultural aspects.
Background
It was believed that with the partition of the undivided India in 1947,
the Hindu-Muslim problem would be solved, and national leaders such
as the late Jayaprakash Narayan argued that it was ‘similar to two
brothers fighting to be separated’. Accordingly, it was supposed a se-
paration based on the just distribution of assets would bring about
amity between the two parts. This argument implied that if the Muslim
demand for Pakistan were accepted, the dispute between the ‘two
brothers’ – Hindus and Muslims – would come to an end. The late Ja-
waharlal Nehru and others also believed that with the spread of mod-
ern scientific education, people’s attitudes would change, and com-
munalist strife would become a thing of the past. The implied expecta-
tion was that the process of development would engage energies in
positive tasks, leaving scarcely any time for squabbles and disputes.
Above all, it was assumed that all conflicts would cease through the
workings of democratic principles.
Such assumptions appear to have been largely unfounded, as India
continues to face the divisiveness and violence of communalism and
communal conflict. So far, the socio-economic and socio-political pro-
cesses have been extremely convoluted. Economic development did not
proceed along a straight line, as expected, and the impact of education
also fell short of expectations by being limited to a small minority.
Post-independence India witnessed large-scale communal riots with
thousands of innocent people killed, and the population became di-
vided on the basis of the Hindu majority versus the Muslim minority
(Engineer 2004). Historically, severe and recurrent communal riots
have taken place mainly in certain ‘riot prone’ (Varshney 2002) urban
areas. But the recent communal riots in India show a tendency of ex-
panding into the rural areas as well (Engineer 2004). A large-scale
communal riot between Hindus and Muslims took place in the Indian
state of Gujarat between February and May of 2002. It erupted after an
altercation between some Hindus and Muslims at a railway station in
Godhra city, which escalated to an arson attack on a train. In this inci-
dent more than fifty people were killed. According to official figures,
more than a thousand people were then killed in the violence that fol-
lowed this event, not only in urban areas but spreading to interior
areas of the state and lasting for more than two months. Violence in
the Indian state of Gujarat in 2002 graphically revealed the vindictive-
ness and fear that lay beneath the antipathy between the Hindu and
Muslim communities, and presented a grave challenge to the minority
Muslims (Augustine 2003: 59-76). There are numerous incidents of
communal and religious violence and tension in various parts of the
country.1 Each major communal riot further embitters Hindu-Muslim
relations.
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Multicultural society and identity politics
South Asia as a region is multi-religious and multi-lingual and consists
of several communities with distinct identities. Since politics in the
medieval period in South Asia was based on a feudal system, and since
a feudal system, dependent on monarchical and dynastic power, was
essentially non-competitive, conflicts along these lines, if they occurred
at all, were not grave (Engineer 2004). All religious and linguistic
groups were loyal to one dynasty or other. With the consolidation of
British rule, however, politics in colonial South Asia became competi-
tive as different linguistic groups and in particular groups with differ-
ent religious affiliations began to compete with each other for a share
of political power and government jobs. Religion became a source of
identity in the mobilisation of political forces, and consequently a
source of conflict (Singh 2000). The power elites among both the Hin-
dus and Muslims began to assert the religious identities of their fol-
lowers, with a view to gaining power on the basis of numerical
strength. The electoral system introduced by the colonial powers
proved even more divisive. Under pressure from the Muslim minority,
the British administration introduced separate electorates for the Mus-
lims (‘communal representation’) through the Act of 1909. It helped
the Muslims by giving them more electoral seats than they would have
had on a purely numerical basis (Seth 2000: 302). The Muslims pos-
sessed a double vote as the Muslim electorates were superimposed
upon the general electorates; and that, not surprisingly, was a source of
grievance for other communities, especially the Hindu nationalists.
In such a charged atmosphere, it was not surprising that communal-
ism as a social or political movement, or even as a mere ideology, was
strengthened. Communalism and communal violence turned out to be
two stages of the same phenomenon. The strengthening of communal
tendencies creates the conditions by which collective violence is
spawned. In fact, the spread of communalism is an indispensable pre-
condition in the upsurge of communal violence. Therefore, communal
violence is not set in motion and cannot be manipulated unless a cer-
tain atmosphere has been generated by communalism. Communal is-
sues have formed a vital aspect of political campaigning in India dur-
ing the past sixty years, and this trend grew steadily stronger during
the 1980s. It was precisely during the 1980s and early 1990s that the
greatest number of incidents of communal violence erupted in India
(Engineer 1989: 65-89).
Three important factors in the period following 1980 are helpful to
an understanding of the emerging socio-cultural cleavages in India.
The first is the emergence of ‘identity politics’ in the nation’s develop-
ing economy, and the second is the global emergence of ‘cultural na-
RELIGION AND CULTURAL NATIONALISM 67
tionalism’ in the world. The third factor is the growing ‘climate of reli-
gious extremism’ represented through certain extreme positions of
some religious organisations2 and the terrorist confrontations in India.
Identity politics and economic development
The process of socio-economic development in India that was initiated
under numerous five-year plans changed the entire political landscape.
The dynamics of development unleashed forces that gave rise to castes
and communities becoming divided along socio-economic lines, which
produced effects that could be politically mobilised. On the one hand,
the process of mobility within the framework of the capitalist economy
bred structural inequality, but on the other, it brought about a revolu-
tionary rise in aspirations. It should also be noted that in an underde-
veloped society, the process of economic development is invariably ac-
companied by violence. According to Asghar Ali Engineer (1989: 65-
89), the experience of all underdeveloped societies undergoing the pro-
cess of development, throughout history in general and in the twenti-
eth century in particular, has shown that violence is integral to this pro-
cess. Engineer concludes that in India’s case, violence has erupted in
caste, communal and regional forms since development in a capitalist
framework began. Inequitable development generates deep grievances
within groups that are caste-based or possess religious and regional af-
filiations, and when these groups have been frozen out of the competi-
tive economic situation, they turn to asserting their separate identities
even more vehemently. On the other hand, urged on by their identity
consciousness, the privileged caste-based groups, communities and
groups with regional affiliations, have become increasingly aggressive
about protecting their own privileges. Confrontation has thus been cre-
ated, and in the process of inequitable development, historical identi-
ties have come to assume even greater importance. Inasmuch as iden-
tity can be a vehicle of political mobilisation, the process of develop-
ment has accordingly strengthened caste and communal forces in
India.
Historically, Brahmins dominated the socio-political scene. They be-
gan to be challenged, however, in the post-independence period. The
Brahmins’ hold on power began to wane when the middle classes and
other castes began to grow stronger in a socio-political sense. The Mar-
athas in Maharashtra, the Reddys in Andhra Pradesh, Vokaliggas in
Karnataka, the Rajputs and the Patels in Gujarat, the Yadavas in Uttar
Pradesh and Bihar, to name only a few groups, started revealing an at-
titude of hostility towards the Brahmins and the members of the feudal
classes after independence. With the onset of the agricultural revolu-
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tion and through the democratisation process, the middle class ac-
quired economic clout and eventually political power. It was observed
that the greater the degree of development, the more the capitalist class
was strengthened and the feudal classes were weakened.
However, throughout the process, the underprivileged were also be-
coming conscious of their deprived social conditions as well as their
rights. The process of democratisation and development led members
of the lower caste, the tribal people in rural areas, and Muslims in ur-
ban areas to assert themselves, thereby making the middle class even
more aggressive. This type of assertiveness and aggressiveness took the
form of identity politics. When the leaders of the Congress Party
leaned towards the minorities (Muslims and tribes), those of the Janata
party (later BJP) sought to acquire the votes of the upper and middle
classes.
In these circumstances it was obvious that the anti-’reservation’ agita-
tion of 1981, the subsequent caste riots in the city of Ahmedabad, and
the anti-’reservation’ violence of 19853 were economically and politically
motivated. The issue of reservation quotas for ‘backward communities’4
became the focal point for the hostile political mobilisation of the
upper castes, who turned violent. The 1981 anti-’reservation’ agitation,
a reaction to the KHAM5 coalition policy adopted by the then ruling
Congress Party, was channelled into a major communal conflagration
in a shrewd bid to check the sharp polarisation taking place among
Hindus along caste lines. This, however, took a turn to communalism
when political mobilisation began along the lines of Hindu national-
ism.
Cultural nationalism in a globalising society
Hindutva is the name for Hindu nationalism as a political movement.
Created in 1925 in the state of Maharashtra, the RSS (Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh or National Voluntary Corps) is the core institution
of Hindutva. This term has been variously identified with cultural na-
tionalism, Hindu fundamentalism, and so on. However, Hindutva is
different from Hinduism. The Hindu nationalists’ conception of na-
tionalism is rooted in the primacy of culture over politics. According to
their interpretation, culture ‘is but a product of our all-comprehensive
religion, a part of its body and not distinguishable from it’ (Panikkar
2004: 6). This naturally implies that the country’s national culture is
tantamount to Hindu religious culture.
Cultural nationalism, therefore, is a euphemism, invoked in order to
mask the creation of a state with a Hindu religious identity. This char-
acteristic of the nation was clearly spelled out by RSS leader M.S. Gol-
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walkar in the following words: ‘This country, Hindustan, the Hindu
race with the Hindu religion, Hindu culture, and Hindu language com-
pletes the Nation concept’ (Louis 2004: 40). The relationship between
Hindutva and Hinduism is also well described in the writings of the
first exponent of Hindutva, V.D. Savarkar. Savarkar had argued that a
Muslim or a Christian, even if born in India, could not claim to pos-
sess the qualities demanded by the concept of Hindutva. The essentials
of Hindutva, according to Savarkar, are ‘rashtra (a common nation), jati
(a common race), and sanskriti (a common civilization)’ (Louis 2004:
36).
Commenting on what takes place in India in the name of religious
fundamentalism, Ashutosh Varshney points out that ‘the Hindu na-
tionalists are religious nationalists, not religious fundamentalists’ be-
cause ‘the Hindu nationalists are calling neither for Ramrajya (the
Kingdom of Lord Ram) nor for a return to traditional Hindu law’
(Varshney 2002: 70; italics in the original). In this context he remarks:
‘The aim of Hindu nationalists is neither to “semitize”6 Hinduism nor
to enforce religious uniformity and orthodoxy. Rather, it is to create a
political unity among the Hindus, divided otherwise by the various
castes, languages, and doctrinal diversities’ (Varshney 2002: 71; italics
in the original).
The historian K.N. Panikkar (2004: 4-8) notes that the concept of
cultural nationalism conceived and propagated by Hindutva is based
on a misrepresentation of the nature of national identity. Nationalism,
like democracy, is indivisible with its constitutive elements – political,
economic and cultural – all intermeshed. Privileging any one of these
attributes tends to undermine the holistic character of nationalism.
There is no denying the importance of culture in the make-up of na-
tional identity, yet culture alone does not mould the national identity of
any country (Panikkar 2004: 6). This was true of India as well where
nationalism emerged and evolved as a part of anti-colonial conscious-
ness. Culture was an integral part of this process of national recon-
struction for those who were trying, by invoking culture as a tool of re-
sistance, to develop a national culture, which was distinct from the co-
lonial and the traditional. Yet, the struggle for a national culture during
the anti-colonial period either remained an epiphenomenon or an in-
strument of political mobilisation. Therefore, the cultural question was
not adequately addressed during the anti-colonial struggle, and Hindut-
va appropriated the space thus left vacant.
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The climate of religious extremism
The last two decades have witnessed shocking attacks against Muslims
in India, represented through the incidents of the destruction of the
Babri Masjid, a Muslim mosque in Ayodhya (Uttar Pradesh) in 1992,
preceded and followed by a wave of communal riots targeting Muslims
throughout India, and the murderous pogrom against the Muslims in
the state of Gujarat in 2002. Against such Hindu aggression, some
Muslim extremist organisations turned to revenge in the form of indis-
criminate bomb attacks in some important cities.7 Since the year 2001,
several terrorist attacks have shattered major cities in India. Many peo-
ple were killed instantly and several hundred wounded in these inci-
dents. Some of the most populous centres and places of Hindu reli-
gious pilgrimage, like Jaipur (13 May 2008; 80 people killed and more
than 200 people injured) and Varanasi (7 March 2007; 28 people killed
and more than 100 people wounded) have been the target of attacks.
On 18 May 2007, 9 people were killed and many were injured in a
bomb blast at the Mecca Masjid (mosque) in the southern city of Hy-
derabad. Indiscriminate and coordinated bombings ripped through
packed commuter trains in India’s financial capital of Mumbai on 11
July 2006, killing more than 200 people and wounding hundreds
more. These are some of the major incidents in recent years, and vir-
tually all these attacks, as the investigating officials said, were linked to
terrorists, some from inside the country and some from foreign outfits.
It is clear that it is not just the Islamic jihadis, but also separatists like
the United Liberation Front of Assam (Ulfa) and Maoist rebels in India
who use serial bombings on a regular basis.
There is also a climate of aggression in various parts of the country
in the name of defending Hindu culture. The Bajrang Dal organisa-
tion, for instance, which describes its mission as to protect the honour
and interests of Hindus, organised a vehicle rally in Bhopal on the eve
of Valentine’s Day, vowing not to allow any Valentine Day celebrations.
Hundreds of Bajrang Dal activists rode their bikes in procession while
rending the air with slogans like ‘Bharatiya Sanskriti par Aakraman
band karo’ (Stop the attack on Indian culture). ‘We will oppose Valen-
tine’s Day tooth and nail because the concept has come from the West
and through it an attempt is being made to spoil Indian culture,’ said a
district convener of Bajrang Dal in Bhopal.8
In another incident on 25 September 2004, a group of RSS mem-
bers attacked the sisters of the Missionaries of Charity at a Dalit (out-
caste) colony in Kozhikode, Kerala. The nuns were reportedly invited to
the colony by a poor woman, who had been receiving rice and essential
provisions as charity from them for over a year and who wanted some
of her neighbours too to get such help. The RSS volunteers accused
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them of preparing the ground for religious conversion in the Dalit col-
ony. When they were about to return, a mob, allegedly raising the slo-
gans ‘BJP-RSS zindabad (Victory)’ and ‘Bharat Mata Ki Jai (Salute to
Mother India)’, surrounded the nuns’ vehicle and smashed its window-
panes and brutally attacked the nuns.
Violence between Hindus and Muslims was involved in the Ayodhya
incident and in the Gujarat riots. Indiscriminate bomb blasts in major
cities in India at regular intervals and the confrontations provoked by
extremist organisations cannot be considered sporadic or random.
How should such incidents be understood in the global context?
Ideological justification
In the context of the changing world order after the cold war, Samuel
Huntington (1996) proposed his controversial theory of the clash of ci-
vilisations in the widest sense, to explain the phenomenon of expand-
ing conflicts along fault lines of identities. But he was wrong, because
the image of identity he conceived as defining civilisations was partly
racial, partly geographical, and partly based on religious affiliation and
culture. He ignored at the same time the interaction between civilisa-
tions, coexisting cultures and various areas of religious syncretism in
the world. He noticed a process of confrontation and emerging antag-
onisms in the world, especially in the form of an ‘anti-America’ feeling.
Huntington approached this sentiment within an ideological frame-
work. But, whether this expresses a clash of civilisations has been ser-
iously criticised ever since Huntington’s argument appeared in 1993.
Arjun Appadurai in his Fear of Small Numbers: An essay on the geogra-
phy of anger (2006) offers a compelling explanation about the sources
of global unrest, terrorism, and ethnic strife. Rejecting the concept of a
clash of civilisations, he explores the idea of a ‘clash of ideocides or a
clash of civicides’(2006: 117). What marks today’s fractured political
world, claims Appadurai, is a return to ideologies, which intensify sus-
picions and uncertainty among groups and lead to what he calls ‘ideo-
cide’, a new form of ideological totalism, which targets whole nations
and ways of life for extermination. Terrorism, driven by ‘ideocide’,
blurs the line between military and civilian space, and divorces war
from the nation (Appadurai 2006: 117).
Huntington’s model assumes that civilisation flows from a coherent
and unidimensional geographic base such as ‘the West’ or ‘the Muslim
world’. Appadurai argues that globalisation has fractured this illusion
and has created a disjunctive world where the fear and power assigned
to minorities can change quickly and dramatically. The world today is
filled with angry diasporic minorities – Sikhs, Basques, Kurds, Tamil
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Sri Lankans, Chechenyans, etc. – with the potential for cellular organi-
sations. Members within these communities can morph from one kind
of minority – weak, disempowered, disenfranchised and angry – to an-
other kind: cellular, globalised, transnational and armed and danger-
ous. Their anger can be focussed on specific nation-states, but primar-
ily on America, which is seen by many as the driving force of globalisa-
tion.
The geography of anger refers to how social certainties and uncer-
tainties are mapped in complex ways over geographical territory. It
oscillates dialectically between forces of permanence and change, be-
tween tradition and modernisation, fragmentation and homogenisa-
tion. The fuel of the geography of anger is new information technolo-
gies, which speed up, circulate and recontextualise local grievances into
global settings. The spark is the uncertainty about the enemy within,
and the anxiety about the incomplete project of national purity. As na-
tional sovereignty is challenged by the forces of globalisation and famil-
iar cultural structures are torn apart, there is an inevitable backlash
that stresses blood and soil. Christian, Hindu, and Muslim fundament-
alisms are attempts to mobilise the certainties of identity and the sac-
redness of nation. Violence, especially the spectacular violence asso-
ciated with terrorism, genocide and wars, is a way of producing a more
stable identity and cultural certainty.
According to Appadurai, minorities quickly become a problem in a
modern global context because they challenge national narratives of so-
cial cohesion and homogeneity. When majorities within a nation are
reminded of the slim margins which allow them to maintain their
dominance, they contribute to fantasies of national incompleteness, to
rage, and ultimately to a desire to purify the land of the minority. Eth-
nic identity is the flash point of such struggles, and the intimate vio-
lence they produce, neighbour killing neighbour, amounts to a displa-
cement into the cultural field of deeper global processes. The ethnic
violence within modern India between Muslims and Hindus is part of
an unstable mix of global and regional forces, which produces contra-
dictions and insecurities about who belongs within the nation and who
shares the entitlements of the state. These forces tend to be countered
by national politics, such as those found in the BJP (the Hindu Nation-
alist Party), which relies on the construction of an ethnicised Muslim
and calls for national purity (Appadurai 2006: 104-107).
The justification of fundamentalist religions
We may ask ourselves: what is the reason for the seeming propensity
toward fundamentalism in all religions, not merely Islam? One possi-
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ble explanation is that the present economic and political systems
jointly generate a series of traumas that society, as a whole, must ab-
sorb and manage. Jose´ Maria Mardones (2005: 6-8), debating current
religious and ideological tendencies in relation to violence, tries to ex-
plain the climate of religious fundamentalism in a wider context. He
argues that religious fundamentalism is an answer to the ‘traumas of
modernity’ because religious sentiments make these traumas more
bearable. A reading of faith from the perspective of justice would pro-
voke more tension, or what we might call an ‘over-tension’. A more tra-
ditional and fundamentalist religion guides and balances; instead of
generating more fear and anxiety, it offers help and solace. This kind
of religion works because it distends the social fabric and produces a
feeling of peacefulness and reassurance.
According to Mardones, a democratic political system and a funda-
mentally neo-liberal economic system supposedly generate a series of
traumas and uprootings that bring instability to the equilibrium of the
social system. To counteract these disturbing forces, fundamentalist re-
ligion acts as an agent to strengthen roots, produce interior peace and
assuage the effects of the traumas. It is evident that in such a view, reli-
gion plays basically an ameliorating and equilibrating role (Mardones
2005: 6-7). It also offers an answer to the emerging number of ‘new
age movements’ (so-called NRMs) in different social contexts. For in-
stance, there is a growing attraction toward ‘healing centres’ and ‘spiri-
tual gurus’, especially in major cities in India.
Socio-political circumstances of the growth of cultural
nationalism
Historically, during the 1980s, many Muslims went to the oil-rich Arab
countries as migrant workers and prospered economically.9 Hindu na-
tionalists, on the other hand, emerged on the political scene with a de-
finite political purpose. The RSS maintained a low-key posture while
spearheading the VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad or World Hindu Move-
ment), a movement founded in 1964 to campaign for militant Hindu-
ism. It selected various issues that aggravated communal cleavages and
set in motion violent conflicts. A critical issue was the conversion of
Dalits (outcaste people) to Islam in the district of Meenakshipuram in
the southern Indian state of Tamilnadu (Engineer 2004).10
Linking this incident to the economic clout of the rich Gulf-region
Muslims, and their close association with oil-rich Arab nations like
Saudi Arabia, a number of Hindu organisations were alarmed by this
incident.11 Hindu organisations such as the VHP and RSS interpreted
the Dalits’ conversion to Islam at Meenakshipuram as happening be-
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cause of the economic benefits flowing from the oil-rich Gulf region.
And they began to mobilise people, triggering a debate on an anti-con-
version law to be passed in parliament. The VHP became politically ac-
tive and aggressive after this incident. Their sense of alarm was further
intensified by the Western mass media, which described the Meenak-
shipuram incident in such terms as the ‘rise of militant Islam’ and the
‘swelling tide of fundamentalism’. The VHP also created a controversy
over the birthplace of the highly revered Hindu deity Ram in the city
of Ayodhya, in the Faizabad district of the northern Indian state of Ut-
tar Pradesh. They claimed that a mosque located there (referred to as
the Babri Mosque) was situated on the very spot where Lord Ram was
born. Hence a movement aimed at constructing a temple on the site of
the mosque began. This culminated in the destruction of the Babri
Mosque on 6 December 1992. It was a sad day for the proponents of
democracy in the nation.
The contemporary advocates of cultural nationalism, and the move-
ments they lead, aim at creating a nation in which the Hindu religious
identity coincides with the cultural. This has been attempted through a
deliberate intervention on their part to create a culture that defines a
‘Hindu nation’, rather than simply by a cultural intervention. The im-
portance of such a distinction is well understood by the activists of
Hindutva. As a result, they are constantly engaged in actively interven-
ing in the cultural life of the people, with the purpose of reorienting it
in a religious direction. Through a selective appropriation of cultural
and intellectual traditions, and through the intervention by their innu-
merable organisations, they have lent credence to the Hindutva claim
that it represents the interests of the Hindus. It is selective because it
excludes those with non-Hindu affiliations.
The multicultural character of Indian society
India is a country of great cultural diversity. It is not only religious
plurality that gives rise to divisions; there are various other social and
cultural entities that add to the pluralistic character in terms of lan-
guage, geography, ethnicity, religion and culture. Through S.K. Singh’s
People of India (1992), which is based on a survey of all Indian commu-
nities conducted by the Anthropological Survey of India, we have ob-
tained an insight into the plurality of the caste-community structures
and their cultural and socio-economic diversities. The basic category in
this survey is ‘community’, which is marked by endogamy, occupation,
and perception. The term ‘community’ as used in this survey resem-
bles the concept of caste and tribe, although it is not inclusive of all
their features.
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Communities have been identified at various levels. First, there are
the ones, usually large in number, that are caste-based and minority
groups. Second, there are those that identify themselves utilising lin-
guistic and cultural categories (for example as Assamese, Bengali, Gu-
jarati, Rajasthani, Tamil, and so on). Third, there are those who identi-
fy themselves in terms of endogamy, occupation, and social percep-
tions. (Though communities have been identified through endogamy,
occupation, and social perceptions, Singh concedes that there are about
half a dozen communities that do not conform to these three criteria.)
The fourth group of communities consists of those identified as Adi
Dharma, Adi Andhra, Adi Karnataka, to name a few, that fall under the
constitutional list of the Scheduled Castes (those outside the main-
stream Hindu caste system). In all, there are 4,635 communities in In-
dia. Of these 2,209 have been categorised as main communities, and
sources have estimated that there are 586 segments within these com-
munities. In addition, there are also other, minor communities and
their segments, which are spread across the states and union territories
of India.
The findings of this survey affirm that the diversity of communities
does not affect the sociological structure of the states and union terri-
tories. More than 71% of these communities are located within the
boundaries of the states and union territories. This shows that the
states and union territories may not only be categorised as linguistic
and cultural, but also as sociological units. There are only 111 commu-
nities (3.97%) spread throughout India. Interestingly, this diversity in
communities may be observed not only among Hindus but among the
minority religious groups as well. The communities found within min-
ority religious groups are: Muslims 584, Sikhs 130, Jains 100, Bud-
dhists 93, Christians 339, Jews 7, Parsis 3 and Animists 411 (Singh
1992). This explains the diversity and complexity of social structures
and cultural practices among various religious groups, as it also affirms
the essential plurality of cultures and cultural practices in India.
The cultural tradition that Hindutva seeks to construct does not re-
spect either the trajectory of its own historical evolution or the impor-
tance of external influences in its make-up (Lobo 2003). Thus, it takes
a static view of cultural tradition, ignoring its inherent dynamism. One
of the consequences of this attitude is the intolerance, reflected in the
different interpretations and conflicting representations, toward the
minority communities of Muslims, Sikhs and Christians in India re-
cently. This intolerance, however, does not represent the whole Hindu
society, but only the section that supports the idea of ‘cultural national-
ism’.
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Cultural nationalism: a threat to secular democracy in India
A democratic setup with universal franchise in a comparatively less ‘ad-
vanced’ country like India presents its own dilemmas during the pro-
cess of development. However, in the modern globalised world, one
cannot constrain a society to be mono-religious, and a nation has no
choice but to coexist with other multi-religious and multi-lingual na-
tions. Thus, religion as a basis of nationhood will never serve to estab-
lish a peaceful society. On the contrary, it would lead to confrontations
among different religious communities, and the pressing economic
problems of the people will always be sidelined in favour of religious
issues.
Hindutva, as understood by its advocates, involves conformity to the
idea that India has primarily been a Hindu rashtra (nation). On this is-
sue Ganesh Devy (2002: 262-263) writes: Hindutva ‘is not a religious
philosophy or a social reform movement. It is a political philosophy
based on cultural chauvinism, which insists that the non-Hindus of In-
dia accept their place as “minorities”, whose safety and security will de-
pend on their ability to earn the “goodwill of the majority”’. Thus, at
the heart of the Hindutva ideology is the notion that what is good for
the majority should also be good for the minorities, and that any asser-
tion of minority rights is essentially a threat and a challenge to the po-
litical authority of the majority. Devy (2002: 263) states:
Such minorities therefore, are seen by the Hindutva advocates
as anti-national and anti-social. Besides, any attempt by a minor-
ity group to swell their numbers is seen by the Hindutva vo-
taries as aggression. Hence, conversion to Christianity or a Hin-
du’s marriage to a Muslim or a Christian is seen as undesirable
and provocative acts.
Thus, the Hindutva advocates create a threatening atmosphere, which
discourages minority communities and faiths from asserting their
identities. It is ‘nationalistic Puritanism’. In other words, cultural na-
tionalism in India means ‘dictatorship of the majority’, which is the
very negation of democracy. A truly democratic country would ensure
equal rights for all, irrespective of religion, caste and creed. Religion,
ethnicity, or linguistic origin should not get in the way of fundamental
rights. Not only does dictatorship of the majority have no place in a de-
mocracy, a true democracy should ensure additional rights to religious
and linguistic minorities in order to protect their religious and cultural
traditions. The Indian Constitution, for example, ensures these rights
to minorities through Articles 25 to 30.
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Cultural nationalists call the enactment of such provisions contained
in the Constitution the ‘appeasement’ of minorities, and they try to in-
cite the religious feelings of the majority community. The political suc-
cess of the Hindutva-supported political parties in India in the last two
decades shows that this incitement of the religious feelings of the ma-
jority community was also for the purpose of winning votes and acquir-
ing political power. This is the kind of exploitation of sentiment that
gave rise to the Gujarat riots, which were a blot on Indian democracy
(Augustine 2003: 59-76). However, the people in India have proved
that they are capable of confronting cultural nationalism by democratic
means, as seen in the last general elections. The BJP, which was the
ruling party, despite its efforts to promote its ‘India shining’ slogan,
was ultimately defeated and forced to be the opposition. During the
election campaign, the parties in opposition at that time, led by the In-
dian National Congress had promised to tackle communal violence by
the enactment of a ‘comprehensive law against communal riots’, and
these parties came into power in a coalition government called the
United Progressive Alliance (UPA). Although the ‘Communal Violence
(Prevention, Control and Rehabilitation of Victims) Bill’ was an en-
couraging sign, it also shows its limitations of implementation. The
Bill was supposed to be a showpiece legislation of the UPA govern-
ment, a law to check communal violence like the 2002 Gujarat riots,
and to facilitate stricter punishment for communal violence, speedy in-
vestigation and trial of offences through special courts; it provided in-
stitutional arrangements for the first time for the relief, rehabilitation
and compensation for victims of violence. But ever since the Bill was
introduced in Rajya Sabha (Upper House of the Indian parliament) in
2005 there has been opposition to it.12 Certain provisions of this Bill
are short-sighted and may not be really effective to tackle communal-
ism at the ground level. For instance, section 55 of the draft Bill em-
powers the federal government to declare within a state or province a
‘communally disturbed area’, thereby bringing the law and order situa-
tion of that area under its purview. However, we have repeatedly wit-
nessed that officers abjectly await political directions before they exer-
cise their powers, and the force itself becomes biased and sympathetic
to its own community and even participates in violence rather than
protecting the victims. Repeated commissions of enquiry on commu-
nal violence have also established a consistent pattern that where force
is used by the state, it is used highly disproportionately against the vul-
nerable.
78 SALI AUGUSTINE
Confronting communalism in India
India is a country in which for hundreds of years different cultures
have coexisted. But now the Hindu-Muslim relationship has been pro-
jected as a major divide. Communalism basically is not about religion
so much as it is a political ideology, as we have seen with regard to cul-
tural nationalism. It is about using history and grievances of the past,
some of them imagined and some of them real. As Hindutva and its
political mobilisers evolved a cultural politics in the course of the 19th
and 20th century, the partition of the country in 1947 created a new
constitutional concern about the rights of the minorities (such as Mus-
lims). The emergence of coalition politics (of political parties and var-
ious affiliated social movements) created an atmosphere of identity pol-
itics (head count by religious identity) and politics of the ‘vote bank’.13
The contemporary political mobilisation in India is a ‘vote-bank’ poli-
tics that is responsible for using religion to divide people.
What should the response of the minorities be to the aggressive Hin-
dutva groups? Should they submit and accept the concept of ‘Hindu
Rashtra (nation)’ and the status of ‘second-class citizens’? Or should
they resist such demands and fight back with equal militancy? Neither
course can be recommended, for such efforts will further divide the
people by ethnic identity. Minority communalism against majority
communalism is retaliation. Some have advocated boycotting the elec-
tions, which is not wise. That will only lead to the misuse of democ-
racy. Rather, winning the confidence of the majority community is im-
portant.
The counter to the communalist forces is ‘secularism’, which was
seen by Nehru as an essential component of the independent India.
The term ‘secularism’ is used in India in a range of rather different
ways. The obvious meaning is the separation of religion from State.
This requires that the law is independent of religion, and that religious
motifs are not incorporated in the symbolic construction of the State.
However, this use of the term has been extended into a peculiarly In-
dian solution: that the State should be even-handed towards all reli-
gions. There is also the strange communalist appropriation of the idea
of secularism, which claims that all (acceptable) belief can be incorpo-
rated within Hinduism that is uniquely tolerant of all. This notion re-
sults in accusations of ‘pseudo-secularism’ being levelled at the other
two, more conventional concepts.
An aware secular democratic force within the Hindu majority com-
munity could stall the Hindutva forces better than an aggressive minor-
ity. Democracy in a multi-religious nation can work only if it is secular.
Can a religious person be a secularist in a political democracy? This is
possible when we explore the minds of the majority of the Hindus in
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India. Sudhir Kakar points out that a flexible Indian can be a secularist.
He (2006: 38) writes, ‘Hindu Nationalism’s greatest threat is from
within, from the flexible Hindu, because he is as receptive to liberal
western attitudes as he is to the spiritual byways of other traditions’.
According to Kakar, there are three important actors on the contempor-
ary Hindu religious scene: the traditionalist, the Hindu nationalist, and
the flexible Hindu. The flexible Hindu is generally urban, educated,
and belongs to the expanding middle class. He can be a traditionalist
in the sense of giving significant space to rituals in his religious life.
He can also be a nationalist in his sympathy with certain Hindutva
stances such as disapproval of Islamic and Christian missionary activity
and, at the upper end of the socio-economic scale, a globalist who en-
thusiastically embraces new religious and spiritual movements irre-
spective of their territorial origins. The flexible Hindu differs from the
other two in that he is more eclectic in his religious attitudes and be-
liefs than the traditionalist and is less ideologically committed than the
nationalist (Kakar and Kakar 2007).
Communal violence or other sectarian violence across the world to-
day is no less crude or less reductionist. Underlying the coarse brutal-
ity, there is also a big conceptual confusion about people’s identities,
which turns multi-dimensional human beings into one-dimensional
creatures, as Amartya Sen (2006: 172-73) points out. Looking into his
own memory of the 1940s communal violence, Sen (ibid.) writes:
The political instigators who urged the killing (on behalf of what
they respectively called ‘our people’) managed to persuade many
otherwise peaceable people of both communities to turn into
dedicated thugs. They were made to think of themselves only as
Hindus or only as Muslims (who must unleash vengeance on
‘the other community’) and as absolutely nothing else: not In-
dians, not subcontinentals, not Asians, not members of a shared
human race. Even though the vast majority of both communities
did not think in those narrowly frenzied terms, too many were
suddenly trapped into that vicious mode of thinking, and the
more savage among them – often at the troubled ends of each
community – were induced to kill ‘the enemies who kill us’ (as
they were respectively defined). Many-sided persons were seen,
through the hazy lenses of sectarian singularity, as having ex-
actly one identity each, linked with religion or, more exactly, reli-
gious ethnicity (since being a non-practitioner of one’s inherited
religion would not give a person any immunity whatever from
being attacked).
80 SALI AUGUSTINE
It is therefore important to look into the aspect of identity in the emer-
ging global interactions, because generating the illusion of unique
identity exploitable for the purpose of confrontation would appeal to
those who are in the business of fomenting violence, and there is no
mystery in the fact that such reductionism is being practised. Identity
as group membership cannot be ignored. But the diminution of hu-
man beings involved in assuming only one identity category for a per-
son (neglecting other aspects), expunges at one stroke the far-reaching
relevance of our manifold affinities and involvements. Amartya Sen
(2006: 175-178) identifies such tendencies as a ‘solitarist illusion’ and
cautions that ‘the solitarist belittling of human identity has far-reaching
consequences. An illusion that can be invoked for the purpose of divid-
ing people into uniquely hardened categories can be exploited in sup-
port of fomenting inter-group strife’. Through the persistent efforts
made by the communal organisations and leadership, religion-based
politics developed in post-independence India. The search for cultural
identity and distinctiveness in each community not only blocked
chances of integration and assimilation between the two, but created
divisions into communal categories. Sometimes religious differences
have been over-stressed, leading to self-chosen isolation and alienation.
Negatively, religious differences have been mobilised for furthering
economic gaps, social cleavages, the political power struggle and reli-
gious identification, and cumulatively giving rise to communal out-
bursts.
Communal conflict associated with religion is a complex phenomen-
on. Therefore, the concept of identity and group membership in a plur-
al society is to be reconsidered, especially in the context of global inter-
actions. Human identities can take many distinct forms, and people
have to use reason to decide on how to see themselves, and what sig-
nificance they should attach to having been born a member of a parti-
cular community. The illusion of cultural destiny is not only mislead-
ing, it can also be significantly debilitating, since it can generate a
sense of fatalism and resignation among people who are unfavourably
placed. As Sen (2006: 117) points out, the alternative to cultural nation-
alist tendency is not something called ‘plural monoculturalism’14 be-
cause it reduces cultural interactions. Rather it is a realistic ‘multi-cul-
turalism’, with cultural freedom that broadens the horizon of under-
standing other people and other groups. A ‘plural monoculturalism’ in
a society can easily be divided and mobilised by extremist organisations
or leaders for political purposes. In a competitive socio-economic atmo-
sphere in the globalising world, the mobilisers can easily manage to
persuade otherwise peaceable people to turn into enemies. Hence the
multi-cultural character of India described above demands an urgent
need to broaden the horizon of understanding other people and cul-
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tures, a process in which educationists and educational institutions
should play a critical role in India.
Notes
1 The Christian minority also has experienced an increasing number of attacks by
members of the Hindu nationalist organisations in the last two decades.
2 For example, volunteers of Sivsena (Hindu political party in Maharashtra) and Baj-
rangdal (a Hindu youth organisation) attacked chocolate shops in Mumbai, Bhopal
and other cities on Valentine’s day.
3 Medical college students of Ahmedabad (Gujarat) launched an agitation in January
1981 over the issue of reservation of places (through affirmative action) for Scheduled
Caste people; and in 1985, anti-reservation forces rose in Gujarat to oppose reserva-
tion quotas for socially and economically ‘backward castes’.
4 The Janata Party government established a commission in 1979 with a mandate to
‘identify the socially or educationally backward’ people in India. It was called the
Mandal Commission, headed by B.P. Mandal, its purpose being to consider the ques-
tion of place reservations and quotas for people to redress caste discrimination; it
used eleven social, economic, and educational indicators to determine ‘backward-
ness’. In 1980, the commission’s report affirmed the affirmative action practice under
Indian law whereby members of lower castes (known as ‘Other Backward Classes’
and ‘Scheduled Castes and Tribes’) were given exclusive access to a certain portion of
government jobs and study places in public universities. It also recommended
changes to these quotas, increasing them by 27% to 49.5%.
5 K for Kshatriya (lower caste), H for Harijan (Dalit), A for Adivasis (Tribes) and M for
Muslims. It was a social coalition in Gujarat in 1980, supported by the Congress
party, which united the lower castes, Tribals and Muslims to counter the upper-caste
political control in Gujarat and which won a record 140 Assembly seats.
6 ‘Semitize’ here refers to the alleged argument that the Hindu nationalists represent a
turn in Hinduism toward what has been called ‘the semitic model’ (‘one book, one
God, one sacred city’), instead of its intrinsic pluralism.
7 These were indiscriminate bomb blasts by unidentified sources, though the police in-
vestigation traced them to Muslim organisations such as the Students’ Islamic Move-
ment of India (SIMI), Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Harkat-ul-Jehadi Isla-
mia (HuJI).
8 ‘Bajrang Dal plans to spoil V-Day party’, Rediff News, Bhopal, India; 12 February
2005.
9 The Muslim religious affinity apparently made it easy for Indian Muslims to find
jobs in the Gulf countries, especially in the beginning of the flow of labour migra-
tion.
10 Dalits in Meenakshipuram village in Tamil Nadu’s Tirunelveli district embraced Is-
lam in February 1981. They apparently adopted Islam because of their social situation
and because of maltreatment at the hands of Thevars, the landlords in this area. It
set off a national debate on religious conversion and triggered communal riots in var-
ious parts of the country.
11 Organisations like VHP and RSS in the 1980s took a special interest in the flow of
resources from the Muslim Middle East to religious and educational institutions in
India, arguing that this sort of subsidy of Indian Muslims needed to be monitored
and restricted.
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12 The Bill is now under consideration by the Indian Cabinet with a view of making cer-
tain changes to it, suggested by NGOs, which are at the forefront of the Bill’s fallout.
13 ‘Vote bank’ relates to identity-based blocs of voters. In India, political parties/leaders
encourage a caste or religious community to vote on the basis of narrow communal
considerations and maintain them (often through divisive policies) as a loyal bloc of
voters who consistently back a certain candidate or political formation in democratic
elections. This practice is called vote-bank politics.
14 Having two styles or traditions coexisting side by side, without the two ever coincid-
ing.
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6 Is Identity Clash Inevitable?
Identity and Network Building amongst mainland
Chinese Migrants in Hong Kong
Sam Wong
Introduction
Migration and identity, two closely linked concepts, have sparked much
interest, especially in relation to diaspora studies (Benmayor and
Skotnes 1994; Vertovec and Cohen 1999). Two interesting scenarios
are displayed in the context of Hong Kong: first, research on identity
has been predominantly focused upon local populations. This is ob-
viously connected with an identity crisis and the massive wave of emi-
gration resulting from the Handover Question and the worry about the
future of Hong Kong. Second, studies on new arrivals from mainland
China have been preoccupied with social adjustment. But the issue of
identity change happening in the process of migration is under-re-
searched (Wong 2007).
In recent years, attention has been drawn to mainland Chinese mi-
grant identity. Research shows that migrants’ identities are diverse and
complex – whilst some groups uphold strong ‘Chinese identity’, the
others develop ‘Chinese-Hong Kong identity’ or ‘Hong Kong identity’
(Christian Family Service Centre 2001). The significance of these find-
ings is that they challenge the mainstream notion of adjustment. High-
lighting the diversity of migrant identities helps to dispel the myth that
migrants are a homogeneous group who share a common identity and
have similar interests.
The majority of these studies, however, is quantitative in nature, rely-
ing on questionnaires to capture the complex concept of identity. The
limitation of this approach is that the dynamic and complex process of
identity building is not adequately analysed. How identity building af-
fects the migrants’ social networking with local people and their co-eth-
nics remains unclear.
This paper, therefore, is an attempt to address these issues. Drawing
upon my 12 months of ethnographic research on mainland Chinese
new arrivals in Hong Kong, I intend to explore the duality of agency
and structure in identity building and to examine the dynamics of so-
cial networking. This paper re-examines two currently popular notions:
‘identity clash’ and ‘investing in identity’. The former offers a pessimis-
tic view that the clash of identity between migrants and the local popu-
lation is inevitable. The latter argues for reinforcing migrant identity to
engender empowerment and citizen rights.
Using mainland Chinese new arrivals in Hong Kong as an example,
this paper demonstrates the dynamics, complexity and diversity of
identity building in the process of migration. It also explores the links
between identity, social networking and livelihoods. This paper argues
that the emergence of the ‘Chinese-Hong Kong identity’ amongst new
arrivals highlights that the dualistic view about the conflict of identity
between migrants and the local population is oversimplistic. Migrants
developing a strong ‘Hong Kong identity’ help to reproduce discrimina-
tion against other migrants. This paper also challenges the notion of
‘investing in identity’ to engender citizens’ rights for reasons that iden-
tity building is not necessarily a conscious act, and that reinforcing mi-
grant identity would create exclusion to those who no longer want to
be identified as migrant. Finally, it discusses the identity clash between
social workers and migrants and its impact on the effectiveness of ser-
vice provision.
The structure of this paper is as follows: it starts by reviewing the
major paradigm shifts of migrant research in Hong Kong. Then it ex-
plores the complex and dynamic changes of migrant identities over the
process of migration. The third section focuses on the links between
identity and social networking. In conclusion, I draw attention to the
impact of the conflict of identity between social workers and new arri-
vals.
From adjustment, discrimination to identity
There has been a shift in emphasis on mainland Chinese new arrivals
in Hong Kong. They can roughly be divided into three periods: social
adjustment (1980-1990), discrimination and poverty (1990-2000) and
identity and citizenship (early 2000s). This arbitrary division is not to
suggest that the ‘social adjustment’ discourse is no longer influential at
the policy level – quite the opposite in reality, but it highlights how
new concepts enter the debate and challenge the old paradigm.
Migrant issues in the 1980s were merely ‘adjustment problems’, and
the focus was to provide migrants with basic needs, such as housing,
medical care, employment and education (Hong Kong Council of So-
cial Service 1985). The main concern was the split family phenomenon
caused by the discrepancy in the times of arrival in Hong Kong be-
tween mainland children and their parents.
86 SAM WONG
Academics and NGOs in the 1990s had started to question the effec-
tiveness of assimilation policies. They showed their concerns about the
worsening poverty and the rising discrimination against new arrivals
(Lee 1997). The rising discrimination against mainland migrants
caught the attention of the media, which forced the government to
launch an investigation (Home Affairs Branches 1997). The Hong
Kong Psychological Society (1997) found that local residents tended to
believe that Chinese migrants were ‘bad’ in nature. Some 54% of re-
spondents thought migrants brought bad influences to Hong Kong,
and 55% believed that migrants were themselves to be blamed for their
poverty.
Issues of identity emerged in the debate in early 2000, along with
the ideas of social exclusion, citizenship and public participation. One
of the influential studies was conducted by the Christian Family Ser-
vice Centre (2001). The Centre interviewed 103 women who were over
18 years old and who had been settled in Hong Kong for less than four
years. Questionnaires were used to capture the migrants’ perception
about their differences with their local counterparts regarding social
norms and values. The results show that 41.7% of respondents regards
themselves as ‘Chinese’, 37.9% as ‘Hongkongers from the mainland’,
and 20.4% as ‘Hongkongers’. Regarding social networking, 46.5% ad-
mitted that they interact only or most often with new arrivals.
Significantly, the research shows that migrants are not a homoge-
neous group that shares an identical identity. It also exposes a big dis-
crepancy of perception over the ethnic identity between migrants and
the locals – a higher proportion of Hong Kong people believe they are
‘Hongkongese’ rather than ‘Chinese’. For instance, Lam (1998) found
that only 10.4% of local respondents regarded themselves as ‘Chinese’
and 33.9% as ‘Hongkongese’.
While these findings highlight migrants’ diverse identities, they are
quantitative in nature and rely on questionnaires to capture the mi-
grants’ understanding of identity. They lack a deep and contextual ex-
ploration about what ‘Chinese identity’, ‘Chinese-Hong Kong identity’
and ‘Hong Kong identity’ actually mean. The temporal and spatial rela-
tionships between identity building and social networking remain un-
clear since how identity shapes the migrants’ interactions with local
people and their co-ethnics, both within Hong Kong and across the
border, is not adequately examined.
Based on this background, I worked as a volunteer in three migrant
groups and made contact with both male and female migrants, their fa-
milies, social workers and community leaders to conduct my fieldwork.
Research methods included informal interviews, participant observa-
tion and focus group discussion. Through snowball sampling, I met
migrants who did not join any migrant groups. About 85 migrants
IS IDENTITY CLASH INEVITABLE? 87
were involved in my research, and their duration of residence in Hong
Kong ranged from one to ten years. This research is guided by Gid-
dens’s (1984) idea of ‘duality of structure’ – human individuals are
‘knowledgeable agents’ who are capable of negotiation, but they live
within social structures which both facilitate and constrain the exercise
of their agency.
Contextual analysis of identity building
Local studies are keen on examining how migrants develop identities
in the host society, but they rarely discuss what identities have already
been formed before their resettlement (Wong 2005). My research
shows that the majority of migrants had developed a strong ‘imaginary
Hong Kong identity’ before they left their homeland. This identity is
characterised by a strong preference for moving to Hong Kong and a
strong inclination towards Hong Kong values. This identity remains
‘imaginary’ because they have never been to Hong Kong, and their im-
age of Hongkongers is ‘second-hand’, largely portrayed by their rela-
tions in Hong Kong and the media, so that their general perception of
Hong Kong is positive. They consider adjustment as merely ‘a matter
of time’.
The ‘imaginary Hong Kong identity’ has a strong correlation to the
development of ‘Chinese identity’ in Hong Kong. Migrants who have a
strong Chinese identity tend to have negative images of Hongkongers
because they claim that the local people discriminate against them.
They have a clear-cut dichotomy of ‘we-ness’ and ‘they-ness’, and they
try to avoid contact. For example, parents from Hong Kong and the
mainland seldom interact outside the waiting areas of schools. The lat-
ter have fewer Hong Kong friends, and most often their friends are ex-
clusively new arrivals. This group is largely composed of well-educated,
middle-class migrants whose academic and technical qualifications are
not recognised in Hong Kong. My study also shows that some poor mi-
grants from interior provinces also develop this identity since they suf-
fer from a higher degree of exclusiveness owing to their language bar-
riers and cultural differences.
Migrants developing ‘Chinese-Hong Kong identity’ (or hyphenated
identity) demonstrate high flexibility in using their identity resources.
They usually do not regard ‘Hongkongese’ and ‘Chinese’ as two differ-
ent identities; instead, they see them as compatible, and they welcome
both Hong Kong and ethnic Chinese friends. This is demonstrated by
their interpretation of discrimination as a mutual problem: while Hon-
gkongers look down on migrants, migrants build walls to protect them-
selves. Quite contrary to my expectation, migrants with this mixed
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identity are mainly from the lower class with very limited resources;
for instance, single parents and the disabled. It is because they need to
maximise their network resources to meet survival needs that they
maintain flexibility in using their mixed identities to handle varied cir-
cumstances and to maximise social resources due to poverty. For exam-
ple, a migrant revealed in interviews that when she applies for social
security and public housing, she highlights her Chinese migrant iden-
tity. But when she needs to seek support from the locals, she will try
her best to hide her migrant identity and stress her good knowledge of
Hong Kong.
Another group of migrants embraces strong ‘Hong Kong identity’.
This group comprises migrants mainly aged 20 to 30 who come from
provinces near Hong Kong, such as Guangdong, and from other urban
areas. They face fewer difficulties in making an adjustment. They
watched Hong Kong media before migration, so they are closer to
Hong Kong values, and they have experienced multiple migrations be-
fore moving to Hong Kong. They feel more positive towards Hong
Kong people and, conversely, negative towards migrants from rural
and uneducated backgrounds. They believe that migrants from poor
backgrounds themselves are responsible for arousing feelings of dis-
content among Hongkongers. They also claim that they share similar
values with Hong Kong people. Migrants of rural backgrounds can also
develop a strong ‘Hong Kong identity’. They feel that migration to
Hong Kong is an escape from oppression in their tiny villages in Chi-
na. Disengaging from their co-ethnics in Hong Kong is a way to avoid
gossip spreading back to the mainland.
Dynamics of identity building
The categories of identity serve to highlight the key features of identity
perception and affiliation. However, identity is a fluid and transforma-
tional concept (Castells 2004). New arrivals experience changes in
identity building in the process of migration. The life course approach
is used here to demonstrate the dynamic and transformative nature of
identity-building processes because it witnesses the ‘shifts in their
(people’s) ethnic identities over time, or when they change or adjust
their behaviours and practices in specific social situations, with differ-
ent groups of people’ (Song 2003: 74).
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Case study A Sandy, 25 years old, moved to Hong Kong in 1998
Sandy was born in Guangzhou. She watched Hong Kong’s television pro-
grammes since her childhood. She fancied Hong Kong pop idols and read
many Hong Kong magazines. After moving to Hong Kong, she does not
want to be identified as migrant. She thinks up a new English name for
herself because she believes it is easier to mix with the locals. She avoids
making contact with other Chinese migrants because she thinks they are
uneducated and ‘rural’. She seldom goes back to her hometown since she
moved to Hong Kong.
The process of integration, however, is not easy for her. She finds it most
embarrassing when she looks for jobs and her bosses can identify her mi-
grant background by her identity card. She complains that her bosses low-
er her wages and her colleagues make jokes about her accent. In order to
demonstrate her capability, she tells herself to work harder. She thinks
that Hong Kong is not as good as she expected. Without too many local
Hong Kong friends, she attends an evening class where she met some
migrants of her age. They become good friends and offer mutual support.
Sandy’s account (in Case study A) illustrates a complex process search-
ing for identity. She has an ‘imaginary Hong Kong identity’ before
moving to Hong Kong. She develops a strong ‘Hong Kong identity’,
which she uses to try to differentiate herself from other migrants by
using an English name and to disengage her social life from other mi-
grants. However, her migrant identity is revealed by her identity card
and the cold reception by her colleagues forces her to re-think the
meaning of the ‘Hong Kong identity’. Gaining support from migrants
in the evening class, she gradually develops a ‘Chinese identity’ to re-
sist discrimination in her everyday life.
Social networking and livelihoods
How identity relates to social networking and how this affects mi-
grants’ livelihoods are the concerns in this section. I am interested in
exploring social interactions between migrants and local people and be-
tween migrants themselves, and both within Hong Kong and across
the border.
The primary networking feature of strong ‘Chinese identity’ is the
tendency to seek support from mainlanders. They pay regular visits to
their hometowns in China to get financial or emotional support.1 They
feel comfortable in seeking local support from their migrant friends,
and they tend to participate in migrant-only groups since they feel safer
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and they are free to speak their own languages. Positively, these net-
work patterns strengthen mutual help between migrants in combating
poverty through money lending. This also increases information flow
about China and their hometowns. However, this may cause further ex-
clusion and aggravate their poverty by maintaining strong bonding
with their ethnic friends in China. A considerable financial burden is
borne by lower and poorer classes since they are expected to bring ex-
pensive presents back to China to show off their success.
Migrants of ‘Chinese-Hong Kong identity’ exhibit a higher flexibility
in networking than the ‘Chinese identity’ group. They join both Hon-
gkongers’ and migrants’ groups, and make friends with both Hongkon-
gers and mainland Chinese. They go on regular visits to China for big
events and festivals because they need to maintain good relationships
with their family and friends, though they stay most of the time in
Hong Kong. Their identity-switching ability is also manifest in lan-
guage: they speak dialects in front of their ethnic friends, but avoid it
in front of local Hong Kong friends. Dealing with both old networks in
China and new networks with migrant friends and Hongkongers in
Hong Kong is not without costs, however, in particular for those who
have heavy family obligations and full-time jobs. Access to multiple
networks puts considerable pressure on their time, money and energy.
The group embracing ‘Hong Kong identity’ is expected to reduce the
number of visits to China, but my research shows the opposite. Mi-
grants use their visits to China to reinforce their own Hong Kong sta-
tus. In other words, their ‘Hong Kong identity’ is reinforced by main-
landers in China. For example, a young migrant is called ‘Hong Kong
boy’ when he returns to his village. In group participation, they are
more willing to try mixed groups because they have more chance to
meet Hongkongers there. My study also shows that parents use their
children’s networks to engage with local people: for instance, migrants
attend parental committees in their children’s schools. This group of
migrants exhibits denser networks to solve their everyday problems,
but they feel they need to work hard to demonstrate their capabilities
in front of Hongkongers (shown in case study A). This also worsens
their poverty since migrants keep comparing themselves with Hon-
gkongers, but their general income is lower than theirs. They try to be-
have like Hongkongers, but they feel frustrated that they are not trea-
ted as equals.
Structural constraints
Identity building and switching are not simply an exercise of migrants’
own agency, as the institutional and structural arrangements shape
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their capabilities to do so (Kershen 1998). Migrants of strong ‘Chinese
identity’ use their networks on the mainland to resist local discrimina-
tion; however, its effectiveness depends on the reception of their family,
relations and friends on the mainland. Migrants maintain their old net-
works by regular visits to China, but a cold reception by their family
members and villagers undermines their efforts. In addition, villagers
project their imaginary identity on migrants. For example, a migrant
complained that his friends always assume that he should pay the bills
after meals since he is now a ‘well-off Hong Kong citizen’. This discre-
pancy of identity definition causes disorientation amongst migrants.
Migrants of different social classes and gender have varied responses
to identity construction. Middle-class migrants are more able to make
regular phone calls to the mainland, to afford several trips back to Chi-
na annually, and to take gifts with them. Female migrants are more
constrained by gender stereotypes, traditional values and norms in
their home towns than their male counterparts. Divorced migrants, for
example, are not always welcome in their villages because marriage
failure is regarded as personal failure.
The government policy hinders migrants from seeking support from
mainlanders. Migrants who receive social security can stay on the
mainland for a certain length of time within a year – currently 60 days,
but an extension has recently been proposed. They risk losing their en-
titlement if they breach this regulation. This policy restricts especially
the elderly migrants’ mobility and choice of place to stay. It also has ne-
gative implications on their network building and anti-poverty strate-
gies. My study shows that some poor migrants refuse to apply for so-
cial security since they fear breaching the law.
Local people are also responsible for shaping migrants’ identities.
They prevent migrants from shifting their identity to Hongkongese as
they can exploit migrants by using their disadvantageous Chinese iden-
tity. Some employers, for example, deliberately exaggerate migrants’ in-
accurate accents and insufficient knowledge about local culture to un-
dermine migrants’ bargaining power and thus pay lower wages.
Discussion and policy implications
In this paper, I have offered a contextual analysis of identity building
amongst mainland Chinese new arrivals in Hong Kong. I have also de-
monstrated the dynamic and complex process of identity construction,
and how it relates to social networking and public participation. Put-
ting migrants’ agency and livelihoods back into social structures, I have
highlighted the constraints on identity switching. What lessons can
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NGOs and social workers draw from these complex identity character-
istics and transformations?
The ‘identity clash’ discourse is often cited, especially in the media,
in explaining racial, ethnic, cultural and religious tensions (Oommen
1997). It conceptualises the local population and migrants as two oppo-
sitional groups, and claims that the clash of identity between them is
inevitable. On the one hand, local people consider migrants as free-ri-
ders who place burdens on the existing social services and cause unem-
ployment and crime. Migrants, on the other, feel socially stigmatised,
marginalised and distrusted. They feel discriminated against in the la-
bour market and treated as second-class citizens. The clash of identity
results in hatred, self-exclusion, confrontation and violence. For in-
stance, Huntington (2004) asks whether national identity can co-exist
with a distinctive immigrant subculture. In explaining the rising ten-
sion between Muslims and local people in Holland, Moynahan (2005:
38) suggests that: ‘Muslims now have a big need to show their identity.
So there is the risk of a clash. The clash is already in the mind.’ The
riots in Bradford, UK, in 2001 were arguably caused by the second
generation of South Asians who feel ‘socially excluded’ from the main-
stream English society (Bagguley and Hussain 2003).
The notion of identity clash may contain some truth, but it mista-
kenly reinforces a dualism that local people and migrants are two dis-
tinct and internally homogenous groups. As shown before, migrants
developing ‘Chinese-Hong Kong identity’ adopt flexible strategies in in-
teracting with the locals and other new arrivals. These attempts prove
effective in avoiding embarrassment and conflict. The generalised cate-
gory ‘new arrivals’ or ‘migrants’ presumes that people sharing similar
cultural backgrounds and historical experiences necessarily develop an
identical identity and naturally work together. My study, however, sug-
gests that new arrivals are diverse in interests and placed at different
social positions. Migrants with a strong ‘Hong Kong identity’, for ex-
ample, discriminate against their co-ethnics and help to produce and
reproduce inequalities and exclusion.
Investing in identity?
Disillusioned by the failure of assimilation policies, some social service
agencies have placed empowerment and migrants’ citizen rights high
on their agenda. While acknowledging the significance of co-learning
between new arrivals and local people, many NGOs remain active in
forming migrant-only groups, intended to draw migrants together to
achieve collective goals. Migrant identities are reinforced in social cam-
paigns in order to enhance internal solidarity. This development runs
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parallel to the World Bank’s advocacy of building social capital by ‘in-
vesting in identity’ (World Bank social capital website). The community
management policy, for example, places emphasis on the importance
of improved migrants’ networks in generating ‘ethnic capital’ (Wint-
robe 1995: 44).
Nevertheless, the notion of ‘investing in identity’ offers an inade-
quate understanding of identity building. My research suggests that
the process of identity building is fluid and unpredictable. How to
shape and transform migrants’ different identities into one fixed, pro-
grammed and desirable form to achieve the anticipated outcomes is
problematic. Not only does it constrain new arrivals from accessing
multiple social networks, but it also excludes those who fail to conform
to that particular identity. In addition, the notion places emphasis on
the migrants’ consciousness to draw upon their identity to attain pri-
vate goods. This may well be supported by migrants who switch their
hyphenated identities in different contexts. My study, however, also
shows that building identity is not always a rational or conscious
choice. Instead, normative principles and ‘the right way of doing
things’ play a role in guiding the migrants’ decision-making in identity
affiliation and social networking.
Questioning social workers’ identity
An increasing number of well-educated, second-generation migrants
have joined social service agencies to serve their less well-off counter-
parts. These social workers generally arrived in Hong Kong in their
early teens with their parents for reasons of family re-union. Owing to
their low level of English proficiency and with educational qualifica-
tions generally unrecognised in Hong Kong, they had to start in the
lower grades in secondary schools. Those doing better in school caught
up very quickly and finally entered universities to receive tertiary-level
education. Because they already have an understanding of the similar
cultural backgrounds and dialects spoken by the migrant communities,
the general belief is that they are more effective in mobilising mi-
grants.
Owing to the hardship and discrimination in their early years, some
of these social workers develop a strong ‘Chinese identity’. They believe
that new arrivals, like themselves, can challenge social inequalities.
They tend to consider migrants as transformative agents who desire so-
cial change, and see raising consciousness and empowerment as essen-
tial strategies in tackling power inequalities between new arrivals and
local people.
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The problem of this approach is that they risk imposing their own
identity and values on migrants. Challenging domination is not cost-
free. While the livelihoods of migrants are deeply embedded in ‘harmo-
nious’ social relations in their communities, reinforcing migrant iden-
tity may generate confrontational relationships between new arrivals
and the locals. Some migrants do not consider this as the ‘desirable’
way of living, so they withdraw from public participation. In other
words, new arrivals are not necessarily transformative agents since they
wish to be apolitical after the painful experience of resettlement. How
to empower migrants without undermining their livelihoods needs cri-
tical exploration.
These social workers are more likely to have an identity clash with
migrants of strong ‘Hong Kong identity’. In my experience, social
workers tend to consider this group of migrants ‘undeserving’ of help
since these people tend to discriminate against other new arrivals. As a
result, these migrants feel isolated and withdraw. This exclusionary
practice shows that social workers fail to recognise that this group of
migrants can be an asset to resource-poor members in accessing multi-
ple networks. This undermines, rather than builds, the livelihoods of
poor migrants.
Note
1 It is often mistakenly assumed that monetary flow is necessarily unidirectional from
migrants to their families. Migrants in interviews reveal that their families and
friends on the mainland became wealthy in the reform era in the 1980s.
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7 Socio-Economic Crisis and Its Consequences
on a Little Known Tribal Community in
West Bengal, India
Samar Kumar Biswas1
Introduction
Advanced communities have the privilege of enjoying a high living
standard through their easy access to sophisticated technology, health
facilities, educational infrastructure, communication facilities and other
modern amenities. The Totos, a lesser-known tribal group from the
northern part of West Bengal close to the Indo-Bhutan border, find
themselves in very different circumstances. They practise mainly
settled cultivation, growing maize and other grains, engage in animal
husbandry, and collect fruit, roots, tubers, medicinal plants and other
items of daily need from the forest. They often have to cross the border
into Bhutan to earn a livelihood. At present, factors such as deforesta-
tion, land alienation, population pressure, lack of proper educational
infrastructure and health facilities, poor sanitation and water supply
system, the practice of an outdated technology, and poor communica-
tion impact on their socio-cultural, economic and political existence
and act as the main obstacles to a better standard of living. In portray-
ing the life of this Indian tribal community, the focus is on the ques-
tion: what are the impediments for development of some of India’s tri-
bal communities? Maintaining a strongly separate identity has not
brought the Totos a better way of life.
Today, India has a population of over one billion and represents the
second most populous nation in the world. Almost 15% of the world’s
population live in India in extremely diverse social, economic, geogra-
phical and ecological conditions (Ahuja 1993: 16). India’s people be-
long to a wide variety of races, religions, castes, tribes, languages, social
customs, beliefs, political philosophies and ideologies. Levels of educa-
tional status, formal knowledge, technology and skills are as varied as
the levels of socio-economic conditions. All of these factors have con-
tributed towards prominent class distinctions in Indian society, in
which some people have incomparably greater access to the opportu-
nities of modern times, while others are far less fortunate, enjoying
none of these privileges.
The criteria of poverty are varied. In 2002, the government of India
mentioned in its BPL (Below Poverty Line) Census Report for the
Tenth Five-Year Plan (2002) that the criterion for identifying people liv-
ing ‘in crisis or distressing conditions’ was a monthly income below
540 rupees per head. In this context the term ‘crisis’ is based on the
calculation that the average daily calorie requirement of an adult per-
son is 2400 (rural) and 2100 (urban). Those unable to consume that
amount of calories per day may face some nutritional deficit. Every so-
ciety has its particular socio-cultural set-up to meet this requirement,
which in turn has to be closely correlated with a particular environ-
ment. Change of any kind may unsettle this fine balance. The dangers
are even more acute with societies that traditionally strongly depend on
nature and are equipped only with very limited technological skills.
In India, while a section of society has access to basic amenities,
some have not. Of the total population, 16.2% are Scheduled Castes
and 8.2% are Scheduled Tribes2 (Census 2001). Most of these people
are educationally and economically underprivileged in comparison with
the general population and hence remain very poor and underdeve-
loped. They are far removed from the level of modern and general apti-
tudes. Indeed, they have a pressing need to hold their own vis-a`-vis the
general population by acquiring the desired knowledge and expertise.
But unfortunately for them, the speed of environmental and socio-eco-
nomic changes makes it difficult for them to keep up with the de-
mands of the times, and hence their crisis continues unabated. Even
today, the economy of many of these underdeveloped people and parti-
cularly for the tribal people is forest-based. Their cultural and religious
life is also closely related to this form of economy and social existence.
Overpopulation, deforestation and continuous exploitation of forest re-
sources by others have serious effects on their livelihood. Various envir-
onmental strategies to limit the exploitation of the forest and its re-
sources have also had a serious impact on their economic activities as
the forest becomes out of bounds, and anyone found violating this ban
is liable to punishment. Thus, the very survival of these forest-depen-
dent people is under threat today because they do not have the means
to acquire new skills or improve their existing skills. Moreover, most of
the underdeveloped tribes do not have sufficient numerical strength
and political capacity to protect their resources from the grasp of
others. They are facing social as well as economic crisis. The Totos3 are
such an underdeveloped tribal group facing all these problems, which
are highlighted in this study.
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The Toto tribe
The Toto tribe is designated as one of the three underdeveloped tribes
of West Bengal. At present, they live in the village Totopara in the Ma-
darihat block of Jalpaiguri district, which is about 250 m to 500 m
above sea level (Das 1967: 7). This village lies at the foothills of the Hi-
malayas in the border area between Bhutan and West Bengal. The Titi
forest – a tropical rain forest – runs along the village’s boundaries on
the west and south, and the river Torsha flows on its east boundary
(Sarkar 1993: 4). The Totos have lived there since the middle of the
18th century, leading their own way of life far removed from the influ-
ences of the culture of the Indian majority. This area came under Brit-
ish rule in 1868, and since the very beginning, the British policy was
to keep Totopara as a reserve for the Totos, allowing no other people to
settle there. The whole area within the mouza4, comprising about 3.12
square miles, was recorded by D. Sunder, the Settlement Officer of
Western Dooars during 1889-94, in the name of the Toto mondal
(chief)5 on behalf of the entire community (Sunder 1895: 86-88; Roy
Burman 1964: 16; Das 1967: 8-9; Sanyal 1973: 10). Due to the inacces-
sibility of the deep forest, the village remained completely isolated until
1982 (Majumdar 1991: 6).
In 2006 (during my field study), there were 270 Toto families with
about 1300 individuals (at my count 671 males and 615 females). The
Totos form a largely endogamous society consisting of fifteen exoga-
mous clans (sarkhae) and are settled in six hamlets in Totopara.
Concerning their physical features, the Totos are of Mongoloid stock.
Their complexion, however, is rather on the darker side (Sanyal 1973:
1). The language of the Totos has been classified by Hodgson, Grierson
and Chatterjee as belonging to the Tibeto-Burman family of the sub-
Himalayan group and as ‘non-pronominalized’ [sic]6 (Grierson 1909:
250-251; Chatterjee 1951: 15; Sanyal 1973: 45). The Toto language shows
certain similarities in its structure to other languages of this group,
such as Limbu, Rong or Lepcha, Rai, Dhimal and Bhutia, etc. The cen-
sus of 1961 classifies the Toto under the Bhutia languages (Majumdar
1991: 50).
Upon marriage, the Toto youths generally tend to set up a separate
house. A Toto couple is treated as a separate family unit by the Toto So-
cial Council. A Toto family is usually small and patrilocal, and descent
is traced through the male line. Ideally, a Toto family consists of the
husband and wife and their unmarried children. My study reveals that
88.89% of the families are of the nuclear type, and the average family
size is around five (my field study 2004-2006). The main function of
the Toto family is four-dimensional, viz. (i) co-habitation, (ii) procrea-
tion, (iii) provision of food and (iv) shelter (Sarkar 1993: 20).
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The Totos recognise two types of relatives (neoscha); viz. consangui-
neal relatives (miphu papaya) and affinal relatives (samdi or pami-bei).
According to Murdock’s classification, the kinship terminology of the
Totos falls under the Hawaiian type (Sarkar 1993: 25). The foremost
rule of marriage is clan exogamy. The Totos generally observe monoga-
my, but polygyny is permissible though not common. They practise
both negotiated marriages and love marriages. Widow marriage is al-
lowed (Sanyal 1973: 37). Marriage between close as well as distant cou-
sins on both the father’s and mother’s sides (Mother’s Brother’s
Daughter (MBD) and Father’s Sister’s Daughter (FSD) type of cross
cousin marriages) is permissible (Sarkar 1993: 24). Both junior soro-
rate and levirate is allowed. While in the past boys and girls used to be
betrothed at the age of five to seven (Majumdar 1991: 9), at present the
usual age is ten for girls and 15 for boys. Sometimes a bride may be
older than the bridegroom. Extra-marital relations are forbidden. Pre-
marital relationships are allowed only among unmarried persons and
only if they plan to get married. Divorce (peismi) is allowed, although
the Totos try to avoid it; and if there is marital discord, the wife can
leave her husband and engage in a relation with some other suitable
man.
The birth of a baby is considered a happy occasion. For this purpose
a part of the bedroom in the house is screened off temporarily. Other
women assist during the delivery (Sanyal 1955: 92). On the fifth, se-
venth, ninth, eleventh, or thirteenth day after the birth, there is the
name-giving ceremony (madipawaya) with the assistance of a pow
(priest)7. In case a couple remains childless, they adopt the son of a
close relative. The rice-giving ceremony (bathelangpua) takes place
when the child reaches the age of five. On this occasion, the child is
dressed up in new garments, again with the assistance of the pow.
Death is believed to be caused by malevolent spirits. The dead are
buried in their respective clan ossuary located towards the east of the
village, i.e. towards the banks of the river Torsha. The mourning rituals
are observed on the sixth day after death for males and on the fifth day
for females (Chakrabarti and Chattopadhyay 1964: 62). The attendants
to the burial are fed on that day. Although previously the mourning
period extended over twelve months, nowadays it is observed for only
twelve days. Once the mourning period is over, the widower or widow
is allowed to continue his or her normal life, and remarriage is per-
mitted after one year.
The Totos’ daily routine is as follows: rising early in the morning,
they consume chia (tea) and some food before they leave for the fields.
Children aged between ten and 15 go to the forest in the morning to
collect firewood. Adult females do this work in the evening. At midday
the adults have the meal that they prepare in the morning and carry to
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the field. In mid-afternoon the children return with the cattle, while
the women return with loads of green vegetables on their back and
with some tubers for the pigs. The men return home last. After their
return from the fields, the women tend to the children, arrange fodder
for the pigs and then go to the merrang (cooking place) to prepare the
evening meal: usually boiled cereal and some curry cooked with salt
and chillies. More recently, mustard oil is used for cooking. The main
meals, when all family members sit together, are taken twice daily –
early in the morning and at dusk. Soon after the evening meal, the To-
tos go to sleep.
The Totos’ diet is as simple as their lifestyle. Among the meats,
sometimes fresh and sometimes dried, is beef, pork, fowl and pigeons.
Fish is a very rare delicacy. Dried fish is sometimes purchased from
the market. During the rainy season the Totos use a hand-net to catch
fish in the Torsha river. They also collect snails, caterpillars, wasps and
spiders for consumption. Eu8 (home-brewed liquor), fermented from
maize, marua (Setaria italica Beauv.) and kaoni (Eleusine coracana
Gaertn.),9 is a favourite drink. Betel-leaf and betel-nut are also very
popular. Bidi (a thin cheroot) and cigarette smoking is also common
among both sexes. Bodily hygiene is poor: they rarely take a bath. Roy
Burman (1964: 18) states that ‘the Totos are very dirty. Rarely do they
wash their body. After eating they do not wash their mouth. Even at
that time they clean their hand [sic] by rubbing on the ground’. How-
ever, these habits are gradually changing in recent times.
The Totos are animists, their worship involving the road, sky, hills,
forest, river, sun, moon, stars and in fact all the ‘terrene elements’ and
‘starry hosts’ (Sanyal 1955: 95). Almost all clans have their own ances-
tral deities, but it appears that most of the Totos in recent years have
forgotten the deities’ names. They also have house deities. The chief
deity is Ispha or Mahakal, and Pidua is the second most important.
Two major religious festivals, Mayu and Ongchu, are observed by the
whole community in the demsha (temple). They also observe the cele-
brations of Fagua and Gorom puja or Gram puja for the welfare of the
village. The pow and deba-pow or kaiji (head priest) performs the ri-
tuals, usually by offering eu and meat.10
Personal property is very simple and consists of clothes and orna-
ments. Previously, personal belongings, including cash, used to be bur-
ied with the owners. Now this custom has fallen into disuse. Domestic
animals are individually owned by family members, including children
in their early teens. Owners have absolute right over the disposal of an-
imals. Sanyal (1955: 93) states: ‘property is inherited from father to
son. Females get nothing. All sons get equal share. But the adult son
must maintain the old mother and minor brothers and sisters’. This
was validated by my field study (2004-2006). However, despite un-
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equal inheritance rights, I observed that the women are treated with
much respect and enjoy considerable freedom.
Crisis and consequences
There are many changes occurring in the Totos’ socio-cultural life as
they are increasingly coming into contact with the outside world, and
this forces them to adopt many new ideas. Owing to these changes, the
economic, political, social, religious, environmental and other aspects
of their life are being transformed profoundly. But this transformation
is not necessarily working for the better and in fact is creating an acute
crisis.
The influx of non-Totos is one aspect of change. Earlier, when the
Totos were totally dependent on a forest-based economy, they were the
only inhabitants of the area. But later on, the influx of people from
elsewhere in search of meeting their own basic needs resulted in land
and population pressure. According to the official estimate in 2003,
73.92% of the families in Totopara were non-Totos, with 700 Nepali fa-
milies, 25 Bihari families, 4 Bengali and Muslim families and 2 fa-
milies of Garo and Mech origin. This influx has caused many problems
for the Totos, especially having to share the natural resources. Their
authority over their traditional resources started to decline. In 1969, a
greater portion of the land previously owned by the Totos was recorded
as vested in non-Totos (Sarkar 1993: 22). The Totos now have only 343
acres11 of land (17.18%) (Biswas and Bhattacharjee 2006: 106). Thus,
the Totos have become almost landless and resourceless in their own
territory.
Their contact and interaction with the outside world have also trans-
formed their social and cultural life. Toto youths are greatly attracted to
the living patterns and styles of the outside world, and imitate them.
The traditional dress, household implements, ornaments and architec-
ture are rapidly being replaced by modern things. The modern pop cul-
ture has also invaded traditional forms of dance and music. The social
institutions of the Totos are also being affected and are changing ra-
pidly. But by far the most important effect is the loss of scope for tradi-
tional economic pursuits, combined with environmental degradation
and loss of space through the physical presence of non-Totos. All this
has seriously affected the Totos’ life. Even the language is changing ow-
ing to the influx of terms and expressions from the Nepali, Bengali,
Hindi, Bhutia and Bodo languages, which have been absorbed into the
Toto language. Thus, while on the one hand the Toto language is los-
ing its purity and importance, on the other, none of the other lan-
guages is spoken properly. This is a matter of grave concern, especially
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in the context of school education and, of course, in terms of preser-
ving the tribe’s cultural heritage.
Until 1960, the Totos were totally untouched by formal education.
At present, 45.37% of the people are literate (56.16% for males and
33.13% for females). Unfortunately, the level of education among them
is very poor and remains confined to the primary level (56.70%) and
Class V-III level (31.34%). Only 10.10% of them have reached the Class
IX-X level, and a meagre 1.86% are above Class X level of education
(my field study 2004-2006).
A major problem with the formal education of the Totos is that they
are taught in languages they are not familiar with, as a result of which
the children have difficulty in understanding the lessons. In addition,
most of the teachers, being outsiders, fail to understand the students’
mentality. Also, the schools lack the most basic infrastructural facilities.
The children often do not get adequate help and reassurance from
their own families or from the community as a whole. Added to this,
the poor economy poses a major constraint and adversely affects the
educational progress. The need for updated educational skills is essen-
tial to help Toto students become acquainted with the ways of modern
society, but here too there is an acute lack. As a result, even the young-
er generations are not equipped to cope with the demands of living in
the wider Indian society.
A very common phenomenon among the Totos is to get their chil-
dren married at an early age. It has been noticed that 44.36% of fe-
males and 32.45% of males got married before they reached the age of
18 and 21, respectively, thus violating the government’s marriage laws.
Furthermore, dowry payment has been reported in 5.9% of marriages.
While previously there was no prevalence of dowry or bride price pay-
ment, it is now slowly gaining ground. In the traditional Toto society,
community-exogamous marriage was strictly prohibited, but it is hap-
pening today, with nine females and five males having married into
other communities (field study 2004-2006). That is to say, inter-tribal
and tribe-caste marriages are occurring today with increasing fre-
quency.
In Toto society, traditionally, most women bear children at an early
age. My study reveals that 41.06% of women gave birth to their first
child when they were between 14 and 18 years old. Some 64.09% have
more than two children, varying from three to nine. This large number
of childbirths is probably due to the fact that Totos rarely use methods
of family planning. Their young age at the time of marriage and first
childbirth may also be the cause of ill health among mothers and chil-
dren. Only 112 deliveries (8.62%) were performed in a health centre,
while 1,188 births (91.38%) took place at home. One major problem is
that there are no professional midwives available. Furthermore, it has
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been noticed that early menopause is a common phenomenon among
Toto women, commonly starting before the age of 40 (field study
2004-2006). Reproductive and child health issues can be considered
serious problems among the Totos.
Previously, the Totos depended mostly on jhum cultivation,12 animal
domestication, and food and wood gathering in the forest for a liveli-
hood. The crops cultivated by them in and around Totopara were
maize, marua, kaoni, pulse, wet rice, potato, tapioca, green vegetables,
ginger and areca nut. Generally, they did not sell their crops, but used
them for their own consumption. They carried out their agricultural ac-
tivities and other work by way of a labour exchange system. However,
my field study revealed that the Totos are now primarily engaged in
agricultural work, services, household work, animal husbandry and
grazing, firewood collection for others, and were also involved in the
businesses of other people, serving as porters and wage labourers (for
instance, in mining in Bhutan). In their agricultural activity the Totos
primarily depend on the plough for cultivation and have no knowledge
of modern scientific means of agricultural production involving the
use of better technology, fertilizer, pesticides, etc. For irrigation they de-
pend entirely on the monsoon rains.
Whereas earlier on as much as 1996.96 acres of land was recorded
in the name of the Toto mondal, the chief, on behalf of the whole com-
munity (Mitra 1953: CCXV), in 1969 individual ownership of land was
introduced, and as per the records, it was noted that 89 Toto families
had 300 acres of land in their possession. The residual land, which is
more than 1600 acres, was labelled as ‘vested land’.13 This ‘vested land’
seems to have been marked as ‘ownerless’, allowing anybody to settle
there without special permission being required. A decade later, in
1979, it was found that 33 Toto families were landless. During the re-
cent government survey (Chowdhuri 2005: 151-152), conducted during
2000-01, it was noticed that due to the increase in the number of fa-
milies, the amount of land available for one family had decreased sub-
stantially. However, due to the distribution of the ‘vested land’, the
number of landless families has gone down simultaneously (Chowd-
huri 2005: 151-152). But the land available for cultivation is inadequate,
and a number of Totos have no cultivable area on their own property,
which is also another serious problem. In the course of the field study,
it emerged that only 343 acres (17.18%) of land remain in the posses-
sion of the Totos, while the rest (82.82%) has passed into the hands of
non-Totos. Consequently, the size of the average land holding is only
1.27 bighas14 per family. The study further reveals that 11 families
(4.07%) are without any agricultural land. Four families (1.48%) are
landed sharecroppers, three (1.11%) are landless sharecroppers, and 14
(5.19%) are day labourers. This is alarming as previously Toto society
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did not have sharecroppers or agricultural day labourers. Obviously, it
is due to land alienation, population pressure as well as economic scar-
city that sharecropping on anothers land has been introduced. As there
is not enough land for cultivation in this village, the villagers go to the
neighbouring Ballalguri village, about five km away, to pursue cultiva-
tion work. Today, as they are outnumbered in their own territory, and
most of their land (82.82%) and resources are under the control of
non-Totos, the Totos are even forced to go beyond India’s borders in
search of jobs for their survival. The study (2004-2006) revealed that
26 Toto families (9.63%) depend entirely on Bhutan for their liveli-
hood, and 130 families (48.15%) depend on work both in India and
Bhutan. The remaining 114 families (42.22%) depend entirely on work
in India for their livelihood. Interestingly, the Totos are known to have
traditionally undertaken angdaita, trade tours to Bhutan. Under the
Bhutia rule, the Totos were engaged in carrying rice, salt and the like
from the markets in the plains to Bhutan, and on their return journey
they would bring oranges and various jungle products from Bhutan for
sale in the plains (Sarkar 1993: 11). But at present, for several reasons,
this possibility has been restricted to a limited few. Furthermore, most
of the Totos are not getting paid well for the areca nut, one of the most
important cash crops they produce. The mahajans (moneylenders) on
whom the Totos depend for loans or advance money refuse to pay
them a proper price even as they force them to hand over their produce
to them.
The first and foremost characteristic of the Totos’ economic circum-
stances is the close association between their economic life and the nat-
ural environment, i.e. the forest. The forest is an important source for
generating livelihoods and income. The Totos forest-based economy
mainly consists of hunting, food gathering, and collection of ‘Minor
Forest Produce’ (MFP) such as fuel, life-stock fodder and construction
materials for their houses. However, with the gradual influx of non-To-
tos, the Totos lost their previous control over much of the territory and
its resources. The forest started to degenerate at a rapid pace through
logging, clearing and over-exploitation of the natural resources for the
purposes of the non-Totos. The Jalpaiguri district, where the Totos re-
side, was previously covered by dense forests, but now only 28.75% re-
mains as forestland (according to the ‘West Bengal State Forest Report
2000’; see De 2005: 110).
Under the changed circumstances, the Totos are unable to ade-
quately produce their seasonal food crops to meet their own needs.
Hence they tend to depend more on the forest for gathering and collec-
tion of jungle fruits, roots and tubers, leaves, mushrooms, etc., to bal-
ance their seasonal agricultural shortage of foodstuff to some extent.
But with dwindling forest area and alienation of resources, this is be-
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coming very difficult. They construct their huts and houses with bam-
boo, bushes, wood, grass, leaves, etc. available from the forest. In other
words, their whole material culture and their food requirements are to
a large extent forest-based. So there can be no doubt that with the de-
crease in control over the forest area, it has become extremely difficult
for the Totos to meet their daily necessities.
Today, it is a matter of grave concern that problems like soil erosion
due to environmental changes in the region remain unaddressed, and
a rise in global temperature gets noticed here too as elsewhere in the
world. The lack of knowledge among the Totos and their poor numeri-
cal strength (26.08%) have also prevented them from protecting them-
selves against the continued exploitation in respect of land ownership
and rights over the forest.
In the past, a large portion of this low-altitude region of the hillocks
with laterite soil was under orange plantation, oranges being the chief
economic crop of this area. In fact, the orange orchards were in very
good condition until the 1930s, when the forest began to be cleared in-
creasingly for settled agriculture. Orange growing suffered as the fruit
is unable to tolerate direct sunlight, and the orchards were exposed
when the forest was cleared. In addition, humus formation, which was
good for the growth of orange orchards, was adversely affected by the
deforestation, leading to humus disappearance. The Totos also used to
collect ripe berries of pipul plants (Piper longum)15 from these groves
and sold them to the traders. They bred lac-worms16 too in the shirish
trees (Albizzia stipulata) in the forest. But due to rapid deforestation,
the pipul plants and shirish trees are hardly found any more, the lac
industry is now virtually non-existent, and all the related activities have
also disappeared.
Bamboo has always played a crucial role in the socio-economic life
of the Totos. Previously, Totopara and its adjacent forest areas grew a
good quality of bamboo bushes. Selling bamboo helped to meet family
expenses (Das 1967: 67; Sanyal 1973: 28). But due to rapid commercia-
lisation, the non-Toto bamboo traders started cutting down the bamboo
bushes for monetary gain. At the present time there is not a single
bamboo bush in this village, forcing the Totos to go to the deep forest,
despite many hazards, to collect the bamboo needed for making many
things.
The Totos are known to have had a keen interest in animal husban-
dry. They used to rear pigs, fowls, goats and oxen. Animal husbandry
supplied them with good nutrition in the form of animal protein. With
massive deforestation, soil erosion and land alienation, there has been
a sharp decline in grazing land, which poses a serious challenge to ani-
mal husbandry. It is true to say that even today many families continue
to keep some livestock, but the number is much lower, mainly due to
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lack of fodder and grazing land. This adversely affects the Totos’ nutri-
ent supply. The generally poor level of income also prevents them from
purchasing their nutritional requirements from the market.
With the rapid increase of the migrant population together with the
population increase of the Totos themselves, today there is an increased
pressure on the available land. Exacerbated by the Totos’ unscientific
exploitation of the existing natural resources, this is causing an adverse
effect on the ecological balance and affecting both farming activities
and the availability of natural resources. Due to their lack of awareness
and poverty, most of the arable land (82.82%) has passed from their
control to outsiders. Many of them have been forced to mortgage their
land, mostly to Nepali moneylenders, and some are being forced to sell
their land, and in this way a large portion of the Totos’ traditional land
is lost to them. Owing to the influences of the more affluent sections
of outside society, most of the Totos have lost the economic security
they had previously enjoyed.
The degradation of the forest along with the increasing pressure on
their traditional but limited natural resources forced the Totos into pov-
erty. Despite all their efforts, 85.92% of Toto families cannot earn more
than 2000 rupees in total per month. With this meagre income they
have to support an average of five family members (field study 2004-
2006). The extreme misery can be seen in cases where 1.11% of fa-
milies are fully dependent on others. The crops produced by the Totos
may take care of their basic needs for about seven to eight months in
the year. But in most cases for the rest of the year they have to depend
on other work and also collecting forest resources. Often, in order to af-
ford basic necessities, they become entrapped in indebtedness. The ma-
hajans (money-lenders) lend money under unrealistic terms and condi-
tions, known as the thika (agreement) system. The Totos, unable to un-
derstand the underlying trickery, accept these conditions and end up
losing their property (Biswas and Bhattacharjee 2006: 109). It may be
noted in this context that of the 93 Toto families (34.44%) who have ta-
ken loans from various sources, 65.60% have availed themselves of
loans from non-government lenders. Some 83 families (89.25%) have
taken a loan of up to 5000 rupees each, and 10 families (10.75%) have
borrowed even higher amounts (field study 2004-2006). Here also,
the lack of knowledge about the terms and conditions of money-lend-
ing creates an acute crisis in terms of exploitation and chronic indebt-
edness. As indebtedness keeps growing along with poverty, reduction
of available natural resources, shortfall in both grazing and agricultural
land, Toto society is under threat.
The food requirements of the Totos are very simple, but the econom-
ic crisis leaves them unable to meet even their basic nutritional needs.
The Totos traditionally depend on different cereals at different times of
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the year. Their simple techniques of agricultural production and scant
knowledge are responsible for low crop yield. The crops produced last
only up to seven or eight months in a year. During these months they
have to supplement their diet by consuming roots and tubers collected
from the jungle. For the rest of the year they must purchase grains,
mainly rice and maize, from the market – which they find very difficult
due to poverty. Only a few Toto families can make up the shortage
through trade and services. Not surprisingly, they are faced today with
an acute food shortage due to population pressure and decreasing avail-
ability of home-grown produce. In addition, previously, the Totos were
able to catch fish and snails for their diet from the small streams that
pass by their village, but when the outsiders gradually settled down in
various parts of Totopara, the natural flow of the streams became
blocked, and the availability of fish and snails has been badly affected
(Biswas and Bhattacharjee 2006: 111).
Health issues are very much connected with the environment, parti-
cularly the forest ecology (Chaudhuri 2003: 23). Through their intimate
knowledge of the local environment, the Totos know much about the
medicinal value of the flora. This enabled them to rely on ‘folk medi-
cine’ for the treatment of various ailments, the needed medicinal plants
being collected from the forest. They also worshipped ancestral deities
in the forest to secure good health. They often consulted the pow and
the jhankiri (Nepali medicine man) for herbal medicine. Even today
about 41.40% of the people depend on traditional treatment, for which
they use more than 20 varieties of plants. Once again, due to massive
deforestation and environmental degradation, most of the roots and tu-
bers, herbal plants and other medicinal resources are no longer avail-
able in this area. My study revealed that 814 persons (62.62%) are suf-
fering from various diseases like fever (25.18%), malaria (23.83%),
cough and cold (9.21%), gastric problems (5.77%), skin disease
(3.44%), arthritis (2.70%), pneumonia (0.98%), dysentery (7.99%), tu-
berculosis (3.44%), anaemia (5.65%), cancer (0.25%), chest pain
(6.39%), jaundice (2.46%) and eye problems (2.70%). Besides sick-
ness, premature ageing and a short life span are very common. It is a
fact that only 2.15% of the living Toto population are aged 55 and above.
Meanwhile, for the treatment of diseases, 10.69% depend on tradi-
tional forms of treatment, 49.75% on modern forms and 30.71% on a
mix (field study 2004-2006). There is a government hospital, but the
health services are sorely lacking.
The Toto dwelling houses (nakosa) are built on wooden or bamboo
poles about 1.5 to 2 m above ground. The roof is generally sloped from
the middle and thatched with grass. The floor and the walls are made
of planks or bamboo splits. In front there is an open projected space, a
bamboo platform known as dui. A staircase made of a single log, kai-
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bei, is placed from the dui for climbing up to the dui and the house.
The area below the bamboo platform of the house is enclosed with
bamboo and wooden bars where pigs, fowl and other livestock are kept.
Previously, they depended on the forest entirely for the construction
materials for their houses. Now the unavailability of these materials
due to deforestation is causing problems. At times they are unable to
thatch the roof properly. During the rainy season, rainwater seeps into
their houses and, making them damp, often causes health problems
such as coughs and colds, fever, etc. Although the government has pro-
vided the Totos with 100 houses, they are not properly built and not at
all suited to the people’s socio-economic condition. Furthermore, 140
latrines have also been provided, but they are devoid of appropriate sa-
nitation and adequate water supply.
The Totos are known to have depended totally on the forest for raw
materials for their handicrafts and household utensils such as the woo-
den bowls, tahati (pumpkin spoon), bamboo-made vessels and cala-
bash. At present, they are still using brooms, baskets, winnowing trays,
mats, ropes, jitan (bamboo stirrer), wooden liquor buckets or clay-made
pitchers, jitting (filters made of bamboo basketry work), etc. For bed-
ding the Totos rely on straw mattresses and gunny bags. Here too, due
to deforestation, the production of bamboo and wooden items has been
seriously affected.
The dress code of the Totos is very simple. Previously, the art of
weaving and spinning was a local tradition to produce traditional cloth-
ing; but recently, due to the advent of the modern mill-made clothes,
the traditional fabrics made by handloom have totally disappeared. The
women now wear clothes in the Nepalese fashion. Very few wear orna-
ments. The traditional coin-made necklace has disappeared, and now
various types of cheap ornaments are sold in the market of Totopara. It
should be noted that sometimes poverty prevents them from purchas-
ing even their minimum clothing requirements. As many of them do
not even have sufficient woollen garments, they struggle through the
cold winter months. For umbrellas they use big leaves rather than para-
sols.
The tribal socio-cultural life is also intimately connected with the for-
est ecology. The forest was an inseparable part of tribal life (Chaudhuri
2003: 89). The Totos’ socio-cultural and religious life was closely corre-
lated with the forest ecology, and it was in the very lap of nature that
their culture found its rhythm of survival. But factors such as defores-
tation, environmental degradation and loss of traditional economic pur-
suits are now alienating them from their cultural roots. Traditionally,
Totos are animists. Nonetheless, with time and owing to the influences
identified before, the religious life of the Totos has changed very much.
Deforestation has severely affected their forest- and nature-based reli-
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gious rites and rituals that relate to totemic objects. Just as the forest
can no longer provide the Totos with the necessary ritual requirements,
their poverty prevents them from buying the relevant items on the lo-
cal market. Moreover, many of them are absent from their homes due
to job demands, and as a result their participation in the various reli-
gious festivals is gradually declining. It is also noticeable that under
the changing situation, the familial ties, including their interaction
with kin, have weakened considerably. Religious conversion also intro-
duces new difficulties. The conversion of three Toto families to Chris-
tianity, in 1997, created social disharmony. The converted families were
barred from the socio-religious life and traditional ceremonial occa-
sions. As a result, social solidarity and cohesion are under serious
threat (Biswas and Bhattacharjee 2006: 110-111).
The traditional dance, music, and secular and sacred songs of the To-
tos have also undergone change. The traditional secular songs are con-
sidered unfashionable and are being replaced among the younger gen-
eration by the modern-day Nepali, Hindi and Western songs, which
lack devotion. The significance of religious culture is gradually lost as
the younger generation in particular is showing less interest in their
traditional religious beliefs.
The traditional Toto society has two separate village organisations,
their main concern being to run the socio-religious and secular func-
tions of the village, respectively. The head of the religious organisation
is the head priest or kaiji, while the headman mondal presides over the
secular administration. Both positions are hereditary. There is also a
group of people called karbari (messengers), who carry information
from the kaiji and the mondal to the members of the society. The kaiji,
with the help of the village elders, is expected to settle disputes arising
from infringements against socio-religious customs. He is empowered
to expel the taboo-breakers from the society, while the mondal settles
disputes regarding land, crops, cattle, resource exploitation and domes-
tic problems.
Since the time of introducing the statutory panchayat system17 in To-
topara, the traditional village organisation is rapidly and noticeably los-
ing its importance, and the role and importance of the mondal is disap-
pearing in present-day Toto society. Currently, the village panchayat is
under the control of political parties, of which the Totos have very little
knowledge. The Totos have only a nominal representation in the statu-
tory panchayat system compared with the stronger representation of
the non-Totos. The Totopara statutory panchayat consists of five elected
members, only two of whom are Totos, the remaining three being non-
Totos. Consequently, the Totos have very little scope for making them-
selves heard regarding their own community development or influen-
cing any decision-making. While previously familial, inter-familial and
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other conflicts were resolved by the selected members of their own
community, now these are mostly dealt with in the administrative and
judicial forums. Here, too, as they have very little knowledge regarding
law and administration, the Totots and their genuine problems are
overlooked.
Among these problems is an adequate water supply. Earlier on, the
Totos had two hill springs for their sources of drinking water. Although
the government took some initiatives regarding water supply in Toto-
para, the supply scheme does not cover every hamlet. Two under-
ground reservoirs that were made by NGOs are not in proper working
order. On the whole, the availability of good drinking water remains a
problem.
Totopara is about 32 km away from the nearest urban area, Madari-
hat. The road connecting Totopara and Madarihat, partly metalled and
partly unmetalled, runs in a zigzag route through tea gardens and deep
forests and crosses three rivers on the way. Motor vehicles are not often
available. Also, the road is poorly constructed, wearing out in places.
Worst still, during the rainy season in particular, due to landslides and
water logging, Totopara remains cut off. It thus becomes clear that due
to poor road conditions, infrequent motor services and a poor commu-
nication network, Totopara remains secluded from neighbouring areas
for most of the year, which adds to the difficulties the Totos face in
their daily life.
The Totopara region became an Indian province in 1865. It is situ-
ated in the Indo-Bhutan border area. The Totos are seen to have more
in common in cultural terms with some Bhutanese tribes, such as the
Daya tribe. Many Totos earn a livelihood in Bhutan. If there is an ad-
ministrative crisis in this border region, the Toto economy is ignored
and is bound to suffer. In fact, controversies that have arisen in the re-
cent past have already had a significant impact on the socio-economic
condition in this region.
Conclusion
Every society is changing in its socio-economic and religio-cultural
ways to keep up with change and development, both local and global.
In this process gross economic differences between sections of a so-
ciety or nation emerge. Tribal societies such as the Totos often suffer as
they are slow or unable to react: newcomers utilise more of the natural
wealth, leaving the original owners deprived; through over-exploitation
nature is losing its ecological balance, resulting in natural hazards such
as landslides, soil erosion, floods, etc. Quite obviously, these problems
touch tribal societies that are so very dependent on nature, like the To-
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tos, more deeply. As a result, their social organisation is weakening,
and they are faced with an acute social and cultural crisis. If culture is
the outcome of our need for survival, the Totos are in confusion today
as their traditions are unable to prepare them for modern demands.
The problem is exacerbated as the Totos do not share the customs of
majority Indian society and instead fit in more with the neighbouring
cultural patterns. We may conclude that in the context of development,
the difference between the Totos and majority Indian society is grow-
ing at a rapid pace. In relation to Indian society, the Totos still remain
underdeveloped and ill-equipped with power and economic strength.
The immediate need is to devise proper developmental strategies and
ensure their implementation. Only then can we be certain that the To-
tos will emerge from their crisis, leave behind their distressing life si-
tuation, develop and assume their place in mainstream Indian society.
Notes
1 My thanks to the Department of Anthropology, North Bengal University, India, for
enabling me to carry out the research for this essay (field study 2004-2006).
2 Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) are Indian communities that are
explicitly recognised by the Constitution of India as requiring special support to over-
come centuries of discrimination by the mainstream Hindu society. The SCs/STs to-
gether comprise over 24% of India’s population, with the SCs at over 16% and the
STs at over 8%, as per the 2001 Census. The proportion of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes in the population of India has risen steadily since independence in
1947. The Scheduled Caste people are generally known as Dalits while the Scheduled
Tribe people are usually referred to as Adivasis.
After independence, the Constituent Assembly accepted the existing definition of
Scheduled Castes and Tribes and (via articles 341, 342) gave the President of India
and the respective governors of the states the responsibility to compile a full list of
castes and tribes, with the authority to edit it later, as required. The actual complete
listing of castes and tribes was made via two orders: The Constitution (Scheduled
Castes) Order, 1950 and The Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950, respec-
tively.
3 The Standing Committee on Labour and Welfare (18 December 2002) advised that
certain tribal communities are listed as Scheduled Tribes (STs), in exercise of powers
conferred by clause (1) of Article 342 of the Constitution of India. However, it was ob-
served that not all these STs were at the same level of development. In fact, there are
certain STs that are at a much lower level of development even as compared to the
other Scheduled Tribe communities. It was also observed that in the matter of devo-
lution of funds for the development of STs, the major share was taken by those com-
munities who are more assertive and in a better position to demand such benefits.
As a consequence, the marginalised STs were left out of the process of development.
In order to ensure the development of these communities, certain groups were iden-
tified for the first time in 1975-76 and thereafter in 1993. They are regarded as the
poorest of the poor amongst the STs and were called ‘Primitive Tribal Groups’
(PTGs). The criteria for identification of such PTGs are: (i) pre-agricultural level of
technology; (ii) very low level of literacy; and (iii) declining or stagnant population.
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Based on the above-mentioned criteria, 75 tribal communities were identified as
PTGs spread over what are now 17 states and one union territory (UT) in India. In
West Bengal the (i) Birhor, (ii) Lodhas and (iii) Totos are designated as PTGs.
4 A mouza is the geographical expression for a unit of landmass for revenue settlement
and revenue collection. Village is defined as a human settlement within a mouza
with strong social bonding. Within a mouza there may be more than one village.
And, at the same time, one village may belong to two contiguous mouzas.
5 A secular chief of the Totos is known as mondal (head man). He is empowered to ar-
bitrate, in consultation with a committee consisting of elder members of different
clans, in any dispute among the villagers regarding distribution of land, encroach-
ment, exploitation and their own domestic problems. The position of mondal is her-
editary.
6 In this language the sentences are not formed by suffixing the personal pronouns to
the verbs to denote only the subject, but also to mean the direct and indirect objects.
The language of the Totos is just a spoken patois without script. It has been exposed
to influences from other languages spoken in the immediate vicinity. The Toto lan-
guage has incorporated many words and idioms from the Tibetan, Bhutias, Bodo,
Lepcha, Bengali, Hindi and Nepali languages. Grierson (1909) in his Linguistic Sur-
vey of India states: ‘the Toto dialect will be dealt with after Rong, because it does not
make any use of pronominal suffixes. Our materials are, however, so imperfect that
it is impossible to say anything for certain about its affiliation. Higher numbers are
counted in twenties’.
7 In Toto society there are priests called pow from different clans, who assist the chief
priest (deba-pow or kaiji) and also officiate on behalf of the kaiji (chief priest) in a de-
finite order of priority.
8 Eu is a home-brewed liquor, the Totos’ favourite drink. It is fermented chiefly from
rice, maize, kaoni and marua, two varieties of millet. The brewing is done in every
household. The kaoni or maize or marua or rice or a mixture of them is put in an
earthen pot and covered with water to about three inches above the level of the grain.
A piece of a root from a particular tree is put in and left for some days. Gradually,
the fermentation sets in, and when the froth comes up to the neck the drink is ready.
It is taken undistilled. For the village festivals it is compulsory for every family to
contribute a certain amount of eu.
9 Mainly three cereals, viz. maize, marua (Setaria italica Beauv.) and kaoni (Eleusine cor-
acana Gaertn.) are produced by the Totos. Marua and kaoni are species of millet.
Maize is their staple food.
10 A chief priest is known as deba-pow or kaiji. The kaiji forms a religious council con-
sisting of elders of different clans for consultation in connection with violations of so-
cial custom and norms. Kaiji is empowered to place and remove a taboo.
11 The unit of land measure is an acre. One acre comprises 4,840 square yards or
43,560 square feet (which can be easily remembered as 44,000 square feet, less 1%).
Because of alternative definitions of a yard or a foot, the exact size of an acre also var-
ies slightly.
12 Jhum or Jhuming or shifting cultivation (swidden cultivation or slash and burn) is the
most prevalent form of cultivation in the hill areas of Bangladesh and other region of
northeast India. Most tribal people practise this type of farming on hillsides outside
reserve forests. The main crops generally grown in jhum are rice, maize, millet, se-
same, cucumber, pumpkin, melon, string bean, cotton, banana, ginger, turmeric, etc.
The traditional 7-8 years minimum rotation cycle has now been reduced to just 3-4
years.
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13 In the context of land reform, land owned by an individual beyond a particular
amount is taken by the government and considered ‘vested land’ which is generally
distributed among landless families.
14 1The unit of land measure is the bigha, which varies from one-third of an acre to al-
most one acre. The government-standardised bigha in West Bengal is 14,400 square
feet, which equals 1,333.33 square meters or roughly one-third of an acre.
15 Dried berries of pipul plants (Piper longun) have a high market value and are used to
make cough syrup.
16 Lac worms or insects belong to any of the species of Metatachardia, Laccifer, Tachor-
diella, Austrotacharidia, Afrotachardina, and Tachardina of the superfamily Coccoidea,
order Homoptera, which are noted for resinous exudation from the bodies of females.
These insects have a global distribution except in Europe. The insect starts its life as
a larva or nymph, which is about 0.6 mm long and 0.25 mm wide across the thorax.
It secretes lac all around the body excepting the rostrum, the brachial plates and tip
of the abdomen. Thus, it becomes encased in a cell of lac, which gradually increases
in size as the insect grows. India is still being regarded as the principal lac-producing
country of the world. Besides lac’s use as sealing wax, it is widely used for varnishing
leather goods and dying silk.
17 Statutory Panchayat: the philosophy of panchayati raj is deeply steeped in tradition of
rural India and is by no means a new concept. Panchayati raj provided a system of
self-governance at the village level; however, it did not have a constitutional status. In
India the panchayati raj system was first adopted on 2 October 1959 in the Nagpur
district of Rajasthan. April 23, 1993, is a landmark day in the history of panchayati
raj in India as on this day, the institution of panchayati raj was accorded constitu-
tional status through the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act 1992, which
provides for: Establishment of a three-tier structure; (1) village panchayat, (2) pan-
chayat samiti at block level, i.e. intermediate level panchayat and (3) zilla parishad or
district level panchayat. The village panchayat is termed modern or statutory village
panchayat.
114 SAMAR KUMAR BISWAS
8 Post-Colonialism, Globalism, Nativism:
Reinventing English in a Post-Colonial Space
Krishna Sen
Introduction
The English language and English Studies in India have a complicated
history, and their present status is extremely contested. Having origi-
nated in the need to produce an English-speaking administrative cadre
to run the business of the Empire, the discipline was instrumental in
the formation of a new social group, the Indian middle class, whose
very identity is intertwined with the worldview implicated in its knowl-
edge of English. As in colonial times, so too in the contemporary post-
colonial and globalised era, the affluence and social standing of the In-
dian middle class flow from its access to English. Hence, independent
postcolonial India does not offer a simple binary of ‘nativism’ versus
cosmopolitanism or ‘globalism’, it has attempted to appropriate and
transmute its colonial ‘English’ heritage – though that, too, is not with-
out its problematic social, economic and political consequences.
Mother tongues and the master tongue – the case of India
What happens when postcolonial identity politics intersect and compli-
cate the neat binary of globalism and nativism? And how do certain
key markers of identity such as language, class, and culture inflect the
doubly transculturated terrain of postcolonial societies in the era of glo-
balisation? A close look at the ground realities in India, for instance, re-
veals a more striated topography than is accounted for in discourses
prioritising oppositional categories such as West and East, global and
local, hegemony and subservience, or the clash of cultures. For while
these stark contradictions undoubtedly exist and need to be addressed
and resolved, they coexist alongside the internal hybridity, the domesti-
cation of technology, and the creative glocalisation of global idioms that
characterise postcolonial cultural formations. The turbaned Indian
farmer in the more prosperous regions of the country who keeps
abreast of market prices and national politics sitting cross-legged on
his adobe floor in front of a black-and-white television set, and commu-
nicates with his peers on his mobile phone while driving his bullock
cart, is hard to slot within clear-cut binaries. Like globalisation, some
legacies of colonialism, too, have undergone equally problematic kinds
of indigenisation, and can no longer be viewed simplistically as
blemishes on the postcolonial space. Language is one of the most sen-
sitive of these phenomena – the many critiques of the marginalising of
the mother tongue by the master tongue, and the consequent jeopar-
dising of national identity, are too well known to need repetition. India
has had a particularly fraught relationship with English as a result of
motivated imperial policies. And yet, in the state of West Bengal in
eastern India, where the teaching of English was abolished at the pri-
mary level in state-sponsored schools in the early 1980s in favour of
mother-tongue instruction, English was re-introduced at that level from
the beginning of the 2000 school year. How do we read this sublation
of a nativist construction of the nation by a linguistic inheritance that
used to be branded as anti-national with unfailing regularity from the
colonial period onwards?
India is the second largest English-speaking country1 and one of the
largest English book-producing countries in the world, yet English oc-
cupies a contested space within the Indian polity. The debate over the
status of English and its relationship with India’s major indigenous
languages and their rich vernacular literatures (some of them dating
back in their written forms to the early centuries of the Christian era)
was part of a nation-building discourse dating back to pre-indepen-
dence days that sought to integrate all of India’s ‘pasts’ in a new narra-
tive of a potentially resurgent nation – the long and culturally prolific
pre-colonial epochs with their Sanskrit, Buddhist, and Islamic (Mugh-
al) heritages, the synchronous evolution of the regional languages and
cultures, and the more recent colonial and Eurocentric inheritance.
This is the vision that informs Jawaharlal Nehru’s The Discovery of In-
dia (1946). The practical problem in implementing this grand Nehru-
vian design lies (as in all former colonies) in the hegemonic impact of
Western culture, most powerfully symbolised by the English language.
As Arvind Krishna Mehrotra (2003: 1) puts it in his Introduction to A
History of Indian Literature in English: ‘[…] by 1800 […] British domina-
tion eventually covered all aspects of Indian life - political, economic,
social, cultural. The introduction of English into the complex hierarchi-
cal language system of India has proved the most enduring aspect of
this dominion’. A case in point would be the contentious issue of an of-
ficial language for a multi-lingual state. The framers of the Indian Con-
stitution had in 1951 designated English as the associate official lan-
guage of India along with Hindi until 1965, after which it was to be
withdrawn from official use. That has not happened as yet, primarily
because the individual states within the Union prefer to use their own
languages for official purposes rather than Hindi, which many of their
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inhabitants do not speak at all – thereby leaving English even today as
the sole link language within the country. Incidentally, English is the
‘official’ language of at least two Indian states, Meghalaya and Naga-
land, whose various tribes speak vastly different sub-languages, with
no common medium of communication other than English. English is
also the native tongue of the small Eurasian or Anglo-Indian (the more
usual term) community, the offspring of mixed marriages during the
colonial period, whose numbers are fast dwindling due to emigration
to Britain, Australia and Canada. So English does have a status other
than being solely a colonial legacy. There is, nevertheless, a strained re-
lationship between the mother tongues and the ‘other tongue’ (Kachru
1982), which Probal Dasgupta (1993) has dubbed ‘India’s Auntie Ton-
gue’ – not least because, as Aijaz Ahmad (1992: 75) has pointed out,
non-metropolitan India identifies English as the language of elite privi-
lege.
The English language and Indian English literature (also known as
Indian writing in English), both of which are legacies of British coloni-
alism, stand in the eye of the storm. The sharply opposed reactions
that they still arouse may be inferred from the antithetical titles of the
two opening essays in English Studies in India: Past, Present and Future,
a 2005 collection edited by Balvinder Ghotra: Vinod Sena’s ‘Brand of
Shame or Mark of Destiny?: The Legacy of English in India’ and Grace
Vaseekar’s ‘The Great Tradition of English Studies in India’. Salman
Rushdie stirred up a hornet’s nest by declaring in the Preface to Mir-
rorwork: Fifty Years of Indian Writing, 1947-1997 (which curiously repre-
sented ‘Indian writing’ only by original work in English from Nehru to
Kiran Desai, with just one piece in translation from one of the vernacu-
lars):
… this large and varied survey turns out to be making, funda-
mentally, just one – perhaps rather surprising – point.
This is it: the prose writing – both fiction and non-fiction – cre-
ated in this period [i.e. 1947-1997] by Indian writers working in
English, is proving to be a stronger and more important body of
work than most of what has been produced in the sixteen ‘offi-
cial languages’ of India,2 the so-called ‘vernacular languages’,
during the same time; and indeed, this new, and still burgeon-
ing, ‘Indo-Anglian’ literature represents perhaps the most valu-
able contribution India has yet made to the world of books.
(Rushdie and West 1997: viii; emphasis in the original)
One wonders how the editors assessed the Ramayana and the Mahab-
harata, or Tagore and Premchand, or any of the leading contemporary
writers in India’s major vernaculars, also known as ‘official’ languages
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on the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. Rushdie has of
course not gone unchallenged. Amit Chaudhuri’s (2001: xvii-xxxi) two
introductory essays in The Picador Book of Modern Indian Literature ca-
tegorically refute Rushdie.
The challenge of nativism
Indeed, Anglophile predilections have always been attacked by Indian
intellectuals, even by those who write in English. Aijaz Ahmad (1992:
75) derided ‘(t)hese post-colonial consolidations and expansions’ of
English over the regional languages. In After Amnesia, G.N. Devy
(1992: 111) recalls Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s Decolonising the Mind (1987) in
decrying the ‘cultural amnesia’ of ‘an irrationally adulatory sect, living
with a self-induced hypnosis and thriving on the import of alien to-
tems’. Devy is an adherent of his mentor, the Maharashtrian litterateur
and critic Bhalchandra Nemade’s uncompromising ‘nativism’ (deshiya-
ta):
It is expected that native perceptions naturally express them-
selves in any literature. However, as a result of years of slavery
under crafty European rulers, a peculiar kind of colonialist inter-
nationalism was born in various parts of the colonial world in
the mid-twentieth century. … It is time to tell people who are
used to such elitism that any human being or literature can
stand tall only in its own native land and linguistic group. …
being native means being attached to a particular place. … But
when non-native, alien, imported values, languages, and cul-
tures coming in from outside threaten native values, languages
and cultures, communities have to become nativistic in order to
survive. (Nemade 1997: 233-236 passim)
Nativists like Devy and Nemade reject what they describe as the neo-co-
lonial hegemony of metropolitan post-colonial theory which unduly
foregrounds the colonial inheritance at the expense of earlier and ri-
cher heritages, and virtually locks the ex-colonised nation into its im-
perial past under the misleading rubric of a globalised cosmopolitan-
ism.
However, as the contributions in Makarand Paranjape’s edited vo-
lume Nativism (1997) demonstrate, there is no consensus regarding
such stringent cultural purism, even among those who denounce the
exorbitation of English. Indeed, one does not find in India any simple
binary opposition between Eurocentrism and nationalism in the sphere
of language. English is both loved and hated since, as Amit Chaudhuri
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(2001: xiii) observes, the English language and the new kinds of knowl-
edge that it carried into India are too deeply imbricated in the forma-
tion of Indian modernity and the Indian middle class to be easily
teased out from the variegated skein of Indian life and then discarded.
This explains the ambivalent position of English in the India of today –
culturally alien in being the tangible symbol of an unfortunate history,
and yet a marker of a certain kind of identity over and above its educa-
tional and economic importance in a globalised world.
English in independent India – a globalising motif
Independent India incorporated English into its ‘Three Language For-
mula’ of the 1960s, but because of inadequate resources and poor
teaching, English remains an insuperable hurdle for students in rural
and poor urban areas. Yet the intense ambition of India’s urban youth
to access the world through fluency in English is reflected in the popu-
larity of both the English language and English literature in the acad-
emy. The study of canonical British literature (and to a lesser extent,
other literatures in English) remains a vibrant academic pursuit at the
tertiary level. In certain parts of India, English Departments are among
the healthiest in the Humanities stream – every seat is filled (though
with a majority of women), and students are often turned away. This
may not be the case in many Asian countries. But as in these other
countries, with the burgeoning of elite technical and management
schools from the 1960s onwards, English Language Teaching (ELT) en-
rolment, too, has increased exponentially. These developments con-
tinue despite the fact that, as Rukmini Bhaya Nair (2002: 108) has
pointed out, this leads to a devaluation of competence in the regional
languages.
There is yet another piquant dimension to English Studies in con-
temporary India. The University Grants Commission of India (UGC),
the sole arbiter and funding authority for higher education, stated in
the preamble to its guidelines for a model curriculum in English (da-
ted 2001, and initially valid for a period of five years but not substan-
tially revised yet): ‘Virtually all students within the Indian university
system study a certain amount of English. This is not the case with
any other subject. Planning the curriculum thereby becomes a complex
task with broader social implications beyond the academic ones.’ The
document goes on to reiterate an earlier policy that, because of the
spread of the English language and literature over the entire range of
the Indian curriculum (science, business and engineering students,
too, take one compulsory unit each in English literature and English
language), this curricular component should aim to nurture a multicul-
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tural and global perspective within the student body by familiarising it
with ‘world englishes’ and translated texts: ‘It was felt that the Honours
course in English [i.e. the English major] could be a gateway to all lit-
eratures instead of being confined to Britain alone,’ and that even the
General [i.e. English minor] level should include ‘literature in English
written outside the British Isles’ as well as ‘non-English literature in
English translation’ (meaning literature in the Indian vernaculars).
The repeated reference in this premier national educational policy
document to the need to introspect on the meaning and significance of
English studies within the Indian curriculum not only goes well be-
yond the uses of English literature as conceptualised by the colonial
masters who set up the first modern universities in India, but also sig-
nals an important change of direction. What it implies is that the study
of English, which had been part of a notorious colonial ploy to churn
out an English-educated and hence psychologically complicit adminis-
trative cadre to carry out the business of empire, would now be co-
opted by a post-colonial (or, as we prefer to say, independent) India to
serve its own purposes – i.e. to mobilise its large English-speaking
middle class to negotiate with global trends and issues.
Contemporary India’s aggressive entry into certain sectors of the glo-
bal economy is as much due to widespread English skills as to high
standards in information technology – and it has to do not just with
knowledge of the language, but also with the cultural competence that
comes from familiarity with the literature. This strategic appropriation
of the coloniser’s tongue to serve nationalist purposes problematises
the Fanonesque allegation that imperialism enforced the total accul-
turation of the colonised subject. It is, rather, close to Bill Ashcroft’s
(2001: 1) redefinition of the ‘post-colonial’ as no longer only subversive
and resistant, but transformative and liberatory: ‘It is transformation
that gives these societies control over their future. Transformation de-
scribes the way in which colonised societies have taken dominant dis-
courses, transformed them and used them in the service of their own
self-empowerment.’ This creative transformation of imperial discourses
might well be termed ‘postcolonial’ (minus the hyphen), since it in-
volves a productive osmosis rather than mere continuation.
Nevertheless, problems remain. How are we to confer on this ob-
viously ‘foreign’ entity with its manifest links to a rejected colonial past
a measure of national identity and cultural relevance? How do we cope
with the strange paradox that English enjoys an almost fetishistic ca-
chet with the Indian upper middle, middle, and aspiring middle
classes, while remaining an equally fetishistic object of populist aver-
sion among conservatives and fundamentalists of all hues? How are
the often first-generation learners of rural India to be brought within
the orbit of opportunities afforded by English? And finally, can English
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ever become Indian? These issues form part of a larger socio-cultural
discussion on the nature of ‘Indianness’ and are reflected in a number
of authored or edited studies, notably by Gauri Viswanathan (1989),
Rajeswari Sunder Rajan (1992), Svati Joshi (1994) and C.D. Narasim-
haiah (2002). Of these, Gauri Viswanathan is Saidian in her excavation
of sinister designs in the colonial project of English education in India;
the collections edited by Rajeswari Sunder Rajan and Svati Joshi ex-
plore the incongruity of pursuing an elite discourse in a largely rustic
country; but C.D. Narasimhaiah claims that the ideological dilemma of
colonial cringe no longer exists in a country that has not only thor-
oughly ingested the English language at certain levels of its society, but
also added substantially to its vocabulary in what might be called an in-
stance of reverse colonisation. Moreover, the increasing popularity of
American literature, Indian writing in English, and what used to be
called Commonwealth literature (a politically incorrect term in present-
day India, now replaced on syllabi by the clumsy phrase, ‘New Litera-
tures in English’) ensures that British literature remains just one com-
ponent among many in the literature syllabus, though in several uni-
versities it is still the major one. But none of this explains the pecu-
liarly ambivalent status of English in India.
English in colonial India – a motivated imperial legacy
English education in India was the fruit of an ideological struggle be-
tween the British Orientalists who held sway until about the 1830s,
and their adversaries, the Anglicists, who soon gained ascendancy due
to reasons of political expediency. The Orientalists, led by Sir William
Jones who founded The Asiatic Society at Calcutta in 1784, glorified In-
dia’s classical Vedic and Sanskritic past (though with some reservations
relating especially to polytheistic Hinduism), celebrating it as a higher
level of literary and cultural attainment than even the European Re-
naissance. The Anglicists, on the contrary, considered the form, con-
tent and worldview of the ancient Indian texts to be decadent, and even
barbaric. The Orientalists wished to prioritise the traditional educa-
tional system based on the study of Sanskrit, along with Arabic and
Persian (a Mughal legacy), the vernaculars, and the sacred texts of In-
dia’s many religions. With the increasing territorial gains of the British
East India Company, however, knowledge of English among the local
populace became a necessity for effective communication.
The beginnings of English Studies in India are anticipated in Moun-
stuart Elphinstone’s 1823 ‘Minute’ on the need to teach English and
the European sciences in native schools and can be formally traced to
the intervention of Thomas Babington Lord Macaulay, who became the
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Law Member of the Governor General’s Council after the passing of
the Government of India Act of 1833. Macaulay’s ‘Minute on Indian
Education’ (1835) was responsible for establishing English as the med-
ium of higher education in India in order to create ‘a class of persons
Indian in blood and colour but English in taste, in opinion, in morals,
and in intellect’ who ‘may be interpreters between us and the millions
whom we govern’ (Macaulay 1965: Section 34). Macaulay’s politically
motivated contention was that while Sanskrit was already a dead lan-
guage, and Arabic and Persian alien and non-Indian tongues, the living
vernaculars were so wretchedly meagre in their resources that no ser-
ious education could be imparted through them. Worthwhile knowl-
edge could only be disseminated through English, and through a study
of the English literary masters such as Shakespeare, Milton, Pope and
Wordsworth. It may be noted that Macaulay was advocating the serious
study of British writers in India at a time when the major universities
in England still taught only the Greek and Latin classics, considering
English literature to be a minor phenomenon – Oxford and Cam-
bridge, for instance, introduced English as an Honours subject only in
1894 and 1926, respectively (McArthur 1998: 367-368). So we have a
colonial Calcutta newspaper commenting on an 1848 staging of Othello
in Calcutta’s Sans Souci theatre with the Bengali actor Baishnabchurn
Addy in the lead role: ‘Shakespeare, exiled from the country he hon-
ours so much, seeks an asylum on the Calcutta boards’ (The Bengal
Hurkaru, 19 August 1848).
Macaulay’s educational strategy, supported by the then Governor
General Lord Bentinck, was instrumental in creating a language-based
class system that remains the cusp of the post-independence contro-
versy. This was foreshadowed when Macaulay observed: ‘In India, Eng-
lish is the language spoken by the ruling class [and] by the higher class
of natives …’ (Macaulay 1965: Section 12). Macaulay’s ‘Minute’ was
quickly followed by the 1835 English Education Act under Lord Ben-
tinck, in terms of which the teaching of English was taken out of the
purview of the Sanskrit College and the Muslim Madrassa, the two
leading educational institutions at Calcutta that had already pioneered
the teaching of English and the English classics – there are records of
extracts from Shakespeare being acted by the students of Bhowanipore
English School and Hindu College in 1828, and Julius Caesar being
performed by local actors at Prosonnokumar Tagore’s Hindu Theatre
in 1831 (Bose 2007: 139). But after Macaulay the language and its lit-
erature were actively co-opted to the process of empire-building. The
institutionalisation of English Studies was further codified through Sir
Charles Woods’s Dispatch of 1854, often referred to as the ‘Magna Car-
ta of Indian higher education’, that paved the way for the modern uni-
versity system with instruction in English for all subjects except the
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vernaculars. The study of English Literature was first entrusted to the
newly established Presidency Colleges at Calcutta and Madras, and
then to the postgraduate departments of the three universities set up
in 1857 in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay.
With a direct connection now set up between an English-based edu-
cation and coveted administrative positions for Indians in the colonial
government, there naturally occurred a refiguring of the hierarchy of
‘useful’ languages within the subcontinent. This was the first step in
the systematic devaluation of the indigenous classical and regional lan-
guages. But there were further ramifications to Macaulay’s postulate
that the Indian educational system ‘ought to enable a Hindoo to read
Hume and Milton’ (Macaulay 1965: Section 32). If we assume that fa-
miliarity with a literature is tantamount to being exposed to its ideol-
ogy and values, Macaulay’s ‘Minute’ clearly goes beyond the inculcation
of language competence and gestures towards acculturation. Macau-
lay’s imperialist vision of the future of English is clearly adumbrated in
his ‘Speech on the Government of India’ (1833): ‘The scepter may pass
away from us. … But … there is an empire exempt from all natural
causes of decay. … that empire is the imperishable empire of our arts
and our morals, our literature and our laws’ (Macaulay 1967). As G.N.
Devy (1992: 9) has observed: ‘A new education system based on and
spread through the English language was introduced, and with it was
introduced English literature as a civilizing influence.’
There was a consequent blurring of the distinction between English
Language and ‘English Literature’ in the English Studies courses de-
signed with the express intention of imparting Western culture and va-
lues for the purposes of empire-building. British Literature functioned
as a motivated paideia, or as part of what Althusser called ‘the Ideologi-
cal State Apparatus’, answering exactly to Terry Eagleton’s charge
against literary studies in general: literary studies became ‘a vital in-
strument for the insertion of individuals into the perceptual and sym-
bolic forms of the dominant ideological tradition. … What is finally at
stake is not literary texts but Literature – the ideological significance of
the process … whereby a series of “literary traditions” are interrogated
to yield a set of ideologically presupposed responses’ (Eagleton 1978:
57). In those early days no science or technology was taught at all, but
only the character-forming humanities and social sciences (especially
history and politics with a decidedly Eurocentric slant). Raja Rammo-
han Roy, the liberal reformer and founder of the Brahmo Samaj,
pleaded in vain in his December 1823 letter to William Pitt, Lord Am-
herst, the Governor-General of India from 1823-1828, for the introduc-
tion of science education in native schools and colleges to inculcate the
true spirit of Western rationality and modernity in Indian society (Roy
1977: 300-303). Gauri Viswanathan (1989: 1-4 passim) concludes:
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… the discipline of English [in India] came into its own in an
age of colonialism … and in the long run served to strengthen
Western cultural hegemony in enormously complex ways … The
history of education in British India shows that certain huma-
nistic functions traditionally associated with literature – for ex-
ample, the shaping of character or the development of the aes-
thetic sense or the disciplines of ethical thinking – were consid-
ered essential to the processes of socio-political control by the
guardians of the same tradition. … A vital if subtle connection
exists between a discourse in which those who are to be edu-
cated are represented as morally and intellectually deficient and
the attribution of moral and intellectual values to the literary
works they are assigned to read.
This was surely one of the intended corollaries of the Macaulayite edu-
cational reforms.
English as a matrix of the Indian middle class
However, the actual situation was more complicated, and Viswa-
nathan’s neat schematisation of British versus Indian culture can be
problematised through a more nuanced response to colonial education.
One must remember that English was the engine that activated the for-
mation of the urban Indian middle class. This middle class, created by
the English education that legitimised its access to lucrative colonial
employment and gave it the prestige of a delegated authority, was pro-
foundly subversive of the hierarchical structures of orthodox Indian so-
ciety based on the Hindu caste system and Muslim feudalism. The
new social phenomenon of an Indian middle class owed its provenance
not to the traditional categories of birth and wealth, but to academic
merit, professional competence, and capitalist enterprise, all of which
were facilitated by knowledge of English. It occupied and indeed owed
its very existence and socialisation to a space cleared out by Western
ideas with their vision of the self-directed and purposeful individual as
the origin and ground of meaning and event. In allying the acquisition
of wealth and social standing with individual rather than group iden-
tity, this new class not only questioned orthodoxy, but developed its
own vested interest in promoting congenial Western ideologies. In the
chapter entitled ‘Domestic Cruelty and the Birth of the Subject’ in his
Provincializing Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty traces the moral crisis in
19th-century Indian society to the struggle between Occidental norms
of the autonomy of the subject on the one hand, and prescriptive famil-
ial and community obligations on the other (Chakrabarty 2000: 117-
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148). Since English Studies represented the path of social circulation
and success, the culture that it purveyed was viewed as curiously ‘neu-
tral’. So we arrive at the paradoxical situation where British imperial-
ism is reviled, but Shakespeare and Milton are celebrated: indeed, the
leading 19th-century Bengali authors, Michael Madhusudan Dutt (who
had converted to Christianity, hence the English first name) and Bank-
imchandra Chattopadhyay, were regularly hailed as the Milton and the
Walter Scott of Bengal, respectively, with no sense of the ambiguity in-
herent in these encomia. Said (1995: 3) has explained this paradox as
follows: ‘European culture gained in strength and identity by setting it-
self off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground
self.’ Ashis Nandy (1983: 2) characterised this subterranean admiration
for Western ideological and intellectual paradigms as ‘the intimate en-
emy’ that gnaws away at the fragmented colonised (and later, neo-colo-
nised) self. The British Orientalist scholar Horace Hayman Wilson had
as early as the 1830s accused the British administration of creating a
culturally deracinated monster in this new middle class.
By annihilating native literature, by sweeping away all sources
of pride and pleasure in their own mental efforts, by rendering
a whole people dependent upon a remote and unknown country
for all their ideas and for the very words in which to clothe
them, we should degrade their character … (quoted in Viswa-
nathan 1989: 41-42)
Certainly, it was (and still is) marked by a curious hybridity. Sister Nive-
dita (born Margaret Noble), the follower of Swami Vivekananda, re-
marked in The Web of Indian Life (first published in 1904) (1950: xii):
‘Hindu life in the city of Calcutta … was a world in which men in loin
cloths, seated on door-sills in industry lanes, said things about Shake-
speare and Shelley that some of us would go far to hear’.
English as a problematic identity paradigm
Why was there no sense of contradiction between opposition to imper-
ial politics and acceptance of the imperialist’s culture in the form of
English Studies? It is possibly because that culture appeared to be lib-
eratory in a hierarchical society. Indian nationalism, for instance, drew
most of its inspiration from 19th-century British liberalism rather than
from indigenous sources, leading Partha Chatterjee (1986) to label it a
comprador or ‘derivative’ discourse. Most 19th-century Indian intellec-
tuals seemed to have accepted a carefully constructed revisionary colo-
nial historiography that not only legitimised the colonial intervention
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but also perpetrated the ‘divide and rule’ policy. Following the para-
digm of European history, Indian history was reconstrued in a tripartite
narrative of a classical age, a decadent or Dark Age, and a renaissance.
India’s glorious classical age was the Aryan and Hindu past – the Brah-
minical heritage of the Vedas, the Upanishads and the epics Ramayana
and Mahabharata. The period of decadence was identified with the cen-
turies of Muslim invasion and Mughal rule, under the supposedly
baneful influence of which the pure stream of Hinduism dwindled into
dead ritual. The renaissance, proclaiming a potential resurgence of the
Hindu polity, was catalysed by the cleansing fount of Western rational-
ism and liberalism learnt from the colonial master. This motivated
parabola of ultimate redemption through exposure to English culture
was the burden of the prescribed history text books in the Presidency
colleges and universities – Marshman’s History of Bengal and History of
India, Murray’s History of India, with readings from Mill and Other
Authors, and Henry Morris’s History of India (Viswanathan 1989: 125) –
and it had important cultural consequences. By focalising Brahminical
Hinduism, it totally occluded India’s animistic tribal legacy as well as
the very different culture of the Hindu lower castes: and by demonis-
ing the Islamic heritage – a ploy accepted even by Bankimchandra
Chattopadhyay in his influential Bengali novel Anandamath – it created
rifts which had not previously existed in their later extreme forms. But
by representing the colonial intervention as a deliverance, it vindicated
English Studies as one of the key vehicles of that renaissance. That this
same vehicle acted as the mediator of the colonial Indian’s access to
Western liberalism and triggered the nationalist dream of a resurgent
India was surely unintended.
It would, therefore, be an oversimplification to claim that English
Studies in India in the 19th century represented a simple binary oppo-
sition between coloniser and colonised or even, among the colonised,
between the Anglicists and the Sanskritists. Both the ‘modernisers’ like
Raja Rammohan Roy and the traditionalists like his bitter opponent
Raja Radhakanta Deb were in favour of English education. They advo-
cated its usefulness specifically for land-owning upper caste Hindu
boys (the zamindars) and the children of the new professional petty
bourgeoisie, thus cementing the formation of radically new social ties
cutting across caste and inherited wealth. This rising class or new elite
welcomed English Studies as the point of entry into what is known in
the West as the ‘civil society’.
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Indigenising English – conflicts and contradictions
Nonetheless, Indian modernity and its ancillary middle class ethos are
not carbon copies of Western modernity, precisely because they evolved
out of a complex dialectic of colonialism, nationalism, and the herme-
neutics of a powerful nostalgia for the vanished glories of an ancient
past. English Studies constituted a privileged locus in the Indian mid-
dle-class imaginary for both its potential and its (non-diasporic) hybrid-
ity, a multifaceted site of creativity as well as collaboration, of adapta-
tion no less than adoption. The problem is that this holds true even to-
day, well after independence, with its attendant discursive dilemmas.
On the literary level one can cite the many rebuttals of Rushdie, or the
heated exchange between Indian English author Vikram Chandra and
the reputed scholar of Indian English writing Meenakshi Mukherjee
following Mukherjee’s contention that Indian English writing packages
an exotic India for Western consumption (Chandra 2000). It also has
the makings of an explosive political issue. To populist orators English
is the clearest marker of the ‘creamy layer’ whose fluency is buttressed
by a non-native fusion culture. One thinks of rebukes to these hybrid
ontologies within the country as in Aijaz Ahmed’s ‘Disciplinary Eng-
lish: Third-Worldism and Literature’ (Ahmed 1994) or Badri Raina’s ‘A
Note on Language and the Politics of English in India’ (Raina 1994).
It is, however, this same middle class that created the great literary
works of 19th-century India, in the vernaculars no less than in English.
Calcutta, the seat of British imperial power till the shifting of the capi-
tal to Delhi in 1913 and the city which demonstrated the earliest recep-
tivity to Western cultural and intellectual influences, produced both the
first long narrative poem in English (Michael Madhusudan Dutt’s ‘The
Captive Ladie’ in 1849) and the first Indian novel written in English
(Bankimchandra Chattopadhyaya’s Rajmohan’s Wife in 1864). But Dutt
and Chattopadhaya also established the traditions of the vernacular (as
opposed to the classical Sanskrit) epic and the vernacular novel, the lat-
ter articulating (in Meenakshi Mukherjee’s words), ‘the tension suf-
fered by the early generation of English-educated men in India regard-
ing negotiation of different world-views, later glibly and simplistically
labelled the east-west encounter’ (Mukherjee 2000: 62). What is inter-
esting is that through the interface with English, the vernaculars them-
selves came to be enriched with genres hitherto unrepresented in San-
skrit or any of the native literatures – verse forms such as the sonnet
and the ode, subjective narratives like the essay and the autobiography
(signaling ‘the birth of the subject’), and most significantly (in view of
the major changes agitating traditional social formations), the novel.
Of these genres the most vibrant is Indian fiction in English, though
major poetry and drama are also written. One is thinking here, not of
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diasporic writers of Indian origin located in Britain and America, but
those extremely successful writers in English who lived and worked
(and still do) within India, from R.K. Narayan to Arundhati Roy, who
won the Booker Prize for The God of Small Things. Theirs is a very dif-
ferent post-colonial space to that suggested in Rushdie’s Imaginary
Homelands or Homi Bhabha’s The Location of Culture – it is situated at
home and explores not the psychological disruptions of the interstitial
diasporic space, but (in the words of Indian English novelist Pankaj
Mishra 2001: 42) ‘an ancient civilization’s tortuous initiation into mod-
ern life’. Predictably, these novelists have been excoriated for their ease
of access to the global market that is denied even the greatest of con-
temporary vernacular novelists, except through the occasional transla-
tion. G.N. Devy (1995: 162) feels that such writers are ‘linguistically
and culturally uprooted’. In their defence K. Satchidanandan (1997: 21)
avers in ‘Defining the Premises: Nativism and its Ambivalences’: ‘It
also seems essential here to address the question regarding the exis-
tence of an “Indian literature” … While literature definitely has lan-
guage-specific qualities, language is not the sole identity of literature.
It has ethical, aesthetic, civilisational, historical and ideological dimen-
sions too …’ Similarly Vasant Palshikar (1984: 44) maintains that all lit-
eratures written within a nation are ‘native’ since a writer is ‘native’ not
by virtue of the language s/he uses, but by virtue of belonging to the
milieu. Amit Chaudhuri (2001: x), a resident of Calcutta and the win-
ner of several national and international awards for his English fiction,
goes so far as to declare that English is the only viable medium for ana-
lysing the internal hybridity of a society in transition since, unlike the
vernaculars, it is an emblem of this hybridity.
Yet Indian English writers have been divided on this issue. The most
famous caveat (and problematisation of the issue) is in Raja Rao’s Fore-
word to Kanthapura:
The telling has not been easy. One has to convey in a language
that is not one’s own the spirit that is one’s own. One has to
convey the various shades and omissions of a certain thought-
movement that looks maltreated in an alien language. I use the
word ‘alien’, yet English is not really an alien language to us. It
is the language of our intellectual make-up - like Sanskrit or Per-
sian - but not of our emotional make-up. (Rao 1999: v)
R.K. Narayan’s riposte in his essay ‘Toasted [i.e. ‘brown’] English’ is well
known:
The time has come for us to consider seriously the question of a
Bharat [i.e. Indian,’ ‘Bharat’ being the indigenous name for In-
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dia] brand of English … Now the time is ripe for it to come to
the dusty street, the market place, and under the banyan tree …
I am not suggesting here a mongrelisation of language. … Bhar-
at English will respect the rule of law and maintain the dignity
of grammar, but still have a swadeshi [native] stamp about it, like
the Madras handloom check [sic] shirt or the Tirupati doll.
(Narayan quoted in Harrex 1996: 26)
Narayan found ‘Bharat English’ the most appropriate vehicle for pro-
jecting the cultural osmosis effected by the colonial encounter. A brief
extract from his first novel, Swami and Friends (1935), will illustrate the
kind of English he had in mind:
The Tamil Pundit … was guiding the class through the intrica-
cies of Tamil grammar. … Swaminathan and the Pea sat on the
last bench.
“I say, Pea,” said Swaminathan, “I got a new brother this morn-
ing.”
The Pea was interested. “How do you like him?”
“Oh, like him! He is hardly anything. Such a funny looking crea-
ture! … But I tell you, his face is awful, red, red like a chili.”
They listened to the teacher’s lecture for a few minutes. “I say,
Swami,” said the Pea, “these things grow up soon. I have seen a
baby that was just what your brother is. But you know, when I
saw it again during Michaelmas I could hardly recognise it.”
(Narayan 1998: 49-50)
The casual juxtaposition of ‘Tamil pundit’, ‘red chili,’ the collo-
quial ‘I say’ and the formal ‘Michaelmas’ could, and indeed
does, happen only in India, as G.V. Desani’s All About H. Hatterr
demonstrates with flair. Narayan was equally confident in his ap-
propriation of Western narrative modes. His own fiction, he
claimed in his ‘English in India’, was structured along the lines
of the ancient Indian epics and puranas and concerned itself
with purely Indian issues of caste and kinship and the many
contradictions of a fast-changing society, while still maintaining
the Western formal requirements of plot and characterisation
(Harrex 1996: 22).
Narayan’s was perhaps one of the most complete reinventions of Eng-
lish in the postcolonial space that is the India of today – indeed, he
fairly claimed the language as his own. In his essay entitled ‘A Literary
Alchemy’, he observed:
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Passing from literature to language, ‘Indian English’ is often
mentioned with some amount of contempt and patronage, but
is a legitimate development and needs no apology. We have fos-
tered the language for over a century and we are entitled to
bring it in line with our own habits of thought and idiom. Amer-
icans have adapted the English language to suit their native
mood and speech without feeling apologetic, and have achieved
directness and unambiguity in expression. (Narayan 1988: 197-
198)
Yet for all that, the dilemmas have not been resolved. G.J.V. Prasad
(2005: 46; emphasis in the original) laments:
And what is Indian English, whose language is that? … it is not
hostility to English that I want to point attention to here, it is
not the lack of appreciative audience …, or the lack of a sense of
community among writers, but simply to the uncertain owner-
ship over the language – an uncertainty that still persists after
nearly two centuries of Indian English poetry.
It is this continuing insecurity over the ownership of the language that
Meenakshi Mukherjee (2000: 166) has described as ‘the anxiety of In-
dianness’. Yet surely, in this era of globalisation, one needs to accept
that all national traditions are polyvocal and plural, and can only be
fully accessed through multiple points of entry. In ‘Traveling Cultures’,
for instance, James Clifford (1992: 101; emphasis in the original) ques-
tions the conventional anthropological model of cultures as fixed and
local: ‘The goal is not to replace the cultural figure “native” with the in-
tercultural figure “traveler”. Rather the task is to focus on concrete
mediations of the two in specific cases of historical tension and rela-
tionship.’ But in India today, it is ultimately a social, and not a cultural,
confrontation – as in the 19th century, access to English spells privilege,
and the present tensions are economic rather than academic.
English – a contested marker of privilege
From being the signifier of a hegemonic colonialism, the English lan-
guage in India can all too easily, within the politically charged field of
nationalist exigency, be transformed into the signifier of a hegemonic
globalisation, rousing economic as well as political hackles. Business
columnist Sucheta Dalal wrote in the Indian Express in 2005 of ‘… an
important differentiator that has already emerged in the job market to-
day. It is the earning difference between those who are conversant with
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the English language and those who aren’t. Salary differences between
equally qualified (non-professional/technical) candidates can be as high
as 400 to 500 percent’. Predictably, it is the rare fire-breathing nation-
alist politician who does not send his children to prestigious ‘English-
medium schools’ (as they are called), since being ‘at home’ in English
is India’s signifier of upward mobility, opening many doors even with-
in the country. One recalls Mrinal Sen’s pointed critique of professional
Anglophilia in his award-winning 1970 Bengali film Interview. The un-
comfortable reality remains that English is a ‘glocal’ phenomenon in
urban India, and still an alien in rural India. But the irony lies in the
fact that to eliminate English and what it stands for today would be to
eliminate the strongest elements in the Indian middle class. It would
also foreclose an emergent ‘India Inc’s’ claims to a global identity – a
kind of ‘counter-globalisation’ or ‘globalism,’ so to speak, to offset
Hardt and Negri’s (2000) globalised ‘Empire’ of (mainly American)
multinational capital. Indeed, it is perhaps time to think of a hetero-
glossial ‘globalism’ rather than a Eurocentric globalisation, where Eng-
lish may be viewed as a postcolonial tool rather than a neo-colonial tyr-
ant. India has shown that English can be appropriated and used,
though not without difficulty.
English and the nation
The English language, one of the most controversial elements in the
polycultural space of Indian nationhood, occupies the slippery site
where personal, social, national and global identities and imperatives
converge and collide. If it assists India towards a ‘tiger economy’ in the
global sphere, it frequently cannibalises vernacular cultures in the local
sphere – while paradoxically creating wealth within the country
through the knowledge industries. Perhaps, then, it is also time to re-
think the postcolonial nation-space, not in monolithic Westphalian
terms, but as a multivalent entity that transits flexibly between the glo-
bal and the local.
Notes
1 This is the case even on the basis of the 1991 Census of India (all the raw data from
the 2001 Census has yet to be collated). According to the section entitled ‘Bilingual-
ism and Trilingualism’ in the Publications of the Census of India 1991, India had
90,000,000 English speakers, of whom 65,000,000 used it as a second language
and 25,000,000 used it as a third language (Issue 10, 2003, 8-10). That figure will
only have increased by 2001. The corresponding figure for the USA is 262,375,152 ac-
cording to the section entitled ‘Language Use and English-Speaking Ability’ in Publi-
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cations of the US Census 2000 (published 2006). In the second edition of The Cam-
bridge Encyclopaedia of the English Language, David Crystal gives the number of Eng-
lish speakers in Britain as 596,000 (Crystal 2003:109). However, in a 2005 interview
Crystal is quoted as saying (without supporting statistics) – ‘India [is] currently […]
the country with the largest English-speaking population in the world. Ten years ago
that record was held by the United States, but not any more.’
2 The 2001 Census of India lists 22 official languages in the Eighth Schedule of the
Indian Constitution (Statement – 4: Scheduled Languages in Descending Order of
Speakers’ Strength – 2001). See http://www.censusindia.gov.in/
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9 Occidentalism and Asian
Middle-Class Identities:
Notes on Birthday Cakes in an Indian Context
Minna Sa¨a¨va¨la¨1
The birthday cake is a relatively recent import in Indian cultural life.
The adoption of practices conceptualised as ‘Western’, such as eating
cake, strengthens the new middle-class Indian’s national-cultural iden-
tity by making the difference palpable and discursive. New Indian mid-
dle-class identities are flexible, as they are able to incorporate see-
mingly contradictory cultural materials. For instance, Occidentalist
ideas – stylised images of the West – are appropriated by the new
Asian middle classes in their processes of national and class identifica-
tion. The emergence of Occidentalism in India and in a number of
other Asian countries derives from the historical realities of colonial-
ism, which led to the creation of the local colonial administrative elite
that then developed into a politically and socially leading class promi-
nently involved in nation-building.
In European intellectual and colonial history, the contrast between
East and West, Orient and Occident, is ideologically loaded with signifi-
cance. Through imagination and identification, this amorphous cate-
gorisation has been exhibited for centuries – if not millennia – and has
had tangible consequences for people’s realities and relationships
around the world. Andre Gunder Frank (1998: 357) sees a parallel in
the importance of the line between East and West in the 19th and 21st
centuries, stating that ‘real-world history continuously – and cyclically?
– jumps and alternates across this imaginary Western/“Orientalist” di-
vision. That is what happened in the 19th century and promises to hap-
pen also in the 21st.’
This recurrent and momentous imaginary line between East and
West that Frank speaks about is repeatedly drawn, in a sense, in con-
temporary new middle-class Asian lives. The middle classes are charac-
terised as being in between both socially and culturally. They form a
mediating class that is defined by a negation: not being dependent on
the continuous sale of their labour power, nor having the independence
of the elite. In addition to this socially intermediate position, univer-
sally shared by the middle classes (Burris 1995), the middle classes of
developing societies also tend to locate themselves culturally and politi-
cally in between: separating themselves from the national popular
classes, while being in the vanguard of the mass-based nationalistic
movements; sharing at least partly the consumerist attitude with the
middle classes of the post-industrialised societies, but still identifying
themselves as distinct from them (e.g. Liechty 2003; van Wessel 2001).
Given this intermediate and shifting positioning both in their own so-
ciety and in the global arena, how do new middle-class Asians create
images of the West to assimilate to themselves and with which to
adorn themselves; and what is the cultural and political significance of
those images?
The politico-economic configuration within which new middle-class
Asians live has changed drastically during the last decades: many Asian
societies, not only Japan and China, have come to challenge the Euro-
American economic and political hegemony, thus reducing direct de-
pendency that could be a breeding ground for emulation – or its oppo-
site. The colonial history of domination that exposed Asian elites to
Western influences for centuries is turning on its head: the economic
and/or political potency of India, Pakistan, China, Indonesia, Japan,
Korea, Malaysia and others is seriously challenging the taken-for-
granted Euro-American world hegemony. Although the colonial subju-
gation has had deep cultural and psychological effects (see e.g. Nandy
1983 on India), the social logic of the East-West dichotomy in new mid-
dle-class Asians’ lives cannot be understood solely as an extension of
past colonial asymmetry. In order to understand the ongoing processes
of identification and cultural interaction in the present world of ‘Wes-
ternised’ suicide bombers or expatriate Indian IT professionals who en-
ter into arranged marriages, we need a better understanding of the dia-
lectics of belonging and difference in the lives of new middle-class
Asians.
The discussion concerning cultural influences in the context of glo-
balisation has examined whether and how the world is becoming
homogenised (e.g. Robertson 1995), whether there is cultural resis-
tance or accommodation (Marcus 1992), and whether we can see cul-
tural ‘closure’ (Meyer and Geschiere 1998) taking place in subordinate
cultural settings. Cultural responses to hegemony may be varied and
inventive, and the imitation that strikes the eye may conceal a different
indigenous signification (see e.g. Friedman 1994: 105-109; Nandy
1983). Despite this relativising approach that has largely become the ca-
non in socio-cultural anthropology, it is unrealistic to deny the fact that
economic globalisation brings with it a growing awareness of cultural
Otherness that demands a reaction. Although these reactions may not
be predetermined, the need for a reaction is inescapable.
As its essential counterpart, modernisation of the economy and the
apparent uniformalisation that global influences may bring about lead
simultaneously to new forms of particularism and cultural difference:
revivalism of ethnic and nationalistic movements is its most common
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manifestation. When under pressure from dominant outside influ-
ences, people tend to create a new sense of conscious culturalism: a
conscious mobilisation of cultural differences in the service of larger
national and transnational politics (Appadurai 1996: 15). For the new
middle-class Asians, the idea of the West has appeared as one of the
most readily available sources of difference and denunciation: it helps
them to imagine themselves in relation to others in their own society,
as well as to people elsewhere.
My question here is not whether the new Asian middle classes are
culturally beginning to resemble their Euro-American counterparts,
which I would find a barren inquiry; instead, I have chosen to look into
whether and how the idea of the West is important for processes of
identification and social value particularly in India, where outside in-
fluences have been perennial for millennia. Recent decades have wit-
nessed a growing political tendency to create a nationalist ethos that
claims only a particular form of ‘Hinduness’ to be culturally authentic
‘Indianness’ (van der Veer 1993, 1996). In this task, Hindu nationalists
have shared their view with much of post-colonial social and cultural
research on India (ibid.). The understanding of the cultural difference
of India vis-a`-vis the West has its roots in Indological research and car-
ries its political and civilisational effects along to the present day (e.g.
Breckenridge and van der Veer 1993).
In the following, I will first briefly present the concept of Occidental-
ism, examine the social phenomenon of the new middle classes in In-
dia and beyond, and then present ethnographic examples related to
birthdays and cakes that help to clarify what the West could mean in
the political agenda of identity formation and in the mundane social
reality of new middle-class Indians. I will conclude with a few specula-
tive and comparative propositions concerning the new Asian middle
classes and the importance of the stylised images of the West in their
social life.
Occidentalism
The dichotomy of East and West made a polemic appearance in Sa-
muel Huntington’s (1996) influential, post-communist, ‘clash-of-civili-
sations’ thesis, according to which the lines of a civilisational, rather
than ideological or economic, battle are to be drawn between a Western
society defined by the importance of individual liberties, and non-Wes-
tern others whether they practise Islamic fundamentalism or Confu-
cianism. Huntington’s widely criticised model (e.g. Ong 1999: 185-213)
tends to see the Orient ‘as a symbolic obverse of the West’ (ibid.: 213),
reproducing the 19th-century imagery of civilisational difference. In his
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schema, Indian civilisation, like that of Russia and Japan, hovers inde-
terminately between Western civilisation and its counterforce.
In Buruma and Margalit’s (2004) less provocative and more
nuanced – though polemical – historically based analysis Occidentalism,
the world is divided into the intellectual spheres of the West and the
Other. For Buruma and Margalit (2004), Occidentalism refers to a
moral prejudice and condemnation, a dehumanising picture of the
West painted by its enemies. In Venn’s (2001: 19) usage, Occidentalism
refers to a European self-understanding and a process of universalising
modernity, being a descriptive more than a contentious term. Here I
use the term Occidentalism more in a descriptive than a political
sense: following Carrier (1995), by Occidentalism I refer here to the
use of stylised images of the West. More specifically, Occidentalism is
here understood as a discourse that constructs the Western Other and
allows the Orient to participate actively in the process of self-appropria-
tion (Chen 1992: 688).
Occidentalism is not merely a reverse image of Orientalism – a style
of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction
between the Orient and the Occident and a discourse for ‘dominating,
restructuring and having authority over the Orient’ (Said 1978: 3). Or-
ientalism and Occidentalism are not mirror images but have differing
ideological roles. While Orientalism can be seen as a strategy for Wes-
tern colonialist and post-colonialist world domination, Occidentalism’s
uses are most visible within Asian domestic and regional politics (e.g.
in China: see Chen 1992). Orientalism is thus directed towards domi-
nating the one whose image is purported, while Occidentalism is
mainly made use of within the creators of the image themselves. Or-
ientalism went hand in glove with economic and political domination
of its Other, while Occidentalism has little direct influence on its Other,
the West (though this influence may gain ground in the new global si-
tuation). Although Occidentalism and Orientalism have a differing po-
litical and ideological role, the images ingrained in them are inter-
twined and mutually reinforcing, so that they can only be considered
in dialectical relation to each other (Carrier 1995).2
According to Carrier (1995: 8), both Occidentalism and Orientalism
are forms of essentialisation – a process in which ‘political relations
within and between societies shape the construction and interpretation
of the essential attributes of those societies’. The ways in which new
middle-class Asians see the West are created in relation to their image
of themselves as non-Western, which in turn is highly influenced by
Orientalistic images of their own national cultures. While creating an
image of the West, and appropriating it, they are externalising an im-
age of their own past or authentic ‘tradition’ in Europe, commonly re-
ferring to the peasant way of life (see e.g. in Sweden: Frykman and
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Lo¨fgren 1987) or to the later-adulterated Golden Period of high civilisa-
tion. When discursively creating the West, the new middle classes si-
multaneously create nationalistic belongings and identifications.
Chen (1992) separates ‘official Occidentalism’ from ‘anti-official Oc-
cidentalism’ in her analysis of the discursive uses of the West in China.
She shows how official discourse in Mao’s China used the essentialised
image of the West to support nationalism and suppress the population
(ibid.: 688). The anti-official Occidentalism of the intelligentsia in turn
uses the constructed image of the West to fight political oppression.
Chen’s analysis of the essentialised images of the West in China shows
how multifaceted the uses of ideological images can be. The political
situation within a country, rather than between societies, or civilisations
in Huntington’s terms, may explain the form of Occidentalism.
For Hindu nationalists the West is a moral threat and is to be kept at
bay. This was evident, for example, in the protests in India in 2001,
brought on by the revelation that a trace of beef extract was used in
McDonald’s French fries in the United States. Although the French
fries in India’s McDonalds were still guaranteed to be and to have al-
ways been pure vegetarian, the incident was enough to bring demon-
strators onto the streets and a militant Hindu youth group to vandalise
a McDonald’s outlet in a Mumbai suburb. This is a graphic example of
the ways McDonald’s can be experienced as a threat to the Hindu In-
dian way of life. However, the supporters of the Bharatiya Janata Party,
the Hindu nationalist party, do not necessarily share the straightfor-
wardly anti-Western ideology of the party or its close ideological allies.
Some Hindu nationalist sloganeers could be included in Buruma and
Margalit’s (2004) category of the ideological enemies of the West,
while the majority of BJP supporters have a more accommodating atti-
tude towards commodities and ideas defined as Western.
Although the viewpoints publicly presented by the Indian sangh pari-
var3 may be analysed as a form of ‘hatred towards the West’ a` la Buru-
ma and Margalit, for analysing Indian new middle-class lived realities,
Carrier’s (1995) and Chen’s (1992) uses of Occidentalism appear to al-
low a much more nuanced analysis. Carrier and Chen are both inter-
ested in how people who consider themselves non-Western appropriate
the idea of the West for their own purposes.
As a counterpoint to the condemnation of the West that the Hindu
nationalist ethos often entails, Indian intellectuals have quite opposing,
even worried, images of the middle-class attitude towards the West: Di-
pankar Gupta (2000) considers the new Indian middle classes’ Wester-
nisation to be skin deep, a kind of ‘Westoxication’4 without adherence
to the core values of democracy and individual liberty; Pavan K. Varma
(1998) sees the middle classes plagued by a feeling of inferiority that
‘spawned a vast imitativeness …, and made most educated Indians – in
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their lifestyles and aspirations and cultural idiom – persistent and un-
thinking apes of everything Western’ (ibid.: 154). Ashish Nandy (1983),
in his tour de force The Intimate Enemy, considered this aping part of
the civilisational strategy of the subordinate to manage the colonial si-
tuation, by remaining aloof and indefinite and thus securing a flexible
and adaptable position towards hegemony. Gurcharan Das in turn de-
scribes the lingering ambivalent legacy that English education in the
colonial period has left in the middle-class psyche:
Our inner lives are a parody. We have one foot in India, the
other in the West, and we belong to neither. [...] We mouth plati-
tudes about Indian culture without having read the classics in
Sanskrit. Instead, we read Time magazine to “keep up.” We are
touchy about India and look to the West for inspiration and re-
cognition. (Das 2002: 283)
All in all, the new middle-class attitude towards the West – and the in-
telligentsia’s attitude towards the new middle classes – could best be
described as ambivalent. The dynamics of this ambivalence, in turn, re-
quire further probing.
The study of the new middle classes
In the last decade, there has been growing scholarly interest towards
the current socio-cultural and political role of the middle classes in In-
dia (e.g. Favero 2003, 2005; Fernandes 2006; Sa¨a¨va¨la¨ 2001, 2003,
2006, forthcoming; van Wessel 2001, 2004) and beyond, in Asia (e.g.
Chua 2000; Sen and Stivens 1998; Pinches 1999). The concept of the
middle class, or classes, in the Asian context appears problematic, fuz-
zy and difficult to define. Middle classes in India have been often de-
fined by economic criteria alone (based on annual household income,
such as in the surveys of the National Council of Applied Economic Re-
search) or a combination of various educational and consumption cri-
teria (e.g. Sheth 1999; see Fernandes 2006 for an apt analysis and cri-
tique). The notion of the middle class in economic terms is quite differ-
ent in India and in post-industrialist countries. For example, the
majority of Indian households defined as middle class cannot afford a
car or a holiday abroad, unlike in the West, while in India it is possible
for them to hire servants, which in turn is hardly the case among most
middle-class Europeans.
The growth of the new middle classes in post-industrial countries re-
flects socio-economic change that societies are experiencing in varying
degrees: growing bureaucratisation that follows the enlargement of the
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field of the modern state; transformation to a post-industrial society in
which the service sector gains growing importance, and the onslaught
of the information society. These macro-level processes create jobs that
demand educated, skilled and salaried employees. Despite the apparent
socio-cultural differences, say, between a middle-class Korean and a
middle-class Indian, there are certain structural similarities, deriving
from a legacy of hierarchically ordered social structures, a largely
shared colonial past characterised by dependency, and current econom-
ic globalisation (Chua 2000; Pinches 1999).5
Here I use the term ‘new middle classes’ to refer to people who work
in organisations, draw regular salaries, consider themselves middle
class, are educated, do not work manually and do not hold decision-
making positions (apart from the operational level) (Burris 1995). I
thus see an important analytical difference between the elite (those
who have decision-making power and financial, cultural and/or intel-
lectual independence) and the middle classes, although the difference
between the elite and middle classes is not always made clear in social
research. Even when the elite are left out, the group characterised as
the new middle classes remains highly diverse (Fernandes 2006). Be-
cause class is best not considered as a social group but rather as a pro-
cess or positioning (Liechty 2003), it is evident that drawing dividing
lines and giving exact definitions is impossible, even useless. In order
to acknowledge the multiple and shifting positions among people who
could be characterised as middle class, I use the concept in the plural
(see also Kahn 1994).
Most Asian societies were colonised by Europeans or Americans,
and the colonies were partly administered with the help of an educated,
indigenous group of bureaucrats. In India, the emergence of the new
middle classes has been closely tied with the needs of colonialism and,
after independence, of public administration. The middle classes in
post-colonial societies were, so to speak, born and bred with ideas of
the West (e.g. Joshi 2001 on India). The capitalism and globalisation of
the last decade, in turn, explain the latest changes in the character of
the new middle classes. The state has been and still is pivotal in creat-
ing and securing middle classes in many post-colonial societies (see e.
g. Kahn 1994: 38 on Malay middle classes).
In a frame of reference deriving from Weber (1978) and Bourdieu
(1984), new middle-class life could be seen as centring on social value.
People position themselves as middle class on the basis of their ability
to follow certain morally valued practices, thus creating a distinction
between themselves and those below. In the Asian context, could prac-
tices and consumption with a reference point in the West be a source
of social value and distinction? The issue is far from straightforward,
as middle-class people have an ambivalent relationship to the West,
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which they partly see as their Other (Favero 2003, 2005; Liechty 2003;
Sa¨a¨va¨la¨ forthcoming; van Wessel 2001). The idea of the West plays a
particular role in the struggle over distinction in India, having simulta-
neously negative connotations (eating polluting substances such as
beef and pork, women behaving in morally questionable ways, indivi-
dualism and selfishness) and positive connotations (superior wealth,
technological advances, freedom and democracy; Sa¨a¨va¨la¨ forthcoming).
These ambivalent interpretations of the West in India are partly shared
with other Asian societies (see e.g. Tobin 1992; Watson 1997).
Birthdays and cakes in India
To clarify how the idea of the West is manifested in Indian social reali-
ties and categorisations, we will examine the presentation of a cake in
India, through both a public drama related to a cake in a temple and a
domestic cake-cutting ritual at a birthday party. Despite its utter banal-
ity, the cake in the Indian context can be instructive of the middle-class
predicament between Occidentalism and national identification. As we
will see, even such an innocuous thing as a cake may turn out to be a
politically and ideologically sensitive issue that highlights civilisational
anxieties.
The phenomenon of the cake in India lives primarily in the context
of birthday celebrations, which are important domestic set-ups of mid-
dle-class sociality. In Europe, birthdays emerged as manifestations of
a middle-class attitude toward time and the life cycle of the individual
(e.g. in Sweden: Frykman and Lo¨fgren 1987: 31-33), when the middle
class endeavoured to differentiate itself from the peasantry, which had
a more cyclical, agriculturally oriented understanding of time. Mechan-
ical time-keeping, an emphasis on formal education, and a career men-
tality make birthday celebrations meaningful in the middle-class envir-
onment. Birthdays of ‘ordinary people’, not only of rulers, deities and
saints, are a typically modern phenomenon, requiring awareness of
time other than that based on the agricultural or religious seasons and
calendar. It presupposes a conception of time as rigid, measurable and
linear. For my Hyderabadi middle-class informants in 2000, children’s
birthdays were highly important, while married adults rarely celebrated
theirs (see Baumann 1992 on Punjabis in London).
What makes an Indian birthday party interesting from the point of
view of Occidentalism is its central symbol, the cake, an utterly Wes-
tern icon in India, where baking is not part of the indigenous kitchen.
Cakes were introduced to India through Portuguese and British coloni-
alists and have been mainly identified with the Anglo-Indian and
Christian populations; but over more recent decades, Christmas and
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birthday cakes have also become a common fare in Hindu and Muslim
middle-class homes, and have lost much of their colonial connotation.
The popularity of cakes is growing fast among affluent Indians, who
have more money than before to spend on these expensive items. Bak-
ing at home is less popular than buying cakes from bakeries because
most kitchens do not include an oven, and even if one exists, special
utensils and ingredients must be purchased. Moreover, not all middle-
class women or their servants possess baking skills. Bakeries offering
cakes for every possible celebration are mushrooming in Indian cities,
testifying to their growing popularity. When a cake or some other
baked item is offered, Indians are substituting this for Indian sweets
that are the standard offering for honoured guests as well as in feasts
and rituals.
The presence of eggs in cakes makes them the epitome of foreign-
ness in India: Indian sweets and desserts contain only vegetarian
items, and usually ghee, which makes them highly auspicious and pure.
Thus, a cake made with eggs creates a novel food category. Bakeries of-
fer eggless cakes as well, but there is nevertheless the risk of any cake
containing hidden egg, and strict vegetarians consider this to be pollut-
ing. Some vegetarians make an exception and eat cakes even if they
contain eggs, while others decline altogether. According to my experi-
ence, the first option is the most common. Whenever a cake is offered
in a social situation, the question of diet surfaces, because a consider-
able number of middle-class people have a vegetarian caste back-
ground. A middle-class person from a vegetarian family has to decide
what her/his relationship is to the tradition of vegetarianism on the
one hand, and to the West and modern life that a cake epitomises, on
the other hand. This is why a cake can turn out to be an important is-
sue in the politics of identity.
The ‘political cake’
Apart from the role of the cake in domestic socialising, it may also re-
flect wider political issues, as shown by a controversy that emerged in
2003. A Bharatiya Janata (Hindu nationalist) Party leader from the
state of Madhya Pradesh, Uma Bharati, offered a heart-shaped cake
with candles to the divinity Hanuman to celebrate Hanuman Jayanti
(the deity’s birthday) in a temple and sang ‘Happy birthday’ in English
to the deity. Her visit to the temple was designed to launch a campaign
against the presiding chief minister of the state, using the temple for
political purposes. This is how the incident was reported in an English-
language Indian magazine:
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Uma placed candles on the cake, just as is the fashion in mod-
ern society for celebrating birthdays or achievements, lighted
them and sang ‘Happy birthday to You Hanumanji.’ Of course,
she did aarti [offering of light] with the cake and later cut it and
distributed among BJP workers and a group of Dalits and tri-
bals. (The DayAfter 11 May 2003)
She had used a cake instead of the usual sweets or fruit offering, and
instead of camphor flame or ghee lamps, had used the cake candles for
aarti, the service of lights that is a vessel of disembodiment between
the divinity and the worshipper. The ‘Happy Birthday’ song replaced
any mantra that could have been used for addressing Hanuman. Ques-
tions were instantly raised in the media concerning the potential pre-
sence of polluting egg in the cake – and political opponents in both
her own BJP and other parties were quick to make use of the occasion
to portray Uma Bharati in an unfavourable light (see The Hindu, 18
May 2003; Narrain and Tripathi 2003). Had she disregarded the rigid
requirements for offerings to Sanskritic deities, for example to include
only pure and vegetarian items? Moreover, she had entered the sanctum
sanctorum of a temple that allegedly denied women entry. If she offered
egg to Hanuman, it would have been a sacrilege in the eyes of strict
Hindus, which many BJP supporters are. After the incident, the state
minister of public health ordered the temple to be purified with water
from the Ganges in order to remove the pollution that bringing a cake
to the temple had potentially caused (The Telegraph, 29 April 2003). Ac-
cording to a newspaper article, the minister claimed that Uma Bharati
has “polluted” the temple by offering a “cake” on Hanuman
Jayanti. He is unmoved by Bharati’s claim that the cake con-
tained no egg. For the minister, the “pollution” and the “cultural
invasion” of western civilisation is too grave to be ignored. (The
Telegraph, 29 April 2003)
The question of whether the cake was baked without egg, to be suitable
as an offering, is secondary to understanding the incident: offering a
cake, a foreign and thus suspicious substance by definition, to a deity
was considered objectionable. Doubt over the contents was a manifesta-
tion of xenophobia and a felt need to ‘protect’ Hindu practice from an
invading, polluting foreign influence. It was curious that a politician
from the BJP, a party that celebrates Hindu pride, would opt for such
an offering and, moreover, sing ‘Happy Birthday’ in English to a deity.
Uma Bharati is a relatively less well educated, unmarried, lower-caste
politician who has taken an oath of celibacy and become a sadhvi, a
nun. She has taken an extremely militant approach towards religious
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matters in India, having been one of the main agitators in the demoli-
tion of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya in 1992 that led to widespread
communal violence. Without a long formal education, this daughter of
a lower-caste farming family could hardly be accepted as a middle-class
person by other people who consider themselves as such. Her hapless
act in the Hanuman temple shows that she lacks cultural capital – she
mixed practices that should not have been mixed, including features
interpreted as manifestations of the cultural Other in a religious field
that is central for Hindu nationalists, many of whom come from a
middle-class background (Yadav, Kumar and Heath 1999). Even those
middle-class people who do not share the religious fervour of the Hin-
dutva type considered Uma Bharati’s worship to be in bad taste, even
ridiculous, revealing her lack of cultural capital.
The birthday cake
Let us now turn from this public drama transmitted by the media to-
wards the domestic scene where birthdays and cakes take on a more
benign role. As mentioned above, birthdays are mainly arranged for
children, manifesting their trajectory through their education and to-
wards adulthood. On one particular occasion, I witnessed the 18th
birthday of a middle-class girl in Hyderabad. The dining table had been
moved into the middle of the room and a sizable iced birthday cake
from a bakery had been placed in the middle. The cake was covered
with cocoa dust and decorated with stripes of whipped cream, a marzi-
pan rose, cherries and ‘Happy Birthday’ in blue letters. The cake looked
stunning and vastly exceeded the ordinary.
Before the party started, I, together with the girl’s mother, had put
18 candles on the cake. In addition to her mother, father, brother,
grandmother and me, some neighbours from the same apartment
block had been invited. (The birthday girl had thrown a separate party
for her best friends at a private club earlier the same day.) When every-
one was present, the birthday girl lighted the candles herself, while I
was given a camera to take a snapshot. We sang ‘Happy Birthday’ and
the party reached its apex when she blew out the candles. It was time
to cut the cake. She cut small pieces, and each of the participants was
expected to come forward, in order of hierarchical importance, to feed
the birthday girl some cake. Her maternal grandmother was the first to
feed her by hand, in a way similar to feeding someone Indian sweets
in rituals such as marriage. The girl ended up stuffed with cake as
everyone made her eat a bite, one after the other. Later she delivered
pieces to everyone on disposable plates. We ate them by hand. There
was some discussion about whether the young Brahman girl and her
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brother from upstairs would eat a cake that contained egg, but they
contended that they did not mind eating cakes outside the home. An-
other Brahman couple from the housing complex came over for a visit
but declined to eat anything but Indian snacks fried in oil, which are
symbolically pure items to accept from hierarchically lower persons.
The birthday party shows how a cake – which refers to the foreign
through its mixture of ingredients such as eggs and whipped cream,
its English script, and the necessity of purchasing it from a specialised
bakery – is domesticated. The cake’s apparent potential for exotic refer-
ence is put into a frame in which its foreignness adds to the value but
takes a ‘tamed’ and locally significant form. The sheer fact that the
beautifully iced cake was bought from a bakery by the mother and not
prepared by the women of the family made the consumption of the
item different from the usual festivities. Basically, cooked food items
coming from outside the familial sphere (apart from those deep-fried
in oil or containing ghee) are considered a risk, as they may transmit
harmful substances from the cook. Granting high value to a bakery
product and sharing it in a ritualised manner manifested the family’s
association with the outer world of business and success. The presence
of guests who would have to decide whether to eat the cake or not due
to religious dietary restrictions underlined the cake’s external, even exo-
tic, character.
If we look in ethnographic detail at how birthdays are celebrated
among new middle-class Indians, we come to see a curious combina-
tion of Occidental imagery and ‘indigenising’ practices. The process of
‘recontextualisation’ (Brannen 1992), ‘indigenisation’ (Ivy 1995), or ‘do-
mestication’ (Tobin 1992; Raz 1999) is a well-known phenomenon in
studies on consumption and Western cultural influence in Japan and
elsewhere. Anthropologically, every adoption of a technique, product,
or idea entails a process of interpretation and contextualisation, mean-
ing that the direct, hegemonic influence of a powerful cultural centre
can never be totalising. The attraction of the cake, which has an ‘exotic’
air about it, is partly explained by conspicuous consumption and status
competition, but even that is not an exhaustive explanation. It gives far
too rationalistic and economistic an image of the practice (see Fried-
man 1994: 149-150). Middle-class Indians do not do their utmost to
emulate the elite; on the contrary, they consider the elite immoral and
even offensive, while simultaneously prestigious and mesmerising.
The need to belong may be at least as important as the need to distin-
guish oneself (Liechty 2003).
People who identify themselves as middle class differentiate between
themselves and the elite by making use of the concept of Westernisa-
tion. The elite is considered immoral due to its excessive Westernisa-
tion, manifested in women’s alleged improper dress, in sexual license,
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the consumption of alcohol, the loosening of family authority, disre-
spect towards religious sensibilities, and avarice (see also van Wessel
2001: 88; Liechty 2003: 69ff).
The cake can be consumed in a form that emphasises the hierarchi-
cal relationships between age groups (cutting the cake, feeding the
cake as a blessing) and as a derivative of taken-for-granted gender roles,
since it is the women of the family who are responsible for the pur-
chase, choice and presentation of the cake at a party. Using fingers to
eat the cake further ‘indigenises’ the act. This could even be seen as
multiplying the blessing’s potency, as it is introduced into the context
of a seemingly ‘Western’ birthday party (Baumann 1992: 108). In Uma
Bharati’s case the cake symbolised a threat to nationalistic differences,
while in a common middle-class birthday party features connoting the
West have a benign instrumental role. In both cases the presence of a
‘Western’ item strengthens the nationalistic or Orientalist discourse on
Hindu India.
A speculative, comparative conclusion
In a developing society like India, where the middle class, though in
some ways characterising a sizable portion of the population, is still a
minority, certain consumer practices retain a Western image (McDo-
nald’s, birthday cakes, jeans) as long as they connote an elitist way of
life. When the society grows more affluent and large numbers of peo-
ple can afford to engage in these ‘exotic’ consumer practices, their
‘Western-ness’ tends to diminish and be replaced by ‘indigenisation’. In
that situation their importance in the nationalistic discourse as coun-
terpoints decreases. When and if birthday celebrations and cakes be-
come common fare in India, the cake most probably will no longer be
identified with the West, but will be accommodated as a perfectly In-
dian way of celebrating a birthday. Maybe offering a cake to a deity in a
temple will become ordinary, and after ten years we will wonder why
Uma Bharati’s cake controversy created such uproar. A comparable pro-
cess is going on in Asia with regard to McDonald’s: In Japan and Sin-
gapore, where the restaurant is frequented by the common man,
McDonald’s has come to be considered an indigenous company (Wat-
son 1997; Chua 2000; Traphagan and Brown 2002).
The Asian new middle-class phenomenon differs significantly from
the ‘older’ process of middle-class formation experienced by the Euro-
American world since industrialisation and the emergence of the mod-
ern state. In the present situation, new middle-class Asians create
highly fluid identities and are quick to realign their points of reference
according to the situation. They are both having their cake and eating
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it too – giving a high value to certain practices that manifest their In-
dianness, such as concern for vegetarian versus non-vegetarian distinc-
tions, while playing with features that refer to their competence in
Western cultural imagery, such as cutting a birthday cake, without the
need to claim an uncontradictory identity. In this respect, they could be
called a ‘postmodern’ new middle class compared to the ‘modern’, new
Euro-American middle class. This postmodernity nevertheless does not
mean that they are ‘floating freely’. Their identities must necessarily be
based on a palette of various materials that they are constantly
strengthening and recreating. Their own cultural tradition is among
those materials, and so are ‘modernity’, Westernisation, and material-
ism. New middle-class Indians (and possibly those in other tradition-
ally hierarchical Asian societies) do not engage in similar classification
struggles to the new European middle classes. They capitalise on tradi-
tional status markers if possible, but easily shift emphasis elsewhere
temporarily and can compete equally well on other terrains. This is
manifested in the popularity of many religious reform movements and
traditionalised practices such as Feng shui and its Indian equivalent,
vaastu. The adoption of practices defined as ‘Western’, such as eating
cake, does not make a new middle-class Indian any less ‘Indian’; on
the contrary, it strengthens her/his national-cultural identity by making
the difference palpable and discursive. New Indian middle-class identi-
ties are flexible and able to incorporate seemingly contradictory cultural
ingredients.
Notes
1 This essay derives from fieldwork in India in 1999-2000 and 2004. The study was
financed by a post-doctoral grant from the Research Council of Culture and Society,
the Academy of Finland. I would like to thank Professor Krishna Sen (University of
Calcutta) for her most helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper and Maija
Ma¨kinen for helping with the language revision. Earlier versions of some parts of
this essay are published in Sa¨a¨va¨la¨ (forthcoming).
2 The emergence of a sizeable minority of Muslims, Asians and Africans in Europe
which is assessed in terms of Orientalism is poised to steadily change the concept of
Occidentalism.
3 Sangh parivar refers to a number of organisations with Hindu nationalistic affilia-
tions around Rashtrya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Association), such as
the Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party), the youth organisation Bajrang
Dal (Army of Hanuman), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council), and
others.
4 ‘Westoxication’ is a term coined by Jalal-al-e-Ahmad, an Iranian writer and political
activist in the 1960s, to describe the cultural situation in the Shah’s Iran.
5 Here we should not forget the potentially important civilisational influence of Hindu-
ism/Buddhism over several millennia in a vast geographical area in Asia (Sen 2004).
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10 Ode to ‘Personal Challenge’:
Reconsidering Japanese Groupism and the Role
of Beethoven’s Ninth in Catering to
Socio-Cultural Needs
Eddy Y.L. Chang
Introduction
Music is a means by which people can achieve self-understanding, ex-
press their individuality and even defy social restraints and prejudice,
while facilitating the shaping of individual and collective identities. In
Japan, this emerged in the form of personal challenge through what is
known as daiku gensho¯ (第九現象) – a modern socio-cultural phenom-
enon with individuals coming together to sing the Ode to Joy of Beetho-
ven’s Ninth Symphony en masse and mostly in the form of annual year-
end concerts throughout Japan.
Although daiku has been featured in various media, most works on
the subject present different origins of the phenomenon pay little heed
to unravelling the individual motives for partaking in a daiku event, or
simply dismiss the phenomenon as a mere manifestation of stereotypi-
cal Japanese groupism. This paper challenges the simplistic view of the
daiku experience by presenting the process in which Beethoven’s Ninth
has catered to ‘personal challenge’ in Japan. A brief history and back-
ground of daiku will illustrate the establishment of the phenomenon
and reveal the significance of Beethoven’s masterpiece in modern Ja-
pan. This will illuminate the complexity of modern Japanese identity
building.
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony1 – particularly the Ode to Joy – has been
universally instrumental in advocating peace, harmony, love, friendship
and unity, as well as facilitating celebrations and commemorations of
special events. In Japan, the Ninth has an additional role to play: it is
the subject of an annual ritual that at first glance would tempt one to
dismiss it as a typical manifestation of Japanese groupism.2 Indeed, the
incessant tendency and desire to belong as exemplified through daiku
would make the Japanese look as if they ‘do not think’ and merely want
to ‘belong to something’ because everyone else does. On the other
hand, some might say that Japanese culture is not unique but simply
borrowed, which questions the uniqueness of daiku. These ideas would
discourage any attempt to reconsider the Japanese behaviour and their
identity building through looking at the daiku phenomenon. It would
seem that daiku is no more than a phase of foreign culture admiration
or idolisation, and it would have little substantial impact on the Japa-
nese culture.
However, one should not dismiss daiku so readily. The phenomenon
is both unique and non-unique at the same time. Further study into
the daiku phenomenon has revealed that there is more to the phenom-
enon than just mere groupism on display. That and the fact that the Ja-
panese are well known for their ability to adopt foreign elements into
their own culture and further develop these to create variations of the
originals say there is something unique about such a Japanese rendi-
tion of foreign culture. It has been claimed that daiku was inspired by
a German tradition, and thus in this sense it is not uniquely Japanese.
Yet, we do not see in Germany the same level of passion, scale, not to
mention the many different types of daiku events seen in Japan. Daiku
is not unlike events such as New Year concerts or carols by candlelight
celebrated en mass around the world – it is all about belonging and
sharing; and yet saying this would mean that daiku is not unique, nor
that it is a manifestation of typical Japanese groupism, since the same
groupism can be discerned elsewhere around the world.
So then, what is special and unique about this phenomenon in Ja-
pan? The daiku experience hints at, and indeed demonstrates, a new
rendering of a Japanese socio-cultural trait that combines the tradi-
tional virtue of enduring hardship and a modern attitude in taking up
personal challenges, while maintaining the Japanese nature to strive
(gambaru)3 and sharing the experience. It would appear that the days
when the Japanese would resign to this nature of striving with tacit ac-
ceptance have made way to accommodate more personal challenges
that have more specifically intended goals. As in other cultures, many
Japanese today – particularly young people – are no longer satisfied
with the idea of simply keeping to or being bound or limited by tradi-
tions that encourage endurance without being permitted to question
them or to demonstrate individuality (Matsumoto and De Mente 2003:
121). That is not to say, however, that the Japanese have opted for an ab-
solute abandonment of their inherent nature to endure (gaman)4 and
strive (gambaru). Rather, one might consider that the Japanese now
continue to remain so with slight moderations. We see more people in
Japan actively participating in activities that come in diversified forms,
such as represented by the daiku experience, to challenge something
otherwise normally left to professionals. Many opt to do so because it
offers a way to overcome personal hurdles or achieve individual goals
by keeping to the nature of gambaru. As we will see, daiku facilitates
this need to achieve and provides the venue for realising the challenge,
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with many taking it one step further: to take their passion for singing
the Ninth overseas, joining voices as a way of promoting love and peace
on an international level.5
The popularity of Beethoven’s Ninth, which transformed into daiku
and soared to embrace an astonishing number of concerts each year,
can be understood by the following episode that opens the introduc-
tions to Wasserman’s book on the subject:
In December 1983, the German conductor Peter Gu¨lke, invited
to direct the NHK Orchestra’s performance of Beethoven’s Ninth
Symphony, met his fellow conductor Gunther Herbig in the
foyer of a hotel in Tokyo. “What brings you here?” asked the lat-
ter. “For the Ninth,” Gu¨lke replied. “Me, too,” responded Herbig,
“let’s just hope that we are not in the same orchestra!”6 (Wasser-
man 2006: 7)
There is no exaggeration in their verbal exchange, and even today the
number of daiku concerts still counts over at least 100 per year. To bet-
ter understand the nature of daiku and its socio-cultural implication
and significance, close examination of strata of cultural traits and his-
torical development of the modern Japanese society would be required;
yet that would amount to tomes of writing. In order to focus on the
discussion on the Ninth’s infliction on or accommodation to Japanese
identity building, this paper will simply provide a concise, introductory
look into the background and impact of this fascinating social phenom-
enon, concentrating on the aspect of ‘personal challenge’ and question
of ‘groupism’ by encompassing vital socio-cultural elements. An at-
tempt will also be made to demonstrate how Beethoven’s music and
ideology have saturated modern Japan. Before delving into this, how-
ever, it is necessary to define daiku.
A word on daiku
Clarifying the significance of Japan’s unusual and uncontested passion
for the Ninth is no easy task as it involves a profound understanding of
not only the country’s history, character of its people, and social issues,
but also traditional customs. In any case, it is vital to first define what
daiku really is and how it came to be established, before attempting to
examine its socio-cultural significance in Japan in recent decades.
The term daiku simply means ‘the ninth’ or ‘number nine’7 and has
been used by the Japanese as a familiar term to refer to the Ninth and
all concerts performing the Ninth. Before presenting the background of
the daiku phenomenon, the reader should be aware that daiku has been
ODE TO ‘PERSONAL CHALLENGE’ 149
primarily used to denote the singing or performing of Beethoven’s
Ninth at the end of the year, and every year on a large scale and with
an overwhelming number of performances.8 However, today it may
also be used to refer to performances of the Ninth in other contexts
and any month of the year. Daiku has now become the name brand for
nearly any performance of the Ninth regardless of whether it is con-
nected to the year-end ritual.
As for other concerts that fall outside of the typical daiku ‘season’
and scale, it would be appropriate to refer to them simply as ‘the
Ninth’. In other words, ‘the Ninth’ would indicate Beethoven’s Ninth as
it is generally performed like any other musical pieces, while ‘daiku’
would indicate the phenomenon where the piece enjoys unrivalled po-
pularity or is performed in various forms and ways not conventionally
conceived, while fundamentally being a year-end or New Year’s event.
Nevertheless, as we will see later on, this clarification often tends to be-
come clouded by the overwhelming number of daiku concerts that are
not performed at the end of the year.
Having defined daiku, we can now continue on to a brief look at the
history of the Ninth in Japan and its development into daiku. This is
necessary before we consider whether daiku is simply a manifestation
of non-individualist groupism or the result of an emerging new trait –
one that incorporates more personal needs. An examination of the
background of the Ninth and daiku in Japan will help better demon-
strate the dualism or parallel of Japanese cultural character and Wes-
tern cultural elements, which work perfectly in harmony to create new
socio-cultural products such as daiku.
In Japan, annual events are popular and vital pastimes, whether tra-
ditional or novelties. These events generally have a strong link with
seasonal changes. Life in Japan is still much governed by its distinct
four seasons, as exemplified by the many matsuri,9 celebrations, and
events all year round like hanami,10 hanabi-taikai11 or momijigari.12 It is
evident that Japan, with its love for seasonal merriment, has always
had the perfect environment ready to cater for events like daiku.13 We
can see some of the characteristics of daiku shared by such events as
hanami and hanabi-taikai: all are held annually in great numbers with
large crowds nationwide. These events are now almost indispensable at
Japanese festivals held overseas also, indicating the establishment of Ja-
pan’s festival culture celebrated en masse.
In the same way that seasonal changes call for the performance of
ceremonies and celebrations, concerts of the Ninth – with particular
spotlight on the Ode to Joy – have become a ‘ritual’ in Japan, almost al-
ways around the end of the year or, in some cases, the beginning of
the new one. Regardless of whether the majority of the Japanese would
go to a concert performing the Ninth or consider participating in one,
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the term daiku is nevertheless synonymous with traditional events that
are celebrated each year with much enthusiasm. In his article on the
Ninth, Schlecht (1996) asserts that ‘to a Japanese December has be-
come what Handel’s Messiah is in the West’. The Ninth is not just some
Western musical piece having won a large audience in Japan by sheer
chance; it possesses elements that are convenient to the modern Japa-
nese society and has consequently ascended to becoming a socio-cultur-
al event firmly established in modern Japan. It is a socio-cultural phe-
nomenon that sets the scene of the wintry season, much similar to
Handel’s Messiah in the West during the Christmas and year-end sea-
son.
Besides this factor, the grand scale of performers being recruited also
makes daiku an interesting subject of study. Many performances boast-
ing a choir of some hundred or so singers today will even look ridicu-
lously dwarfed by some of the major long-running annual concerts that
have some 5,000 to 10,000 singers. What is also significant is that the
choir is usually made up of amateur singers of all ages and from all
walks of life. The fact that the passion for singing the Ninth was not
ephemeral and has instead become established as daiku serves as an
indication that the Ninth offers the answer to certain needs of the Japa-
nese who participate. It is thus of great interest to see how the Ninth, a
western product, has become instrumental in the accomplishment of
diversified personal achievements by so many amateurs, strangers to
one another, and how the Japanese society has required and utilised it
to achieve goals in personal, local, national and international contexts.
Background of the Ninth in Japan and its development into
daiku14
The history of the first known Ninth ever performed in Japan is less
than a century old. It was in 1824 that the piece debuted in Vienna. A
century later, it was performed in Japan by the then Tokyo Music
School.15 However, records show that the piece was actually first per-
formed by German POWs kept captive at Kurume16 (Chiba Prefec-
ture17) and Naruto18 (Tokushima Prefecture,19 this being the very first
recorded performance in Japan), prior to the first full-scale public per-
formance by Japanese musicians (Yokoda 2002: Appendix iv-v). The
Naruto performances became the most well-known, serving as a remin-
der of not only the friendship between the German prisoners and the
local Japanese living in the surroundings of the camp, but also the
kindness shown to the prisoners by the commandant of the camp,
Toyohisa Matsue.20 One could consider this as the beginning of Japan’s
fixation on Beethoven’s final and most grandiose opus.
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During the Second World War, the Ninth gradually became the ob-
ject of exploitation for a variety of wartime purposes. It served as music
for boosting the morale of young men ready to depart for the war front,
as requiem music for those who never returned, and as music to show
Japan’s wartime defiance against American and British cultures, which
the Japanese military regime regarded as evil and inferior. This Ninth
was of a different nature to that performed by the German POWs, hav-
ing been smeared with a strong military overtone. Given Japan’s fasci-
nation with German ideology, there is a clear indication that Japan was
eager to become a nation like Germany, rekindling the Meiji govern-
ment’s keen interest in the ideology of the Prussians whose victory
over the French in 1871 had left a deep impression on the Japanese.
Subsequently, this paved the way for the ultimate masterpiece of the
great German composer (known also as the Saint of Music)21 to serve,
as an extension to what Watanabe (Sakurai 2007: 188-189) calls ‘com-
munal music’ such as anthems, the perfect musical piece the Japanese
military would adopt to boost the morale of its troops and to glorify its
cause in the Second World War.
The Ninth as a replacement of the ‘Messiah’
After the war, for those who survived and began to rebuild the nation,
the Ninth took on yet another role. It began replacing the role of Han-
del’s Messiah as a post-war charity event that was performed at the end
of the year. This was not simply due to the need for music that could
offer consolation to people in despair; it also acted as a means of ac-
quiring income for the orchestra (Suzuki 1989: 163). While the Messiah
catered to post-war Japan as a charity event, its purpose was to donate
concert proceedings to the needy. Gradually, the Ninth took over as a
way of acquiring income for the orchestra and choir, while the Ode to
Joy responded to the hope for a better life. It was a guarantee that the
families and friends of orchestra musicians and choir singers would
also likely be in the audience, promising profit for the orchestra, while
achieving the ‘salvation of the spirit’ through a grand ‘get-together’ of
people in the cold year-end period. However, at this stage the Ninth
had not yet reached its peak popularity to become daiku, for it was not
always performed at the end of the year, and not every year.22
NHK and the end-of-year tradition
The trigger of the year-end tradition that later became daiku has been
attributed to the performances of the Ninth by the NHK Symphony Or-
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chestra under the direction of Joseph Rosenstock.23 The conductor was
at one time quoted as hinting at a connection of his NHK Symphony
Orchestra Ninth with a year-end tradition in Germany (Suzuki 1989:
106). His successor, Leonid Kreutzer,24 who temporarily took over the
baton and conducted the Ninth at the end of the year – at the time still
a rare practice – is also considered to have contributed to this tradition
(Suzuki 1989: 163, 165). While in Germany there has never been any
socio-cultural phenomenon comparable to daiku, orchestras favoured
Beethoven’s last symphony as a piece that signified ‘new beginnings’
and thus generally performed it on New Year’s Eve or in the New
Year25 (Kanzaki 2005). Although there is no direct link between the
German tradition and daiku, a possible link between the two may have
been suggested by the conductors who directed Ninth performances in
Tokyo. It may not have set daiku in full motion, but it certainly has
helped to reinforce the foundation of the phenomenon.
Post-war emancipation
The Ninth was also instrumental in the emancipation of the soul dur-
ing the decades that followed after the Second World War, which can
be seen in the numerous cases of Ninth concerts organised by a move-
ment known as utagoe-undo¯26 (‘singing voice movement’), which
peaked in the 1960s. Meanwhile, Ro¯-on27 (Japan Worker’s Music Asso-
ciations) also held many Ninth concerts, which, in the words of Ya-
mane Ginji,28 gave the working class the inner strength to fight against
oppression29 from those with power (Suzuki 1989). The number of
Ninth concerts held by Tokyo Ro¯-on was exceptionally high between
1954 (eight in that year) and 1966 (six in that year), with nine perfor-
mances in 1965 alone (Tokyo Ro¯-on 2004); thereafter the frequency per
year fell to one to three concerts, with the 2008 concert being the 114th
in its history (see Table 1 for listed numbers of performances between
1953 and 200030). Ro¯-on’s singing movement has contributed to the
permeation of the ‘sing together’ culture in the Japanese society, paving
the way for a nationwide adoration of the Ninth.
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Table 10.1 Number of performances of the Ninth by Tokyo Ro¯-on (1953-2000)
* Performances of the Ode to Joy in the Japanese language
Year No. Year No. Year No. Year No. Year No.
1960 0 1970 2 1980 1 1990 2
1961 0 1971 0 1981 3 1991 2
1962 8 1972 1 1982 3 1992 1
1953 0 1963 5 1973 2 1983 3 1993 2
1954 8 1964 0 1974 2 1984 3 1994 2
1955 0 1965 9* 1975 1 1985 2 1995 0
1956 0 1966 6 1976 3 1986 2 1996 2
1957 0 1967 0 1977 5 1987 2 1997 1
1958 3 1968 3 1978 1 1988 2 1998 1
1959 6 1969 0 1979 3 1989 2 1999 1
2000 1
This clearly indicates that post-war Tokyo, and presumably all of Japan,
had seen in the Ninth the possibility to encourage people not to give
up hope and to look ahead toward a better future, where there would
be no oppression but freedom and peace for all. On the other hand,
the records also showed a definite decrease in the number of perfor-
mances, but this does not indicate the waning of the Ninth’s popularity.
Here, it must be noted that Tokyo Ro¯-on’s performances did not start
out to become the daiku we see today, nor were they intended to be.
While Ro¯-on’s Ninth has contributed the essential element of ‘chal-
lenge’ seen in many of the daiku concerts, it does not lend itself to be
labelled as daiku, which would require at least the ‘annual event’ criter-
ia and/or the year-end factor. However, as can be seen from the re-
cords, these performances clearly did not have a definite tradition of
playing the Ninth every year. Instead, Ro¯-on’s Ninth should be regarded
more as having initially acted as a bridging agent linking the universal
Ninth and the phenomenon of daiku, before later absorbing the daiku
elements.31 This development, where a movement using the Ninth first
contributed to the daiku but later embraced the daiku elements can be
seen in other examples shown below.
Becoming daiku
The development of daiku from the Ninth is in actual fact more com-
plex than it appears, but may be concisely given as follows:
Beethoven’s Ninth ! Ninth to daiku ! daiku !
(Universal) (Transitional) (Unique Phenomenon)
[post-war … rapid growth … bubble economy …]
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The becoming of daiku has been influenced by such movements as
Ro¯-on that spread throughout Japan, with additional input from the
NHK year-end tradition and post-war social needs and demands. Con-
sequently, Japan gradually witnessed the shaping of daiku, but it was
not until the 1970s and later that we really begin to see a steady ten-
dency toward the annual tradition32 (Chang 2000: 92). The remaining
factor in the making of the complete daiku would arguably be the rapid
economic growth, which was followed by the bubble economy. Japan
experienced a surge of wealth that peaked in the late 1980s and de-
clined when the bubble economy burst. The bubble economy provided
the Japanese not only with the means to spend more money, but also
with more time for the leisure appreciation of culture and the arts.33
Although the daiku phenomenon has declined relatively, in comparison
with its heydays in the 1980s and 1990s, it has not faded away. It has
emerged and upgraded itself as a new socio-cultural element that has
found its way into the lexicon of modern Japanese culture. The follow-
ing sections will present various references to and performances of dai-
ku, in the attempt to define its significance and function in modern Ja-
panese society, and to consider the question of cultural identity, group-
ism and parallel cultural elements.
The significance of daiku in today’s Japanese society
To explain daiku it will require the extraction of four fundamental ele-
ments that feed this phenomenon: akogare,34 moriagaru,35 kando¯36 and
gambaru. The first, akogare, points at two aspects: the admiration for
Beethoven and his world37 and the wish to be able to perform in a dai-
ku concert. This sense of admiration and/or longing is evident in the
‘personal challenge’ aspect mentioned before, wherein the Japanese
hope to demonstrate their individuality or prove their worth by partici-
pating in a much-talked-about special event. It connects with the wish
to be part of something grand, famous, or fashionable. The Japanese
use this word in a variety of aspects in life,38 and it is with this desire
to be something they admire but are generally not cut out to be that
draws them to be part of something like the daiku experience.
The second element, moriagaru, is the element one witnesses in the
huge attendance at concerts around the end of the year, testifying to
the need for grand, seasonal, festive celebrations. The Japanese enjoy
their matsuri, and there are absolutely no limitations on what a matsuri
event should and must be; in fact, anything could very easily be turned
into a matsuri for the sheer reason of enjoying a celebration with
others.39 But any matsuri or gatherings of people will be lifeless with-
out the moriagaru element. This word is a socio-cultural term vital in
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the everyday life of the Japanese. The Japanese use this word when
they want to make an event more exciting – to live it up, or become ex-
hilarated and enjoy the moment shared with others. It is in this sense
therefore, that daiku is socially and culturally significant in Japan, as it
provides the liveliness and grandeur of musical sounds required to
pass the end of one year with a grand finale.
While these two elements make daiku a manifestation of groupism,
it does not spring from a simple ‘sheep mentality’. It pertains more to
the sense of belonging and sharing, where individual people with dif-
ferent goals can feel confident and enlightened through collective ex-
perience. The daiku phenomenon is initiated by the akogare element,
before being lifted to a greater height by the moriagaru element. Then
it is enhanced by the kando¯ element, which also plays an important
part in Japanese culture. This third element lurks in many aspects of
Japanese life and is very much evident in movies, dramas, personal ex-
periences and literary works. The Japanese experience this kando¯ senti-
ment from nature and the changing of the seasons, a hapless love
story, or a fantastic concert. Likewise, the daiku experience feeds that
hungry need to be moved, touched and impressed by the sound of the
music of hundreds or thousands of voices singing for freedom and
peace.
The last element, and one of great relevance to our discussion, is the
gambaru element.40 It plays a central role to the daiku experience. The
Japanese are well known for their gaman and gambaru nature, deter-
mined to achieve a common goal that would benefit the group as a
whole. Questions are rarely raised. What is expected are simple perse-
verance and diligent work toward that common goal. While that is still
evident today, the modern Japanese people have taken on a new way to
gambaru, with more individual intentions, even though they may still
be influenced by traditional groupism.
Daiku on a grand scale
How can a foreign cultural element have such a profound effect and
be so readily absorbed? Such cultural products are nothing new to Ja-
pan, whose culture builds heavily upon foreign elements and ideas.
While Japan has been criticised for performing poorly in its integration
with the rest of the world – and indeed even among its own busi-
nesses, services and people thanks to the uchi-soto41 social code – the
nation produces astonishing results when it comes to integrating for-
eign ideology and cultural elements into its own. For this reason, daiku
would seem to be another example of Japan’s capacity to integrate for-
eign elements within its own socio-cultural realm. But the Japanese do
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not just borrow or copy, they develop it further and make it an integral
part of their own culture and traditions.
In this sense, what makes daiku particularly interesting, if not bewil-
dering, is the sheer scale. Many performances boast an amazingly large
cast of choir members, sometimes between five thousand and even ten
thousand singers. Among the grandest and most impressive is the an-
nual concert organised by Suntory. Dubbed as ‘Suntory’s ten-thousand-
singer Daiku’,42 this tradition began in 1983 as part of the celebration
for the inauguration of the construction of the Osaka Castle Hall,
whose purpose was to commemorate the 400-year history of the castle
(see Plate 10.1). Since then, it has continued to host annually the lar-
gest daiku known to date at Osaka Castle Hall.43
Almost all members of this ten-thousand-singer choir are amateurs
from all around Japan, although some may have experience in singing
or performing at a concert, or have some German language training.
Applications are open from early June and selected by draw around
mid-July. Successful applicants are then given localised schedules for
lessons and training sessions starting from mid-August in preparation
for the grand event. After that, joint rehearsals are held with one thou-
sand to fifteen hundred people per group in the second half of Novem-
ber, with the final rehearsal at Osaka Castle Hall in early December be-
fore the grand concert scheduled on the following day (MBS 2007b).
Apart from Suntory, two other major daiku events also boast a large
number of singers. They are the Kokugikan Sumida Daiku wo Utau-kai
(The Kokugikan Sumida Sing the Ninth Society)44 (see Plate 10.2) and
Daiku Hiroshima.45 The former boasts five thousand singers, while the
latter usually has over one thousand. All three major daiku events be-
gan as commemoration for the inauguration of an edifice: the Osaka
Castle Hall in 1983, the Kokugikan (where sumo tournaments take
place) in 1985 and the Hiroshima Plaza in 1985, respectively. It must
also be noted that the Sumida daiku is held in February every year.
This is evidence of the fact that daiku has eventually branched out from
its year-end ritual. In addition to the number of singers, the number of
daiku performances is equally impressive, with about fifty professional
orchestras performing the Ninth in Tokyo in 1999 alone (Trends in Ja-
pan 2000); and according to an internet ranking of daiku, there were
166 in 2006 and 155 scheduled nationwide in 2007 (Web Bravo 2007).
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Plate 10.1 Pamphlet for Suntory’s daiku in 200646 (Image: Suntory Ichiman-nin no
Daiku Jimukyoku (サントリー１万人の第九事務局 Suntory 10,000-singer
Ninth Symphony Office)
Plate 10.2 Five-thousand-singer daiku in 2008 (KSDUK 2008)
[figures in white and those in between are choir singers]
Daiku as an established cultural event
Daiku is not simply an event on the annual calendar; it has made its
way into cultural references. For example, Let’s Learn Japanese Basic II,
a Japanese language lesson devised by the Japan Foundation (Nagasaki
2006), has one of its units titled We’re thinking of singing Beethoven’s
Ninth.47 Another example that can help illustrate the extent of the po-
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pularity and importance of daiku is NHK’s comprehensive guide Dai-
ku-wo Utao¯48 (Let’s Sing the Ninth [Daiku]) (Inoue49 1991). From under-
standing the philosophy behind the Ode to Joy and Beethoven’s music
to what to take care of on the day of the performance, the booklet lit-
erally served as the passport to singing the Ninth (see Plate 10.3).
The term daiku also features on websites that introduce Japanese
seasonal events, such as in Web Japan’s NIPPONIA. The no. 34 edition
of the web magazine introduced December events in Japan, featuring
daiku as a major annual event (Web Japan 2005).50 Another example is
the site Japan Market Intelligence, which provides a report on Christmas
time in Japan, describing the Ninth as the ‘unofficial seasonal anthem’
of Japan.51 Meanwhile, Trends In Japan, part of Web Japan, goes further
to give more details about the amplitude of the phenomenon with its
Roll Over Beethoven: Japan Can’t Get Enough of the Ode to Joy article in
2000. It is a comprehensive summary for anyone who wishes to get a
quick glimpse of the phenomenon (Trends in Japan 2000). Such refer-
ences to daiku or the Ninth are a clear indication that the phenomenon
has become an indispensable socio-cultural element in modern Japan.
Plate 10.3 NHK’s guide to the Ninth: Let’s Sing Daiku (Image: Japan Broadcast
Publishing)
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Daiku as a reminder of benevolent Japan-German relations
As mentioned before, the term daiku is often used to denote all perfor-
mances of the Ninth, including the one by the German POWs in Naru-
to during the First World War. However, it is important not to regard
the performance by the German captives as part of the modern daiku
phenomenon. That being said, in the midst of the passion for the
Ninth heated up by daiku, the difference between a simple Ninth and a
daiku event falls into a grey zone. Almost all concerts of the Ninth now
take on a strong daiku flavour, they may not be events celebrated at the
end of the year, but they all come with the four elements of daiku men-
tioned above. A recent movie about the friendship between German
POWs and their local Japanese neighbours titled Bart No Gakuen (Mu-
sic Paradise of the Bearded),52 premiered in June 2006. The film uses
the Ninth by borrowing the success of daiku as a means to convey the
friendship, love and peace between the two peoples, showcasing also
the performance of the last movement of the Ninth by the German
POWs. The significance of this movie is that the camp has been faith-
fully restored for the filming and has been maintained since then as a
sort of theme park53 to remind visitors of the friendship shared by the
German captives and Japanese locals during the First World War
(BGPC 2006).54 It would not be an exaggeration to say Beethoven’s im-
mortal symphony, particularly the last movement, would be the park’s
theme song, or anthem even. Here, the message relevant to our discus-
sion is the perseverance and striving to overcome hardship, as well as
the tolerance which gave way to love and freedom of the soul on both
sides. This is in essence a combination of the four socio-cultural ele-
ments,55 and it demonstrates the Ninth through these elements of dai-
ku as a symbol for expressing the joy of freedom and the great friend-
ship of two different peoples.
Commemorations and celebrations
The intertwining of various elements pertaining to the Ninth (conveys
Western ideology) and daiku (caters to Japanese inherent needs to be-
long and share) has not only facilitated ‘personal challenge’ but also
the quest of many to advocate and disseminate peace and love. Apart
from annual year-end performances and the special memory of the
Naruto Ninth, most other performances of the Ninth have the same
nature as those performed around the world, namely celebrations and
commemorations of peace and unity, or celebrating the establishment
or completion of a great work or edifice.56 The Japanese can be ex-
pected to be equally inclined to perform such types of Ninth concert to
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promote peace and love of humankind simply because of what the na-
tion had experienced during the Second World War, both in terms of
aggression and suffering.57 In this sense the Ninth is almost always
featured in celebrations of something worth commemorating, being re-
garded as an event of grandeur in nature, style and scale, as an expres-
sion of spiritual joy shared by a large group of people who otherwise
would find it difficult to do so in a society that discourages overt ex-
pressions of emotions.
Summing up daiku58
It is not difficult to see that daiku did not simply derive from one ori-
gin, nor does it exist for only one reason. A complexity of factors must
be considered. The different stages and types of the Ninth/daiku and
the transition from one to the other can be summed up in the follow-
ing way:
1. The beginning – friendship and cultural exchange;
2. World war era – military propaganda and admiration of German
culture;
3. Post-war era – hopes for peace, better future and establishment of
the year-end ritual;
4. Economic growth era – sense of emancipation for the working po-
pulation;
5. Rapid economic growth to post-bubble era – leisure and individual
personal challenges.
The vital ingredients in the making of daiku come from the needs and
sensitivity toward natural changes possessed by the Japanese:
1. Comfort in relating to something cosmic, surreal, universal (the
Ninth is very often analysed from such perspectives): emancipation
of the soul;
2. Innate sensitivity to seasonal/temporal changes: in the form of an
annual ritual;
3. Wish to be part of something larger and adoration of Beethoven59
(akogare);
4. Appreciation of the festive nature (moriagaru);
5. Love for peace, harmony and joy (kando¯);
6. Nature to persevere and strive (gambaru).
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Daiku as a new way to gambaru – parallel of Beethoven’s music
and Japanese socio-cultural needs
Daiku, described by Wasserman (2006) as ‘a legend of Japanese mod-
ernity’,60 is a manifestation of a new way to gambaru, which in turn is
linked to economic and social changes. The various types of daiku thus
far examined can be further organised into two major types: one where
Beethoven’s final masterpiece is used to advocate peace and freedom,
or where it acts as a hymn, ode or requiem; and the other in which the
music is symbolic of self-achievement and personal challenge, which
was rather conspicuous and popular after the Second World War. And
it is this latter category that takes hold of the curious mind. Perhaps it
is due to the fact that many people began having more free time and
means to explore their personal interests. For the first time, the Japa-
nese could fully embrace Western culture, with a surge of new hobbies
and interests to pursue. And as records and reports of daiku perfor-
mances show us, daiku’s development coincided with the growing
economy.
Then came the economic downturn and crisis in the 1990s. At that
time daiku performances increased, as articles published by Asahi
Shimbun showed (Chang 2000). This may be due to the fact that more
than ever many Japanese sought release from troubles in life through
such social experiences as daiku. In such situations music often be-
comes an instrument of escapism. As Barenboim says, ‘If you want to
forget everything and run away from your problems and difficulties –
from sheer existence – music is the perfect means, because it’s highly
emotional’ (Barenboim and Said 2004: 24), and that ‘music provides
the possibility, on the one hand, to escape from life and, on the other
hand, to understand it much better than in many other disciplines’
(ibid.: 25-26). In this way, people sought reassurance, confidence and
encouragement by achieving it through daiku.
Let us turn to the reasons for daiku participation.61 Participants of
daiku performances come from a variety of backgrounds and are moti-
vated by various purposes. Newspaper reports on daiku performances
involving such amateur groups reveal something of the personal chal-
lenges for people. Ranging from preschoolers to disabled people, they
are taking up the difficult task of singing the Ninth, thus gaining a
sense of accomplishment and personal satisfaction.62 The following
gives some idea of why people participate in daiku: people speaking
about the 2006 Suntory 10,000-Singer Daiku and their personal daiku
experience (MBS 2007a):63
– Suntory’s Daiku turns 25, and so do we. So we feel special to be
part of this event. (25-year-old women)
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– I met my husband through daiku and now I am carrying our first
baby. We sang together, the three of us! (housewife)
– We saw Suntory’s Daiku on television and thought it was awesome
and wanted to be part of it. (high school boys)
– We are twin brother and sister. Our mum loves singing, and she
wanted us to join her singing daiku. The German text was hard, but
we trained hard and were able to sing all the way. (twin children)
– I was in rehabilitation after some health issues, and my wife sug-
gested challenging the daiku as a way to uplift my spirit. It was
great, and I made many new friends. (office worker)
– I turn ninety this year, and I’ve been singing daiku for twenty years.
I started it as a way of cheering myself up after my husband had
passed away. (widow)
– I participated in the first daiku twenty-five years ago, and this year I
returned with my juniors at the company. (office worker)
– My three-year old daughter who is visually impaired said she could
see the conductor!
– My husband who was moody throughout the training showed a
great smile at the last lesson!
– I sang as a present for my sixty-year old mother who just had her
breast cancer treatment.
These examples, though only a very limited selection, show that Japa-
nese people have a great variety of personal reasons for participating.64
The poster for the 2007 Ninth concert of the Japan Philharmonic Or-
chestra (Plate 10.4) is a perfect example that shows different types of
people from all ages and walks of life coming together to celebrate or
challenge the Ninth. Doing so seems to provide them with a chance to
gain an identity of self and to set aside personal troubles and their in-
significance in society. It also provides people with a chance to do
something that requires professionalism. Daiku concerts take advan-
tage of the grandeur of the Ninth to satisfy such personal needs as en-
couragement for ordinary people in a society that may be blessed with
wealth, but lacks opportunities to express intimate emotions. It also ca-
ters to the Japanese passion for advocating peace and love, as can be
seen in the Borderless Choir event, where Japanese participants were re-
cruited to join Austrian singers in a grand performance of the Ninth in
Austria (Plate 10.5). The concert in Austria is interesting if we consider
that Beethoven’s Ninth is rarely so passionately celebrated in the West,
except for very special and grand events. The Japanese have added a
new meaning to daiku by bringing their version of appreciation of the
Beethoven’s Ninth to other parts of the world. In this case, it was an en-
hanced re-import of the piece back to Vienna, where it was first per-
formed. One might say this acted as a pilgrimage by the Japanese to
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the birthplace of the grand opus, paying homage to the composer
whose creations have given them hope and a new way to discover their
individual inner strengths and abilities.
Plate 10.4 Japan Philharmonic Orchestra’s daiku 2007 poster (Image: Japan Phil-
harmonic Orchestra)
Today’s daiku is a manifestation of an emerging new Japanese cultural
trait. A new mentality has been forming to allow the Japanese to ac-
tively achieve personal challenges.65 Traditionally, the Japanese have
been taught to keep their personal feelings and ideas to themselves,
and to observe strict social conformity.66 Through the Ninth, however,
they can satisfy their personal need, prove their worth and gain indivi-
duality.
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Plate 10.5 JAL’s Borderless Choir Daiku in 2007, sponsored by Tokyo FM67
(JAL 2007: 140) (Photo by O¨sterreich Werbung / Trumler)
Conclusion
While many of those participating in a daiku performance do so be-
cause it is now an annual ritual,68 many Japanese take part because of
very personal reasons, regardless of their age and gender. We see ex-
pecting mothers, kindergarten children, senior citizens, disabled peo-
ple, amateur music lovers, professional musicians, and people from
just about all walks of life contributing to the phenomenon.69 Each
participant is there because he or she wants to prove to themselves that
despite being untrained in the skills and techniques required for the
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grand musical finale, they can still accomplish the task of performing
a difficult masterpiece, with enough of the dose of the four elements
mentioned before.70
Is it a manifestation of mere groupism? Superficially, it does appear
to pertain very much to the nature of simple groupism. The Japanese
tend to feel safer acting in groups, sometimes due to fear of being os-
tracised in a society that is severe on outcasts and abhors the abnormal,
and where strict social rules apply at all times. Daiku at least presents
an opportunity where the passively group-oriented Japanese demon-
strate strong individual needs and desires, but still contained within
the safe and comfortable conditions provided by groupism.
The daiku phenomenon has often been critically attacked, deemed
empty and inferior to the kind of Ninth that should have been (Sunaka-
wa 1991: 88-91).71 However, it is unjust to dismiss the daiku experience
as lacking in culture and making comparisons with conventional per-
formances of the Ninth. Japan’s daiku is in its own right quite original
and authentic. A cultural feature of one country can be adopted by an-
other in such a way that it is no longer only a ‘cheap imitation’ of the
original. As Barenboim tells us: ‘The sense of belonging to different
cultures can only be enriching’ (Barenboim and Said 2004: 6). What is
more, ‘transfixation’ of ‘the Other’ is an important process of under-
standing and accepting cultures not of one’s own (Barenboim and Said
2004: 11). In this sense Japan has always been skilful in its adaptation
of foreign cultures. And in the case of daiku, while Beethoven’s music
and Schiller’s words may be products of Occidental ideology and men-
tality, they have left a powerful and profound impact on the Japanese,
for many have found some degree of salvation through melody and the
power of the words.
Notes
1 Hereafter referred to as ‘the Ninth’ or ‘Ninth’. All websites referred to were current in
June 2008.
2 The term ‘groupism’ has been coined to stereotypically brand the Japanese social be-
haviour. It signifies the ‘sheep mentality’, where a group of people flock together and
jump on the bandwagon to follow trends without contemplating what their indivi-
dual needs or wants may be; or perhaps better described as ‘belongingness’ by Lebra
(1976) and later as ‘longing for belonging’ by Ozaki (1983), who dedicates an entire
chapter to the importance of ‘institutional affiliation’ of the Japanese.
3 頑張る（がんばる) To strive, work hard at, arduously aim at, be diligent.
4 我慢する（がまん・する) To persevere, endure, be patient, be tolerant.
5 As demonstrated through workshops by Barenboim and Said; sharing of a common
experience, particularly through music, can make bringing peace and harmony possi-
ble (Barenboim and Said 2004: 9-10).
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6 The translation is my own. French original is given here:
‘En de´cembre 1983, le chef allemand Peter Gu¨lke, invite´ a` diriger l’Orchestre de la
radio te´le´vision japonaise NHK dans la Neuvie`me Symphonie de Beethoven, rencon-
tre dans le hall de l’hoˆtel de Tokyo son colle`gue Gunther Herbig. “Qu’est-ce qui
t’ame`ne ?”, lui demande ce dernier. “La Neuvie`me”, lui re´pond Gu¨lke. “Moi aussi”,
reparit Herbig, “espe´rons que c¸a n’est pas avec le meˆme orchestre !”’
7 Not to be mistaken as ‘the Great Ninth’, as dai is also the reading for the kanji charac-
ter for ‘big, large (大), although given the scale of the phenomenon it does seem
rather befitting.
8 年末の第九 (ねんまつのだいく nenmatsu no daiku): A term commonly used in Japan
to refer to the daiku phenomenon, meaning ‘year-end Ninth/daiku’.
9 祭り（まつ) Festivals.
10 花見（はなみ) Flower-viewing, especially denoting the viewing of cherry blossoms.
11 花火大会（はなび・たいかい) Fireworks festivals.
12 紅葉狩り（もみじがり) Lit. ‘autumn foliage hunting’, denotes the enjoyment of strolling
among trees with vibrant autumn foliage and collecting fallen (maple) leaves.
13 More about this aspect of seasonal changes and their impact on the Japanese is dealt
with in Chang (2007).
14 This section draws mainly from my master thesis.
15 東京音樂學校（とうきょう・おんがく・がっこう) To¯kyo¯ Ongaku Gakko¯Established in 1887
and merged with Tokyo School of Fine Arts – To¯kyo¯ Bijutsu Gakko¯– in 1949 to be-
come Tokyo National University of Fine Arts and Music – To¯kyo¯ Geijutsu Daigaku.
16 久留米（くるめ）
17 千葉県（ちばけん）
18 鳴門（なると）
19 徳島県（とくしまけん）
20 松江豊寿（まつえ・とよひさ）
21 楽聖（がくせい gakusei)
22 Since the Messiah was very popular around the beginning of the 1950s, the Ninth
really only began to shape into daiku from around the 1970s as the rapid economic
growth picked up pace.
23 Polish conductor, born 27 January 1895 in Krako´w and died 17 October 1985 in New
York. He was full-time conductor between August 1936 and September 1946, Princi-
pal Conductor between March 1956 and March 1957, and Honorary Conductor be-
tween August 1951 and October 1985 for the NHK Symphony Orchestra.
24 Russian-born German classical pianist, born 13 March 1884 in St. Petersburg and
died 30 October 1953 in Tokyo. He arrived in Japan in 1938.
25 One such notable orchestra is the Leipzig Gewandhaus Orchestra, once directed by
Mendelssohn, which had a tradition of performing the Ninth in its year-end/New
Year concert programme.
The following is a notice taken from a Leipzig concert information page (LTMa
2004-2006) mentioning the tradition:
2004年12月29日～31日
大晦日の第九コンサート
1918年12月31日、アルトゥール・ニキッシュが、クリスタルパラストで2,800人の観客を前に
ルードヴィヒ・ヴァン・ベートーヴェンの第九交響曲を披露したことで、大晦日コンサートの
伝統が始まった。今年も年末のこの伝統あるコンサートのために多くの人が音楽の街ライ
プツィヒを訪れる。この偉大な交響曲はゲヴァントハウス常任指揮者の指揮でライプツィ
ヒ・ゲヴァントハウスに響き渡る
問い合わせ先:
ライプツィヒ・ゲヴァントハウスGewandhaus zu Leipzig
住所: Augustusplatz 8, D-04109 Leipzig
ODE TO ‘PERSONAL CHALLENGE’ 167
Tel.: +49-0341-1270280
Fax: +49-0341-1270222
E-mail: ticket@gewandhaus.de
www.gewandhaus.de
The Japanese reads:
29-31 December 2004
New Year’s Eve Ninth Concert
Artu´r Nikisch presented Ludwig van Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony in front of a
2,800 audience at the Kristallpalast on 31 December 1918, setting off the tradition of
New Year concerts. This year also, many people will come to visit the musical city of
Leipzig for the end-year traditional concert. Under the Principal Conductor of the Ge-
wandhaus Orchestra, this masterpiece will resonate throughout the Leipzig Gewand-
haus.
Enquiries:
Gewandhaus zu Leipzig
26 うたごえ運動（うたごえ・うんどう)
27 労音 (ろう・おん) or officially 日本勤労者音楽協議会 (にほん・きんろうしゃ・おんがく・
きょうぎかい Nihon Kinro¯sha Ongku Kyo¯kai)
28 山根銀二 (やまね・ぎんじ）1906-1982, Music Critic. His view on Ro¯-on’s Ninth pub-
lished in the December 1966 issue of Tokyo Ro¯-on’s journal Hibiki was quoted by Su-
zuki.
29 The foundation of Tokyo Ro¯-on (2004: 14) began amidst the founding of numerous
cultural circles and organisations operated by people from all walks of life who felt
oppressed during the war, such as the working class and students.
30 Based on data provided in Tokyo Ro¯-on Movement History Editing Committee
(2004).
31 In the beginning there was the ‘general’ Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, which had a
universal function no matter where in the world it was performed. The daiku phe-
nomenon is a uniquely Japanese product, and such performances of the Ninth by To-
kyo Ro¯-on and other similar post-war organisations inherited the spirit of Beethoven
and Schiller’s message and went on to help shape today’s daiku.
32 Based on my own study of major concerts between 1970 and 1996.
33 That is, art, music, language learning, fashion and the like.
34 憧れ（あこがれ）Longing, yearning, admiration, adoration. I have opted for the more
appropriate noun form.
35 盛り上がる（もりあがる）To heighten enthusiasm, to enliven. I have opted for the more
appropriate verb form.
36 感動（かんどう）Moving, impressive, touching. I have opted for the more appropriate
noun form.
37 Beethoven’s own challenges in life that resulted in immortal masterpieces have at-
tracted many Japanese fans. His struggle to overcome gradual loss of hearing and a
troubled personal life has become symbolic to the Japanese. The cosmology and phi-
losophy behind the Ninth discussed in many literary works provide them with great
life inspirations. This is also a prominent factor in why daiku has remained an on-
going phenomenon.
38 Such as their akogare to live abroad, to be a flight attendant, to speak English with
foreigners, to play the piano, to look elegant in a kimono, and so on.
39 For instance, apart from traditional ones, modern festivals spring up in great num-
bers to include modern revivals of old traditions and new festivals whose themes
may be snow, ice, samba, fireworks, fireflies, dance, food, illumination, among many
others. Japan is essentially a nation that lives on festivities of all kinds.
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40 As mentioned in the introduction, while gaman is also an essential Japanese trait, to-
day it is often shunned by the young generations, who are then criticised by the older
generations for lacking the traditional virtue of persevering. The element of gambaru,
however, is still much practised.
41 内／外（うち・そと) The internal/inside vs. the external/outside. This is still a very pro-
minent cultural code. For instance, while the Japanese in general may appear to be
very accommodating and hospitable to a foreigner, the trench between them is still
deep, as a foreigner is always accepted only as a foreigner, placing him/her outside
of the inner circle of the Japanese society, which exists at different levels and on vary-
ing scales.
42 サントリー１万人の第九（さんとりー・いちまんにん・の・だいくSantori ichiman’nin-no dai-
ku)
43 大阪城ホール（おおさか・じょう・ほーる O¯saka-jo¯ ho¯ru)
44 国技館墨田第九を歌う会（こくぎかん・すみだ・だいくをうたうかい）
45 第九ひろしま（だいく・ひろしま）
46 The Japanese text literally reads, ‘Sing about myself. Sing with everyone. And let the
flowers of the sun [blossom] in each and everyone’s [participants’] heart’.
47 Lesson 31 of Episode Sixteen.
48 第九を歌おう (だいくをうたおう）There are also many other ‘get-together’ groups under
the same or similar names nation wide.
49 井上道義（いのうえ・みちよし Inoue Michiyoshi) 1946-, conductor. The guide was pub-
lished by NHK in 1991 for a rebroadcast of a previously aired series, a step-by-step
guide to accomplishing one’s participation in a performance of the Ninth.
50 The explanation given by the site on the origin of the daiku phenomenon, however,
is not entirely, nor even adequately, informative, as there is in fact an array of factors
and reasons in the making of the phenomenon.
51 Winter 2003. It must be noted here that the article refers to the Ninth and the phe-
nomenon as ‘daikyu’, which is clearly incorrect. While the characters are normally
read as ‘dai-kyu¯’, as a special term used to refer to the piece and the phenomenon dis-
cussed in this paper, it should be read as ‘daiku’.
52 バルトの楽園 （ばると・の・がくえん）The word baruto is the Japanese syllabic equivalent
of the German word Bart, meaning beard (although also used to mean any facial hair
such as moustache in this movie). The literal translation of the movie title is thus:
The Music Paradise of the Bearded (i.e. the Japanese and German generals featured
in the movie and seen in the poster). The idea is apparently to show that two differ-
ent races that were at war against each other and represented by their two generals,
who are both bearded, were able to become friends through music (the Ninth). Thus,
the camp itself signifies the ‘Eden of music that brought the two peoples together’
(the kanji used usually mean paradise or Eden, but the first character raku can also
mean ‘to be at ease’ or be read as gaku, meaning ‘music’.
53 The place is dubbed ‘home of joy’, alluding to the ‘joyous’ message in Ode to Joy. Ad-
mission is 500 yen for adults and 200 yen for children below junior high age. The
location park operates daily except between 1 and 4 January. However, after about
three years of opening to the public, the site was closed at the end of February 2009,
awaiting further decisions on its future due to land rights and maintenance issues.
Part of the site is scheduled for reopening in autumn 2009.
54 This film is the latest of a number of similar productions, the first being the docu-
mentary film「望郷 — 日本初の第九交響曲 坂東捕虜収容所」(Nostalgia — The first
Ninth Symphony in Japan. The Bando¯ Prison Camp) produced by TV Man Union
and Fuji Television Network and broadcasted nationwide on 17 December 1977
(Hayashi 1978: 148).
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55 That is to say,
akogare = the admiration for Beethoven and German culture;
moriagaru = enliven what would otherwise have been full of sadness and misery,
heighten the joyful feeling of the friendship;
kando¯= the great sensation of caring and loving people of different races and back-
grounds;
and gambaru = to persevere in the hardships inflicted upon them by the war and sur-
vive.
56 Many examples have been given in my MA thesis (Chang 2000), most of which are
from newspaper clippings from the 1980s and 1990s. Also, as mentioned before, the
Suntory, Sumida and Hiroshima grand concerts began as commemorations of the in-
auguration of a new building.
57 One might even consider that the Ninth would likely be featured if concerts were
held to commemorate peace.
58 Attempts have been made in my MA thesis (Chang 2000) and a recent paper (Chang
2007) to explain why the Ninth transformed into daiku, while much of the funda-
mental information has been provided by a very few authors, in particular Suzuki
(1989).
59 Beethoven and German culture.
60 French title of Wasserman’s book on daiku:
Le Sacre De L’hiver – La Neuvie`me Symphonie De Beethoven, Un Mythe De La Mod-
ernite´ Japonaise.
English translation: The Celebration of Winter – The Ninth Symphony of Beethoven,
a Legend of Japanese Modernity.
61 There are two types of daiku participation: the audience type and the participation
type; it is the latter being dealt with in this paper.
62 The Ninth, being considered the grandest work by the great Meister Ludwig van
Beethoven, who himself persevered through gradual deafness to achieve great suc-
cess, naturally became the ultimate and symbolic goal for people who wish to prove
their worth, to be part of something greater, or simply to fulfil the need for closer hu-
man interaction.
63 From the 2006 Suntory 10,000-Singer Daiku; what participants said about their perso-
nal daiku experience (MBS 2007). The summary in English is my own. The Japanese
original cannot be provided here due to the site contents being updated, and only in-
formation from the year before the current one is available. At the time of first writ-
ing, in 2007, this paper drew information on the 2006 concert from the website,
and the same data could not be included for this revised edition. However, comments
by participants each year made available on Suntory’s website remain similar to the
data retrieved for this paper.
64 Such as the number ‘nine’ or the number of years a daiku event has been held that
coincides with their age and so forth.
65 In this sense, they do not simply follow what others do, even if such ‘following’ is
present and often explained away as groupism, it is not the only driving force that en-
courages participation in a daiku event. In addition, one should also be careful in
how to interpret such ‘following’ and ‘groupism’ in modern Japan.
66 De Mente says, ‘The social and political systems that prevailed in Japan for centuries
required that the people suppress their individuality and their natural instinct for in-
dependent thought and behavior. They were required to conform to precise forms of
behavior, much of which was government-regulated and enforced with strict sanc-
tions’ (Matsumoto and De Mente 2003: 121).
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67 ‘Borderless Choir’ provided a chance to participate in a six-day charity concert tour in
Vienna. Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony was performed by the Vienna Chamber Orches-
tra directed by Daniel Hoyem-Cavazza.
68 It is in human nature to participate in large festive events from time to time for the
sake of it, such as New Year’s Eve parties and fireworks festivals that can also be seen
around the world.
69 Unfortunately, it is not possible to list and discuss more of the events that can pro-
vide a clearer picture of the extent of the passion, or in some cases obsession, of the
Japanese for singing the Ninth.
70 Akogare (passion) / moriage (excitement) / kando¯ (sentiments of being moved and
touched) / gambare (diligent work).
71 Such as the manner of the solemn performance of the piece prior to the unification
of the divided Germany.
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11 Performing Cosmopolitan Clash and Collage:
Krishen Jit’s Stagings of the ‘Stranger’
in Malaysia
Charlene Rajendran
Introduction
The challenge for contemporary discourses on identity is to develop
dialogic and open processes of reworking essentialised and fixed con-
structs that often stem from nationalist discourses whilst simulta-
neously engaging fluid and permeable aspects of identity aligned with
cosmopolitan imaginings. Theatre as a site that deals with this duality
is able to reflexively examine the multiplicity in society in a situated
and imaginative frame, offering opportunities to participate in alterna-
tive embodiments of Self and Other that are open to the clash and col-
lage of cultural difference. This paper discusses the theatre of Krishen
Jit, Malaysian theatre director, critic and educator, whose critical in-
sights into the complexities of culture produced powerful performances
of identity that dealt with the clash and collage – the tensions and po-
tential – of being and becoming Malaysian in the 1990s. Jit’s ability to
weave the local and the global, the national and transnational, was sig-
nificant at a time when Malaysia was moving towards increasing cul-
tural and economic liberalisation in the larger tide of globalisation,
generating spaces and stories where ‘conversations with the stranger’, a
notion developed by philosopher K.A. Appiah (2005), were an integral
part of developing understanding and respect for difference as desir-
able and not disruptive.
Engaging the stranger in society: Dialogic spaces for identity and
difference
The real challenge to cosmopolitanism isn’t the belief that other
people don’t matter at all; it’s the belief that they don’t matter
very much. It’s easy to get agreement that we have some obliga-
tions to strangers. We can’t do terrible things to them. Perhaps if
their situation becomes completely intolerable and we can do
something about it at reasonable cost, we may even have a duty
to intervene. Perhaps we should stop genocide, intervene when
there is mass starvation or a great natural disaster. But must
we do more than this? Here’s where the assent starts to fray.
(Appiah 2006: 153; emphasis added)
Many of us live in a global environment that is increasingly bombarded
with images and stories that portray the putative ongoing ‘clash of civi-
lisations’ (Huntington 1996) where cultural difference is depicted as
deviant, difficult and disruptive while suggesting that uniformity is har-
monious, peaceful and orderly. The warning ‘Don’t talk to strangers’ gi-
ven to young children by their parents in a bid to protect them from
danger may characterise a parallel relationship between paternalistic
and authoritarian governments and their politically infantilised popu-
lace in an effort to limit the risk of unwanted influence and reduce out-
side threat. ‘Strangers’ are typically those who are unknown and unfa-
miliar, incomprehensible and thus unpredictable and considered the
undesirable Other. Despite their commonality as members of the hu-
man species and co-inhabitants of the planet Earth, strangers are
usually regarded with caution and suspicion rather than warm curios-
ity or empathetic enquiry. So philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah’s
(2006) question about an ‘obligation to strangers’ on moral grounds is
clear enough when there is critical distance and ‘charity’ can be meted
out with little or no interaction. The situation, however, is more com-
plex when the Strangers are one’s neighbours and the Self is charac-
terised by these Stranger-Others who clearly do matter – but how so?
Apart from being perceived as threatening, cultural difference is
otherwise framed as exotic, enticing, an ‘entertaining collage’ of unu-
sual mix – here alluding to difference as fetish and freakish, ranging
from dancing women in exotic costume to tribal men brandishing their
spears. These sensationalist notions create representations of diversity
as a form of cultural amusement that now characterises much popular
media and tourism. They also maintain the critical distance between
viewer and viewed to ensure a ‘safe boundary’ that is not meant to be
crossed. Again, the Stranger is regarded with a detached observer’s in-
terest but not engaged as a co-participant in the process of co-existence.
Thus, difference, whether dangerous or delightful, remains largely as
something that is commodified and represented, but not discussed or
negotiated with depth or diligence. Consequently, the more critical and
empathetic1 discourses on difference tend to be exclusive and inaccessi-
ble, unable to penetrate the popular psyche in most societies.
In Malaysian society, cultural difference, particularly of race and reli-
gion, characterises the discourses of politics and identity. Although
‘race’ with its implication of essentialised identity is an increasingly
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contested term, it is still used officially in Malaysia to refer to the main
ethnic groups: Malays (50%), Chinese (25%), Indians (7%), and other
groups that are either indigenous (Kadazan, Dusun, Iban) or Eurasian.
Official policies of political equity and socio-economic entitlement are
based on racial and religious identity, informed by colonial constructs
of what British administrator and political writer J.S. Furnivall termed
‘plural society’, which he argued had subsequently propagated a ‘caste-
like division of labor’ (Furnivall cited in Hefner 2001: 4). This created
segregationist practices that in turn produced special privileges for
some, namely the Malays, on the basis of indigeneity. Although ‘Ma-
lay’, like other racial categories, remains a contested term, it is wielded
politically to perpetuate prejudicial practices that are based on ethno-re-
ligious lines.2 Within the Malaysian constitution, those regarded as
‘Malay’ are accorded special rights in order to safeguard their controver-
sial place as ‘rightful heirs’ of the nation. Political, economic, educa-
tional and cultural privileges are given to Malays based on the principle
that, as the ‘original’ inhabitants of the land, they should be given ‘spe-
cial rights’ which respect their ‘special position’.
Dealing with difference in one way or another is thus an integral
part of everyday existence for many, if not most Malaysians. This is
due not only to the divide between Malays and non-Malays, but also to
the sheer multiplicity of racial and religious identity that is both offi-
cially and unofficially a characteristic of Malaysian life. In addition, di-
verse languages are spoken and heard in informal and official dis-
courses, and it is common practice to switch between languages as well
as between registers in a range of contexts and situations. The Stranger
in society is in this context rarely a ‘strange’ phenomena, but more
likely to be ‘estranged’.
Yet, critical discussions on negotiating and engaging racial and reli-
gious difference are uncommon in Malaysia as these are considered
‘sensitive issues’, which ‘lie beyond the bounds of public discourse’
(Loh 2002: 24), thus limiting the capacity of the public to gain insight
and maturity about their civil rights and political agency as citizens of
a nation that professes democracy.3 As Mandal (2004: 50) points out,
‘the landscape of race politics in Malaysia has been little ploughed with
a disciplined critique and towards elucidating the instability of race as
a concept and social phenomenon’. This results in ‘the absence of a
shared public space within which social and cultural differences may
be negotiated by dialogical means’ (ibid.: 53). The growing need for
these dialogic spaces emerges with increasing connectivity and net-
works that bridge the gaps between groups and communities whose
boundaries are becoming increasingly blurred, and which are thus
seeking to make sense of each other.
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Considering that the Malaysian state is often regarded as authoritar-
ian, semi-authoritarian or quasi-democratic (see Crouch 1996; Loh
2002; Case 2004), the opportunities for articulations of resistance to
the state hegemony are understandably limited and thus all the more
significant. Be it political opposition parties, civil society groups or arts
companies, the state has time and again targeted expressions of dissent
and dissatisfaction with an array of assaults that range from water can-
nons to artistic censorship, revoking of licenses to detention of acti-
vists.4 Thus, the strategies of cultural contestation and resistance must
consider the implications of a political climate unused to participatory
democracy or political liberalisation. Although the ‘political tsunami’ of
the 12th Malaysian general elections on 8 March 2008 witnessed un-
precedented support for the opposition coalition, the newly formed Pa-
katan Rakyat (People’s Alliance),5 this has also produced a slew of reac-
tionary outcomes that include inflammatory statements made about
race and religion. The unexpected ‘victory’ for the Malaysian populace,
now empowered with a more balanced and critical voice in government,
is also considerably sobered by ongoing struggles to deal with issues of
racial and religious tension, both within and between the main parties
of the government and the opposition. While the ‘vote’ may have sig-
naled a strong anti-government protest with a willingness to opt for a
relatively untested alternative, it also marked the urgent need for critical
and empathetic discourses on politics and identity in Malaysia.6
Strategies and skills for developing contextually resilient and sustain-
able practices of inclusion remain scarce in the Malaysian socio-politi-
cal landscape. Few sites exist where dialogues on difference occur with
a capacity to engage diversity and divergence, without having to coerce
agreement or compliance. More often than not, banal or token gestures
towards difference are made, characterised by either the fear of disap-
proval or the pressure of conformity.7 As a result, the anxiety and inse-
curity that stem from the recurrent rhetoric about ‘unstable’ and ‘fra-
gile’ ethnic relations help perpetuate a deeper status quo of depen-
dence on a controlling state.8 This overshadows the potential for
reform towards more participatory democracy that could emerge from
open and dialogic deliberations on difference.
Critically exigent theatre practice is one site where the arts can inter-
vene to provide more dialogical spaces for engagement about the clash
and collage of difference – the tension and the creative potential.
Whilst the theatre of politics, particularly in recent times, has had a
powerful draw on the popular imagination in Malaysia, the politics of
theatre is less familiar. Yet, critical articulations of culture and identity
that are produced within this space warrant attention, particularly in
relation to issues of cultural difference. Mandal (2001: 163) suggests
that ‘what the arts proposes is not a naı¨ve or sympathetic nationalism
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but a dialogue with the nation’s historical and cultural constituents’. In
this vein, he discusses how theatre produces a ‘particular sense of plur-
alism and hybridity’, and one of the markers of this interaction is that
‘much operates on the basis of empathy rather than tolerance … where
difference between cultures is not regarded as alienating’ (ibid: 163).
This capacity to nurture and cultivate empathy is crucial in building an
environment where the harsh effects of alienation may be reversed.
Resisting reductive and essentialist norms of identity in Malaysian
culture and engaging with difference as an embedded norm and not
an aberration, Krishen Jit (1939-2005), Malaysian theatre director, critic
and educator, dealt critically and imaginatively with the clash and col-
lage of Malaysian identity on the Malaysian stage. Recognising the
need for culture to extend beyond the individual, community and na-
tion, Jit’s cosmopolitan imaginings for the theatre were ‘rooted’ and
thus drew extensively from local history and tradition, whilst being si-
multaneously open and informed by global influences that broached
the capitalist drive towards consumerism as well as the transnational
experience of ‘multiple belongings’ and ‘overlapping allegiances’.9
In this paper I will consider how two of Jit’s theatre productions in
the 1990s, The Cord (1994) and A Chance Encounter (1999), reflected a
critical capacity to engage with ‘cosmopolitan clash and collage’ within
a local intra-national cultural space whilst also reflecting the global
trans-national.10 By examining how Jit’s inter-racial casting and multilin-
gual performance impacted on the way the texts developed meaning for
an urban audience in the Malaysia of the 1990s, I hope to suggest that
Jit’s capacity to negotiate difference with empathy and criticality by sta-
ging the conflicting tension and creative potential that emerge from cul-
tural difference made his theatre-making an important space for insights
into being and becoming Malaysian – locally and globally. These pro-
cesses and expressions were indicative of Jit’s insightful and dialogic ap-
proach to issues of cohesive multiplicity and inclusive political ideology.
Conversing among strangers: The clash and collage of being
Malaysian
In 1990, many Malaysians welcomed Mahathir’s11 Vision 2020
which espoused explicit commitment to forging a bangsa Malay-
sia, a Malaysian nation, which transcended ethnic identities.
This objective was to be achieved partly through the creation of
an ‘economically just’ society with inter-ethnic parity. The need
to develop a Bangsa Malaysia had drawn attention to the issue of
equality for all citizens, be they Bumiputera or non-Bumiputera.12
(Gomez 2004a: 3)
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While Malaysia in the 1990s was characterised by economic and cul-
tural liberalisation that brought about marked changes such as the no-
table expansion of a middle class and technological development espe-
cially in infrastructure (see Gomez 2004a: 1), this did not lead to in-
creased political reforms or expanded spaces for critical dialogue on
sensitive issues and civil liberties. In fact, Loh (2002) argues that the
‘politics of developmentalism’ in the early 1990s moved towards coer-
cive authoritarianism and created a ‘privatisation’ of freedom and ethni-
city, which crippled the call for ‘rule of law’ and ‘participatory democ-
racy’ that grew in the late 1980s (Loh 2002: 21). Dr Mahathir’s Vision
2020 was geared towards Malaysia attaining fully developed nation sta-
tus and entailed becoming more commercially savvy and industrially
developed. But it did not include becoming more politically transparent
and democratically mature. As a result, Malaysians, particularly in the
urban capital city Kuala Lumpur, responded to socio-economic changes
that arose from increasing globalisation but were rarely informed by a
deeply contextual understanding of how the nation’s changing politics
and culture were affecting their rights and identities. A Bangsa Malay-
sia was a ‘welcome’ notion, but few resources, skills and spaces were al-
located towards achieving this idea.
Cultural difference, often skillfully negotiated with tacit knowledge
and sharp instincts, was merely an accepted part of a multiracial so-
ciety and hardly examined to reveal the difficulties of clash and the pos-
sibilities of collage that were emergent amidst the social changes. Dr
Mahathir’s posturings towards ‘inter-ethnic parity’ by introducing the
notion that by 2020 Malaysians would be capable of ‘accepting each
other as they are, regardless of race and religion’ (Dr Mahathir cited in
Loh 2002: 33) was clearly meant to iron out problems that emerged
due to ‘intra and inter-ethnic dis-parity [sic]’. These stemmed from a
range of factors that included the disenchantment of rural Malaysians,
Malays included, whose share of the nation’s wealth was seen as being
squandered by self-serving politicians. Rising factionalism within the
Malay community meant support of the ruling coalition was no longer
as strong, and the issue of equality was no longer confined to the is-
sues of race but pointed to socio-economic class and the rising gap be-
tween the rich and poor.13 As a result, the rhetoric raised questions
about this problem but did little to actually develop frames and para-
digms for a Bangsa Malaysia to be expressed and experienced. Even
though this concept ‘anticipated the cosmopolitan social disposition of
an even more integrated global economy’ (Mandal 2004: 49), it pro-
duced little commitment from the state to developing a more inclusive
and open cultural vocabulary. On the other hand, politically engaged ci-
vil society and arts groups that sought to reform a fragmented and ra-
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cialised society worked towards challenging the essentialised notions of
identity that resulted in cultural alienation and polarisation.
The need for cultural contestations that generated discursive spaces
and inspired reflective and reflexive expressions of the relatedness of
Self and Other were becoming more crucial even if largely ignored by
the mainstream media and ruling coalition. This entailed creating ‘con-
versations across boundaries’ (Appiah 2006) in order to inculcate ‘ha-
bits of coexistence’ (ibid.: xix) that ‘interact[ed] on terms of respect’
(ibid.: 145). These ‘conversations’ would then enable participants to
‘evaluate stories together’, and thus provide the basis for an inclusive
engagement that
… can often guide one another in a cosmopolitan spirit to shared
responses; and when we cannot agree, the understanding that
our responses are shaped by some of the same vocabulary can
make it easier to disagree. (Appiah 2006: 30)
Appiah’s argument for empowered ‘conversation’ reiterates the need for
thoughtful and safe spaces to interact with the ‘strange’ and ‘estranged’
in society, in order to hear their stories and develop a better under-
standing towards a position of respect and empathy. When theatre does
this, it contributes towards building a mature and democratic society.
Jit’s stagings of identity were one of the few cultural sites that
worked towards conversations of this nature and thus produced alter-
native cultural imaginings that resisted the state hegemony, by per-
forming stories that embodied and enacted the conflicts and configura-
tions of a plural society.14 While acknowledging the importance of na-
tional narratives and local norms, as well as international influences
and global forces, Jit was fashioning notions of a Bangsa Malaysia in
his theatre-making processes prior to its official declaration, but per-
haps with particular emphasis in the 1990s, to resonate with and cri-
tique the rhetoric being produced. While Mandal (2004) locates Jit as
one of the local arts practitioners who worked towards ‘transethnic soli-
darities’ where ‘Malaysians participate in society without respect for
ethnic backgrounds’ (Mandal 2004: 50), I suggest that Jit’s work was
in fact more cosmopolitan in its approach, albeit oriented towards a
‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ as developed by Mitchell Cohen (1995,
2005)15 and a ‘critical cosmopolitan imagination’ as defined by Gerard
Delanty (2006).16 Within this rooted and critical cosmopolitan ap-
proach, the emphasis is on a capacity to deal with difference, as ‘situ-
ated and open, dialogic and transformative’ (Delanty 2006), whilst
working with the ‘plural dimensions of human identity which don’t
rest easily with each other, and sometimes not at all’ (Cohen 1995) –
thus able to negotiate the ‘clash and collage’ as valuable and non-dis-
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ruptive. It posits a frame that is grounded in lived realities whilst being
permeable to influences beyond the boundary of the local, and in a
manner that is discursive and non-prescriptive, thus able to embrace
the shifts and struggles that ensue.
Whilst the cosmopolitan is often associated with the global and post-
national or transnational, it is also increasingly becoming an approach
with which to negotiate multiplicity within local spaces and national
boundaries, something Delanty (2006: 25) describes as ‘post-universa-
listic kinds of cosmopolitanism’. The national is engaged in an un-
bounded fashion to include the universalistic aspects of the cosmopoli-
tan, without denying the importance of either one.17 This approach
acknowledges the relationships between the ‘rootlessness’ of globalisa-
tion and its ‘rootedness’ to time and place, where Strangers need not
be from afar nor kept at arm’s length, and the ‘Otherness’ of the Other
is seen as an integral part of Self.
Having himself grown up and lived all his life negotiating difference
in a plural context, Jit’s theatre practice, which stretched from the
1960s until his untimely demise in 2005, encompassed a wide range
of cultural forms and styles (modernist, traditional, postmodern, post-
colonial, devised, text-based, site-specific, multilingual, culturally Malay,
Chinese, Indian, etc.), indicating his own capacity to experiment with
diversity and engage culture as ‘contested, temporal and emergent’
(Clifford 1986). This capacity to examine and articulate culture in an
inclusive and revealing manner stemmed from Jit’s interest in culture
as unbounded and multiple, a phenomenon prevalent in Malaysia and
similarly plural societies where official boundaries between commu-
nities are often transgressed in lived experience. In an interview about
his theatre practice, Jit explained:
I actually believe that in the case of plural societies such as Ma-
laysia and Singapore, and even certain parts of India, multicul-
turalism is in one body. We tend to think of it as a negotiation
between one body and another, but I actually think it is in one
body, and in many ways I have been trying to excavate that in
one way or another. (Jit in 2004)18
Jit’s process of ‘excavation’ entailed reassembling the elements of cul-
ture and identity by bringing together disparate and ‘strange’ parts of
the Malaysian community and reworking the boundaries that keep
ideas, images, accents, textures and sounds in confining, separate
realms. However, Jit’s theatre did not merely mix and fuse, it also
raised questions about the normative in an effort to create alternative
interpretations of history and identity, problematising the Self and
Other and their relatedness, in order to produce ‘a transformative vi-
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sion of an alternative society’ (Delanty 2006: 40). Nor did it dwell on
the harmony of multiplicity but told stories that ‘live[d] out the ten-
sions between universalism and particularism’ (Cohen 2003: 76) in or-
der to resist both limiting nationalism and homogenising globalisation.
Having travelled widely in his career as a theatre director and scho-
lar, Jit was influenced by the theatre discourses and practices that were
both regional and international. His study and engagement of the way
local and national, international and global theatre responded to
changes in the physicality and psyche of theatre-making were based on
interactions, collaborations and critical deliberations with directors and
practitioners that spanned Singapore and India, the USA and Indone-
sia. Jit’s own reflections on two seminal multicultural theatre perfor-
mances that embraced wide-ranging cultural differences, Peter Brook’s
Mahabharata (1985) and Ong Keng Sen’s Lear (1999), indicated his
views that the relationship between the particular and universal, local
and global, needs to be negotiated more thoroughly to reflect cultural
sensibilities adequately. His assertion that ‘you have to traverse through
the local cultural contexts in your journey to a global resolution’ (Jit
2003: 117) reflects his awareness of the problems that arise in simply
mixing, fusing or even hybridising cultural material with little insight
or integrity. Whilst he analysed both performances as spectacular and
strategic negotiations of the struggles of multicultural theatre in a glo-
bal society, he was nonetheless critical of the lack of ‘equal value’ given
to the ‘local concerns’ (Jit 2003: 117), reflecting his dissatisfaction with
reductive expressions of identity and culture.
Jit’s own multicultural productions, albeit on a smaller financial
scale and more often within the boundaries of a national frame, sought
to avoid these problems by developing conversations between local
‘strangers’ that gave voice to the uncertainties and incompleteness that
emerge in situated yet transitional identities. By working with local
stories that paid careful attention to issues of being Malaysian and the
challenges of negotiating a complex and varied Malaysian sensibility,
Jit’s work recognised the ‘need to talk to strangers’ (Appiah 2005: 222)
and expressed the ‘thick and thin relations’ (ibid.: 230-231) between
members of the community and nation.19 The value of Jit’s reflexive
engagement and imaginative interaction produced stagings of stories
with the potential to evoke ‘a cosmopolitan spirit’ (Appiah 2006) that
sought to perform and elicit dialogic and imaginative responses instead
of passive and prescriptive ones. If ‘the basic human capacity to grasp
stories, even strange stories, is also what links us powerfully to others,
even strange others’ (Appiah 2005: 257), then the questions that arise
are how Jit proceeded to do this and how adequately these expressions
of cosmopolitan clash and collage managed to interrogate socio-politi-
cal issues with clarity and resonance in a largely depoliticised audience.
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This also leads to concerns about how much of the process of cosmo-
politan imagining succeeded in being transformative, for all its open-
ness and reflexivity.
The stranger beneath the surface: Towards a questioning theatre
in Malaysia
I feel we don’t ask enough questions about our normative beha-
viour. We are not investing enough into what we see as Malay-
sians. I am trying to penetrate the whole issue of how we ima-
gine our community. Even if it is “imagined”, what is it that is
imagined? (Jit in Ambikaipaker 1999)
Since its independence from British colonial rule in 1957, Malaysia has
struggled to come to terms with its diverse cultural populace as a na-
tional ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983). Led politically by the
Barisan Nasional (National Front),20 an alliance of racially defined par-
ties, race informs many aspects of socio-cultural life and has led to Ma-
laysian theatre being divided along ethno-linguistic lines, producing
Malay Language Theatre (MLT), Chinese Language Theatre (CLT) and
Indian Language Theatre (ILT), often leading to participation in these
spheres along the same ethnic lines. The exception is English Lan-
guage Theatre (ELT), due to English being initially a colonial and then
educated upper-class language of power that overrides barriers of
race.21 In more recent times English has become the language of high
social status due to its prominence in international trade and a lan-
guage of popular culture due to its prevalence in global media – thus,
no longer simply regarded through older frames of colonial culture
and power. Jit’s theatre was largely part of ELT, and his explorations
and articulations of ‘what is imagined’ were within this somewhat ex-
cluded and elite space, confined to urban Malaysia and participated in
primarily by upper- and middle-class Malaysians – thus making his
cosmopolitan stagings susceptible to the criticism of being unavailable
to the masses.
In plural postcolonial societies such as Malaysia, where hierarchies
of culture have characterised the practices of multiculturalism and thus
perpetuated prejudice and segregation, the challenge is to transcend
these structures whilst respecting and representing the identities con-
cerned. Theatre that thus embodies and enacts the interstitial spaces
where the individual, community, nation and world intersect develops
a means of processing how these transitional constructs of identity can
provide a vocabulary of dialogic and cosmopolitan imaginings – even if
not widespread. By staging the tensions rather than denying them,
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forms of pluralist co-existence can be performed, viewed and reflected
upon, generating imaginative spaces where border crossings and over-
lapping allegiances are enjoyed as well as problematised – despite the
limited reach. The process of viewing and re-viewing identity in this
way is potent as it engages the bodies and voices, memories and experi-
ences of performers and audiences as simultaneously present texts in
connection with each other. The doubleness of theatre, which engages
the difference and relatedness between performer and character, place
and space, text and context, elicits multiple interpretations and transla-
tions of meaning as valid responses to images and ideas, words and ac-
tions, stories and situations – albeit within narrow confines. This chal-
lenges totalising nationalist narratives, which tend to define or deline-
ate with absolute certainty rather than grapple with openness and
flexibility. To resist practices that privilege a select few and perpetuate a
discriminatory status quo, the cosmopolitan ideal of ‘equity for all’ ad-
vocates that a fundamental right to respect and dignity are due to all
persons and cultures – regardless of their differences. This argues for a
sense of justice that operates within and transcends the boundaries of
nation, ethnicity, religion, class, gender, etc., dismantling the hierar-
chies of culture in order to develop more equitable paradigms of plural
practice, particularly within globalising economies. Not easy nor likely
to occur in the near future, but no less valuable as a principle for re-
thinking culture, modernity and nationhood.
As a Malaysian theatre practitioner and educator, my interest is to ex-
amine theatre as a medium that negotiates difference and examines
the conflicts of plurality in order to articulate and embody alternatives
to the dominant discourses of unitary cultures. My own identity as a
Malaysian resists being labelled officially as ‘Indian’ and ‘Christian’
when my culture is meaningless if not able to be inclusive of Malay,
Chinese, English, Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist and so on. Hence my par-
tiality towards processes in theatre practice, such as Jit’s, where multi-
ple and overlapping identities are reflexively represented and thus able
to intervene in a cultural imaginary. This is admittedly part of my own
journey to comprehend and extend the dialogues of difference that op-
erate within and without me – personally, socially and politically. Jill
Dolan (2005: 2) refers to theatre’s ability to provide ‘utopias in perfor-
mance’ where the coming together of persons in live performance of-
fers hope because they ‘share experiences of meaning making and ima-
gination that can describe or capture fleeting intimations of a better
world’. This intersubjectivity of performer and audience that leads to
reimaginings of what is possible in generating alternatives is some-
thing Jit’s theatre sought to provide.
Among the strategies that Jit deployed to embody and enact this ne-
gotiation of plurality were inter-racial casting and multilingual perfor-
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mances, where difference was performed as an integral part of Malay-
sian culture, and the multiple belongings and overlapping allegiances
of identities were explored as enriching resources of how ordinary peo-
ple deal with ordinary and extraordinary situations and why it matters.
Casting the stranger as no longer other
When Jit cast Malay and Chinese actors in Indian-Malaysian roles, or
Indian and Malay actors in Chinese-Malaysian roles, he prodded perfor-
mers and audiences to reconsider what is meant by Malay, Chinese or
Indian in a highly racialised Malaysian context, and how the interac-
tion of these identities within one body can occur – as in a Malay man
can be an Indian character and thus what is Indian or Malay is neces-
sarily constructed from the ideas, experiences and actions that are ‘per-
formed’ and not prescribed or inscribed. This raised issues about the
signification of an Indian character by a Malay actor, which refracted
meanings beyond race as literal to race as part of a composite that is
symbolic of power structures. This was not always readily received by
audiences, perhaps unwilling or unable to ‘read’ the signifiers in ques-
tion.
In 1994, when Jit cast a talented young Malay actor from MLT, Ham-
zah Tahir, as Ratnam, a young Indian working-class plantation worker,
in an ELT play The Cord by K.S. Maniam, two reviewers referred to the
actor as ‘miscast’ (Khoo 1994; Karim 1994). The character Ratnam is
situated at the heart of a community of disenfranchised estate-worker
Indian-Malaysians who resent feeling like outcasts in a country they
had chosen to make their home. Raising issues about entitlement and
belonging, the play centers around Ratnam’s relationship with his em-
bittered estate-worker father, Muniandy, and Muthiah, an arrogant Eng-
lish-educated Indian clerk who rises in status among the other estate
workers and is revealed as having fathered Ratnam by raping Lakshmy,
Muniandy’s deceased wife. Ratnam is the angry young man, disap-
pointed with his lot in life and lives in dreams of escape that include
buying a Yamaha motorcycle which ‘when you sit on it, you’re riding
heaven’ (Maniam 1994: 33).
Jit’s casting of a young Malay actor from small-town Malaysia in this
lead role pointed to the shared disenfranchisement of non-urban, work-
ing-class Malays who were also made to feel like outcasts in a country
that purported to serve their interests. Whilst all the other actors who
played Indian-Malaysian roles were of upper- and middle-class urban
Indian background, myself included, it was the casting of Hamzah that
seemed to unsettle and raise questions. In both reviews, little was said
about his performance skills, but allusion was made to his being
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unsuited to the role by virtue of his background. Somehow, the fact
that the rest of us were not working-class Indians did not raise con-
cerns about our suitability to perform these roles. So was it Hamzah’s
accent, or his racialised skin that did not fit?
I suggest that the verisimilitude of class alone was less important be-
cause the play was in English, and it felt ‘normal’ to hear upper-middle
class Indian-Malaysians take on working-class roles, speaking in an ap-
parently ‘unmarked’ accent of Malaysian-English, not quite free of the
registers of class and race, but more similar to the accents of an ELT
audience perhaps. However, the corporeal presence of a MLT actor
speaking English in his own accent, inflected by both class and ethni-
city, disrupted the imaginings of a unitary culture of working-class In-
dians. By staging Hamzah’s portrayal of Ratnam in a manner that
overtly juxtaposed Hamzah’s identity with Ratnam’s, Jit pushed towards
a confrontation of cultures where that which is considered contamina-
tion due to hybridisation and thus mongrelisation and impurity of
identity, was reclaimed as empowering as it challenged the normative
comforts of elite culture.
In the hubris of economic affluence that characterised the early
1990s in Kuala Lumpur, the idea that an urban English-speaking
group of Malaysians expected to watch a performance about disenfran-
chised estate Indians without notions of implication indicates not
merely the elitism of ELT, but also its general insulation from the less
palatable questions about political equity and social justice. Thus, when
a MLT actor is seen to refract the meaning of marginalisation, and Rat-
nam says to Muthiah, played by Vadaketh Chacko22, in a bitter con-
frontation about his worth:
You nothing but stick. You nothing but stink. Look all clean, in-
side all thing dirty. Outside everything. Inside nothing. Taking-
making. Walking-talking. Why you insulting all time? Why you
no like me? Why you sit on me like monkey with wet back-side?
(Maniam 1994: 64)
Hamzah’s political presence could unsettle an affluent audience unwill-
ing to confront the prejudices they embody – whatever their race.
Although Malay-Malaysians are indubitably the politically dominant
race, fluency in English gives access to a different kind of prestige, and
thus it is possible that ELT audiences (largely non-Malay) secure their
notion of ‘superiority’ – between and within races – by classifying lan-
guage as a significant determinant of acceptance, even within the ap-
parently neutral space of ELT. In this way, the ‘oppressor’ is not simply
the powers of state, but the forces of culture and society that perpetuate
exclusion and prejudice – within and beyond the nation. This conveni-
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ently deracialised segregation of the upper-class, deliberately sustained
by the ruling coalition in order to project an image of ‘equality and jus-
tice’ in the bid towards a Bangsa Malaysia, was being shaken and stir-
red by Jit’s astute staging of marginalisation as beyond race. The lan-
guage of class and culture were performed to pry open the tensions
that lay beneath the surface and the apprehension of the reviewers sig-
nals the reluctance or incapacity to deal with this. Language – spoken,
gestured, embodied and performed – is thus recognised as a potent
theatrical signifier of social and cultural identity (singular and multi-
ple), as well as political and economic mobility (upward and down-
ward), thus able to produce both solidarity and suspicion simulta-
neously.
Conversing with the Stranger and the Self
Issues of language use and language policy weave an intricate and
complex map in Malaysian society as the diversity of languages that are
spoken retain intellectual and affective, national and communal, perso-
nal and global value. Whilst Malay is the national and official language,
English, Chinese (Mandarin, Cantonese, Hokkien, Hakka, etc.) and In-
dian (Tamil, Telugu, Hindi, Malayalam, etc.) languages are also spoken,
and in a wide variety of mix and match. Most Malaysians are fluent in
more than one language, if not accent, register or dialect, thus making
it inevitable for switches and mixes to occur, depending on the de-
mands of context. Particularly in spoken discourse, languages are
mixed and accents frequently switched to indicate the corresponding
meanings implied by these changes. This is done not merely to accom-
modate the listener, but also to enhance the vocabularies of the speaker
with more than one register of interaction and connection. This deals
with difference in a syncretic and fluid way, able to use the everyday to
‘invent a personal language’, something de Certeau (1988: xxii) identi-
fies as one of the ‘strategies of modernity’.
Jit’s multilingual performances were often devised plays in which he
would work with actors of diverse racial and class backgrounds and en-
courage a collage of stories in multiple languages through an improvi-
sation process to produce a conversation between Strangers for perfor-
mance. This produced multilingual texts that depicted the diversity of
the performers and the characters they embodied, revealing the inter-
sections and interstices that marked what these languages meant to-
gether and apart. Whilst some performers spoke only in the language
associated with their ‘official’ identity (e.g. a Malay speaking Malay, a
Chinese speaking Chinese), others would perform in a mix of lan-
guages that included those deemed ‘Other’ to them (e.g. a Chinese
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speaking Malay, a Malay speaking English, etc.).23 Jit’s multilingual
texts were characterised by constant language and code switching to
portray the fluidity of communication that is possible when the needs
exceed the rules. A performer could speak in a variety of languages
within one sentence, from different accents of English to variations of
Malay and Chinese. What is significant is that this would not seem
strange to a local Malaysian audience (or audiences accustomed to liv-
ing in a multilingual environment) adept at processing language as
mixed and multiple.
In one such devised work performed in 1999, called A Chance En-
counter, Jit explored the negotiations of difference between two women
who meet across a cosmetics counter in a shopping mall. They are
from differing backgrounds, generations and ethnicities and, despite
this, draw on their sense of shared vocabularies to communicate stories
about their lives and memories. Their interaction is encoded in multi-
ple texts that use diverse registers and vocabularies, unbound by offi-
cial grammars or rules. The young Chinese cosmetics saleswoman, An-
ita, played by Foo May Lyn, speaks in educated, grammatical English,
Cantonese-inflected English, Cantonese and a patois of Malay, as if it
were all part of the same language – one of the many ‘Malaysian’ lan-
guages that are concocted to meet the requirements of the speaker and
listener. This range depicts not only the more ‘rooted cosmopolitan’ di-
versity of the character, but the versatility of the actor as well, suggest-
ing that various cultural worlds operate in her construct and operation
of self.
The elderly Indian-Muslim housewife, Fatima, played by Faridah
Merican, speaks only Malay (specifically Penang-Malay, which is
marked by a distinct accent and vocabulary) but understands a smatter-
ing of English as well.24 Being more provincial and of an older genera-
tion, Fatima commands due respect from the younger woman, who ac-
commodates the older woman’s linguistic needs as part of her goal to
promote and sell her product. As the two women talk about looking
beautiful, being healthy and using cosmetics, they reveal a capacity to
establish diverse connections with each other, such as a shared love of
movies and telling ghost stories. This eventually leads to them sharing
more private episodes about their families and relationships, and in so
doing, they unravel their stories, values and cultural frames and come
to realise that they are in fact not strangers but were once neighbours
in a different city. Their ‘chance encounter’ as Strangers produces re-
vealing insights into how their lives are in fact part of a shared narra-
tive. As they engage with the cosmetic makeover of exfoliation and hy-
dration – now familiar processes in the global beauty market – they
peel off layers of dead skin to reveal what lies beneath.
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As a devised play, the dialogue performed was not scripted but cre-
ated in rehearsal when the director and actors, with the additional help
of the playwright, Leow Puay Tin, improvised with a language that
could convey the complexities of the fluid context. They devised a code
of speaking that was inflected by expressive and demonstrative actions
– gestures that helped to build meaning and connection across their
multiple styles of signification. This is in fact a way of being ‘Malay-
sian’ that is identifiable to most urban Malaysians who deal with their
cultural space by accommodating as they see fit; and theatre offers the
ideal site for staging and problematising this reality. By weaving the fic-
tion and reality with a cosmopolitan imagination, Jit was challenging
the notion of ‘pure’ languages that need to be used according to a ‘stan-
dard’. Jit explained that the language used was:
… not broken25 Malay but an invented language that is not-not
Malay … It is a language for the stage that is not real but can
convey the ideas necessary with a Malaysian accent, tone and
colour. (Jit in 1999)26
By giving credence to this ‘invented’ language, Jit performed a politics
of language that was open to incorporating non-standard varieties as
their own creolised mixtures, which needed to be fluid and able to inte-
grate change as it occurred. The freedom to ‘mix and blend’ also gave
agency to the performers to create a language they could wield and
own, whilst imagining the possibilities that occur on a daily basis.
For example, when Anita explains some of the benefits of her beauty
products, she uses literal and thus awkward translations of English
phrases into Malay (e.g., ‘makan itu lemak’ – devour that fat, ‘kasi kilat’
– give shine) to describe how they work. However, at other times she
would use the technical terms in English (e.g., anti-cellulite, light-re-
flecting) but struggle to pronounce these words as they are clearly not
part of her familiar register. However, what is most effective is the cru-
cial language of gesture such as when she demonstrates ‘toning and
firming’ by physically outlining her svelte figure and pointing to how it
‘jadi satu S la!’ (becomes an S you see) to indicate the curves in the
right places. The value of staging and performing this process of trans-
lation is an opportunity for the audience to reflexively interpret how
language works in pluralist spaces and how an open and fluid ap-
proach to conversation enhances the possibilities of making connec-
tions.
Apart from the appealing humour of these moments, the resonance
of hearing and watching these ‘invented’ yet ‘identifiable’ languages
challenged the viewer to question what really constitutes the language
of Malaysians when encountering strangers on the street. Whilst the
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play was a veritable success and reviewed as being ‘one of the most
powerful works of Malaysian theatre in recent times’ (Khoo 1999) and
a ‘penetrating reflection of Malaysian life’ (Dass 1999), it was also ad-
mittedly difficult to access for the ‘less local’ audiences who were either
not Malaysian or whose knowledge of Malaysian languages were more
singular.27 Here Jit turned the tables, particularly on the urban Eng-
lish-speaking global citizen, to privilege the Malaysian-speaking local
citizen whose capacity to span several languages whilst moving comfor-
tably between them was not denigrated as contaminated, but cele-
brated.
Conclusion
… a pluralist liberal democratic society does not deny the exis-
tence of conflicts but provides the institutions allowing them to
be expressed in an adversarial form … A well functioning de-
mocracy calls for a clash of legitimate democratic political posi-
tions. This is what the confrontation between left and right
needs to be about. Such a confrontation should provide collec-
tive forms of identification strong enough to mobilize passions.
If this adversarial configuration is missing, passions cannot be
given a democratic outlet and the agonistic dynamics of plural-
ism are hindered. (Mouffe 2005: 30)
A cosmopolitan imagining that is grounded in a socially situated and
political understanding of culture does not avoid the tensions that
emerge in spaces where the collisions of culture and identity occur but
develops spaces and vocabularies for engaging with them creatively
and reflexively. Mouffe’s (2005: 1-34) argument for ‘agonistic’ processes
that allocate space for the representation of conflicts that emerge as a
result of the ‘we/they’ dichotomy stresses the need to ensure differ-
ences remain and disagreements are reflected in the effort to sustain
working relations. By developing platforms and stages where the stor-
ies of these conflicts can be told from a variety of voices, to reflect the
range of ideologies and diverse practices, the clashes and collages can
be examined and apprehended with more insight and depth.
The stories we tell and the experiences we share in theatre character-
ise our preoccupations and perceptions in one way or another. They
are arguably ‘collective forms of identification strong enough to mobi-
lize passions’ (Mouffe 2005: 30) that are produced through the lenses
of performativity and the semiotics of staging. In that sense they pro-
vide ‘democratic outlets’ as opportunities to converse with one another
and confront the sensibilities that determine our responses to each
PERFORMING COSMOPOLITAN CLASH AND COLLAGE 189
other, providing insights into how we negotiate encounters with the
different and similar, strange and familiar. As inhabitants of a world
that is becoming increasingly interconnected with each new technolo-
gical device designed to improve connectivity and networking, the need
to be skilled in dealing with difference escalates further. The presence
of greater diversity in the cities and transit lounges that also reflect the
rapidly growing migratory flows that result from new trade agreements
and outsourcing contracts also point to the need to transcend the de-
monising of the Stranger. But how do we process our interactions with
Strangers in a manner that improves the dynamics of conversing with
Strangers, without having to coerce them into losing their ‘strange-
ness’?
Theatre that questions the normative notion of Strangers as ‘un-
knowable and undesirable’ by recognising the commonalities we share
as human beings resists the socialised tendency to distance Strangers
by revealing the relatedness of Self and Other, ‘we and they’. In addi-
tion, much theatre has come to recognise its capacity to reckon with
the ‘strange-nesses’ in that which appears familiar – the Self in the
Other, ‘them in us’, and vice versa. Defamiliarisation, or Brechtian alie-
nation, prods a conscious and active reflection about what is being
staged and how it is being staged – moving away from naturalist as-
sumptions about theatre being a simple mirror of reality. Here theatre
operates more like a prism to refract the images and ideas that may at
first appear incomprehensible but are really a process of developing
more acute critical consciousness and political insight.
Jit’s theatre-making processes to produce experimental yet resonant
performances were informed by his insatiable curiosity about the hu-
man condition and an empathetic understanding of the complexities
that pertained to being human. His capacity to operate as a ‘cosmopoli-
tan bricoleur of resistance and cooperation’ (Hardt and Negri 2004: 50)
and skillfully draw on difference as a cultural resource was related to
his experience as a trained historian and his own participation in thea-
tre within a range of capacities – as director, producer, educator, critic
and adviser. This plurality of lives that Jit led, within and without the
theatre, gave him insights into culture and identity that evoked ques-
tions about how the multiplicity and interactions that produce the dra-
ma of our existence can be better articulated and reflected on. His
choice to then experiment with stagings of the Stranger that sought to
articulate the ‘agonistic dynamics of pluralism’ (Mouffe 2005: 30) was
an effort towards confronting the tensions of recasting difference and
questioning the representations of inclusive plurality. By problematis-
ing normative constructs and performing alternatives based on open-
ness, Jit indicated how theatre’s capacity to converse is critical to story-
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telling and story-sharing, thus crucial to the ‘modern solidarity’ (Ap-
piah 2005: 245) that will proffer a cohesive multiplicity.
Notes
1 The notion of empathy is characterised by a capacity to feel for the Other even if one
is not able to understand everything about the Other’s position and perspective. In a
discussion on transethnic solidarities within Malaysian political and cultural practice,
Mandal (2004: 65) also refers to the need for ‘empathy towards difference’ in the pro-
cess of moving away from coercive processes of dealing with identity that create toler-
ance more than acceptance.
2 Malays are defined by not only their racial category but also religion: constitutionally
being Malay in Malaysia includes being Muslim as well. Whilst Indians are asso-
ciated with being Hindu and Chinese with being Taoist-Buddhist, these aspects of
their identity are not constitutionally defined. Being Christian does not imply any
particular race, but it does suggest being non-Malay and is associated with being An-
glophone, although several churches operate in Chinese, Tamil and Malay. The conti-
nuation of policies that privilege the Malays and subsequently deny non-Malay seg-
ments of society equal rights is evident in political discourses that perpetuate con-
cepts such as ‘ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy) and pendatang (newcomer)’ to
refer to Malaysians of Malay and non-Malay lineage, respectively. This discriminatory
and chauvinistic practice asserts a rightful claim for Malays to be granted privilege
and special status that alienates the non-Malay citizen (see Mandal 2004: 57).
3 See Loh and Khoo (2002) for comprehensive discussions on the problematic dis-
courses of democracy in Malaysia, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s.
4 Most recently, the stirring images of the HINDRAF demonstrations in December
2007, when unarmed demonstrators from the marginalised Indian community, in-
cluding men, women and children, were dispersed by the state with water cannons,
depict the kinds of civil rights abuse that produce anger and resentment. See http://
www.malaysiakini.com/news/75315 for a compilation of special reports on the HIN-
DRAF events. In other instances human rights and arts groups have also been the
target of state crackdowns. See Khoo, Tikamdas and Wong (2003) for a discussion on
the Malaysian arts community’s struggle to resist censorship in the 1990s; and Ra-
jendran (2002) for an examination of the politics of theatre that attempts to resist
the normative through strategic devices of artistic framing.
5 The Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Alliance) is a newly formed coalition of opposition par-
ties that are multiracial and multireligious in character. Combining the secular DAP
(Democratic Action Party) and the Islamic PAS (Parti Islam SeMalaysia) with the Par-
ti Keadilan (Justice Party) formed by Anwar Ibrahim after his dismissal from office
in 1998, this new political process requires the skill and space to create new plat-
forms for political organisations that are no longer ruled by racial or religious profile.
This capacity to deal with this challenge will determine the success of the coalition in
the long run.
6 See http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/80152 and http://www.malaysiakini.com/
news/81611 for a range of articles on the implications of 8 March 2008, now termed
a ‘political tsunami’ to reflect the scale and unexpectedness of what occurred. The
tsunami metaphor also points to the large task ahead to rebuild national integrity
and political justice after several decades of severe erosion due to corruption, crony-
ism and nepotism, three evils identified in particular with the Mahathir era.
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7 A notable exception is the website led by the academic and political activist, Dr Farish
Noor, which calls itself ‘The Other Malaysia’ in which the team declares, ‘We are
committed to an academic culture that is democratic, progressive, pluralist, multicul-
tural, anti-racist, anti-sectarian and anti-communalist. We take as our starting point
the premise that Malaysia is and has always been a plural society where respect for
alterity and difference has to be made a priority. But for pluralism to be defended
and cherished, a society like ours requires a common national narrative and imagery
that is inclusive rather than exclusive, accommodating rather than reactionary’. See
Noor (2008).
8 The racial riots of May 1969 are cited time and again by the state as a warning that
racial relations in Malaysia are a ‘fragile’ and ‘sensitive’ area. Whilst undoubtedly the
events of May 1969 remain as a vivid reminder of the extent to which economic and
cultural disenfranchisement can lead to violent outbursts, the socio-political situation
in Malaysia has changed considerably and is more complex than it used to be.
9 ‘Multiple belongings’ and ‘overlapping allegiances’ are phrases frequently used in the
discourse on cosmopolitanism to discuss identity constructs as inherently plural,
even in seemingly homogenous cultures. They challenge the idea that ‘singular’ be-
longings and ‘distinct’ allegiances, ideas propagated by nationalism and communal-
ism are the only valid basis on which to build a sense of social cohesion.
10 Mandal (2001: 160) cites Jit’s work as ‘articulations of Malaysia’s hybrid realities’ that
reiterate the capacity of Jit’s theatre to deal with difference as desirable rather than
deviant – stagings that drew on difference as a resource for understanding the hu-
man condition with more depth and dialogue.
11 Dr Mahathir Mohamed was the Prime Minister of Malaysia from 1981-2003. During
this time he implemented several changes in policy that led to the Mahathir era be-
coming one of the most complex and dynamic in Malaysian political history. See
Cheah (2002: 159 -184) for a discussion on Mahathir’s rule as Prime Minister.
12 The word bangsa refers to ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ but does not translate exactly as either
one. Bumiputera, which literally means ‘prince of the soil’ is the term initially used to
refer only to Malaysians of Malay origin and is now inclusive of other indigenous
groups such as the Iban, Kadazan and Dusun groups.
13 See Gomez (2004b) for discussion on these issues and the impact of poor imple-
mentation of state policies on the state of Malaysia.
14 For more extensive discussion on Jit’s stagings of difference in Malaysia, see Rajen-
dran and Wee (2007).
15 Mitchell Cohen’s (1995: 233) ‘rooted cosmopolitan’ frame proposes a ‘dialectical con-
cept’ that ‘accepts multiplicity of roots and branches and which rests in the legiti-
macy of plural loyalties, of standing in many circles, but with common ground’.
16 Delanty (2006: 38) distinguishes the cosmopolitan imagination as being ‘a form of
cultural contestation’ which is ‘reflexive’, ‘internalized’ and ‘defined by an openness’,
which engages the tensions between the local and global, universal and particular as
the ‘basic animus’ (ibid.: 35) of cosmopolitanism.
17 Among the diverse cosmopolitanisms that have emerged in the discourse, the ‘verna-
cular’, ‘discrepant’, ‘rooted’ and ‘cosmofeminist’ speak particularly to this idea. See
Robbins (1998) on the various cosmopolitanisms and Cheah (1998) for a discussion
of how the ‘cosmopolitical’ is a ‘mutating global field’ in which the opposition be-
tween cosmopolitanism and nationalism is questioned, and the hyphen between the
nation and the state informs the relationship with the global. Cheah and Robbins
(1998) provides a comprehensive range of deliberations on the links between the na-
tional and the cosmopolitan and the ensuing relationships between them that are not
necessarily oppositional.
18 Krishen Jit, May 2004, in a recorded interview with Charlene Rajendran.
192 CHARLENE RAJENDRAN
19 In a chapter entitled ‘Rooted Cosmopolitanism’ Appiah (2005: 213-272) discusses the
difficulties of ‘obligations to strangers’ in relation to the abstractness of nationalism
and how it ‘posits a relation among strangers’ (ibid.: 238) and thus ‘relations between
citizens must, of necessity, be relations between strangers’ (ibid.: 217). In connection
with this he distinguishes between moral and ethical obligations using Avishai Mar-
galit’s notions of ‘ought’ to characterise the difference between thick and thin rela-
tions – thick relations pertain between those who share a past or collective memory
compared to thin relations, which apply to strangers who simply share a humanity
(ibid.: 230-231).
20 Malaysia’s main political coalition, the Barisan Nasional (Malay: National Front) is
made up of communally defined parties that are meant to represent the interests of
each group accordingly. Each of the main party components, namely the United Ma-
lay National Organisation (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Ma-
laysian Indian Congress (MIC), also has a sub-party for women that is allocated a
quota of representatives within the main party. Whilst this reflects a plural society, it
also prevents a more integrated cohesion in national identity. See Shamsul (2001) for
an extended discussion on pluralism and plural society in Malaysia and its transfor-
mation in the course of history.
21 See Philip (2005) and Rowland (2005) for discussions on how ELT provides a ‘neu-
tral’ space within which issues of race are examined with greater openness and cri-
tique. Their arguments assert that English is both an international language as well
as a Malaysian language – no longer simply regarded in contemporary Malaysian
contexts as a ‘colonial’ language that needs to be resisted. As a result, theatre in Eng-
lish has been the most integrative and plural as practitioners are not dominated by
any particular racial group unlike in Malay, Chinese and Indian language theatres.
22 Educated in local and international education institutions of high repute that in-
cluded the Victoria Institution, Malaysia, and Cambridge University, in the UK,
Chacko invariably represented the elite and upper-class Indian in Malaysia, and his
accent would have been noticeably inflected with these markers as well.
23 Unfortunately, these did not include the more marginalised groups and languages,
namely Indian and Aboriginal, reflecting theatre’s poor reach to these sections of so-
ciety.
24 Significantly, Faridah Merican is a well-known ELT and MLT actor whose public pre-
sence as an English newscaster on television and radio makes her portrayal of this
role one that is also layered with questions about the mix and fluidity of her own
identity.
25 Broken English’ is the term used to refer to ungrammatical English. English that in-
corporates words and syntactical structures from other languages such as Malay, Can-
tonese and Tamil is sometimes called Malaysian-English – seen as an ‘impure’ ver-
sion of the standard.
26 Krishen Jit, March 1999, in a video-recorded interview with Ray Langenbach.
27 A small number of audience members, mostly foreign to Malaysia, expected to see a
play in English and left soon after they encountered problems with the language
being used. Some demanded a refund of their ticket, and their contention was that
the title was in English and thus gave the wrong impression. This raises questions
about whether a multi-lingual performance should also have multi-lingual titles. It
also reiterates the need for Malaysian theatre to rework its division along linguistic
lines and become more inclusive of cultural experience beyond the boundaries of ‘of-
ficial’ languages.
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12 Constructing Identity:
Visual Expressions of Islam in the
Predominantly Catholic Philippines
Vivienne SM. Angeles1
Introduction
Government policies in response to Muslim agitation for independence
as well as the increasing contacts between Muslim and non-Muslim Fi-
lipinos on the one hand and the Middle East on the other have im-
pacted the way Philippine Muslims present themselves visually. From
their perspective, their traditional status as members of ethnic groups
has evolved into one of membership in a worldwide umma that looks
to Saudi Arabia as the centre of Islam. There is, therefore, a de-empha-
sis on ethnic clothing, art and architecture and the acceptance and pro-
motion of what they consider to be Islamic forms of dress, art and ar-
chitecture characteristic of the Middle East. Filipino converts to Islam,
many of whom were introduced to this religion in the Middle East
where they were contract workers, have followed suit. Muslim identity
formation happens now through visual expressions of Islam as mani-
fested through clothing, art and architecture within the contexts of
minority status, Philippine Christian-Muslim relations and the escalat-
ing Philippine labour migration to the Middle East.
The Philippines: Asia’s Catholic country
The combined efforts of Spanish missionaries and conquerors in the
Philippines from 1521 to 1898 resulted in the conversion of a majority
of Filipinos in Luzon and the Visayas islands to Christianity.2 Muslims
in the southern part of the country resisted Spanish incursions, but
the latter’s continuing military advances relegated the former to pro-
vinces in the southern island of Mindanao that became identified as
Muslim areas. The interplay of religion, politics and economics made
for a confrontational type of relationship between Muslims and Spa-
niards in the course of over three centuries of colonisation (Majul 1973;
Warren 1985). Considering the Spanish goal of Christianisation and
their success in most parts of the country in this regard, religion be-
came a salient feature of Filipino identity. American occupation, which
began in 1898, sustained this religious distinction by creating the Bu-
reau of Non-Christian Tribes as an administrative unit, in spite of the
American ideal of a separation of church and state. Today, the Philip-
pine population is estimated at 96,061,680 of which 80.9% are Ro-
man Catholics and 5% are Muslims.3
Until the 1970s, Muslims were concentrated in the southern parts of
the Philippines where they constitute a religious majority in several
provinces such as Sulu, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, and Maguinda-
nao. By the mid-1970s, Muslims started moving to other parts of the
country for better economic opportunities, education4 or as refugees
from the military conflict in various Muslim areas. As they moved
northwards, they either lived among Christians or created their own
communities. The number of Muslims in the non-traditionally Muslim
areas has been growing, and they have become very noticeable because
of how they express their Muslim identity visually through their mos-
ques, art and the clothes they wear.
The study
This study focuses on visual expressions of Islam. It concentrates on
the material culture of religion as a form of visual language used to ex-
press believers’ understanding of their religion, their perception of
themselves and how they want others to view them. It is a form of
communication in which, through objects, clothing, art and architec-
ture, a person’s beliefs and religious identity are conveyed to the viewer.
Although the use of these material objects may have been affected by
other reasons, such as peer or parental pressure, these expressions can
primarily be taken as religious statements because the individual be-
lieves that how he or she presents herself is a way of actualising reli-
gious beliefs. However, this non-verbal form of communication has to
be viewed in the context of Philippine realities: the continuing tension
between Muslims and Christians, especially the seemingly never-end-
ing conflict in the south of the Philippines – in recent years armed
confrontations between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the
military take place intermittently – and the increasing labour export to
the Middle East. We will look at the mosque, clothing, home and some
art forms as vehicles for visual expression of Muslim identity in a
country that is predominantly Christian.
The research focuses on visual expressions of Philippine Islam as
manifested in the traditionally Muslim and non-Muslim areas and the
changes to which they are subjected. It will be argued that Philippine
government policies in response to Muslim agitation for independence
together with increasing contacts between Philippine Muslims and the
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Middle East have affected the way Philippine Muslims view and pre-
sent themselves. Government responses to the secessionist movement
led to policies that made conditions favourable for Islamic resurgence
and, hence, helped usher in a more vigorous Muslim assertion of their
identity. Equally important is the increasing contact between the Philip-
pines and the Middle East insofar as it has influenced Muslim percep-
tion and expression of their identity as part of the global umma. This
contact with the Middle East has also affected the religious composi-
tion of the country.
The setting
The Philippines comprises about 7,100 islands with a total land area of
117,000 square miles. Muslims are concentrated in the largest southern
island of Mindanao, particularly in the southwestern region, which is
closer to Malaysia and Indonesia than to the capital city, Manila. My
choice of research locations was dictated by the need to visit commu-
nities that are representative of the northern, middle and southern parts
of the country. The intention was to see how far North Muslims have
settled and also observe how Islam continues to be expressed visually in
one of the first places to which it was introduced: Simunul Island.
Plate 12.1 Map of the Philippines. Highlighted areas indicate places visited
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Islam and ethnicity in the Philippines
Muslims in the southern Philippines are from different ethnic groups
distinguished by various characteristics. The major Muslim ethnic
groups are: Tausug, Maranao, Maguindanao, Yakan, Samal, Sangil,
Jama Mapun, Palawani, Molbog, Illanun, Kalibugan and Kalagan. They
speak different languages, pursue different occupations, and tradition-
ally wear different types of clothing with distinct weaves and colours
particular to these tribes. These ethnic differences notwithstanding,
they share a common Muslim identity, which is critical to their rela-
tionship with the government and Christian Filipinos (Noble 1975).
Their identity traditionally combines ethnicity with religious identity;
thus being a Muslim became synonymous with being a member of
these tribes. The distinction, therefore, between what is Islamic and
what is ethnic is blurred in the eyes and understanding of the non-
Muslims and, in some ways, also the Muslims.5 Muslims I interviewed
over the years see Islam and their ethnic customs and traditions as so
strongly intertwined that one is identical with the other.
When traders and missionaries introduced Islam to the Philippines
in the 14th century, it was received by the people in a way quite differ-
ent from the tension and conflict that characterised the Spanish con-
version to Christianity (Majul 1973). The depth, intensity, and centrality
of the Filipino experience of Islam varied, but the fact that these Filipi-
nos considered themselves Muslims at the point of Spanish contact im-
plied a sense of community and connectedness with Muslims in other
parts of the world. The intensity of their ‘Muslimness’ has been ques-
tioned by colonial writers (Combes 1897: 41-44) and contemporary
scholars (McKenna 1998), but from the perspective of religious studies,
we see that Islam provided them with a sense of identity and commu-
nity vis-a`-vis the majority Christian population. Expressing this identity
in the non-Muslim areas, however, has not been easy because of ten-
sions between Muslims and Christians.
Muslims and the Philippine government
The relationship between Muslims and the independent Philippine
government has been fraught with difficulties since 1946. Largely re-
sponsible for this is the Spanish colonial heritage of Christian-Muslim
conflict, the government-sponsored Christian settlement of Muslim an-
cestral lands and general government neglect of Muslim areas, all of
which left a legacy of mutually negative perceptions among Muslims
and Christians. Muslims felt alienated from what they called the
‘Christian government’ and began to consider their poor economic si-
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tuation as the result of government discriminatory policies (Angeles
1987). One of the Muslim responses to this state of affairs was the for-
mation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1969. The
MNLF defined itself as a revolutionary movement whose goal was to
establish an Islamic state in the southern Philippines.6 By the time
President Marcos declared martial law in 1972, the MNLF had become
a well-organised and well-funded movement, enjoying wide support
among Philippine Muslims and from countries like Saudi Arabia, Li-
bya and Pakistan. Soon after this declaration, the government and
Muslims engaged in a full-scale war that resulted in great numbers of
military and civilian casualties. As the military conflict escalated, Mus-
lim countries pressured the Philippine government to resolve the con-
flict.
Part of the government response was to launch policies that were
not only conducive to the practice of Islam but also contributed to the
articulation of Muslim identity, particularly in places outside of Minda-
nao. While maintaining the perception of the Philippines as Asia’s
Catholic country in its travel promotions, in 1973 the government
started to officially recognise Islam as part of Filipino heritage. Then
President Marcos issued a decree asserting that the preservation and
enhancement of Islamic tradition and the promotion of well-being of
Muslim communities would guide the policy in Mindanao.7 With the
intensifying conflict in the background, various other presidential de-
crees were issued, among them a decree recognising Muslim holidays
– the Eid al Fitr, Eid al Adha, Maulid al Nabi, Laila al Isra wa’l Miraj
and Ammon Jaddid – as legal Philippine holidays.8 In the same year,
President Marcos also signed a decree establishing the Philippine Cen-
ter for Advanced Studies at the University of the Philippines, which in-
cludes an Institute of Islamic Studies.9 In 1978, the government cre-
ated the Philippine Pilgrimage Authority to take care of hajj arrange-
ments for Philippine Muslims. Although these actions raised possible
issues about the separation of church and state as guaranteed in the
Philippine constitution, the government was quick to emphasise that it
was responding to the needs of its ethnic minorities who happen to be
Muslims. On the part of Muslims, these decrees served to break down
the barriers that alienated them from feeling part of the Philippine na-
tion because of their different religion10 and allowed them to more
openly and visually express their Muslim identity in the non-Muslim
areas. The government hoped that these legal instruments, albeit pro-
mulgated during the period of martial law, would lead to an improve-
ment in relations between Christians and Muslims and would end the
rebellion.
The MNLF rebellion reached its height in the mid-1970s and took its
toll on the people and government. Many Muslims left their homes to
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seek refuge in other parts of the Philippines and in Malaysia. Some
moved all the way north to Aparri and built communities, established
mosques and madaris.11 Before long, enclaves of Muslims emerged in
various Philippine cities and towns, but since land area is limited,
homes in these enclaves are tightly packed. These places became ve-
nues for Muslims to preserve and maintain their lifestyles, their reli-
gion and its material culture.
Philippine Muslims and the Muslim world
Historically, Philippine Muslims had trade contacts with the Middle
East long before the advent of Spanish colonisation. It was, however,
the late 1950s when Filipinos began going to the Middle East to study,
particularly to Egypt’s Al Azhar University.12 The number of Muslim
countries offering scholarships to Muslim Filipinos increased over
time, so that by the 1980s Filipinos were also going to Syria, Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Pakistan and Malaysia for their education.
Filipino contact with the international Muslim community is not
limited to Muslim Filipinos. In the last 25 years, labour has become
the major Philippine export, with the majority of overseas Filipino
workers (OFW) going to the Middle East, especially to Saudi Arabia.13
OFWs can also be found in the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar,
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Bahrain and other countries in the region.
These linkages, whether through education or employment, have
helped not only in promoting an Islamic consciousness among Philip-
pine Muslims, but also in drawing them to active involvement with the
larger, international umma (Angeles 2001). At the same time, this si-
tuation introduced many Christian Filipinos to Islam, which eventually
led to conversion in a number of cases. Lacar found out from his inter-
view of 322 converts that about a quarter of them had been to the Mid-
dle East as OFWs, but most converted upon their return to the Philip-
pines. Only about 6% converted while they were still in the Middle
East (Lacar 2001). This phenomenon of Filipino Catholic conversion
continues to grow, and in the Philippines this has given rise to the var-
ious Balik Islam14 groups, several of which are involved in missionary
activities. One of them, the Islamic Studies Call and Guidance (IS-
CAG), has established Muslim communities centred on a mosque in
various parts of the country. Together with the internal northward mi-
gration of southern Philippine Muslims, the establishment of Balik Is-
lam communities has contributed to the growing visibility of Muslims
in the non-Muslim areas of the Philippines.
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The mosque as visual expression of Muslim identity
The mosque comprises several categories of material culture: artefacts,
landscape, architecture and art. Mosques are man-made, they alter the
landscape, they reflect a particular type of architecture, and it is also a
place where Islamic art is visible. As a sacred space where believers
prostrate themselves before God, it is important to look at the mosque
structure in terms of ritual actions – specifically prayer. One of the ‘pil-
lars’ (basic requirements) of Islam is salat (prayer), which is to be per-
formed five times daily.15 Muslims perform their prayers wherever they
are, but the congregational prayer at Friday noon (salat al jumma)
should be done in the mosque. Majul (1978: 780) asserts that from a
philosophical point of view, the mosque on Fridays ‘represents the
place where the concerted submission of all Muslims to a rigidly con-
ceived monotheism is publicly expressed’. The structure of the mosque
is linked to actions involved in praying. The Qur’an (2: 144, 149, 150)
requires facing in the direction of Mecca, hence the qiblah wall, which
gives the directional orientation for the worshipper. On the qiblah wall
is the mihrab, a niche on the wall which is usually the only part of the
mosque that has elaborate designs – either mosaic or calligraphy. Mos-
ques include a minbar, from which the khutbah (homily) is delivered,
and the dikka, a wooden elevated platform where the respondents of
the mosque repeat the ritual actions of the imam and speak the re-
sponses. Because praying requires different positions such as standing,
prostrating and sitting, the mosque is bereft of furniture. Interiors of
Philippine mosques have the above essential components of mihrab, qi-
blah, and minbar, but they do not usually have the dikka or the ihsan
(courtyard), which are more common in the Middle East. Also, the
mihrab is simpler and rarely contains the elaborate calligraphy that is
often found in the mihrab of Middle Eastern mosques.
The first mosque in the Philippines was established in the town of
Tubig Indangan in the southernmost island of Simunul in Tawi Tawi
province in 1380. It was reconstructed several times and has taken on
different forms through the years. The earliest picture available of this
mosque, hanging by its entrance, shows a construction of wood and co-
gon grass with a two-tiered roof – a very common architectural feature
of mosques in the Southeast Asia region in earlier times.16 In 1980,
Tubig Indangan celebrated 600 years of Islam in the Philippines. In
preparation for the event, the mosque was reconstructed based on a
new design and with donations from Muslim countries. It was inaugu-
rated on 7 November 1980 by President Marcos, as a demonstration of
support for Filipino Muslims and in keeping with the earlier govern-
ment declarations that Islam is part of Filipino heritage. As can be
seen from the accompanying pictures, the Tubing Indangan mosque
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has been structurally transformed from a typical Southeast Asian struc-
ture to one that relates more to its Middle Eastern counterparts. For
about 600 years, its design was typical of the region until the 1980 re-
construction. The four pillars inside the mosque with the traditional
okkir17 design are the only reminders of the local and regional character
of the mosque.
Plate 12.2 Tubig Indangan mosque in the 1960s
The Islamic City of Marawi18 has the greatest number of mosques in
the Philippines. Muslims in this city generally belong to the Maranao
ethnic tribe and constitute about 92% of the city’s population. Travel
brochures boast of Marawi as the Islamic cultural centre of the Philip-
pines. It has many Islamic schools where Arabic, Islam and the Qur’an
are taught. The city’s Mindanao State University houses the King Faisal
Institute of Islamic Studies and the Zayd Ibn Thabit Qur’anic Studies
Center. Mindanao State University is a public institution, but the pre-
sence of a mosque and the Qur’anic centre visually express the univer-
sity’s Islamic identity in this Islamic city. Most of the mosques in Mar-
awi feature multi-domes and minarets. In keeping with the colours of
the mosque of Medina, several mosques are painted white/cream and
green, like the Bacolod Grande, Bacolod Chico, King Faisal and Gnassi
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Mosques. The biggest mosque in Marawi is the Marawi Islamic Center
located in the heart of the city near the marketplace. People I inter-
viewed could not give the exact date of the mosque’s establishment,
but noted that Kuwait, Libya, Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia were major
benefactors.
Plate 12.3 Tubig Indangan mosque in 2004
To Maranao Muslims, constructing a mosque is pious work and promi-
nent Muslims feel they have an obligation to build a mosque for the
community (Abbahil 1980: 97). Once established, even if largely unfin-
ished, the mosque is not only a constant reminder of the religion19 but
also serves as an anchor for the community and as a symbol of Muslim
presence in the area. The mosque is a gendered space. Islam does not
require women to go to the mosque, but when they do, they are ex-
pected to conform to prescribed gender-based use of mosque space.
Men occupy the front section of the prayer area while women are
either behind the male congregation or in balconies overlooking the
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main prayer hall. In most mosques, there are separate entrances for
men and women, but in others, like Tubig Indangan, women also en-
ter through the front door, but then immediately turn left towards the
stairs leading to the women’s section. To further enhance gender segre-
gation, a black curtain is hung along the entire width of the railing. In
the Blue Mosque in Cotabato, there is a free-standing lattice wall that
segregates women from men. While there is a continuing debate on
the mosque as gendered and contested space and on women’s roles
within it in the West (Kahera 2002: 118-135), this has so far not hap-
pened in the Philippines. The women I interviewed accept gender seg-
regation within the mosque as a requirement of Islam, and sitting in
the specific areas in the mosque is part of expressing and accepting
their identity as Muslim women.
In many Middle Eastern mosques, a courtyard provides the transi-
tion between the mosque and the street, but in the Philippine situa-
tion, almost all mosques I have visited have no courtyard owing to
space limitations. Muslim enclaves in MetroManila have tightly packed
dwellings, and many Muslims are squatters on either private or govern-
ment land. The establishment of a mosque creates a focal point for the
community and gives a sense of permanence, thus making it difficult
for land owners to evict the Muslim squatters.
There are two major mosques in MetroManila: the Masjid Minda-
nao, also known as the Blue Mosque, and the Globo de Oro Mosque.
Located in Maharlika Village, the Blue Mosque was built on 34 hectares
of land that is part of Fort Bonifacio, a military facility. Maharlika Vil-
lage was established by Proclamation 1217 of President Ferdinand Mar-
cos in 1973, as part of the government response to Muslim unrest in
the South, and to accommodate the growing number of war refugees.
The design is essentially Middle Eastern, as demonstrated by its exter-
ior and details such as the woodcarving design over the door in the
form of geometric arabesques, which is more commonly seen in the
Middle East. The other major MetroManila mosque is in the Quiapo
district of Manila. It is more popularly known as Globo de Oro Mosque
because of its gold-painted dome and location in the Globo de Oro sec-
tion of Quiapo. It is the largest mosque in MetroManila and can ac-
commodate 3,000 worshippers. The structure has Middle Eastern fea-
tures such as the dome and the minaret, but at the same time incorpo-
rates the colours and variations of ethnic Maranao, Maguindanao and
Tausug art, particularly the okir/ukkil design in traditional colours. The
flowing and curving lines are reminiscent of the naga or serpent motifs
in Maranao art.
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Plate 12.4 Dome of Globo de Oro Mosque, Manila
There has been an unprecedented growth in the number of mosques
in the Philippines since the 1970s. Many were built by private indivi-
duals either for their own use or for the community, while others were
constructed with Middle Eastern financial help. Even the government
was involved in building or repairing several mosques, which were da-
maged in the course of the war in the mid-1970s.20 Where before
1970 there was no mosque or Muslim community on the island of Lu-
zon where Manila is located, now there are mosques in every province,
with major communities in Baguio City, Pangasinan province and
Manila. The widely visible minarets and domes readily point to the pre-
sence of Muslim communities.
Islamic art and the art of Filipino Muslims
A primary characteristic of Islamic art is the absence of figural repre-
sentation. Scholars writing on the subject explain this in terms of sev-
eral ahadith21 attributed to the prophet Muhammad: ‘The angels will
not enter a house in which there are images and paintings’. There is
also the popular hadith where Muhammad asked that a portrait in a
house be taken down because on judgment day the artist would be
asked to breathe life into the painted image. With these traditions
against figural representation, the foremost expression of Islamic art
throughout the Islamic world, then, has been calligraphy. However, ex-
cept for a few mosques in Mindanao,22 calligraphy has been kept to a
minimum in the Philippines. In the Masjid Awwal in Tawi Tawi, the
CONSTRUCTING IDENTITY 205
only calligraphies present are the words ‘Allah’ and ‘Muhammad’.
However, many private Muslim homes and business establishments in
Mindanao and in MetroManila have framed calligraphies on their
walls, the more popular ones being the framed 99 names of God, Sur-
ah 112, as well as the cross-stitched calligraphy of ‘Allah’ and ‘Muham-
mad’. Many framed calligraphies I saw in homes and stores were im-
ported from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, brought by returning overseas
contract workers, or by pilgrims as mementos of their pilgrimage to
Mecca.
Plate 12.5 Okkir art on protruding beam of a torogan (home of royalty) in Marawi
area
Okkir or Ukkil is a major art form among the Muslims of the southern
Philippines. (Maranaos use the term okkir while the people of Sulu use
ukkil, from the word ukit, which means to carve. For consistency, I will
use the term okkir.) In their detailed study of okkir, Saber and Orellana
(1981) noted indications of Hindu and Chinese influences, particularly
in the naga pattern, which is one of the most popular motifs in okkir
art. This naga design is a stylised form of a mythical dragon or serpent.
As seen in the panolong (protruding beam) of a torogan (ancestral home
of royalty), the naga or niyaga motif is stylised with leaf and graceful
spiral fern designs. With the increasing contact between the Middle
East and the Philippines from the 14th century onwards, it is possible
that Middle Eastern Islamic art came to the country and influenced the
already existing okkir art, resulting in more stylisation and an increas-
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ing absence of figural representation in the designs. Like the arabesque
of Middle Eastern designs, this panolong consists of smaller motifs that
are connected to each other, thus allowing for a sense of unity of de-
sign. It also exhibits movement, as the leaves and spiral ferns lead
viewers to the other component motifs. The okkir on the beam under
the torogan shows the rhythmic pattern of plant forms, which in turn
demonstrates dynamism, movement and unity of design as the arab-
esque does.23
Muslim art in the southern Philippines, however, is not entirely lack-
ing in figural representation. One of the popular figures in Philippine
Islam is the buraq, the winged horse with the head of a woman, which
figured in Muhammad’s ascension to heaven. This story of Muham-
mad’s ascension (miraj) is based on Qur’an (17: 1), which speaks of Mu-
hammad’s journey by night from ‘the sacred mosque to the farthest
mosque’.24 The miraj is celebrated annually on the 27th day of the
month of Rajab all over the world. In many villages in the Sulu islands,
the celebration is highlighted by chanting the story of Muhammad’s
journey either in Arabic or the local Tausug language with very vivid
descriptions of the seventh heaven (NCCA 2001). With this yearly ri-
tual, the buraq has assumed an important place in early Philippine
Muslim imagery. The buraq image is also embroidered on the ol-ol, a
canopy that is attached to the ceiling of the house and serves two func-
tions: as a catch-all for whatever may be falling from the thatched grass
roof and as ceiling decoration. Scenes of Mecca and Medina are also
portrayed on the ol-ol. Another winged white horse, called kurah samba-
lani by the people of Sulu, is believed to transport the soul of the dead
mujaheedin (warrior) to heaven (Sakili 1988: 50). There are life-size
wooden kurah sambalani in Muslim areas with okkir designs painted
on them.
The okkir design is also applied to both decorative and wearable
clothing. One of the popular designs on the likos (which is used as dec-
oration in homes and public spaces during celebrations of weddings
and festivals like Eid al Fitr) is the 99 names of God embroidered in
coloured thread and sequins on every panel. The motifs displayed in
the panolong (beam) of the torogan, buraq, likos, ol-ol and boras (mats) of
Muslim Mindanao demonstrate the proliferation of okkir art that has
also been combined with themes and symbols of Islam. These okkir de-
signs also utilise the principles of the arabesque: rhythm, repetition, in-
terconnected lines, interlacing and movement. This unity and sug-
gested infinity of design have been interpreted as an expression of ta-
whid – the unity of God, which is the central belief in Islam
(Burkhardt 1976; Landau 1955).
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Plate 12.6 Ninety Nine Names of Allah
Identity through clothing
Philippine Muslims’ clothes have always reflected the traditional styles
and colours of their ethnic background, which in turn identified their
tribal affiliation. Since they are Muslims, the dress is also construed as
Muslim dress, particularly by non-Muslims. This linkage of the ethnic
and Islamic has been more markedly observed since the colonial peri-
od. While the majority of the Philippine population then converted to
Christianity and adopted a Spanish-influenced type of clothing, the
Muslims of the South became more distinct from the rest of the popu-
lation through the ethnic clothes they continued to wear.
Colonial literature provides descriptions of Philippine clothing from
the 1600s to the late 1800s. Combe´s (1906: 143) noted that women
made ‘a sack nine palmos long and open at both ends. They gird this at
the waist as much as may be necessary … They adjust it by drawing it
close to one side of the body and by making folds on the other side of
all the extra width in proportion to their body … [It] serves at night for
mattress, sheets and curtain … on retiring, they ungird the sack and
the part which they doubled about the knees they put up on the head’.
Obviously, Combes was referring to the malong, a tube skirt commonly
worn in Southeast Asia. About 200 years later, Hunt’s (1968: 39) de-
scription of clothing was basically similar except for the headdress. He
added that the men of Sulu preferred the pulicat red handkerchief,
which they tied around their heads. He also noted the strong Chinese
influence for everyday wear and special occasions. Tausugs wore kantsu
– loose pants that, when tucked at the waist, give the semblance of a
skirt. It is also a unisex garment like the malong. Colonial pictures
show bare women’s heads in their everyday lives, and Orosa (1923: 73)
noted that Muslim women in the Philippines did not cover their faces
the way Muslim women of other countries did. Men generally wore the
headdress mentioned by Combe´s (1906: 142), such as the tobao (ker-
chief folded, rolled and tied on the head) or the kopia. For ceremonial
occasions, members of royalty wore richly decorated clothing like that
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worn by Sultan Jamalul Kiram in an official portrait that appeared in
several American newspapers in the course of his visit to the United
States in 1910.
A head cover was not usually part of an everyday outfit. Up to the
early 1970s, many women, men and children wore ethnic clothes with-
out a head cover. Others wore Western clothing. Some wore white head
covers – either turbans, or white scarves – to signify their having per-
formed the hajj. A professor at the Institute of Islamic Studies of the
University of the Philippines asserted that when he was growing up in
Sulu, women only wore a head cover when doing the salat at home or
in the mosque. Children wore it when they went to the madaris be-
cause it was part of the school uniform.25 He himself wears Western
clothes when he goes to work and uses the malong and kantsu only at
home.
There have been notable changes in Philippine Muslim women’s
clothing as demonstrated by the use of loose and long pants, long
sleeved shirts with matching head covers, or the loose, long, Middle
Eastern dress, the abaya. From the mid-1970s on, many Muslim wo-
men have integrated the head cover into their style of clothing and, at
the same time, the malong has given way to different outfits used with
the head cover. The head covers come in different forms: hijab, with
face exposed, scarves that wrap around the head loosely, and the niqab
that covers the face except the eyes. The combination jeans or pants,
loose, long-sleeved shirt and head cover are now common attire for
working women. For those in Islamic schools, however, the standard
attire is the loose long dress with a head cover.
At the BangsaMoro26 women’s consultations in Marawi City in June
2004, participants came in different versions of what they consider to
be proper Muslim dress. Local Muslims have also integrated imported
pieces of clothing into their attire such as long, loose dresses from Abu
Dhabi, Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries, which were
brought home as presents by family members who were contract work-
ers. Another attendee, a Muslim woman activist and head of a non-gov-
ernment organisation (NGO), was wearing a tailored shirt and pants
that reflected some traditional design. She believes it is important to
follow the dress requirements of the religion and to show her identity
as a Muslim, but since she also belongs to the Maranao tribe, she feels
that she should project that ethnic background as well.27 Everyone
wore a type of head cover with only one participant wearing the ni-
qab.28 There were different styles of clothing: from loose pants, long
skirts to abayas, but conspicuously absent was the traditional, ethnic
malong.
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Plate 12.7 BangsaMoro women
The increased use of a head cover in the Philippines was particularly
noticeable in the mid-1970s. This was the time when the war in Mind-
anao was at its height, and Muslims, particularly the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF), wished to emphasise that the Philippine
Muslims had never been colonized. They wanted to assert their sepa-
rate identity as an independent people who had been oppressed and
deprived of their rights in recent times. The MNLF encouraged its wo-
men members to wear a head cover and required it during their meet-
ings. An MNLF woman member said that this was a way of asserting
their identity as Muslims, and they were inspired in this by the world-
wide Islamic resurgence. When President Marcos issued presidential
decrees acknowledging Islam as part of Philippine heritage, many
MNLF women members felt that the decrees gave long-overdue recog-
nition to Islam and the Muslims. Although the decrees did not really
end the conflict in the south, the official recognition paved the way for
a more open expression of their identity as Muslims and made them
feel empowered. Other Muslim women also started wearing a head
cover to show their solidarity with the cause of the MNLF. The head
cover then became a symbol not only of the identity of Muslims assert-
ing their rights in a predominantly Christian country, but also of a
growing and intensifying Islamic consciousness.
There are no published debates about the use of a head cover among
Muslim women in the Philippines, but in my interviews with Muslim
women, they offered various reasons for wearing it. Foremost is the
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idea that the head cover is prescribed by Islam. The men and women
of the group called Islamic Studies Call and Guidance (ISCAG) believe
they must conform to the dress requirement of Islam described as:
‘loose but not tight, long but not short, thick but not thin and with a
veil’.29 The abaya fits this description since it is loose, thick and long.
This also reflects the orientation of the ISCAG organisers who encoun-
tered Islam in the course of their employment in Saudi Arabia. They
are converts from Catholicism, from the traditionally Christian areas in
the Philippines, and did not share the ethnic characteristics and heri-
tage of southern Philippine Muslims. Other Muslim women also took
to the abaya since, as Mrs. Alonto, wife of former Senator and Muslim
leader Domocao Alonto, said, it is more comfortable and easier to wear
than the malong. ISCAG women, however, emphasised that their dress
conforms to the Qur’anic verses that call for modesty.
Plate 12.8 Maguindanao Muslim woman in traditional attire but with modern skirt
design
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While the ulama in Marawi City enforced the use of a head cover, there
were Muslims in other parts of Mindanao who demanded the right to
use a head cover. In 1993, Muslim women in Cotabato City demon-
strated against Notre Dame University when it implemented a memor-
andum from the Secretary of the Department of Health prohibiting the
use of a head cover for medical and nursing students working in the
hospital. In response, Muslims in Cotabato organised the Islamic Re-
sistance Against Hijab Prohibition (IHRAP) while the female medical
personnel and students refused to comply with the departmental order.
Hundreds of Muslims, including schoolchildren, marched in the
streets of Cotabato city carrying banners and placards protesting
against the memorandum. Eventually, the Secretary of Health
amended the memorandum and allowed Muslim women ‘to wear the
head veil prescribed by their religion while on duty, provided that steri-
lity of vital areas is ensured’.30 Muslims welcomed the amendment,
and one of the protest participants said that part of their jihad is the
struggle to be recognised as Muslims and to exercise the right to dress
the way they want.
Among men, the growing popularity of the galabiyya31 in the mosque
and everyday life has become more noticeable in recent years. Men also
wear a variety of head covers, from the fez, to the tubao, to the Maranao
totop or kopia, similar in shape to the Jewish yarmulke. Some wear Arab
headdress for special occasions. In ordinary circumstances, the only
thing that makes a Muslim man visibly different from a non-Muslim is
the head cover. Members of the Jami at Tabligh32 wear long, loose shirts
over pants cropped at the hemlines and white head cover. They are
readily identifiable because of this clothing as well as their beard,
which is obligatory. Men of the Islamic Studies Call and Guidance
group (ISCAG) may wear regular clothes except that they cannot ex-
pose their navels, and shorts should go below the knee. Men grow their
beard and may grow a moustache that should be trimmed. Most men
at the ISCAG compound generally wear clothes similar to those of
other Filipinos: shirt and pants; but what distinguishes them from
others is the beard. Nuh Caparino, of ISCAG said that fancy hairstyle
for men is not acceptable, but noted that ‘men can be bald, semi-bald,
or wear his [sic] hair shoulder length’.33 Other Muslim men, however,
like Professor Asiri Abubakar of the Asian Center of the University of
the Philippines, emphasised modesty as the major characteristic of
men’s clothing. He wears the usual type of clothes worn by other Filipi-
nos, but for formal occasions, he wears a long-sleeved, batik-printed
shirt, imported from Malaysia or Indonesia. Employees of the Office of
Muslim Affairs (almost all are Muslims) in the MetroManila area wear
uniforms of either the traditional Philippine barong tagalong, a shirt
that was identified in colonial times with the Christian areas, or a mod-
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ified version called polo barong, while women wear ankle length cloth-
ing with a head cover. While Muslim students in Manila’s universities
in the 1960s and early 1970s wore similar clothes to their Christian
classmates, today they no longer feel bound to conform as Islam is
now officially recognised as part of Philippine heritage. There are a
number of women, some of them converts, who wear the hijab on the
University of the Philippines campus.
Sartorial customs change over time. Crane (2000: 5) contends that
fashion during the second half of the 19th century ‘appeared to offer
possibilities for a person to enhance his or her social position’; but the
recent change in clothing, from the traditional ethnic attire or the or-
dinary clothes of the ethnic Muslim Filipinos to the typical ‘Muslim
clothing’ reflects instead a person’s intention to emphasise his or her
religious conviction.
The Philippine Muslim home
The ‘Muslimness’ of the home reflects how Muslims present their
identities in their use of private space. In the home of Imam Harun
Magadapa in Cebu City, the walls display passages from the Qur’an in
either brass, tin or plastic, which came from Malaysia and Saudi Ara-
bia. In this home, prayers are done upstairs where there is a dedicated
space directed towards the Ka’aba, which in the Philippines means fa-
cing west. At the home of the mosque administrator in Ecoland, Davao
City, there are several framed calligraphies from the Qur’an and the
words ‘Muhammad’ and ‘Allah’. In other houses, chapters of the
Qur’an, imported from Egypt or Saudi Arabia, line the walls. Chapter
112 – Surah Ikhlas, proclaiming the oneness of God, and the ayat kursi
(throne verse) are the most popular calligraphies in homes, businesses
and mosques, and are done in print, embroidery or cut out from calen-
dars. Like the African-American Muslim homes of Philadelphia de-
scribed by Beverly McCloud (1996), Philippine Muslim homes usually
have calligraphy or images of the Ka’aba in print and on carpets hung
on the wall. In other Muslim homes, like one of those we visited on
the outskirts of Marawi City, we see the combination of the ethnic and
Islamic art as indicated by the use of the likos34 with the naga design
draped on the upper wall and the placement of carpet featuring the
Ka’aba. There are also framed or embroidered renderings of the throne
verse35 together with the Surah 112 and the 99 names of God. Not all
homes have a copy of the Qur’an, but the calligraphy on the walls
serves as visible reminders of the teachings of Islam.
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Plate 12.9 Muslim home in the outskirts of Marawi City
Conclusion
Visual expressions of Islam in the Philippines have undergone changes
that were ushered in by both local and global developments. Since
being Muslim was previously linked with ethnicity, forms of clothing,
art and architecture reflected the ethnic backgrounds; but over time, as
Filipino Muslims became more exposed to the Middle East either
through education or employment, they began to adopt the forms and
styles of the Middle East, especially the loose clothing style. Clothing
performs an important role in constructing Muslim identity because it
is readily visible, and the person wearing ‘Islamic clothing’ is actually
proclaiming to others his/her identity as a Muslim and at the same
time is conforming to a religious requirement. Although the extent of
religiosity of the person may not be easy to measure, some Muslim wo-
men, such as the women of ISCAG whom I interviewed, see the wear-
ing of the niqab as an indicator of deeper religiosity. While clothing of
the different Muslim tribes traditionally indicated marks of distinction
(considering the colours and styles used by royalty and lower-ranked in-
dividuals), the adoption of Middle Eastern outfits like the abaya and ga-
labiyya somehow democratises clothing to the extent that one is no
longer restricted to the colours that designate ethnic tribe or one’s
place in the social hierarchy. The wearing of the Arab-style dress links
the wearer to global Muslimhood while the earlier ethnic outfits had
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limited the identity to particular ethnic groups that happened to be
Muslim.
Clothing has a symbolic importance for Muslims in the public
sphere because it involves behavioural expectations. One of the women
of ISCAG I interviewed who was wearing a black niqab explained that
wearing the Muslim dress involves a responsibility to act as a Muslim
woman and in a way that lives up to the provisions of the Qur’an. A
convert from Catholicism, she said that in spite of the warm Philippine
climate, a Muslim woman still has to fulfill the dress requirement of
the religion because ‘the way you dress, the way you talk, the way you
carry yourself, you are presenting to others that you are a Muslim and
one has to be very careful about that’. That kind of responsibility – of
presenting oneself as a member of a religious group visually through
clothing and internally through the responsibility dictated by the reli-
gion – was something, she said, she had never experienced as a Catho-
lic.
There are new patterns of consumption emerging as Muslim women
not only consider what is appropriate Islamic dress but also what is
fashionable. Carmina Abbas, wife of a Maranao Muslim whom I inter-
viewed in 2005, noted that ‘if Filipino Christians look to New York and
Paris as fashion centres of the world, for Muslim women, it is Saudi
Arabia and the Middle East’. The goods I saw in the Aldovinco mall in
Davao city and stores in Quiapo, Manila, near the Globo de Oro mos-
que indicate that dresses are also sourced from Malaysia and Indone-
sia. The provenance of the clothes, however, has less significance than
the message the clothes are trying to convey: ‘I am a practising Mus-
lim’. The interviews show that Islamic dress demonstrates a religious
distinction within and outside the Muslim communities, but at the
same time expressed a sense of moral righteousness of the wearer.
The Middle East plays a significant role in these changing visual ex-
pressions of Islam in the Philippines. The Middle East, especially Sau-
di Arabia, is a choice destination for overseas Filipino workers, most of
whom are non-Muslims. This has led to classes being offered on Islam
and the Qur’an at Islamic centres in Riyadh and Jeddah for Filipino
workers. Countries, such as Libya, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates have
also been providing funds for the construction of mosques with a Mid-
dle Eastern flavour. Philippine mosques have abandoned the typical re-
gional structure of multi-layered roofs and adopted architectural fea-
tures of the Middle East. These countries, especially Saudi Arabia, have
also helped establish madaris, published materials on Islam, provided
funds for translating religious materials into the local language and
also trained religious teachers. These religious teachers bring with
them the Wahhabi form of Islam that is now becoming evident in
some Balik Islam movements. As several imams and women told me,
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they are now more exposed to the purity of Saudi Islam and so they
are able to distinguish between what is really Islamic and what is not.
The mode of dress always enters into the discussion as one of the
things they claim Philippine Muslims have learned.
The Philippine government’s relationship with local Muslims also af-
fects the latter’s relationship with the global umma. The government’s
responses to the rebellion, like its proclamations on recognising Islam
as part of Philippine heritage, made conditions favourable for an Isla-
mic resurgence, which in turn made it easier for Muslims to express
their identity. Although there are continuing problems with groups like
the Abu Sayyaf in the southern Philippines, about the unsettled issue
of Muslim ancestral lands, Muslim dawa activities are gaining a consid-
erable following.
The increasing labour export to the Middle East, particularly to Saudi
Arabia, the growing inclusion of Muslims, their religion and culture
into Philippine society, and the mounting contacts with global Muslim-
hood have all contributed to the changing forms of visual expressions
of the Philippine Muslim identity. To the Muslims I interviewed, Saudi
Arabia provides the anchor for Islam – it is ‘the navel’ of Islam and
whatever happens there filters through to the rest of the world. How-
ever, the situation has also generated questions about Islam in the Phi-
lippines: will there be a homogenised Islam with Saudi Arabia serving
as the religious model or will the future bring a more diverse kind of
Islam? To what extent is Philippine Islam being de-ethnicised? High
speed travel, the internet, the overseas Filipino workers have all be-
come agents of globalisation, and their effects on Philippine Islam and
Muslims merit continuing interest and study.
Notes
1 A shorter version of this paper was presented at the ICAS4 in Shanghai, China, in
2005. I am grateful to the Lindback Foundation for the research grant that enabled
me to conduct research in the Philippines and present my findings at ICAS4.
2 For methods employed by Magellan in effecting the first conversions to Christianity,
see Antonio Pigafetta (1952).
3 July 2008 estimate. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/rp.html#People (Accessed 10 September 2008).
4 In 1957, Philippine Congress passed Republic Act 1888 creating the Commission on
National Integration. The law provided for the creation of scholarship funds for na-
tional minorities, and Muslims were the major beneficiaries. They pursued various
academic degree programmes at universities in Manila and Quezon City, which are
predominantly Christian areas.
5 There are other issues attendant to this, for example, insofar as Islamic laws are con-
cerned. In interviews I conducted for another research project, several respondents
considered adat (custom) as Islamic and vice versa.
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6 In 1996, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) signed a peace agreement with
the Republic of the Philippines. Its chairman, Nur Misuari, subsequently became
governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. When his term of office
ended, the MNLF became involved in a conflict in Jolo, Sulu. Nur Misuari fled to Ma-
laysia as the Philippine government filed charges of rebellion against him and other
members. Malaysia repatriated Misuari to the Philippines where he was put under
house arrest in the early 2000s. With Misuari under house arrest, the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) emerged as the major Muslim movement with which the
Philippine government is currently negotiating.
7 See Republic of the Philippines, ‘Seeking Solutions to the Philippine South’, (January
1976) p. 3.
8 Presidential Decree 291, 12 September 1973.
9 Presidential Decree 342, 22 November 1973.
10 For further discussion on this see Angeles (2001).
11 Madrasah (singular): school. In the Philippines madrasah is the term used for schools
that focus on the teaching of Islam, Arabic and the Qur’an.
12 Egypt was the first Middle Eastern country to offer scholarships to Filipino Muslims.
13 There were 240,000 Filipino workers in Saudi Arabia in 2004. http://www.census.
gov.ph/data/sectordata/2005/. More recent figures released by the Philippine Em-
bassy in Riyadh and the Philippine Consulate General in Jeddah show an estimated
1,016,820 Filipinos working in the kingdom. http://images.gmanews.tv/html/re-
search/2007/ (Accessed 10 January 2008).
14 Balik means ‘return’. Balik Islam refers to Muslims who have ‘returned’ to Islam.
This is based on the idea that Islam was the dominant religion of the people of the
Philippines prior to Spanish colonisation.
15 The other pillars being shahada (testimony of the faith), sawm (fasting), zakat
(wealth-sharing) and hajj (pilgrimage). Prayer is performed in the early morning,
noon, midafternoon, sunset and evening.
16 1Madale (2003) discusses the traditional form of Philippine mosques. The mosque
Wilkes (1906) saw in the 1800s in Jolo had a high roof of similar materials.
17 Wood carving.
18 Formerly Marawi City but was renamed Islamic City of Marawi in 1980.
19 Noradja, personal interview 6 January 2005, Salmonan Mosque, Davao City.
20 The Philippine armed forces were involved in rebuilding mosques damaged in the
war in some ways. They provided transportation, materials and even labour (Angeles
2001: 194).
21 Traditions, plural.
22 Like the Gnassi Mosque and Islamic Center of Marawi.
23 The pattern here is actually comparable to that of the mosque of Amr al Fustat in
Cairo.
24 ‘Sacred mosque’ and ‘farthest mosque’ have been interpreted to mean the Ka‘aba at
Mecca and the location of the dome of the rock, respectively.
25 Asiri Abubakar, personal interview, 19 June 2004, Asian Center, University of the
Philippines.
26 BangsaMoro means Moro nation. Moro was a derogatory term used by the Spaniards
to refer to Muslims in the Philippines.
27 Baikon Cayongcat Macaraya, personal interview, 22 June 2004, Marawi City.
28 The head and face cover that exposes only the eyes of the wearer.
29 Nuh Caparino, personal interview, 20 June 2004, Dasmarinas, Cavite. The exact
words were: mahaba, hindi maikli, makapal, hindi manipis, maluwag, hindi masikip, at
nakatalukbong.
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30 Republic of the Philippines, Department of Health, Memorandum Order no. 1 s.
1994, 21 June 1994.
31 Arab men’s long garment.
32 Jami at Tabligh members from Pakistan started coming to the Philippines in the
mid-1970s.
33 Nuh Caparino, personal interview, 20 June 2004.
34 Decorative wall hanging, usually with calligraphy of the 99 names of God.
35 Qur’an 2: 255.
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13 Islam and Orientalism in New Zealand:
The Challenges of Multiculturalism,
Human Rights and National Security
– and the Return of the Xenophobes
Erich Kolig1
New Zealand has a relatively small Muslim minority. Most are immi-
grants or descendants of relatively recent immigrants. Although offi-
cially bicultural, New Zealand is practically multicultural, as state and
government like to proclaim with great vigour and conviction. In recog-
nition of the nation’s increasingly multi-ethnic and multi-religious
composition – the outcome of an ethnically largely unregulated immi-
gration policy – statutes and legal instruments ensure the exercise of
civil liberties in relation to freedom of belief and culture within a fra-
mework of generally applicable laws. In accord with the model of Wes-
tern liberal democracies, this situation creates an atmosphere of toler-
ance and provides practically the conditions of far-reaching multicultur-
alism.
Yet, the identity ‘Muslim’ creates certain difficulties. The generally
tolerant social discourse is at times challenged by another, which is
centred on the ideas of national cultural integrity, incorporates con-
cerns of national security, and engenders a degree of Islamophobia.2
Following the events of 9/11, the question of national security has
moved into the focus of jurisprudential and socio-political initiatives.
At times this sharply juxtaposes the presence of Muslims and their
identity with a security-conscious nationalism. This highlights not only
the potential for future conflict, but represents a kind of challenge that
all liberal democracies of the Western world are facing.
In the aftermath of 9/11, New Zealanders displayed such a degree of
fair-mindedness that I could write of an ‘accord of cautious distance’
(Kolig 2003) between Muslims and the host nation. No serious physi-
cal attacks on Muslims or their property occurred, although some peo-
ple took it upon themselves to verbally abuse Muslim women. These
obviously provide an easy target: readily identifiable by their dress and
usually peaceable, they become easy prey to expressions of Islamopho-
bic sentiments. Some minor damage to mosques such as graffiti and
smashed windows were also recorded. However, a few relatively harm-
less incidents notwithstanding, there were no strong signals of hostility
towards the Muslim minority of the kind that happened elsewhere.3
Yet, in the longer term this watershed event and especially subsequent
terrorist attacks in other parts of the world have incrementally eroded
the previously rather irenic ‘ethnic’ conditions. It was in particular the
attack in London in July 2005 which aroused a wave of sympathy in
New Zealand – obviously by activating the traditional mother-country
bond – and generated acute suspicion of Muslims living in the West,
more so than the Madrid bombing (2004), the Beslan massacre (2004)
and even the two attacks in Bali (2002 and 2005) had done previously.4
Suspicions, accusations and even attacks on persons and property poi-
soned the previously peaceful and tolerant ethnic relations. In a broad-
er sense, legislative initiatives appeared to be poised like a Damoclean
sword to tighten entry to the country, to threaten expulsion and deten-
tion without trial, and to increase search and surveillance. In some
form or other a process appeared to be unleashed that foreshadowed
the erosion of civil liberties which hitherto had been taken for granted.
The state’s duty of providing national security began to grate against its
role as protector of human rights and guarantor of civil liberties.
The number of Muslims in New Zealand has risen sharply in the last
10 to 15 years (see Shepard 2002, 2006). The Muslim presence goes
back over 100 years, but for a long time comprised only a few hundred
people. The numbers rose in the 1980s to approximately 2,000, and in
1996 to c. 13,000. Now Muslims officially number c. 36,000 (according
to the census of 2006); but some estimates5 put the figure as high as
45,000 – a minority of around 1% in a population of c. four million.
Most Muslims are immigrants; a smaller number are the second- or
third-generation descendants of earlier immigrants, and a few (num-
bering probably fewer than a thousand) are New Zealand converts of
Pakeha and Maori stock.6
New Zealand is officially bicultural, recognising the partnership be-
tween Anglo-Celtic and Maori cultures and elevating tikanga Maori to a
privileged position of, theoretically, co-equality with European culture.
Biculturalism is enshrined in a host of acts and statutes and is de-
signed, theoretically at least, to secure equal respect for the Maori cul-
ture with the dominant European (Anglo-Celtic) culture. Practically,
however, New Zealand is multicultural, acknowledging in various ways
the reality of ethnic, cultural and religious plurality under a benign
Western patronage. Muslims are part of this increasingly colourful so-
cio-cultural fabric, which gradually begins to outshine the traditional
cultural monochrome. However, in the debate about the national iden-
tity, unlike Europe, Muslims hardly play any role. Their numbers are
too small to be generally considered of significance in influencing the
national pluralist composition, although the impact of Islam on the so-
cial discourse is a matter of some discussion. Concerns about loss of
national identity through massive immigration of cultural Others – as
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expressed for instance by Fukuyama (2005, 2006) and Huntington
(2004) – assumes the version of worrying about the nation’s ‘Asianisa-
tion’ in New Zealand. In this debate, ‘Asians’, a label which refers
mainly to East Asians and within that category especially ethnic Chi-
nese, have attracted some attention. (Indians are also drawn into this
category.) They number 350,000 according to the 2006 census, and
their numbers are steadily climbing. Islamophobia was not imported
from Europe by the early (19th century) settlers, as there hardly were
any Muslims, and the very few ones around seemed to keep their reli-
gion to themselves. Instead, xenophobism and ‘racism’ focused from
the beginning on a small minority of immigrant Chinese. In recent
years, and especially in (parliamentary) election years, concerns about
Asian immigration have become part of a populist election propagan-
da. It is periodically trumpeted by a small, yet influential political party
with an anti-immigration platform. Not surprisingly, this party (called
‘New Zealand First’) also vents its spleen at times about Muslim immi-
gration, as do a few politicians of other parties. This party’s anti-Asian
and anti-Muslim rhetoric is pursued as an election platform in con-
junction with the representation of the interests of the elderly in an ob-
vious assumption that the interests of senior citizens, and their pre-
sumed conservatism, coincide with xenophobism. This establishes an
unfortunate link with the violent racist agenda of some small fringe
groups (the so-called ‘National Front’ and more broadly so-called ‘skin-
heads’ and ‘white supremacists’) arranged on the extreme right of the
ideological spectrum; groups that carry out occasional attacks on mos-
que properties and on individuals, who can be physically identified as
Asians and Africans.
Leaving to one side such expressions of ‘physical and cultural ra-
cism’,7 the national picture in general is much more friendly. Immigra-
tion for the most part is merit-based and not race- or culture-based. Ba-
sically tolerant and accepting of immigrants of many different ethnic
backgrounds, New Zealand society is assuming an increasingly multi-
ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious composition. Human rights-
inspired legislation prohibits discrimination, guarantees freedom of re-
ligion and culture, and offers the liberty of conduct grounded in reli-
gious belief. However, subliminally this tolerant discourse, though
based on a seemingly firm legal basis, is now being increasingly chal-
lenged by another, centred on the ideas of national cultural integrity
and drawing on concerns about national security. This discourse erupts
at times into full public view through expressions of Islamophobia. Fol-
lowing the events of 9/11 and subsequent attacks by Islamic militants,
despite the fact that they have happened far from New Zealand shores,
the question of national security has moved into the focus of juridical
and socio-political initiatives. It is now firmly associated with negative
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perceptions of Islam. Terrorism Suppression Acts have been passed
(and amendments are being considered by parliament at the time of
writing) which are tailor-made for organised, Islamically inspired ter-
rorism but are unable to deal with other violent threats.8 This creates a
sharp juxtaposition of the presence of Muslims, Muslim identity and
Islamic interests with a security-conscious nationalism. It does so to an
extent that does not apply to other religious and ethnic minorities.
Worldwide, the rapport achievable between the West on the one side
and the Muslim world and Islam on the other has been subject to
some intense scrutiny. Aside from Samuel Huntington’s (1996) pessi-
mistic – but very influential – evaluation of Islam’s significance in the
modern world, there is also Bernard Lewis’s (1990, 2003) rather acer-
bic analysis of Muslim motives. Both scholars have attracted consider-
able attention and have proved influential in critically viewing global
Muslimhood and especially Muslim minorities embedded in Western
dominant host societies. The ‘Muslim problem’ thus conceived not only
obliquely points to the potential for future conflict of Huntingtonian
proportions9, but represents a kind of challenge that all liberal democ-
racies of the Western world are facing. In countering what is believed
to be the Islamic threat, and in the face of an increasingly hostile
stereotyping of Muslims and the demonisation of Islam, the problem
arises: how to preserve the ideals of tolerance, civil liberty and religio-
cultural freedom? And what is more, demands to tighten national se-
curity are threatening to impact on the rights of everybody. New Zeal-
and is also poised to be drawn into this vortex.
Immigration, nation-state and human rights
The West has a strongly homogenising culture which, well into the sec-
ond half of the 20th century, was reinforced by assimilation policies
that made it incumbent on immigrants to speedily adopt not only the
formal laws of the host country, but also to abide by its customs and
conventions and to shed, as much as humanly possible, their previous
cultural identity. In more recent years Western societies have become
increasingly pluralised, abandoning assimilation as a concerted policy
in dealing with immigrant cultural and religious minorities. Globalisa-
tion has been instrumental in this shift by increasing access to and
knowledge of alternative lifestyles and cultures, as well as enhancing
tolerance of cultural Otherness and respecting cultural choice. The re-
sultant acceptance of cultural diversity is backed by human rights con-
ventions, which assure minorities of civil liberties and the right to
maintain their culture, lifestyle and religion. Massive immigration in
the affluent West – partially caused and promoted by globalisation –
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from ethnically and culturally very different groups is fast dispelling
the traditional, largely monocultural, hegemonic insularity of many
Western nations. The presence and co-existence of culturally very di-
verse immigrants not only vividly exemplify cultural plurality, but also
demand cultural and religious tolerance, and sometimes test its limits.
The ideals of a liberal democracy and equality of the citizenry emphati-
cally embrace cultural and religious tolerance. Although these ideals
may sometimes be imperfectly applied in social reality10, they are
usually supported now by the requisite legislation protective of minor-
ity interests, religious freedom, and cultural choice. Assimilation ideas,
i.e. the expectation of immigrants surrendering their cultural distinc-
tiveness, in short order blending into the respective mainstream society
and becoming rapidly absorbed into its hegemonic culture, have been
replaced by a more realistic vision of an only vaguely conceptualised in-
tegration. Although in actual practice there is a wide divergence of opi-
nion about what constitutes successful integration, in a general sense
it is conceptualised as acceptance of the host society’s socio-political
structures, democratic participation, submission to the dominant legal
system and adoption of the core values of a liberal, secularised democ-
racy (for example, respect of other citizens’ culture and religious be-
liefs).
As the nation-states’ sovereignty gets eroded worldwide, their coer-
cive forces weaken, and their capacity for producing a culturally homo-
genous and homomorphic kind of citizenry is impaired, as is eliminat-
ing, expelling, incarcerating and discriminating against all that resists.
The legal basis for applying assimilation pressures on immigrants (the
self-fulfilling prophecies of the melting pot theory) and screening out
those considered deficient in adaptive capacity also diminishes through
international conventions and domestic legislation. A global human
rights ideology ensures a drastic reduction in highly (racially and cultu-
rally) selective and restrictive immigration policies and discriminatory
practices. In New Zealand such practices were applied in pursuit of an
unofficial ‘White New Zealand’ policy in the 19th and 20th century (un-
til 1974). Even later, a quota system was designed to ensure that the
country would remain culturally Anglo-Celtic. In earlier years a poll tax
had been enforced on Chinese immigrants, who were the single, lar-
gest, non-European immigrant group, with the unofficial purpose of
keeping a lid on this ‘highly undesirable’ influx of the ‘yellow peril’.11
As immigrant minorities with widely divergent cultural backgrounds
congregate in ever larger numbers in New Zealand, as they do in other
Western nation-states, international conventions and national legisla-
tion ensure personal rights and the rights of minorities to freedom of
cultural adherence, of religious belief and its expression in actual con-
duct. A new global scenario has been created primarily by the United
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Nations Declaration of Human Rights 1948, the UN Declaration on the
Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on
Religion and Belief 1981, the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights 1967, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights 1967. These instruments are usually backed by na-
tional pieces of legislation and statutes12. In New Zealand, specifically,
there is the Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993
which, as relatively strong statutes, guarantee rights to culture and reli-
gion (including the right to manifest religious belief in social conduct
with the tacit proviso that such conduct does not violate criminal law)
and enshrine the right to be free of discrimination (see Kolig 2005).
New Zealand has acquired a reputation of being – and likes to think
of itself as – a very tolerant society. The traditionally laissez-faire toler-
ance has been facilitated by the fact that this is an avowedly secularised
nation, which neither favours nor hinders any kind of religious belief.
Since the inception of nationhood, New Zealand did not have a nexus
linking state and a religious denomination together in a pact of some
form. Despite strong links with Great Britain, the Anglican Church
never enjoyed precedence over other churches. The most recent gov-
ernments, in various forms, have declared the secularist nature of state
and governance. Official policy is indifferent and neutral to religious
enterprise of any kind, thus purposely avoiding any link of state philo-
sophy and world view with any religious persuasion.13 Membership in
mainstream Christian churches in general is declining,14 thus decreas-
ing the critical mass of voters of a religiously orientated polity. All this
helps in creating a climate of benign indifference towards religions of
any kind including Islam, and favours an official policy of non-interfer-
ence.
As can be expected in a highly secularised nation such as New Zeal-
and, Islam is not discussed in terms of divine revelation or its competi-
tion with Christian or Jewish dogma.15 Instead, if and when attention
is directed towards Islamic dogma, it is discussed in terms of its com-
patibility with Western civilisation and its cultural norms. Theologi-
cally, Islam is completely acceptable, as is any other religious denomi-
nation. Any argument about the spiritual validity of Islamic belief
would be shrugged off as ‘crankiness’, whereas discussing it in relation
to its adaptability to normative and customary Western socio-cultural
standards is considered relevant.16 It is in this sense that there are
signs of late that the benevolent multicultural climate, engaging the
host society and its Muslim minority, is being eroded by an increas-
ingly sceptical attention directed at Muslims.
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The Orient within the Occident
In Western countries, mainly through the course of increased immi-
gration in the last two or three decades, a Muslim presence is now be-
coming a sizeable and often very conspicuous component of society.
The presence of Muslim minorities is becoming increasingly noticeable
for cultural reasons. Religiously grounded practices of prayer, fasting,
celebrating certain eids (religious festivals), dietary rules, veiling, gen-
der separation, religious architecture, and the like tend to make this
minority more conspicuous than other religionists or ethnic minori-
ties.17 The strength and, sometimes, uncompromising nature of Isla-
mic imperatives, as well as a rising emphasis on a distinct Muslim
identity, seem to create a barrier to mutual rapprochement. Superfi-
cially, it appears as though Islam would generate a disinclination to
adapt to the same extent as other immigrants and minority religionists
do to the demands of the Western host society. Religious obligations
and values appear sometimes to create tensions between Western secu-
larised liberal democratic values and Islamic ones, and some prescrip-
tions of Islamic law sit uneasily or even clash with Western laws. Con-
tributing factors to the difficulties are also the mounting initiatives by
Muslims themselves to create the social spaces in which to unfold their
religious identity more fully and visibly express their cultural values.
Sometimes such spaces can be created only through the dominant so-
ciety making concessions in their conventions, laws and aesthetics.
There is now a rising fear in some European countries with large Mus-
lim minorities that increasing Muslim pressure and granting conces-
sions on the basis of acknowledging the democratic rights of Muslims
as citizens will change society as a whole and may lead to far-reaching
and largely undesired results. There are also increasingly strong,
stereotyped notions about difficulties supposedly inherent in Islam that
create adaptive barriers: above all, a perceived inability of Muslims to
truly embrace a Western-style democratic system and to be religiously
tolerant not only of other religions, but to accept apostasy and blas-
phemy as legitimate expressions of personal freedom of thought and
belief. Equally, there is a perception that there is a reluctance to em-
brace complete gender equality inherent in Islam. In the post-9/11 era,
even more gravely, suspicions surface now about the political motives
of Muslim immigrants sui generis and the nature of Islam as basically
violent and hostile. Episodically, it appears that New Zealand is gradu-
ally inclining towards taking a similar path, as discussion about cultur-
al difference, considered unsurmountable, assumes now sometimes
the bigoted form of ‘cultural racism’, which conflates issues of religion,
culture and national identity. In this form anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic
sentiments may episodically become useful for political mobilisation.18
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Muslim adaptationists and rejectionists
There are indications that Muslim national communities are becoming
polarised in their response to the diasporic condition. One can recog-
nise now a split into two major antagonistic factions: the ‘adaptation-
ists’ for whom adjustment to the demands of the host society by and
large poses no particular problem; and what for lack of a better word
one might call the ‘fundamentalists’ who are motivated by a sense that
Islam cannot be compromised for the sake of adjustment (see Kolig
2006c). For some Muslims who belong in the latter category, the adap-
tation to the host societies’ standards, values and beliefs has gone too
far already, and the differences between secularised Western society
and the duty of remaining faithful to Islam cannot be reconciled. It
may also be the perceived absence of their enfranchisement by the host
society and perhaps what is seen as its hostile stance toward ‘the Mus-
lim world’ at large that create antagonism. This diffuse sense of disillu-
sionment about the failures of the West in some Muslims may gener-
ate attitudes of acute alienation culminating in outright rejection and
implacable, aggressive hostility. The readiness is small on the part of
the majority society to view this phenomenon, in a broader context, as
a socio-critical one similar to the radical left, Marxist and anarchistic ex-
tremism, and student protest movements of the late 1960s, 1970s and
early 1980s. It seems long forgotten that this phenomenon also pro-
duced the urban guerrilla movement of the Red Brigade, the Weather-
men, the Baader-Meinhofs and the like, in their methods and aims
quite similar to modern Islamic terrorism. Born from a radical inter-
pretation of ideas taken over from another time and place, it was
adapted to the objectives of a radical critique of the (then) social status
quo combined with global aspirations.
The question has been raised whether Islam per se is resistant to as-
similation to Western conditions (including integration and acceptance
of secularisation) to an extent greater than is the case with other reli-
gions. If this is so, it would force Muslims emphatically to negotiate
spaces in Western host societies to unfold their religious identity or in
extreme cases to reject the validity of their diaspora.19 Muslim percep-
tion of the preordained primacy of Islam in the world is deeply in-
grained and doctrinally inculcated,20 and the fact that the actual reality
does not bear out this divine ordinance may cause resentment as well
as antagonism. The acceptance of infidel governance may also pose a
problem as much as the traditional cosmological dichotomy between
Dar al Islam and Dar al Harb. That adaptation to Western political and
ideological conditions does pose a philosophical problem to some Mus-
lims is reflected in the work of Muslim scholars in which they argue
that adaptation is possible, for instance by transferring only the princi-
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ples of Islam (not its cultural substance) to the diasporic situation and
that ‘just’ infidel governance is acceptable (Ramadan 2004: 72-73). In
France the propagation of a concept of Dar al Ahd to mitigate the stark
opposition between the Islamic world and the West is clearly designed
to increase the ideological acceptance of the diaspora and to make life
in a foreign ‘infidel’ country emotionally more comfortable for millions
of Muslims (Lewis 1994: 10; Kepel 1997: 151; Esposito 2002: 35; Rama-
dan 2004: 72-73).
Another factor causing suspicion is the Muslim tendency to main-
tain a sense of solidarity with the global umma (community of believ-
ers) that is frequently believed to prevent a sense of solidarity with the
host society. As Muslims appear to be transnational and translocal to a
larger extent than other immigrants, not surprisingly their loyalty to
the nation is often brought into question. It is not just the real or po-
tential transnational mobility, but also the propensity of retaining
strong ties to their places of origin and ideologically also of tending to
harbour sentiments of allegiance to the worldwide umma. In a climate
of heightened suspicion towards Muslims, such links, real or imagin-
ary, with a global ‘imagined community’ (in Benedict Anderson’s
sense) can only add fuel to the fire. When Muslims demonstrated in
New Zealand against the US-led coalition’s intervention in Afghanistan
and Iraq, some people misunderstood this as a lack of commitment to
their country of residence, regardless of the fact that a large body of op-
position existed in the general (and non-immigrant) population.
In New Zealand, the original Muslim immigrants came mainly from
South Asia (including Fiji Indians) and seem to have been willing to
adapt rapidly and to not challenge the dominant system. Thus, their
brand of Islam could fairly easily exist in a grey zone of laissez-faire tol-
erance. With increasing Muslim immigration in recent years, the situa-
tion is changing. The present Muslim minority is of a highly complex
composition, deriving from about 35 to 40 different countries including
a wide sweep of countries in the Middle East, Maghreb, sub-Saharan
Africa, Afghanistan, South and Southeast Asia. Many of these adhere
to a more conservative or traditionalist version of Islam. As Muslim
numbers increase, so do demands that the dominant or host society ac-
knowledge their religious needs. Asserting a Muslim identity more
openly, initiatives increase which demand that the New Zealand state
and society create the necessary spaces for it to be able to unfold more
fully – which in turn has a propensity to draw unfavourable attention
from the wider society.
Contrary to public perception, Muslims in New Zealand, as every-
where else in the Western world, do not form one monolithic bloc of
great inner cohesion joined by a sense of mutual solidarity. Being eth-
nically heterogenous and divided by sectarian differences, the Muslim
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community internally is subject to tensions, creating internal rifts
which not only engender an impediment to the formation of an effec-
tive political front, but also create a spill-over effect in which internal
differences and problems come to public awareness and create strongly
negative impressions. Doctrinal divisions in Sunni and Shia, Miladis
and anti-Miladis,21 linguistic and ethnic differences between South
Asians and Arab and African Muslims, and the like create problems of
practical solidarity and prevent the formation of a cohesive, internally
supportive community. With increasing numbers, mounting hetero-
doxy and ethnic-cultural complexity, there comes, as the European ex-
ample shows, a characteristic minority profile that shows a split into
two factions: adaptationists and the more conservatively and funda-
mentalistically inclined who are unwilling to make concessions in their
religious belief and observance to fit in better with the host society.
As elsewhere in the West, Muslim initiatives are increasing in New
Zealand to have religious needs better recognised in the public do-
main. Cases in which Islamic law challenges the host society’s conven-
tions do appear in public now.22 As a consequence of ethnic diversity,
occasionally differences among Muslims come to the surface, indicat-
ing a widening bifurcation between ‘hard-liners’ and adaptationists.
Such an indication was vented publicly, for instance, when a Muslim
organisation challenged the correctness of halal slaughter methods in
the meat industry (one of the major export revenue earners of the
country). Halal slaughter and processing in the meat industry are su-
pervised and sanctioned by the national Muslim umbrella organisation
FIANZ23, which is dominated by adaptationists. An openly aired chal-
lenge of this kind could potentially have very damaging economic ef-
fects on a nationally very important industry, which in turn invites ac-
cusations of Muslims showing a lack of loyalty to the country. Another
publicly vented difficulty was the accusation raised by some Muslims
against some regional representatives who were trying to involve the Is-
lamic charity organisation al Haramain, which is suspected to have al-
Qaeda links. Yet another indicator of internal conflict was, for instance,
the accusation, launched in the press from Muslim sources, that a re-
gional association is advising Muslims to beat their wives or that fun-
damentalists are on the rise and have a sinister agenda of enforcing
the harsh laws of the sharia, such as stoning as a fit punishment for
adultery and homosexuality. Such episodes hint at inner-Muslim ten-
sions, which arrive with increasing complexity and ethnic and sectarian
plurality. They have the effect, however, of feeding the wider society’s
growing wariness of Islam.
A majority of New Zealand’s Muslims seem to have a pragmatic atti-
tude.24 For most, in my experience, practical adaptation does not pose
a philosophical problem at all; others who may be more theologically
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inclined have cited darura, necessity, as an all-encompassing reason ex-
cusing them from a very stringent interpretation of sharia.25 In their
view for the sake of economic betterment, education, as well as being
allowed to practice religion unhindered, it is permissible to live in a se-
cularist, non-Muslim society. The requirement to practice hijra, i.e. to
leave infidel rule and migrate to a Muslim country, does not appear to
be an issue of conscience. Few in fact seem to perceive of a theological
need to justify their presence.26 However, through a series of terrorist
incidents overseas, the Muslim minority is attracting public attention
and is tarnished with the same brush. Together with an increasing
stereotyping of Islam as an inherently dangerous religion and of Mus-
lims as fanatics, this has the effect of fuelling negative perceptions in
the wider society.
Rising Islamophobia
In Europe the perception of radical cultural alterity was for centuries
mainly focussed on Islam, bringing with it the misconceptions and
prejudicial notions of Islam and negative-stereotypical views of Mus-
lims.27 In New Zealand due to geographic realities, this was not the
case. The small number of Muslims of South Asian extraction may
even have enjoyed some paternalistic benevolence as fellow Common-
wealth people. For the most part their presence was simply overlooked
because of their small number, aided by the absence of a strong drive
on their part to assert their cultural and religious specialness. Xeno-
phobic projections about the presence of a dangerous cultural Other
were focussed on the Chinese, who tended to come into the country in
somewhat greater numbers. Bringing with them a radically different
culture, and being physically distinct and therefore easily identifiable,
they became ready targets of prejudice and discrimination.
Muslim minority groups, now firmly embedded in the West – in
New Zealand as much as elsewhere – are afflicted with two stigmas.
Nowadays, it is not only a sense of cultural incompatibility that lifts
Muslims out in the West’s consciousness, but also a suspicion about
the potentially subversive and dangerous nature of their presence.
Nourished by the myth of a clash of civilisations and gross stereotypes
that all Muslims have a propensity towards violent fundamentalism,
the level of suspicion towards Islam and Muslims has sharply risen:
what Cesari (2004: 35) calls the ‘bin Laden effect’. It seamlessly con-
tinues the ‘reservoir of negative images associated with Islam and Mus-
lims in “the Collective Unconscious” of the West’ (Hassan 1996: 368).
It is hardly surprising, Hassan writes, ‘that, since the demise of the So-
viet Empire, “the World of Islam” is being seen as the new “Enemy”
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which is perhaps even more incomprehensible and intractable than the
last one’. This has led to ‘the routine portrayal of Islam as a religion
spread by the sword and characterized by “Holy War” and of Muslims
as barbarous and backward, frenzied and fanatic, volatile and violent’.
No doubt there is justification in seeing a seamless continuum in atti-
tude from early religiously construed forms of Orientalism to the im-
age of Islam as global political enemy of the West in the post-Soviet
era. At first, it was based mainly on the anti-American expressions of
the Iranian Islamic revolution, but now it is vastly exacerbated by an
image of the jihad-crazed enemy of the post-9/11 era.
It cannot be a surprise that, increasingly, Western democratic civil
rights-based discourses, grounded in the globalised human rights
ideology, after having gained much traction in recent years, now have
to defend themselves against discriminative discourses damaging to
the gains just made. The powerful and increasingly popular argument
of national security demands sacrifices in terms of diminished civil lib-
erties not only for Muslims, but for all citizens. New Zealand is no ex-
ception. The events of 9/11 for New Zealanders may have been a first
step towards practical Islamophobia, but its impact was heightened
then by subsequent terror attacks.28 Politicians of minor political par-
ties began to speak out against Muslim immigration, against hosting
large numbers of Muslim asylum seekers, and warning against the
dangers of ending up harbouring a large Muslim minority. The theme
of ‘jihadis under the bed’ for the time being is still counterbalanced by
positive themes of successful integration.29 However, acts of violence
against Muslims and their property and verbal attacks against indivi-
duals have certainly increased but still remain proportionally rare
events of individual thuggery. After the London attacks, several mos-
ques were smeared with graffiti and windows smashed, women were
attacked and the like, but the damage was inflicted by only a few indivi-
duals, most of whom were promptly caught and convicted. Also, hate
mail sent to Muslims appears to have largely been isolated incidents.
Apart from occasional exceptions in the print or electronic media (in
the form of television commentaries, a very few talk shows known for
the host’s anti-Islamic tendency30, etc.), the media have by and large re-
tained a neutral stance. The exception was a television programme in
July 2005, which portrayed Islam as a sinister force arising in the form
of fundamentalism in New Zealand. Quite incorrectly, intolerant as-
pects of Islam towards adultery and homosexuality were blown up out
of proportion to underline the supposedly anti-liberal character of fun-
damentalism.31 At several points concerns were raised that ‘fundamen-
talist’ preachers had visited the country’s Muslim communities and
could spread their hateful message unhindered.32 However, sugges-
tions to introduce ‘hate speech’ legislation, so as to curb hateful Islamic
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teaching, were rejected by the government by recourse to the freedom
of expression.33
Thus, in the Islamophobic discourse the spectre of a new identity
emerges, the identity of ‘the dangerous (would-be) citizen’ or the ‘anti-
citizen’, a category of people whose presence bears within itself poten-
tial dangers and calls for vigilance. This conjures up visions of war and
crisis situations in which citizens, simply on the basis of their national
origin or ethnicity, come under suspicion – which sometimes seems to
justify harsh recriminatory action by the state.
Four major themes emerge in the Islamophobic discourse: doubts
about the potential of Islam to assimilate to (representative and elector-
al) democracy, its apparently misogynistic gender relations, its pre-
sumed religious intolerance (i.e. the Islamic attitudes towards apostasy
and blasphemy and its treatment of non-Muslim religionists), and its
alleged inclination toward jihad-intoxicated fanaticism. And of course
another ingredient is the perceived medievalism of Islam and its inabil-
ity to reform or modernise itself. Symbolic constructions about Islam,
based on poorly understood facts, come to be instrumental in exagger-
ating the adversarial potential of this religion; and in this form may as-
sume disproportional importance in the political discourse. Billig
(1995) shows how nationalist symbols in our surroundings are so com-
mon and prosaic that they largely pass unnoticed and become uncon-
sciously absorbed. Equally, anti-Islamic notions focused on Islam’s an-
tagonist capacity and re-enforced by negative stereotypes may become
tied in with nationalist rhetoric and symbolisms to the extent that na-
tional security, and even the preservation of a national identity, may be-
come anathema to the acceptance of Muslims.34
National security and the Islamic threat
Instruments of multiculturalism, cultural pluralism and human rights
are now beginning to be infringed upon and pushed aside by legal in-
struments designed to protect national security. The main threat inevi-
tably is seen to emanate from Islam in some form: this may be the in-
tolerance of Muslims vis-a`-vis others which may be thought to disturb
the social peace internally or more specifically the threat of Islamic ter-
rorism. Many nations now have so-called anti-terrorist legislation on
their statute books, much of it hastily drafted at the behest from the
USA.35 New Zealand has the ‘Terrorism Suppression Act 2002’ and
‘Terrorism Amendment Act 2003’. These Acts designate a number of
organisations and named individuals as terrorist.36 The government
declares that under international law it is obligated to give effect to UN
resolutions against terrorism, including taking steps to prevent terror-
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ist financing, recruiting or other forms of support. New Zealand con-
siders itself further obligated to apply these measures against specific
entities listed by the UN Security Council as being associated with the
Taleban or Al-Qaeda network. The police coordinates requests to the
prime minister for designation as terrorist entity, which is then an-
nounced in the New Zealand Gazette.
A further amendment to the Terrorist Suppression Act 2002 is be-
fore parliament at the time of writing. Some politicians37 have warned
that, if enacted, among some detrimental innovations, it is capable of
criminalising liberation movements. Under its aegis, agitation to end
apartheid, for example, would have been labelled terrorist. It brings
home the age-old adage that someone’s terrorist is someone else’s free-
dom fighter.38
Symptomatic for the volatile combination of Islamophobia and a de-
mand for strengthened national security, there has been a debate in
New Zealand newspapers about whether Al-Qaeda has investigated the
potential of this country to serve as a safe haven for terrorists. This is a
veiled charge that security is lax in this country and needs to be
boosted. Speculations have been raised that Al-Qaeda’s no.2 man Ay-
man Al Zawahri visited New Zealand in the 1990s to explore the situa-
tion. The immigration debate has also heated up since in May 2005 an
opposition politician embarrassed the government by revealing the po-
litically dubious background of some would-be immigrants from the Is-
lamic world who are already residing in New Zealand. 39 Through over-
simplification and generalisation, these accusations managed to add
fuel to anti-Muslim sentiments.
While public and political discourses show occasional signs of Isla-
mophobia, state and government remain neutral and even benevolent
(for instance, through interfaith support; immigration and visa laws do
not discriminate against Muslims). However, somewhat paradoxical is
the stance in a few cases taken by the government in matters concern-
ing Muslims. They are unsettling in the sense that transparency of the
legal process may be set aside in the interest of national security.40
In a somewhat self-congratulatory manner, New Zealand’s human
rights record has often been called exemplary, not least owing to the
current government’s favouring many initiatives that champion human
rights causes and legislation, both nationally and internationally41. It
makes concerted efforts to ‘liberalise’ New Zealand society, advance
gender equality, create multi-ethnic harmony, promote interfaith dialo-
gue, and enhance the civil liberties of sexual and cultural minorities.
Yet it has been zealous in its pursuit of the case against the Algerian
Islamist Ahmed Zaoui,42 who was accused of representing a terrorist
threat to the country.43 Despite a relatively liberal policy of providing a
haven for refugees and asylum seekers of all kinds under the aegis of
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international human rights conventions, in the name of national secur-
ity and in contravention of human rights standards, the state and gov-
ernment have insisted on exhausting all possible juridical means to en-
gineer Zaoui’s imprisonment with a view toward his eventual expul-
sion. This case creates the distinct perception, nationally and
internationally, that he is singled out because of his Islamist back-
ground.44
It stands to reason that Zaoui is the first identifiable victim of a
growing national stance that connects security issues with Islamopho-
bia. A former Algerian cleric and politician Zaoui became a cause ce´le`-
bre, rallying the defenders of civil liberties and rights of refugees
against those arguing for caution and the primacy of national and in-
ternational security interests over human rights considerations. Zaoui,
a religious scholar who had been democratically elected in 1991 to the
Algerian parliament as a delegate of FIS (Front Islamique Salut), ar-
rived in New Zealand from Malaysia in December 2002. Having tried
during the voyage to destroy a false South African passport, upon arri-
val he claimed refugee status under international law. However, de-
clared a threat to national security, he was arrested at the airport and
imprisoned on suspicion of having a terrorist background. Subse-
quently, a security risk certificate was issued against him by the Secur-
ity Intelligence Service (SIS). He was held without charge, despite the
fact that in August 2003, the Refugee Status Appeals Authority granted
him refugee status. Through secret dossiers, their contents never re-
vealed, received from European and, one presumes, Algerian security
sources, the New Zealand government took advice about his allegedly
dangerous background and sinister intentions.
Concrete charges against him were not publicly disclosed, not even
to the court of law hearing his appeal for release, nor to his defence
lawyers. Acting on the secret and privileged information, he was held
imprisoned until the Supreme Court, despite Crown opposition, or-
dered his release on bail, in December 2004, after two years of deten-
tion – part of it in solitary confinement. An appeal by the government
is pending before the Appeal Court about the right to deport him.
Hence Zaoui’s future remains uncertain. In April 2005 the Inspector-
General of Intelligence created a position called ‘special advocate’ to ac-
cess and examine the SIS evidence held against Zaoui. Applauded by
constitutional lawyers for making the case fairer, it is still not an ideal
situation inasmuch as the substance of charges against him will not be
made public. Meanwhile Zaoui has been released on bail and is staying
with the Catholic order of Dominican friars.45
In this case, even when it was before the courts, surprisingly all the
public could surmise was that Zaoui had apparently been accused by
overseas intelligence sources of involvement in terrorist activities or of
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association with terrorist groups and interests. Zaoui denies these
charges vehemently, maintaining that he was never a member of GIA
(Groupement Islamique Arme; Al- Jammah al-Islamiah al-Musallah),
by some accounts a radical splinter of FIS (Front Islamique Salut), the
party he represented in parliament. GIA pursues a violent jihadist agen-
da since it split off from FIS after the Algerian government suppressed
the Islamic party. There can be little doubt that Zaoui is an Islamist
whose engagement with Algerian politics was aimed at bringing about
an Islamic state, presumably based on the sharia. But the evidence
available to the general public only suggests that as a democratically
elected parliamentarian he intended to use legitimate democratic
means to achieve this end and that simply for that reason he fell foul
of the autocratic military regime in Algeria. There is no evidence in the
public domain that would suggest that he ever subscribed to a violent
Machiavellian, or jihadist, view or himself engaged in such activities.
Zaoui’s fate is a case in point of the increasing infringement of so-
called security needs on human rights and civil liberty discourses; and
of security needs setting aside the normal rule of law. Quite blatantly,
the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security, who oversees the ac-
tivities of the SIS, argued at the time that in issuing the certificate of
risk, he does not have to take Zaoui’s human rights into account, nor
does he have to consider whether Zaoui faces persecution overseas.46
In a counter-move the Court of Appeal issued an opinion that in extra-
ditions, the human rights situation in the country to which a person
gets extradited has to be taken into account. In 2004, in a Supreme
Court hearing, the Solicitor-General confirmed that despite the security
risk posed by Zaoui, he would not be extradited to a country where he
would suffer persecution in contravention of the Convention against
Torture. But this did not constitute a decisive win for the pro-Zaoui lob-
by. The heavy hand of security interests continues to dominate the si-
tuation: for security reasons the grounds on which the certificate of
risk had been issued, it was claimed, could not be revealed or the evi-
dence be made publicly available, nor could it be made available to
Zaoui’s defence lawyers. The reliability or otherwise of this evidence
thus cannot be scrutinised independently or discussed beyond privi-
leged intelligence circles. Hence, the rationale for his detention, in vio-
lation of a basic democratic right, remained obscure beyond the vague
explanation of the state having good reason – or at least well justified
suspicions about his (presumed) terrorist connections – for detaining
him. As this is not a paper on the juridical aspects of this course of ac-
tion or to what extent of severity it may have violated Zaoui’s human
rights or his rights as a refugee, we shall not enter further into this de-
bate. But it clearly does raise questions about whether anti-terrorist leg-
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islation entitles, or should entitle, a Rechtsstaat to act in this way, and
whether this is excusable in the interest of protecting its citizens.
It seems that open discourse on such questions is being thwarted
and stifled even in Western liberal democracies, in the interest of na-
tional security; there seems to be a radicalisation of this discourse
drawing the concept of what constitutes terrorist threat ever wider and
making it more inclusive. Perhaps understandably, the state apparatus
does not want to be found remiss in protecting the citizenry by being
lax in its attention, as there appears to be now a convergence between
the historical wholesale denigration of Islam in a climate of Oriental-
ism and the present-day wholesale suspicion of all Muslims as poten-
tial terrorists and sympathisers.47
Some perceived of the government’s role in imprisoning Zaoui as
pandering to America’s exaggerated security needs and bending to sus-
pect intelligence efforts of other countries – and in the process tram-
pling on his rights under international laws as a bona fide refugee.
Others, obviously suspecting him to be a Trojan horse of jihad in New
Zealand, demanded his immediate expulsion from New Zealand. This
debate showed the widening dichotomy of the human rights spirit and
a liberal sense of multiculturalism on one side versus a combination of
Islamophobia and a heightened perception of the need of being vigi-
lant on the other. Some politicians, expressing no doubt the sentiments
of a sector of the population, used this case to voice misgivings about
Muslim immigration, opine on the incompatibility of Muslims and
even Islam itself with Western culture, and condemn Islam’s tradition
of disregarding civil liberties. This seems to replicate the European si-
tuation, though in a much more subdued sense, where politicians in
defending liberal core values have argued against Muslim immigration
because through their rising numbers Muslims might endanger the
liberal climate in modern Western society or might bring about un-
wanted changes in the national character, or might pose an outright se-
curity risk. Some couch this opinion in terms of Islamic culture and re-
ligion being inferior and are not shy in expressing this supremacist
view, knowing that their words would find a receptive audience among
voters. While the latter view is simply a newer, post-colonial version of
Orientalism, albeit not as crude as earlier notions, it offers an interest-
ing moral contradiction. In advocating the abrogation of civil liberties
and rights of some to preserve the rights of others, it damages the core
values of Western liberal democracies. On a more useful level it is apt
to point to the intricate and complex problems of multiculturalism.
The ‘Muslim problem’ not only obliquely points to the potential for
future conflict, it even more seriously represents a challenge that all
liberal democracies of the Western world are now facing: struggling in
the face of Muslim extremism – and the resultant hostile stereotyping
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of Muslims and demonisation of Islam – and demands to tighten na-
tional security, to preserve their ideals of civil liberty and multicultural
tolerance. In this dilemma the transparency of the legal process seems
to suffer. Western countries now have to come to grips with the press-
ing need of preserving core values of freedom of speech and belief, hu-
manitarianism towards asylum seekers, upholding the human right of
open and fair trial, all of which so far have been considered the corner-
stones of a modern, free and democratic society.
Addendum
The Terrorism Suppression Amendment Act 2007 was passed in No-
vember of that year. Ahmed Zaoui’s risk certificate was withdrawn on
13 September 2007 and he is free to stay as a refugee.
Notes
1 The original paper in abbreviated form was presented at ICAS 4, Shanghai, in Au-
gust 2005. Participation was supported by grants from the Asian Studies Research
Centre and the School of Social Sciences of Otago University. Research on which this
paper is based was conducted in New Zealand and Western Europe over several
years, partially supported by Otago University grants and through sabbatical leave.
2 ‘Asians’ (mainly Chinese ethnics, Koreans, Indians) too are subjected to critical com-
ments about their impact on national identity, but this bears no connection with se-
curity issues.
3 See, for instance, Allen (2004).
4 I surmise that the second Bali bombing (2005), the Beslan tragedy (2004), the Aus-
tralian embassy attack in Jakarta (2004) and numerous attacks in countries like Phi-
lippines, Saudi Arabia, etc. had only some minor effect in terms of deepening further
suspicion via-a`-vis Muslims.
5 The state-organised census, every five years, does not make it mandatory to declare
one’s religious affiliation.
6 Maori are the descendants of the indigenous, pre-European population of New Zeal-
and. The term Pakeha refers mainly to the descendants of ‘white’, European settlers.
7 ‘Cultural racism’ refers to the argument about the insurmountability of cultural dif-
ference which has replaced the thoroughly discredited biological race debate (see, for
example, Modood 2005). However, the concept of ‘cultural racism’ needs to be used
judiciously, for if it is put forward too vigorously it is detrimental to reasoned debate.
By attaching to it the label ‘racist’, it has the unfortunate tendency to stifle the debate
about cultural difference and threatens to suffocate a seminal discussion of multicul-
turalism.
8 In 2007, an attempt by police to indict a few Maori and Pakeha ‘rebels’ under the
Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 resulted in utter failure. The Act turned out, accord-
ing to informed opinion, to have been tailored for the specific purpose of thwarting
organised Islamic terror.
9 I am referring to Samuel Huntington’s argument (1996) that a major fault line runs
between the West and the Islamic World and bodes for a calamitous showdown.
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10 While examples of lack of tolerance and equality vis-a`-vis minorities could be enum-
erated ad infinitum, Unni Wikan (2002) describes the exact opposite, a Norwegian
case where human rights and a citizen’s right to protection by the state are ignored
for the sake of observing cultural rights.
11 Current immigration policy in New Zealand selects in accordance with language pro-
ficiency and targets desirable skills obviously with a view of facilitating integration.
Gaining citizenship is associated with swearing an oath of fealty (which Muslims can
swear on the Qur’an), or an affirmation of allegiance to the British Crown and the
nation, but requires no proof of an assimilatory effort (such as the citizenship tests
in some countries).
12 See, for instance, Poulter (1998).
13 The New Zealand state provides ‘pluralistic liberty’, i.e. indifference and neutrality to-
wards religion and non-religion alike (see van der Vyver 1996: XIX).
14 The Statement on Religious Diversity [in New Zealand]1991-2006 gives declared
Christians as demographically declining, but still by far the largest category hovering
between 2 million to 2.5 million. The ‘no religion’ category is rising noticeably from
below one million to approaching 1.5 million now. Other major religions also show a
rising tendency, but are far behind at around 200,000.
15 Olivier Roy suggests that Western Muslims should be simply regarded as a Western
faith community, not as bearers of an alien culture (interview with O. Roy www.qan-
tara.de; accessed 27/4/08.) This seems to miss the point that following this religion
to the letter (i.e. following a conservative theological course in social conduct) poses
some adaptive problems in Western society.
16 Muslims are numerically surpassed by Hindus, who are nearly twice as numerous,
and Buddhists (2006 Census: 63,500 and 52,000, respectively). There is also no re-
striction on sectarian activity – so-called cults – as long as they do not come in direct
conflict with the criminal law code.
17 With the exception of Sikhs. Their conspicuous head dress is often taken by the un-
educated as Islamic.
18 To use Muslims/Islam for political mobilisation in the West is not unusual and goes
back to pre-9/11 days (see Vertovec and Peach 1997: 4).
19 As some like to point out, there is a resistant ingredient in Islam which opposes it to
the homogenising force of Western culture and basically causes an incompatibility
between the two. (This is the familiar argument of many anti-Muslim and anti-immi-
gration parties and interest groups.) In a related sense Ernest Gellner’s (1994) argu-
ment of the imperviousness of Islam to secularisation is also relevant here.
20 For example, by such scriptural references as ‘You are the best community raised up
for the benefit of humankind’ (Qur’an 3/110).
21 Those who celebrate the Prophet’s birthday and those who refuse to do so as in their
minds it constitutes illicit worship of a mortal and violates the doctrine of the indivi-
sibility of Allah, the tawhid.
22 For instance, the ‘burqa case’ of 2004-5, in which two Muslim witnesses refused to
unveil before the Auckland district court (see Kolig 2006a).
23 The Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand, which acts as the national
umbrella for several regional organisations, is dominated by Muslims of South Asian
extraction.
24 For a discussion of Muslim integration in New Zealand, see Kolig 2006b.
25 See, for example, An-na’im (1996: 346).
26 For instance, by recourse to a mediating concept such as Dar al Suhl, Dar al Ahd or
Dar al Aman; concepts about an ideologically neutral realm that allows Muslims and
‘infidels’ to live together in peace.
27 Edward Said’s ‘Orientalism’ (1978).
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28 Especially the Bali bombing of October 2002 (in which three New Zealanders died)
and then again the London attacks in July 2005 (in which also a New Zealander
died). In this case the main catalyst of empathy was probably the old colonial ties to
the ‘motherland’.
29 For instance, the reportage about some Afghan refugees from the Tampa, who were
shown being grateful for the humanitarianism received from New Zealand as well as
being successfully integrated migrants. The so-called Tampa affair – when New Zeal-
and took in Afghan refugees rejected by Australia on the principle that these were il-
licit would-be immigrants and ‘queue-jumpers’ – attracted world-wide attention. (Ka-
bir 2005: 295-305; Kolig 2003: 33-34)
30 Characteristically, Muslims also take emphatic pro-Israel statements as inherently
anti-Muslim. The basis for this attitude most probably lies in a sense of pan-Muslim
solidarity, causing the umma (the global Muslim community) generally to feel em-
pathetically for the co-religionist Palestinians.
31 TV 3 ‘60 mins’ 4 July 2005. This programme portrayed what was called Islamic fun-
damentalism as a sinister and dangerous force rising in New Zealand society, threa-
tening to overwhelm New Zealand with hateful and intolerant practices such as ston-
ing homosexuals to death and reducing women to second-class citizens. Some Mus-
lims had been ‘co-opted’ into confirming in various ways this rather scare-mongering
agenda. (See the daily newspaper Otago Daily Times 13 July 2005, p.15.)
32 The latest offering of this kind is an article in the journal InvestigateMagazine (7/74)
of March 2007 (Ian Wishart, ‘Preachers of Hate’). Under stirring subtitles of Al-
Qa’ida’s men in New Zealand’ and Helen [Clark, Prime Minister] hoodwinked by
preachers of hate’, it presents a litany of overseas Islamic preachers with allegedly ra-
dical credentials who have been invited on speaking tours to New Zealand and could
spread their message unhindered.
33 ‘Anti-hate legislation’ may have been used to curb expressions of Muslim extremism
such as the propagation of violent jihad in mosques, making anti-democratic, anti-
government or anti-Western statements, or preaching homophobia by attacking sex-
ual liberalisation and demanding the death sentence for homosexuality and adultery.
But it may also have given Muslims the opportunity to act against expressions of an-
tagonism towards them. However, enacting ‘hate-speech’ legislation has so far been
rejected by the New Zealand government, arguing that as long as it remains just
‘speech’, it is protected by the right of freedom of expression, and if translated into
action, ‘incitement to violence’ is already punishable under criminal law.
34 In 2008 during ANZAC day celebrations (commemorating the military cooperation
between New Zealand and Australia during several wars), a speech by a military lea-
der (Air Commodore Moore) reportedly touched on present-day security provided by
the miliary in its fight against radical Islam. ANZAC celebrations are deeply patriotic
and emotional events. The speech thus established a negative link of nationalism
and patriotism with Islam.
35 The ‘Patriot Act’ of the US, which sets a precedent for a highly invasive surveillance
method over citizens, infringes on civil rights and privacy under the rubric of ‘coun-
tering a threat to national security’. The UK has the ‘Anti-terrorism and Security Act
2001’ with roughly similar powers.
36 www.legislation.govt.nz. Interestingly, it lists only organisations and persons linked
with either Taleban or Al-Qaeda. There is no mention of IRA, ETA, and others.
37 In particular, a member of parliament of the Green Party (who is the party’s human
rights spokesperson) in a widely publicised message in April 2007.
38 This dilemma is exemplified also by the metamorphosis of some violent extremist
groups into a parliamentary party (Maoists in Nepal) or their elevation to government
through democratic election (Hamas in Gaza). Shifting and highly subjective percep-
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tions account for the countless cases of guerillas fighting against foreign occupation
or domestic oppression (regarded by some as entirely legitimate at the time) and in
the process changing from criminals to respectable liberators and eventually to legiti-
mate political parties and governments (for example, Mugabe’s Zanu-PF party in
Simbabwe, the African National Congress in South Africa, the MauMau in Kenya,
etc.).
39 This campaign was specifically directed against Iraqis. When in May 2005 an Iraqi
immigrant complained to a television channel about what he saw as unfair reporting,
he received in reply from this channel an email message that he should watch out
for bombs under his car.
40 For instance, when three Middle Eastern men applied for visas in order to learn to
fly at a New Zealand institute of technology, they were refused without any reasons
given (television news TV3, ‘late news’, 1 May 2008).
41 At the time of writing the Human Rights Commission had just developed an ‘Action
Plan’ which among several things proposes to take ‘steps to achieve harmonious rela-
tions among New Zealand’s diverse communities’, ‘steps to strengthen … cultural
rights’, and ‘a commitment to ensure the legal framework fully protects human
rights’.
42 A more detailed description of the case in the context of asylum policies can be
found in Lafraie (2006).
43 In another interpretation of this case, the reason for his treatment is not that authori-
ties believe that he is a terrorist threat to the country, but rather they fear that New
Zealand may appear internationally as ‘a soft touch’. Zaoui had previously been extra-
dited from several European countries and, given that this case has gained interna-
tional attention, New Zealand does not wish to appear that it applies asylum stan-
dards more generously or leniently than other Western countries.
44 I define Islamism as an Islamic orientation which sees religion and politics as inse-
parable (din wa daulah), desires to implement the shari’a as state law, and aspires to
the creation of an Islamic theocratical state.
45 While this is a significant gesture of interfaith solidarity, the impression of goodwill
has been dampened by the fact that Zaoui’s main Dominican mentor has been ar-
rested on charges of ideologically motivated vandalism. As a member of the Christian
pressure group ‘ANZAC Ploughshares’ (peace activists) he, together with two others,
(in April 2008) broke into the satellite communications monitoring facility (popularly
called electronic ‘spy facility’) of Waihopai, which is used in the war on terrorism,
and inflicted significant damage to the installation. It triggered the ‘aha’ response:
one extremist sheltering another one!
46 In June 2005 the Supreme Court re-affirmed the Inspector General’s position, and
determined that possible extradition lies in the hands of the minister of immigration
who should take human rights issues into account. (This makes the case a matter of
political decision and not legal determination.) Deportation to Algeria may theoreti-
cally not be possible under the United Nations Refugee Convention as his life must
be considered to be in danger there.
47 By comparison with its neighbour Australia, New Zealand has so far managed to re-
tain a moderate perspective on the issue of its Muslim minority (see Kolig and Kabir
2008). No armed raids have as yet been conducted on Muslim homes or Islamic cen-
tres. For example, a British Muslim preacher with a reputation – deservedly or unde-
servedly – for radicalism was allowed to visit the country on a speaking tour in Au-
gust 2005, while he was denied even a one-hour stop-over in Australia en route from
Europe.
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